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Plato.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝ

PLATO'S

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES, CRITO, AND PHÆDO,

FROM THE TEXT OF BEKKER;

WITH

THE LATIN VERSION OF FICINUS;

AND

NOTES

BY

CHARLES STUART STANFORD, A. M.,

LATE SCHOLAR OF TRINITY COLLEGE.

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TO

BARTHOLOMEW LLOYD, D. D.,

PROVOST OF TRINITY COLLEGE.

DEAR SIR,

I beg leave to dedicate to you the following work, with the hope that it may not be found, in its execution, unworthy of the sanction with which you favored the design.

I desire to avail myself of this opportunity to express my grateful sense of your unvaried personal kindness, and to record my individual concurrence in the general estimation of the energy and ability which you have so successfully devoted to the improvement of the interests, and advancement of the character of the University over which you preside.

I remain, Dear Sir,

With great Respect,

Most faithfully yours,

CHARLES STUART STANFORD.

18, COLLEGE.

PREFACE.

THE Apology, Crito, and Phædo have been arranged in their present order, with the intention of affording a connected view of the conduct of Socrates at the periods, and with the attendant circumstances, which they were composed to commemorate, and which include the defence of the philosopher before his judges; his opinions and demeanour in prison, subsequent to his condemnation, with a detail of the important topics which engrossed his attention and discourse upon the day of his decease. Of these selections, it is hard to say whether the subject is more interesting, or the style more fascinating, partaking, as they do, of the leading characteristic of their great author's skill, and combining, as has been justly remarked of Plato's writings, the sublime of simplicity, with all that is beautiful in fancy and profound in thought.

From the commencement of the Apology, to the closing scene in the Phædo, may be considered as a

though far from elegant, or in any degree suitable to the original either in spirit or strength.

For the use of the new fount of Greek type in the University Press, the Editor begs to acknowledge his obligations to the Provost, by whom it was kindly allowed.

18, TRINITY COLLEGE,
Oct. 20th, 1834.

PROLEGOMENA.

SOME ACCOUNT

OF

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS

OF

PLATO.[a]

PLATO[b] was born of Athenian parents, Aristo and Perictione, in the island of Ægina, where his father resided after it had become subject to Athens. The time of his birth is generally fixed in the third or fourth year of the 87th Olympiad, 430 or 429 B. C.[c] On his father's side his origin is traced to Codrus, and on his mother's through five generations to the family of Solon. In early life[d] he

[a] Compiled principally from Enfield's History of Philosophy; Stanley's History of Philosophy, folio, 1687; Tennenann's Manual of Philosophy; the Encyclop. Metropol. Art. Plato; J. A. Fabric. Dissert. de Plat. ejusque Scriptis, &c.; and Biographie Universelle, Ancienne et Moderne. Paris, 1823.

[b] His real name was Aristocles: the various conjectures as to the cause of its having been changed, Brucker looks upon as uncertain and vague.

[c] According to Corsin. and Fabric. on the 7th of Thargelion, 430 B. C. in the third year of the 87th Olymp.; according to Dodwell a year later; to Dacier, in the first of the 88th Olymp., upon the authority of Diog. Laert. But the first date assigned, besides being in accordance with other circumstances, is supported by a paramount authority, Athen. Deipnosoph. l. v. A. 13.

[d] The birth of Plato is said to have been accompanied by a number of prodigies, which doubtless owed their origin to the subsequent development of his character

devoted himself with great assiduity to the study of poetry, in which, as in the sister arts of music and painting, he made such progress as might be expected from a vivid imagination, exquisite sensibility, and a richly cultivated taste. His efforts in lyric, epic, and dramatic composition were far from unsuccessful, but with a modest distrust of his own poetical powers he committed an epic of some length to the flames upon his perusing the Iliad of Homer, and destroyed an elaborate effusion of his tragic muse[a] upon hearing a discourse of Socrates, which prevailed in awakening his feelings to a sense of a more sublime and important pursuit.

It is probable, that Plato received the first rudiments of his philosophical education from Cratylus and Hermogenes, who inculcated the systems of Heraclitus and Parmenides.[b] At the age of twenty years he became a disciple of Socrates, and continued with him for eight years,[c] till that great and amiable philosopher fell a sacrifice to the rancour of party, disguised under the pretext of zeal for the national religion. By the advice of Socrates he resigned his poetical studies for the graver investigation of philosophical truths, to which he also sacrificed his early inclinations towards a public life, from which he was further diverted by a feeling of disgust, arising from the perpetual changes which took place in his time in the government of Greece, from the corruptions of the democracy, and the moral depravity of his countrymen.

While under the guidance and instruction of Socrates, Plato not unfrequently occasioned uneasiness to his fellow disciples and to

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and attainments. Diogenes, Apuleius, Plutarch, and Lucian concur in the story of a swarm of bees having gathered round his cradle, and settled on his lips as he slept. This was not lost upon Cicero, de Divinat. lib. i. 36. "Platoni cum in cunis parvulo dormienti apes in labellis consedissent, responsum est, singulari illum suavitate orationis fore, ita futura eloquentia provisa in infante est." It was also reported of him that he was born of a virgin mother, and that Apollo himself had condescended to become his father.

[a] This was a dramatic piece which he had composed at the age of twenty. It consisted of three distinct tragedies and one comedy, forming what the ancients called a tetralogy. He destroyed it the very day before its intended exhibition, from the cause as above.

[b] Apuleius de Dogmat. Plat. Arist. Met. i. c. 6.

[c] Xenophon. Memorab. iii. 6.

Socrates himself, by engrafting upon the doctrine and precepts of the latter a class of opinions derived from sources totally distinct.[a] He never failed, however, in the zealous attachment, nor changed from the devoted veneration, which he justly regarded his master as eminently entitled to deserve. Plato attended during the trial of Socrates, was one of those who offered to speak in his defence, (though refused leave by the judges to proceed,) and to be bound as a security for the payment of the fine: he attended him during his imprisonment, and was present at the discourse which occupied the last moments of Socrates, on the Immortality of the Soul.[b]

It is supposed, with good reason, that during the life-time of Socrates, Plato had written the dialogues called the Lysis, Phædrus, the Banquet, and probably the Protagoras. Soon after the death of the philosopher, and the dispersion of his disciples, he withdrew to Megara, where he remained till the ferment subsided at Athens. During his sojourn there he is believed to have composed the Apology of Socrates, the Crito, and the Phædo, those affecting and beautiful dialogues which are so intimately connected with his master's history and its unhappy close.

At Megara he and the surviving friends of Socrates were hospitably entertained at the house of Euclid, under whom Plato studied the art of reasoning, and probably increased his natural zeal for disputation.

Anxious to obtain all the information which an acquaintance with the wisdom and learning, and an insight into the habits and manners of civilized countries could afford, he proceeded from Megara on a course of travels, and first visited that part of Italy called Magna Græcia, where he found the two philosophical schools of Heraclitus and Pythagoras, in direct opposition of system and

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[a] "The Memoirs of Socrates, written by Xenophon, afford a much more accurate idea of the opinions of Socrates and his manner of teaching, than the Dialogues of Plato, who every where mixes his own conceptions and diction, and those of other philosophers, with the ideas and language of his master. It is related that when Socrates heard Plato recite his Lysis, he said, "How much does this young man make me say which I never conceived." Enf. Phil. vol. i. b. 2. c. 4.

[b] Plato, however, for obvious reasons, denies this himself. See in Phæd. c. 2. and the conjecture of Forster in loc.

principle to each other; and in full repute and daily collision as, on the one hand, physical analysts and annihilators of existence, and as metaphysical realists and assertors of eternal relations on the other. Plato adopted the doctrines of Heraclitus as far as they related to physics, but was distinctly and decidedly opposed to the sceptical inferences by which those doctrines were accompanied as a necessary result. He embraced the notions of the Pythagoreans as to the permanence of essences, but he modified the doctrine considerably, by incorporating it with those notions of a moral system and an organizing Providence, which he had inherited from Socrates as part of the purer creed of Anaxagoras. In another important particular also he qualified the metaphysical system of Pythagoras: he considered the intellectual world as being in some degree embodied in the visible one. Instead of inferring, as the Pythagoreans had done, that things related were a semblance of the abstract relations, he thought that they participated in those relations.[a] Some other differences subsisted between his notions and those of the Pythagoreans, on the origin and nature of numbers, which are involved in considerable obscurities, and on which it would be impossible to enter here.

He next visited Cyrene, where he became the pupil of Theodorus, under whom he studied mathematics, and from hence he is said to have travelled into Egypt;[b] but there is no information which can be depended on, either as to the circumstances of his visit, or the length of his stay in that country. According to some accounts he assumed the character of a merchant, that he might travel with safety, and passed through the whole kingdom of Artaxerxes Mnemon as a seller of oil.[c] Others relate that he visited the priests there, and was initiated in their profoundest mysteries.[d]

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[a] Encyclop. Metropol. Art. Plat. Arist Metaph. l. i. c. 6. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μίμησιν τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν· Πλάτων δὲ μίθεξιν, τοὔνομα μεταβαλών· τὴν μὲν τοί γε μίθεξιν ἢ τὴν μίμησιν ἥτις ἂν εἴη τῶν εἰδῶν ἀφεῖσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν.

[b] Ancient writers vary so widely in their accounts of the life of Plato, that it is impossible to attempt to reconcile them. Diogenes Laertius asserts, that Plato visited Cyrene first, whence he proceeded to Italy, and from thence to Egypt.

[c] Diog. Laert.

[d] Apuleius. Plutarch.

But Plato himself speaks of the reserve maintained in Egypt towards strangers with regard to the peculiar institutions of the country, and asserts, that, so far from their mysteries being accessible to foreigners, "the animals of the Nile used to drive foreigners away by their meats, sacrifices, and rude proclamations."[a]

The most likely reason of his visit, besides general curiosity, is that stated by Cicero,[b] that he went for the purpose of completing his mathematical studies, and becoming acquainted with their astronomical systems. It must be attributed to the ignorance or vanity of the Alexandrians of a later period, that they insist upon Plato's having been indebted to the sages of Egypt for his earliest knowledge, and for those treasures of moral and political wisdom which he afterwards imparted to his countrymen. Plato's own authority is decisive on this point, which is to the effect, that though the abstract sciences were cultivated in Egypt with great success, the other liberal sciences were but indifferently attended to.[c]

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[a] De Legg. lib. xii. p. 953. E. It has been asserted that Pythagoras learned his cosmogony in Egypt; the doctrine of transmigration, and the immortality of the soul. But it is more likely that he adopted the latter from Socrates, and the former from Pythagoras. It is not probable that Plato, in the habit of a merchant, could obtain access to the sacred mysteries of Egypt; for when Pythagoras was introduced by the recommendation of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, to Amasis, king of Egypt, a great patron of all learned men, that he might the more easily obtain access to the colleges of the priests, the king himself could scarcely, with all his authority, prevail upon the priests to consent to the admission of a stranger, or to permit his being made acquainted with their mysterious rites. Herodot. l. ii. c. 172. Diodor. Sic. l. i. c. 2. Enf. Phil. b. ii. c. 12. s. 1.

[b] "Cum Plato Ægyptum peragravit ut a sacerdotibus barbaris numeros et cœlestia acciperet." de Fin. v. 29. upon which the author of the able and eloquent article in the Encyclop. Metropol. observes, that it is strange how this passage has been misinterpreted, and what latitude has been given to the term *cœlestia* here, even by some writers who were acquainted with another passage of Cicero, which is the best commentary on this, if indeed it stood in need of any. "Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis, et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerant, evocavisse philosophiam, et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis, omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quæreret: *cœlestia* autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret, vel si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum conferre."

[c] Cf. de Legg. lib. v. p. 746. B.

There are no better grounds, either, for supposing that during his residence in Egypt, Plato became acquainted with the doctrine of the Hebrews, and introduced into his own system the principles and precepts of their sacred books. This opinion has been eagerly maintained by several Jewish and Christian writers, but it has been satisfactorily proved to have had no other foundation than mere conjecture, and may be supposed to have originated in that zeal for the honour of revelation which would assign the Hebrew Scriptures or traditions as the source of all Gentile wisdom.[a]

On[b] his return to Greece,[c] richly stored with the philosophical treasures of distant countries, Plato settled in Athens, and took possession of a small house and garden, which he purchased for three thousand drachmas, adjoining the groves and grounds which had been bequeathed by Academus, or Ecademus, to the public, and as it would appear within one common enclosure. There Plato put in execution a design, in contemplation doubtless long before, of forming a new school for the instruction of youth in the principles of philosophy. In this delightful retreat, accordingly, which, from its situation and scenery, was admirably calculated to charm and tranquillize the mind, and which harmonized so well with the study of philosophy and the muses, he opened the academy, and placed above the door of his school, to testify his high sense of the importance of mathematics as a necessary step to higher speculations, the celebrated inscription,

ΟΥΔΕΙΣ ΑΓΕΩΜΕΤΡΗΤΟΣ ΕΙΣΙΤΩ.

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[a] Cf. Enf. Phil. b. ii. c. 8. s. 1. where this opinion is examined and refuted at length.

[b] The sources of Plato's philosophy have been ascertained with some degree of precision to be as follows: his Dialectics he borrowed from Euclid of Megara; the principles of natural philosophy he learned in the Eleatic school from Hermogenes and Cratylus; and combining these with the Pythagorean doctrine of natural causes, he framed from both his system of metaphysics. Mathematics and astronomy he was taught in the Cyrenaic school, and by the Egyptian priests. From Socrates he imbibed the pure principles of moral and political wisdom; but he afterwards obscured their simplicity by Pythagorean speculations. Enf. Phil.

[c] Ex Ægypto reversus Deliis exposuit sensum oraculi quod Græcos jussit aram, quæ in Delo erat, cubica ratione duplicare. J. A. Fabric. For an account of the

This new school soon obtained an extensive celebrity, to which the travels and reputation of Plato contributed not a little among his Socratic brethren. None of these had ventured to institute a school at Athens, except Aristippus, who had confined his instructions almost entirely to ethical subjects, and had brought himself into some discredit by the freedom of his manners. Plato, consequently, remained alone to inherit the patrimony of public esteem which Socrates had bequeathed to his disciples; and he was not deficient in the talent and energy which enabled him to extend the study of philosophy beyond the limits in which his master had enclosed it. The result was, that his school was crowded with pupils of the first distinction; even women[a] are said to have attended his lectures, disguised in male attire. Among the illustrious names which appear in the catalogue of his followers are Dion, the Syracusan prince, and the orators Hyperides, Lycurgus, Demosthenes, and Isocrates.

His political wisdom stood so high that several states applied for his assistance in new modelling their respective forms of government. He rejected proposals of this nature from the Arcadians and Thebans, because they refused to adopt the plan of his republic, which required an equal distribution of property. He gave his advice in the affairs of Elis and other Grecian states, and furnished a code of laws for Syracuse; he was also in great esteem with several crowned heads, amongst others, Archelaus, king of Macedon, and Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily.

Plato is said to have visited the court of this latter prince at three different periods.[b] The professed object of his first visit, which happened in the fortieth year of his age, is stated to have

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circumstance here alluded to, and the mechanical duplication of the cube, see Dr. Lardner's Elements of Euclid, book vi. prop. 13. (586,) (587.)

[a] Enf. Phil. Athen. l. vii. p. 279. l. xi. p. 546. Fabric. Bib. Græc. v. ii. p. 69.

[b] It seems well established that Plato, at some period, visited the court of Dionysius at Syracuse. One visit only of his is mentioned by Diodorus Siculus; but the spurious letters which have passed under the name of Plato, have given rise to very circumstantial accounts of three different visits. Of that visit which really took place, little can be satisfactorily said. Encyc. Metr. Art. Plat. Compare with this, Mitford, Grec. Hist. vol. v. 469. and note; vi. 7.

been a desire, on the part of the philosopher, to take a survey of the island, and particularly to examine into the wonders of Mount Ætna. While residing at Syracuse, he succeeded in converting Dion, the brother-in-law of the king, who, though possessed of distinguished abilities, had allowed them to merge in the luxurious dissipation of a licentious court. No sooner had he been inspired by Plato with a taste for that philosophy which leads to virtue, than he devoted himself with unwearied diligence to the pursuit of wisdom and truth, and endeavoured, in order that Dionysius might if possible be likewise reclaimed, to procure an interview between him and Plato. The free censures and unreserved opinions of the latter excited first the displeasure, and then the suspicions of the tyrant, and the philosopher, in endeavouring to secure his safety by flight, was sold as a slave at Ægina, the inhabitants of which were then at war with the Athenians, by Pollis, the master of the vessel in which he was returning, who had been bribed for that purpose by Dionysius. He was redeemed by Anniceris, a Cyrenaic philosopher,[a] for the sum of thirty minæ, and so enabled to reach home.

He is said to have visited Sicily a second time after the younger Dionysius had succeeded to the throne, vacated by the decease of the elder, but his sojourn was unsatisfactory and brief. He returned again to Athens in consequence of the breaking out of a war, upon the adjustment of which Dionysius promised to send for him, and for Dion also, who having become obnoxious to the tyrant, was banished into Italy, and who had retired to Athens to confirm and complete, by a constant attendance upon the lectures of his master, and a diligent study and practice of his moral precepts, his conversion from the effeminate and enervating habits of his early life.

After no long time the third invitation arrived, which the philosopher would have gladly declined, pleading as an excuse the infirmities of advancing age; but he was prevailed on by the en-

[a] Repayment having been afterwards offered to Anniceris by Plato's relations, he refused the money, saying, with that generous spirit which true philosophy always inspires, that he saw no reason why the relations of Plato should engross to themselves the honour of serving him. Enf. Phil.

treaties of Dion and his family, and also by the urgent solicitations of some Pythagorean philosophers, and went accordingly. For a time every thing seemed to proceed favourably; Dionysius appeared to lend an attentive ear to the counsel and suggestions of Plato, who now, in the midst of a numerous train of philosophers, possessed the chief influence and authority in the court of Syracuse; and who, while Aristippus was revelling in splendid luxury, while Dionysius was indulging his natural acrimony, for which the court afforded such ample scope, and while Æschines was intent upon his favourite pursuit, the amassing of wealth, supported the credit of philosophy in a manner which his friends regarded as indicative of superior wisdom, but which was attributed by his detractors to pride.

Mutual distrust, however, soon intervened, and Plato was put in confinement by Dionysius, from which he was rescued with difficulty by the spirited interference of his Pythagorean friends, and once more restored in safety to Athens.

He now devoted himself with unabated assiduity to his school and the instruction of youth. Having enjoyed naturally a robust constitution, and having lived temperately, he arrived at the eighty-first, or, according to some writers, at the seventy-ninth year of his age, and died from the mere decay of nature in the first year of the hundred and eighth Olympiad. As he had never been married he left no natural heirs, but transferred his effects by will to Adimantus.[a] A monument was raised to his memory in the academy, in-

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[a] Stanley, Hist. of Philosophy, part v. c. 12. "Thus continuing a single life to his end, not having any heirs of his own, he bequeathed his estate to young Adimantus, (probably the son of Adimantus, his second brother,) by his will; thus recited by Laertius.

These things Plato *hath bequeathed and disposed: the Eniphistidean grounds bordering north, on the highway from the Cephisean temple, south on the Heracleum of the Eniphistiades, east on* Archestratus *the Phrearian, west,* Philip *the Cholidian; this let it not be lawful for any man to sell or alienate, but let young* Adimantus *be possessor thereof in as full and ample manner as is possible. And likewise the* Eneri-siadæan *farm which I bought of* Callimachus, *adjoining on the north to* Eurymedon *the Myrrinusian, on the south to* Demostratus Xypeteron, *on the east to* Eurymedon *the Myrrinusian, on the west to* Cephissus. *Three mine of silver; a golden cup weighing* 160; *a ring of gold, and an ear-ring of gold, both together weighing four*

scribed with an epitaph written by his pupil Aristotle, in terms of gratitude and enthusiastic reverence.[a]

It is from the works of Plato, principally, that the judgment is to be formed of his merits as a philosopher, and of the advantages which he conferred upon science. They are chiefly in the form of dialogues, and are justly considered as models of excellence for the rare union of a poetic and philosophic spirit; they are also the only incontestible authorities respecting his opinions, although his entire system can only be attained by conjecture, as he had certain doctrines (ἄγραφα δόγματα) which he did not communicate except to those whom he entrusted witn his *esoteric* philosophy.[b]

His language and style have been the subject of many and high encomiums from ancient and modern critics. Cicero gives it as an assertion of the philosophers, that if Jupiter were to speak Greek, he would speak like Plato ;[c] Aristotle describes his style as "a middle species of diction between verse and prose."[d] Some of his dialogues are elevated by such sublime and glowing conceptions, as plainly indicate the bias of his early taste. The several characters are ably and consistently supported, the course of the debate distinctly marked, the scene depicted in the most lively and efficient colouring, and the style of expression in perfect harmony with the subject, time, and place.[e] In a word, his profound and humane philosophy

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drachms and three oboli. Euclid, *the stone-cutter, oweth me three minæ.* Diana *I remit freely. I leave servants,* Ticho, Bictas, Apolloniades, Dionysius, *goods, whereof* Demetrius *keepeth an inventory. I owe no man anything. Executors :* Sosthenes, Speusippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eurymedon, Callimachus, Thrasippus.

If this will be not forged that of Apuleius is false, who avers, that "the patrimony he left was a little orchard adjoining to the academy, two servants, and a cup wherein he supplicated to the gods. Gold no more than he wore in his ear when he was a boy, an emblem of his nobility."

[a] *Ibid.* "He died in the 81st year of his age, which number he completed exactly, dying that very day whereon he was born. For which reason the Magi at Athens sacrificed to him, as conceiving him more than man, who fulfilled the most perfect number, nine multiplied into itself."

[b] Tennemann, Man. Phil. 130.

[c] Orat. c. 3. 20. Brut. 31.

[d] Arist. apud. Laert.

[e] It must be allowed, however, that amongst other difficulties which are to

have ranked him as a writer amongst his country's highest ornaments, while his works remain as a noble memorial of Athenian genius, elegance, and urbanity.[a]

According to Thrasyllus[b] he published his Dialogues in conformity to the rules of the tragic tetralogy. The first tetralogy has a common subject illustrative of the life which becomes a philosopher; every dialogue has also a double title, the one from the principal person concerned, the other from the subject.

The first Tetralogy.
- Euthyphron, or, Of Piety.
- The Apology of Socrates.
- Crito,—Of that which should be done.
- Phædo,—Of the Immortality of the Soul.

The second.
- Cratylus,—Of Etymology.
- Theætetus,—Of Science.
- The Sophist,—Of Ens.
- The Statesman,—Of Political Prudence and Sovereign Power.

The third.
- Parmenides,—Of Ideas, and the Intelligible Essence of Things.
- Philebus,—Of Pleasure, and in what it really consists.
- The Symposium,—Of the Good.
- Phædrus,—Of the beautiful, the false, and the true.

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be met with in the writings of Plato, there are many which arise from the language in which he expresses his conceptions. Sometimes the reader is dazzled by the splendour of his poetical diction; and sometimes he is perplexed by studied ambiguities, and finds the same term used in different senses, besides different terms being employed to express the same meaning. He also frequently confounds the ideas and language of mathematics with metaphysics, and attempts, after the example of the Pythagorean school, to express philosophical conceptions by mathematical diagrams and proportions, which, added to the extreme subtlety of his speculations upon abstract and sublime topics, shall be frequently found to interfere materially with the perspicuity and intelligibility of his meaning and composition. Enf. Phil.

[a] Encyc. Metropol.

[b] Diog. Laert. iii. 56. s.

The fourth.
- Alcibiades 1,—Of Human Nature.
- Alcibiades 2,—Of Prayer.
- Hipparchus,—Of the Love of Gain.
- The Rivals,—Of Philosophy.

The fifth.
- Theages,—Of Wisdom.
- Charmides,—Of Temperance.
- Laches,—Of Fortitude.
- Lysis,—Of Friendship.

The sixth.
- Euthydemus,—Of Disputation.
- Protagoras,—The Sophist.
- Gorgias,—Of Rhetoric.
- Menon,—Of Virtue.

The seventh
- Hippias 1,—Of Honesty.
- Hippias 2,—Of Deceit.
- Io,—Of Poetry.
- Menexenus,—The Funeral Oration.

The eighth.
- Clitopho,—The Exhortation to Virtue.
- The Commonwealth,—The best Condition of a Republic.
- Timæus,—Of Nature.
- Critias,—Of the Island Atlantis, (mentioned in the Timæus.)

The ninth.
- Minos,—Of Law.
- Laws,—Of Legislation.
- Epinomis,—The Nocturnal Convention, or the Philosophers.
- Epistles, in number thirteen; one to Aristodemus; two to Archytas; four to Dionysius; to Hennias, Erastus, and Coriscus, one each; to Leodamas, one; to Dion, one; to Dion's friends, two.[a]

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[a] Certain dialogues generally introduced into the editions of Plato, have been long ago admitted to be spurious by general consent. These are *the Axiochus, Demodochus, Eryxias, Sisyphus, Clitopho,* and the two short dialogues on Justice and Virtue. Other dialogues generally received as genuine, *the Hipparchus, Minos, the Epinomus, the Latter Alcibiades, the Rivals, Clitopho,* and *Theages,* bear

From the writings of Plato, which were originally collected by Hermodorus, one of his pupils, is to be derived the knowledge of the philosophy and opinions of the earlier Academics, as of the founder of the sect himself, a brief outline of which may not inaptly be introduced here.[a]

Philosophy was divided by Plato into three parts; Morals, Physics, and Dialectics. Under Morals he comprehended politics, and under Physics that science which was afterwards distinguished by the name of metaphysics. Of these sciences he clearly laid down the principal attributes and mutual dependencies, and drew the distinction between the analytical and synthetical methods. Philosophy, therefore, is under great obligations to him *quoad formam*. She is no less indebted to him for the light he has thrown upon the above parts considered separately; though he did not profess to deliver a system of each, but continually excited the attention of others to further discoveries.[b]

Wisdom, in the strict Platonic sense of the term, is the knowledge of those things which truly exist, and are comprehended by the intellect, particularly those which regard the Deity, and the human soul as distinct from the body. Philosophy is the desire of divine science, or the liberation of the mind from the body, and its direction towards those real essences, which are perceptible only by the understanding. A philosopher must possess a mind naturally inclined to contemplation, an ardent love of truth, a penetrating

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strong marks of spuriousness. The dialogues last enumerated are accordingly rejected by Böckh: (*Comment. in Plat. Min.* &c. Hal. Lax. 1806,) Bekker (in his edition of Plato, Berlin, 1818,) and Von Ast (in his *Platons Leben und Schriften*, &c. Lips. 1816, 8vo.) Von Ast not only concurs in this judgment, but goes much greater lengths. He questions the genuineness of *the Meno, Euthydemus, Charmides, Lysis, Menexenus, Laches, the Greater Hippias, Io, Euthyphro, the Defence of Socrates, the Crito, and the Books of Laws.* These are ably defended by the writer in the Encycl. Metropol. Cf. J. A. Fabric. de Plat. et Script. Bib. Gr. l. iii. c. 1.

[a] It is impossible, as Wyttenbach justly observes, (Epist. Crit. ad Van Heusde, prefixed to the latter's Specimen Crit. in Plat. Lugd. Bat. 1818.) to convey, by an abstract, an adequate notion of the merits of the original, owing to some peculiar excellencies in Plato's method and style.

[b] Tennemann, Man. Phil. 133.

judgment, and a retentive memory. He must be also inured to the exercise of temperance and fortitude, that nothing corporeal may divert him from the pursuit of wisdom. Philosophy, as it is employed in the contemplation of truth, is termed theoretical, and, as it is concerned in the regulation of actions, practical. Theoretical philosophy produces a contemplative life, in which the mind, occupied in meditations purely intellectual, acquires a resemblance to the divinity. Practical philosophy leads to an active life, and applies the principles of wisdom to the benefit of society. Besides the contemplation of truth and virtue, the philosopher will inquire into the right conduct of the understanding, and the powers of speech, or will make himself conversant with the art of reasoning and disputation.[a]

The chief heads of Plato's moral doctrine are, that, independently of other ends, virtue is to be pursued as the proper perfection of man's nature; that vice is a disease of the mind, originating in some delusion or misapprehension of our proper interests; that the real freedom of a natural being consists in his being able to regulate his conduct by the determinations of his reason; that every person who is not guided by his reason encourages insubordination in the faculties of his mind, and becomes the slave of caprice or passion; that a course of virtuous conduct, independently of its advantages to society, is beneficial to the individual practising it, as ensuring that regularity of imagination, that tranquillity and internal harmony, which is the mind's proper happiness.[b]

Concerning politics, which Plato defined to be the application,

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[a] Enf. Phil. b. ii. c. 8. s. 1.

[b] Encycl. Metropol. Cf. de Repub. l. iv. p. 444. in Gorg. p. 491. 492. de Repub. l. ix. p. 577. in Phæd. c. 9. Albin. Εἰσαγ. εἰς τά τοῦ Πλάτωνος δόγματα. c. 27. See also the beginning of the fourth *Book of Laws*. The interesting research which Plato carried so far, respecting the supreme good, (especially in *the Theætetus, the Philebus, the Meno,* and *the Republic,*) belongs to the subject of morals. Virtue he defined to be the imitation of God, or the effort of man to attain to a resemblance to his original (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν); or in other words a unison and harmony of all our principles and actions according to reason, whence results the highest degree of happiness. Tennemann, Man. Phil. 136.

on a great scale, of the laws of morality, he has written at large in his Republic, and in his Dialogue on Laws. There is a good deal in his plan of a republic deserving of serious consideration; the great object of laws he judges to be to provide for the natural accommodation of the members of the community, as subsidiary and in subordination to the cultivation of their moral virtues. He considers the perfection of the state to consist not solely in the health, beauty, wealth, and strength of the individuals composing it, but also in their prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude. He defines education to be that which qualifies men to become good citizens, and renders them fit to govern or to obey. He looks upon it as most important, that the early principles instilled into the minds of youth should be those of strict moral virtue, and considers that if poems and fables, early taught, are able to impress the mind through life with a belief of the most improbable fictions, that the same means might be applied, with equal success, for inculcating realities and important truths. Idleness he regards as the bane of all virtue, and urges to industry as the grand source not only of wealth but happiness. He perceives, with great clearness, the advantages resulting from the subdivision of labour, and points out the necessity and natural progress of such subdivision in proportion as civilization advances. As to crimes, he regards them as originating in a love of pleasure, in passion, or in ignorance and folly.[a] But with these and other similar principles which are to be met with in his favourite system, Plato has embodied some which, to those who are conversant with mankind, and capable of entirely investigating the motives of human actions, will make the whole project appear chimerical, and the offspring of a mind replete with philosophical enthusiasm; his design, for instance, of admitting, in his republic, a community of women, in order to give reason an entire control over desire, and the perfection in the contemplation of abstract ideas, which he required in the civil functionaries of his imaginary state.[b]

Dialectics, according to Plato, embrace the essence and the acci-

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[a] Encycl. Metrop. Cf. de Legg. l. i. l. ii. de Rep. lib. i.

[b] Enf. Phil. b. ii. c. 8. s. 1.

dents of things; concerning the former it makes use of division, definition, and analysis. Division separates the genus into its species, the whole into its parts, &c. Definition expresses the genus of the thing to be defined, and distinguishes it from all others by adding its specific difference. Analysis rises from objects of sense to intelligibles; from demonstrable propositions to axioms, or from hypothesis to experience. Induction rises from individuals to universals. Syllogism produces a conclusion by means of some intermediate proposition.[a]

These topics are cursorily touched upon by Plato, and it is rather by example than by precepts that he teaches the true art of reasoning, or exposes the fallacies of sophistry. The ingenious artifices and deceptions practised by the sophists, are clearly represented in several of Plato's dialogues, particularly in his Euthydemus and Sophist. The animadversions of Plato upon the rhetoric of his day, are not to be understood so much as a general and indiscriminate censure of the art itself, as an exposure of the technical refinements, the imposition, and absurditities of cotemporary rhetoricians. This must appear to be the case to any who may attentively study the dialogues connected with the subject.

On theology, the fundamental doctrine of Plato, as of the other ancient philosophers, is that from nothing nothing can proceed. This universal axiom he applied not only to the infinite efficient, but to the material cause.[b] Hence Cicero,[c] Apuleius,[d] Alcinous,[e] and the later commentator Chalcideus,[f] have correctly understood him as admitting two primary and incorruptible principles, God and Matter. Through the whole dialogue of the Timæus he supposes two eternal and independent causes of all things; one, that *by* which all things are made, which is God; the other that *from*

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[a] Enf. Phil. ibid. Cf. Theætet. p. 148. 147. 210. Polit. p. 262. Phædr. p. 266. Laert. iii. c. 80. Apul. de Dogm. Plat. iii. p. 313.

[b] He represented the Divinity as the author of the world, inasmuch as he introduced into rude matter (ὕλη—τὸ ἄμορφον,) order and harmony. Tennemann, Man. Phil. 135.

[c] Acad. Quæst. l. 1. c. 6. [d] L. i. p. 284. [e] C. 12.

[f] Op. p. 3. Comment. in Timæ. c. 13. s. 305.

which all things are made, which is matter. Plutarch seems to have given a just representation of the doctrine of Plato, when he speaks of matter as neither made nor produced, but as presenting itself before the great artificer to receive form and arrangement.[a]

Matter, according to Plato, is an eternal and infinite principle. His doctrine on this head is thus explained by Cicero.[b] "Matter, from which all things are produced and formed, is a substance without form or quality, but capable of receiving all forms and undergoing every kind of change; in which, however, it never suffers annihilation, but merely a solution of its parts, which are in their nature infinitely divisible, and move in portions of space which are also infinitely divisible. When that principle which we call quality is moved, and acts upon matter, it undergoes an entire change, and these forms are produced, from which arises the diversified and coherent system of the universe." This doctrine Plato unfolds at large in his Timæus, and insists upon the notion that matter has no form, but is capable of receiving any. He calls it the mother and receptacle of forms, by the union of which with matter the universe becomes perceptible to the senses; and maintains that the visible world owes its forms to the energy of the divine intellectual nature.[c]

It was also a doctrine of Plato, that there is in matter a necessary, but blind and refractory force; and that hence arises a propensity in matter to disorder and deformity, which is the cause of all the imperfection which appears in the works of God, and the origin of evil. On this subject Plato writes with considerable obscurity, but as far as his meaning can be traced, he appears to have thought that matter, from its nature, resists the will of the supreme artificer, so that he cannot perfectly execute his designs, and that this is the

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[a] Enf. Phil. b. ii. c. 8. s. 1.

[b] Acad. Quæst. i. c. 1.

[c] Enf. Phil. ibid. It may be observed here that matter is not to be understood as body, but that from which bodies are formed. Body is that which is produced from matter by the energy of an efficient cause. This distinction is to be found in almost all the ancient systems of philosophy; it is necessary, therefore, in examining them not to understand the terms *incorporeal* and *immaterial* as synonymous. Enf. Phil. l. c.

cause of the mixture of good and evil which is found in the material world.

The principle opposite to matter in the system of Plato is God. He inculcated an intelligent cause, the origin of all spiritual being, and the framer of the material world.[a] The nature of this great being, he pronounced it difficult to discover, and when discovered, impossible to divulge.[b] The existence of God he inferred from the marks of intelligence, which appear in the form and arrangement of bodies in the visible world;[c] and from the unity of the material system he concluded that the mind by which it was formed must be one.[d] God, according to Plato, is the supreme intelligence, incorporeal, without beginning, end, or change, and capable of being perceived only by the mind. He distinguished the Deity not only from body, and whatever has corporeal qualities, but from matter itself, from which all things are made. He also ascribed to the Deity power and wisdom sufficient for the formation and preservation of the world, and supposed him possessed of goodness, which inclined him to desire, and, as far as the refractory nature of matter would permit, to produce the happiness of the universe.[e]

By Ideas, Plato appears to have meant patterns or archetypes, subsisting by themselves as real beings in the divine reason, as in their original and eternal region, and issuing thence to give form to sensible things, and to become objects of contemplation and science to rational beings. In the Timæus it is argued, that the reason of the Deity (ὁ λογισμος τοῦ θεοῦ) comprehends exemplars of all things; and that this reason is one of the primary causes of things. According to Plutarch,[f] Justin Martyr,[g] and Pseudo Origen,[h] Plato maintains the three principles, God, Matter, and Idea. Laertius speaks of but two principles in nature, as according to the Platonic system, God and Matter, but he may be supposed to allude to those two sources only of being which are primary and

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[a] Tim. t. iii. p. 29.

[b] Tim. l. c. Ep. vii. t. iii. p. 341. [c] De Legg. p. 886.

[d] Tim. t. iii. p. 30. Polit. t. ii. 174.

[e] Polit. t. ii. p. 174. de Legg. x. t. ii. p. 899.

[f] Plac. Phil. l. i. c. 10. [g] Ad Græc. p. 7.

[h] Philosoph. c. 19. p. 108.

independent; for the third, the Idea or exemplar, is to be considered but as instrumental and dependent on the efficient cause. "The exemplar," according to Seneca,[a] "is not the efficient cause of nature, but an instrument necessary to the cause." This branch of the Platonic philosophy will be found explained, where it is made available for argument, in the course of the Phædo.

Visible things were regarded by Plato as fleeting shades, and ideas as the only permanent substances. These he conceived to be the proper objects of science to a mind raised by divine contemplation above the varying scenes of the material world. His impressions on the subject are appropriately expressed in a passage of his Republic,[b] in which he compares the state of the human mind with respect to the material and intellectual world, to that of a man, who, in a cave into which no light can enter but by a single passage, views upon a wall opposite to the entrance the shadows of external objects, and mistakes them for realities. So strongly was he influenced by this impression, that Plato, in the election of magistrates for his Republic,[c] required that none should be chosen who had not, by the habitual contemplation of the world of ideas, attained a perfect power of abstraction. It was another doctrine in the Platonic system, that the Deity formed the material world after a perfect archetype, which had subsisted eternally in his reason, and endued it with a soul. "God,"[d] according to Plato, "produced mind prior in time as well as excellence to the body, that the latter might be subject to the former."—"From that substance which is indivisible and always the same, and from that which is corporeal and divisible, he compounded a third kind of substance, participating in the nature of both." This substance, which is not eternal but produced, and which derives the superior part of its nature from God, and the inferior from matter, Plato supposed to be the animating principle of the universe, pervading and adorning all things.[e] This third principle in nature is, in the Platonic system, inferior to the Deity, being derived from that divine reason which is the seat of the ideal world; wherein it differs completely from

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[a] Ep. 65. [b] Lib. vii. init. t. ii. p. 515.

[c] Ibid. p. 518. Enf. Phil. l. c. [d] Tim. t. iii. p. 34.

[e] Cratyl. t. iii. p. 53. Cf. Aristot. Metaph. l. xiv. c. 6.

the Stoical doctrine of the soul of the world, which supposed the essence of the divine nature to be diffused through the universe.[a]

Upon the foundation of the preceding doctrines concerning the Deity, matter, ideas, the soul of the world, and dæmons,[b] Plato raised the structure of his Physics.

To account for the origin and present state of human souls, Plato supposes that when the Deity formed the universe, he separated from the soul of the world inferior souls, which were thus mediately derived from the divine nature itself, equal in number to the stars, and assigned to each its proper celestial abode; but that these souls (for what reason does not appear) were sent down to the earth into human bodies as into a sepulchre or prison. He ascribes to this cause the depravity and misery to which human nature is liable, and maintains that it is only by disengaging itself from all animal passions, and rising above sensible objects to the contemplation of the world of intelligence, that the soul of man can be prepared to return to its original habitation.

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[a] The doctrine of a twofold soul of the world, the one presiding over it (ὑπερκόσμιος) and the other residing in it (ἐγκόσμιος), was appended to the Platonic system by the later Platonists, to accommodate this system to the notions adopted by many of the Christian fathers respecting the divine nature. (Plotin. Ennead. iii. l. v. c. 2.)

It will appear evident, from an examination of the doctrine of Plato concerning God and the soul of the world, that it differs materially from the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Plato did not suppose three subsistences in one divine essence, separate from the visible world; but taught that the λόγος, or reason of God, is the seat of the intelligible world, or of ideas, and that the soul of the world is a third subordinate nature, compounded of intelligence and matter. Enf. Phil. l. c. See Cudworth's Intellectual System, book i. c. 4. where the subject is discussed at length.

[b] These Plato probably conceived to be subordinate divinities, produced at the same time with the soul of the world, (Tim. t. iii. p. 40. Conviv. t. iii. p. 201.) and supposed them to have been appointed by the supreme Being to the charge of forming animal bodies and superintending the visible world; a doctrine which he seems to have borrowed from the Pythagoreans, and particularly from Timæus the Locrian, according to whom, "the ruler of all assigned the inspection of human affairs to dæmons, and committed to them the government of the world." Enf. Phil. l. c.

With regard to the conduct which should be adopted and adhered to through the trials and perplexities of this life, so as to afford the most consoling hope of a happier life to come, Plato has laid down, through the course of his works, the most admirable and efficient precepts. From the system of the universe, as being regulated by a wise and beneficent providence, he argues against the captious querulousness of those who are induced to complain of or deny this governing influence, because they do not feel it sufficiently near in their circumstances or themselves so as to protect them against the common accidents and disasters of life. He argues against that contracted and selfish feeling which cannot comprehend how at times the general good must be promoted at the sacrifice of particular interests, and in all anxieties and difficulties suggests the patience and comfort which cannot fail to be derived from conscious virtue. To despair, under any circumstances, is a mark of disloyalty to Providence, who never eventually deserts that spirit which has aspired, as far as its faculties would permit, to assimilate itself in goodness to its great original, or suffers it, when thus purified and advanced to a congenial nature, to undergo any real calamity. Those, on the other hand, are really unfortunate, who have succeeded in the purposes of mischief and have become rooted in the delusions of vice. For it is an eternal and immutable law, the operation of which pervades the entire universe, and from the obligation of which no created being of whatever grade is free, that the rewards of virtue are not more unerringly sure than the punishment of vice.

It has been already observed, that, as preparatory to the study of theoretical philosophy, Plato required from his disciples a knowledge of the elements of mathematics. Upon this subject, although he has not left any express treatise, he has yet made frequent use of mathematical ideas and language to explain and illustrate his philosophical tenets; and he recommends these studies as peculiarly adapted to raise the mind from sensible to intellectual objects, and to inure it to abstract and general conceptions.

Such is a comprehensive sketch of the Platonic philosophy, which has been compiled, and of necessity contracted, from other and more extended treatises on this interesting and important subject. A good deal has been designedly omitted, or but slightly

noticed here, which, however, shall be found more largely and, it is hoped, satisfactorily explained and developed throughout the course of the following work, where it is practically applied; but sufficient, probably, has been said at the outset to give some insight into the character, system, and style of Plato, which in the study of this selected portion of his writings may not appear unuseful.

It is needless to enter here upon the praise or censure to which Plato has been subjected, in the extremes of both; it was only natural that where extraordinary ability and deserts demanded admiration and respect, envy and jealousy should essay to thwart the just award by the ready instrumentality of obloquy and detraction. His respect for his great master, if Plutarch may be credited, was exemplified in his life, in an assimilation of manners, in his equanimity of temper, and in that uniformity of character which is the best proof of sincerity and integrity; *Οὕτω καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Συρακούσαις ἄλλος ἐν ἀκαδημίᾳ καὶ πρὸς Διονύσιον ἄλλος πρὸς Δίωνα.*[a]

The doctrines of Plato were expounded in the academy after his decease by his nephew Speusippus, of Athens (died B. C. 339.) He was succeeded by Xenocrates of Chalcedon, one of Plato's favourite pupils, (died B. C. 314.) who in his manner of expression resembled Pythagoras, having, for instance, defined the soul to be *a self-moving number*. After him Polemo of Athens presided at the academy, who considered the "summum bonum" to consist in a life regulated according to nature; and subsequently Crates of Athens. Finally Crantor of Soli, the friend and disciple of Xenocrates and Polemo, maintained the original system of the founder of the school, with the exception of a few alterations, applied principally to the popular doctrines of practical morality. The name of Crantor is the last of distinction in the Old Academy.

In Germany Plato has been a favourite study of the ablest philosophers, amongst others, John Reuchlin, Leibnitz, and Kant. Amongst his British admirers are to be reckoned Gale and More, Cudworth, Bacon, Berkeley, and Shaftesbury. The minds both of Milton and Gray were thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Plato's writings. Of this there is sufficient proof in the Comus, Il

[a] Plutarch, in Opp. vol. 8. p. 193. ed. Reiske.

Penseroso, the Tractate on Education, and the Answer to Smectymnus, of the former. The poems of Gray bear likewise an evident impression of the peculiar philosophical bent of the author's taste. This will appear still more obvious upon reference to his posthumous works, published by Mr. Matthias, in quarto, 1814, which evince upon the subject of Plato's writings, the most earnest study and laborious research.

EDITIONS OF PLATO'S WORKS.[a]

ALDUS. Venet. 1513. fol. Græce.

EDITIO PRINCEPS. Edited by Musurus. (See Roscoe's Leo X. vol. ii. 238—9. 4to. edit.) Although the editorial talents in this edition have been greatly excelled by subsequent scholars, it is still entitled to attention from the number of good manuscripts and ancient publications which were consulted in its compilation.

GRYNÆI. Basil. 1534. fol. Gr.

An elegant, rare, and respectable edition, the joint production of Valderus the printer, and Simon Grynæus, a well known scholar and critic. The *Timæus* and *Politicus* have the commentary of Proclus. The text is not so pure as that of the Aldine edition.

ARLENII. Basil. 1556. fol. Gr.

This edition, which, upon the whole, copies the preceding, has many curious passages and remarks. It was compiled by Arnoldus Arlenius, who, in travelling through Italy, collected some manuscripts of Plato, and in his own copy of Grynæus' edition marked down the corrupt passages of that work, supplied the chasms, and sent the copy thus corrected to HOPPERUS, the son-in-law of the printer Petrus, to have it published accordingly. Still it has many errors in common with that of Grynæus.

SERRANI. Paris, 1578. fol. 3 vols. Gr. et Lat.

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[a] For the subjoined list and the accompanying remarks the Editor is indebted to that valuable work, "Introduction to the Classics," by the Rev. T. F. Dibdin, London, 1827.

Printed by H. Stephen. This celebrated and magnificent edition is well known in the history of classical literature. The first vol. is dedicated to Queen Elizabeth; the second to James the Sixth of Scotland, (then a boy, and subsequently James the First of England;) and the third to the Republic of Berne. This edition has been subjected to some animadversion. The assistance professed to have been received from different sources, is, in fact, from Ficinus, Aldus, Arlenius, Hopperus, and Cornarius, although their names are studiously suppressed. The Latin version is said not to be so faithful as that of Ficinus. See preface to Fischer's Dialog. Platonis, Lips. 8vo. 1783; R. Simon's Bibl. Choisie, t. i. 360; Brucker, Hist. Philosoph. Crit. t. i. c. xii. p. 659; and Harles, Introd. L. Gr. t. i. 397. The text of this edition is deemed very accurate and faithful.

——— Lugduni. 1590. fol. Gr. et Lat.

——— Francof. 1602. fol. Gr. et Lat.

These editions follow the order of Ficinus in the arrangement of the books, and contain his notes and commentaries. In the opinion of John Fabricius (Hist. Bibl. Fabric. t. iii. 189.) they are the best editions of Plato, and preferable to that of Serranus; from which, however, Harles dissents.

Crollii, &c. Bipont. 1781. 12. vols. Gr. et Lat.

One of the few Greek writers, edited by the Bipont Society. The Greek text is taken from Serranus, and the Latin version from Ficinus. The first vol. contains an account of the manuscripts and editions of Plato; the ninth vol. has an excellent tract, or "Introduction to the Reading of the Works of Plato," the illustrations and arguments of the Dialogues, in a separate volume, are by Professor Tiedemann. It is considered as one of the most beautiful productions of the Deux Ponts press.

Bekkeri. Berol. 1816. 8vo. 10 vols. Gr. et Lat.

The united labours of Bekker, Wolf, and Heindorf, appear in this truly critical and valuable edition. The Latin version is by Wolf. In the arrangement of the text numerous MSS. have been consulted. All the ancient scholia, deserving of being collected, are incorporated. One volume is devoted to an account of the life, doctrine, and writings of Plato.

Astii. Lipsiæ. 1819—24. 7 vols. Gr. et Lat.

A very excellent edition. The version, with the exception of the earlier part, which is that of Cornarius, is by the editor. The annotations are admirable, and the indices full and complete.

STALBAUMII. Lipsiæ. 1821—25. 8vo. 8 vols. Gr.

These volumes form part of the series of Greek prose-writers, published at Leipsic. They contain the ancient scholia, "from a MS. in the Bodleian library, with the annotations of RUHNKEN." The prolegomena and annotations are ample and learned.

There have been three Latin editions of Plato; the first by Marsilius Ficinus, Florence, 1491; the second by J. Cornarius, Basle, 1558; and the third by J. Serranus, Paris, 1578.

DETACHED WORKS OF PLATO.

ASTIUS. *Politeia sive de Republ.* Lips. 1804: reprinted in 1814: 8vo. Gr. *Phædrus*, Lips. 1810, 8vo. Gr. with the scholia of Hermias, and a most ample editorial commentary.

BEISTER. *Mario, Crito, Alcibiades: Uterque Berol*, 1780. 8vo. Gr. with some notes of Gottleber and Schneider. Reprinted in 1790, 1812, and 1822. 8vo.

BEKKER. *Dialogi*, Berol. 1816. 8vo. 2 vols. *Commentaria Critica in Platonem a se editum. Accedunt Scholia. Berol.* 1821—3. 8vo. Gr. et Lat.

ETWALL. *Alcibiades et Hipparchus.* Oxon. 1771. 8vo. Gr. et Lat. to which is prefixed the life of Plato by Olympiodorus.

FINDEISEN. *Gorgias.* Gothæ, 1796. 8vo. Gr. The editor having died before the completion of his labours, the work was continued and completed by HAAS. An excellent edition; with the scholia of Hermias.

FISCHER. *Euthyphro, Apologia Socratis, Crito, Phædo.* Lips. 1770. 8vo. Gr. *Cratylus et Theætetus.* Lips. 1770. 8vo. Gr. *Sophista, Politicus, Parmenides.* Lips. 1774. 8vo. Gr. *Philebus et Symposium.* Lips. 1776. 8vo. Gr. *Euthyphro, Apologia Socratis, Crito, Phædo.* Lips. 1783. 8vo. Gr. Such are the labours of the celebrated FISCHER upon Plato. Of these the

last performance, which contains much more than its title announces, is in all respects, the most valuable as well as copious.

FORSTER. *Dialogi* V. Oxon. 1745. 8vo. Gr. et Lat.

First and best edition. It was inaccurately reprinted in 1752.

HEINDORF. *Dial.* IV. *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Hippias Major*, *Phædrus*. Berol. 1802. 8vo. Second edition, greatly improved from the publications of Bekker. The latter has a critical annotation on the *Apologia Socratis*. The same editor also published the *Gorgias*, *Theætetus*, *Parmenides*, and *Euthydemus*. Berol. 1806, 8vo. The labours of Heindorf, inasmuch as they contain according to Fuhrmann, many happy illustrations of difficult passages, are indispensable to the student of Plato.

MULLER. *Chrestomathia Platonica*. Turici, 1756. 8vo. Gr. et Lat. The Latin version is that of Serranus.

NITZSCH. *Ion*. Lips. 1822. 8vo. Gr. with learned prolegomena and annotations. The best separate edition of this work of Plato.

NORTH. *Socratis Apologia*, *Crito*, *Phædo*, *de Legib.* l. x. *Alcibiades Secundus*. Cantab. 1673. with the Latin version of Ficinus.

ROUTH. *Euthydemus et Gorgias*. Oxon. 1784. 8vo. Gr. et Lat.

THOMSON. *Parmenides*. Oxon. 1728. 8vo. Gr. et Lat. with learned prolegomena and running notes.

WYTTENBACH. *Phædon*. Lugd. Bat. 1810. 8vo. Gr. "We dismiss this volume by stating that the perusal of it has by no means diminished the respect which we had always entertained for the talents and erudition of the learned editor." Mus. Crit. p. 258—61.

A VARIORUM EDITION of the works of Plato has been published by Mr. Priestly, whose name stands deservedly high in the annals of Greek classical literature; in nine vols. 8vo. Gr. et Lat. Lond. 1826, comprising the annotations of the following editors: Bekker, Astius, Beister, Buttmann, Bockh, Baumgarten, Crusius, Cornarius, Creuzerus, Etwall, Faehse, Findeisen, Fischer, Forster, Gottleber, Heindorf, Heussoe, Korner, Lange, Massey, Morgenstein, Muller, Nitzsch, Nurnberger, Pinzger, Raabe, Routh, Stallbaum, Stutzmann, Thomson, Winckler, Wyttenbach, and Zeunius.

The works of Plato have been translated into English by Floyer Sydenham, Taylor, and Spens. "Of Sydenham's translation," observes an accomplished writer, "every scholar will speak with respect, and every man of taste with fondness and regard. Its imperfect and unfinished condition bears with it a deep interest as a memorial of Sydenham's melancholy fate; when a man of the highest talents and most elegant accomplishments, after struggling with the inequalities of fortune, and suffering mortifications, not the less galling because concealed and uncommunicated, gave way to the sudden impulse of his indignant spirit, and quitted a world which he disdained to flatter."[a]

"Spens' work bears the marks of being a version from the French, and not from the original. Taylor's translation is a lamentable contrast to the work of his predecessor Sydenham. It is deficient both in spirit and taste, and the difficulties of the original are not only increased by the translator's grammatical ignorance, but its obscurities are rendered still more impenetrable by idle comments written in the unintelligible jargon of the Alexandrian school."

A. Dacier has translated ten of Plato's dialogues into French, with a life of Plato, and an introduction to his Philosophy prefixed, Paris, 1699. Some of these dialogues had been previously translated by F. de Maucroix, Œuvres de Prose et de Poesie. t. i. 1685. From the French of Dacier an English version was published in 1701, called "Plato abridged." Dardi Bembo published an Italian translation in three vols. Venet. 1601. Selected dialogues were translated also by Sebast. Erici, with notes. The works of Plato were translated into Persian, according to Agathias, lib. ii. by command of Chosroes, king of Persia. Fabricius mentions also a translation of the Republic into the Hebrew tongue, as extant in Bibl.

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[a] The subject of this beautiful eulogy was a Master of Arts in Wadham College, Oxford. He proposed to publish a translation of the whole works of Plato, but nine dialogues only were completed. He was thrown into prison for a debt to a victualler, and died in 1787 or '88. He was generally beloved for the candour of his temper and gentleness of his manners. His circumstances excited sympathy among the friends of literature in England, and are said to have occasioned the institution of the benevolent Literary Fund.

Vatic. upon the authority of J. Bartoloc. Bibl. magna Rabbin. tom. iv. p. 353."

A catalogue of the various works written upon the subject of Plato, his doctrine, and writings, will be found in Tennemann's Manual of Philosophy, translated by the Rev. A. Johnson, M. A. Oxford, D. A. Talboys, 1832.

TRINITY COLLEGE,

March 19, M.DCCC.XXXV.

The edition of Matthiæ's Grammar, to which frequent allusion is made in the course of this work, is the fifth, revised and enlarged by John Kenrick, M. A. London, J. Murray, 1832.

The Reader will please to make the following Corrections:

Page 58. note; *read*—"without an additional," &c.
—— 99. note; *for* Sect. 63. *read* Lect. 63.
—— 126. note; *read*—"deny that they were extant, in a collected form, in the time," &c.
—— 159. note; *read*—"If any where at all."
—— 172. note; *for* lorqu'un *read* lorsqu'un.

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

ARGUMENT.

THE Apology consists of three parts; of which the first contains the general answer of Socrates to his accusers, both open and concealed. He meets the objection, that he had brought his misfortunes on himself, by showing that death, which was only feared by those who pretended to wisdom, should never influence him to abandon the course assigned him by integrity and truth. He then proceeds, in a strain of well managed irony, to describe the loss which the Athenians should suffer in him, inasmuch as one who should prefer their interest to his own, and to the prejudice of his personal safety, was not likely to be met with again. He assigns as a reason for his withdrawing from the management of the republic, that his Genius, or Dæmon, did not allow him to engage in civil affairs; that his appearance in public had not been different from that of any one in a private capacity, and that he had never fulfilled the office of a public preceptor, or given different instructions to one of his followers from what he prescribed to the rest. He then explains the cause why his acquaintance and conversation were so eagerly courted by numbers of the citizens, whom he proves plainly not to have been corrupted by him, from the sympathy they evinced in his distress, and their solicitude to extricate him from peril. In fine, he manifests to his judges his courage and magnanimity, by declining to avail himself of those appeals to their pity and compassion, which were usually adopted by the accused, and which he had refused to resort to, not through pride, but because such conduct would be but little consistent with his general reputation for wisdom. Besides, he would have shown but little respect for the laws, had he endeavoured by supplications and tears to mislead their ministers, and so to check the progress of justice and truth.

The second part of the defence contains what Socrates is supposed to have addressed to his judges, when he had been condemned by their first sentence, and was directed to assign his own penalty; an order with which he was so far from complying, that he asserted himself, on the contrary, to be worthy rather of public support in the Prytaneum; since it could not be just, that one who had never done injury to others should wrong himself. Having added, then, a few observations upon his plan of life, he offers to fine himself in a sum evidently expressive of his self-acquittal.

The third portion of the defence contains what Socrates is supposed to have said after he had been condemned to die; in which he first forewarns the authors of his sentence of the evils which were likely to befal them, in consequence of their injustice towards him; then addressing himself to those who had moved for his acquittal, he expresses his readiness to encounter death, which he had ceased to regard as a misfortune; the Deity having given him no intimation of any calamity having been likely to befal him, either at his departure from home, or when he came before the tribunal. Hence he was induced to hope, that what was about to occur was to be regarded as a blessing; for if death were an end of all consciousness, it could not be a misfortune, and if it were the passage to a better life, it should be a blessing. Therefore, he entertained no feelings of enmity or anger towards those by whom he was condemned, since he had learned to regard his decease as, in any case, desirable to himself. Adding a few words upon the subject of his children, he concludes in a manner worthy of the intrepidity and integrity which had made his life eminent, and his fame imperishable.

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

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§. 1. Ὅ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.] This apology contains the substance of the defence delivered by Socrates, in answer to the accusations of Anytus, Melitus, and Lycon, who brought a two-fold charge against him; the introduction of new gods, to the prejudice of those already acknowledged, and the corruption of the Athenian youth. His accusers, influenced solely by an invidious jealousy of his great reputation, espoused, severally, the cause of the different classes to which, from the severity of his censures, the philosopher had become an object of extreme dislike. Anytus urged his condemnation in behalf of the craftsmen and burghers, whilst Lycon advocated the interests of the rhetoricians, and Melitus of the poets.

Several apologies were drawn up for Socrates by his own immediate friends, or admirers of his wisdom and integrity: of these, two only, beside the present, are now extant, one by Libanius, and the other compiled by Xenophon, from the instructions of Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus. As the writer was absent, himself, from Athens at the period of the trial, the work was but indifferently executed; it is useful, however, as corroborating the leading points of the above. Lysias, who was one of the most distinguished orators of the age, prepared a defence, which he submitted to Socrates, to be delivered in presence of the judges. It was highly and elaborately wrought, but the philosopher declined it, observing, that with all its merits as a composition, it was deficient in those qualities which were best adapted to evince the magnanimity, firmness, and dignity, no less requisite for the position in which he was then placed, than he had previously considered them for the purposes of his profession. Hence he preferred the plainness and simplicity, at all times characteristic of his argumentative discussions, and the efficacy of which he had long learned to appreciate, to the ordinary form of a forensic address, with which he was but little familiar, and which consequently, under the circumstances, it should have been hazardous to adopt.

The law which Socrates was accused of having violated, and by which he was condemned, appears, according to the digest and commentary of the learned Petit upon the Athenian laws, to have been the following, the second in the code; Θεσμὸς ἀιώνιος τοῖς Ατθίδα νεμομένοις κύριος τὸν ἅπαντα χρό-

καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καί τοι ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἓν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρῆν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς

νον, Θεούς τιμᾶν καὶ Ηρωας, ἐγχωρίους ἐν κοινῷ, ἐμποινίμοις νόμοις πατρίοις, ἰδίᾳ, κατὰ δυνάμιν σὺν εὐφημία, καὶ ἀρχαῖς καρπῶν πελάνους ἐπετείους. The infringement of this law brought the offender before the court of the Areopagus, where he also received sentence, as appears in the case of St. Paul, Acts, xvii. 18, and Diodorus, surnamed Aθεος, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius. As Socrates, however, though charged with a similar offence, does not appear to have been summoned before the same tribunal, Petit conjectures that it only took cognizance of such delinquencies, when committed by those who were not freemen of Athens, as in the instances mentioned above; "Licetque suspicari, civibus dicam (hujuscemodi) non fuisse scriptam apud Areopagitas, sed peregrinis tantum, quales erant male compositum par B. Paulus et Diodorus." In Legg. Attic. Comment. S. Petit.

§. 1. Ὅ, τι μέν.] Le Clerc, Art. Crit. i. p. 165. Amstel. reads ὃ μέν; Cod. Coislin. 155. apud Montefalcon. Catal. bibl. Coisl. p. 218. Τί μὴν ὑμεῖς πεπόνθατε. Fisch. Tr. *How*, or, *in what degree, you have been influenced, men of Athens, by my accusers.* For the construction of υπο with a neuter verb, see Matthiæ, Gr. s. 496. 3.

Ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.] In so addressing his judges, Socrates pays them a peculiar compliment; Ἀθηναῖος signifying not merely a citizen of Athens, but more emphatically, one who was worthy of such a privilege, as being eminently remarkable for every moral and social quality. See cap. 17. a med. ὅτι ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν Ἀθηναῖος ὤν, &c. Stall.

Ὑπ᾽ ἀυτῶν.] *Præ eorum oratione.* Stall., who compares it with ὑπὸ φοβου, ὑπὸ φιλίας, ὑπὸ μίσους, &c.

Ὀλίγου.] i. e. σχεδὸν, ἐγγύς, *almost, nearly*, Hesych. and Suid. It occurs frequently without δεῖ or δεῖν. Bos. Ellips. Græc. Schaef. Δεῖν, *abesse*, cum ωστε, eleganter reticetur in ὀλίγου, et μικροῦ, ut apud Ælianum Var. Hist. lib. iv. 8. Καὶ ὀλιγου καὶ την πόλιν κατελαβον.

Ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.] For ὡς ἐν (ἑνὶ) λόγῳ εἰπεῖν, *in one word*; or συντόμως, *concisely*. Fisch. There is some difference of opinion upon the exact meaning of this phrase. Le Clerc considers it as intended to soften or qualify an expression which might otherwise appear too harsh, and so compares it to the French, *pour dire le mot*. This is approved by Weiske, in reference to the passage in the text, and several other instances where the form occurs. Stephens also prefers a nearly similar interpretation, *ut ita dicam; prope dixerim*. Thes. Ling. Græc. in voc. V. Cousin renders it, *a parler franchement*.

Οὐδέν.] Several editions read οὐθέν; which, however, is the Æolic form, and not likely to have occurred in an Attic writer.

Μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν, κ. τ. λ.] *But one, in particular, of the many falsehoods which they advanced, I wondered at in them*; αὐτῶν being masculine, and referring to the accusers. Stall. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 317, and Obs.

Ἐν ᾧ.] *By* or *through which*; an ordinary acceptation of ἐν, especially in Pindar, when a mean or cause is assigned, on which something depends. Matthiæ Gr. s. 577. Viger. c. ix. s. 3. 11.

Ὡς χρῆν, κ. τ. λ.] The imperff. χρῆν, ἔδει, προσῆκεν, are often used, not for the presents, but like the Latin *oportebat, debebam*, to denote that something should be, or should have been, which is not; so Cic. Phil. i. 11, "Irasci quidem vos mihi—non oportebat."—Hence the accusers are to be understood as charging the Athenians with having neglected the precaution, which the character of Socrates had rendered indispensable, against deception on his part.

δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὰν μηδ' ὁπωστιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τἀληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥς περ ἐγὼ λέγω,

Δεινοῦ.] *Ingenious, keen, crafty,* opp. to *ἰδιώτης*, or *eloquent.* Hermog. Formul. Orat. iii. 9, and *περὶ Μεθόδου Δεινότητος.* It is sometimes used with a preposition; Aristot. Pol. *δεινὸς περὶ τὴν νομοθεσιάν.* Aristoph. B. 968. *δεινὸς εἰς τα παντα*; and with a preposition understood; Xen. *δεινὸς ταύτην τὴν τέχνην*; more frequently with an infinitive; Plat. Prot. *δεινὸς γραφειν.* Aristoph. N. 243. *δειν. φαγεῖν.*

Ὅτι.] Editt. Bass. and Forst. ὃ τι, which Heindorf, edit. 2nda, 1805, approves. Either reading is admissible, as *τοῦτο* might be easily understood before ὃ τι, instead of which it is, however, more likely Plato would have written ὃ simply; whence the reading in the text has been sanctioned by the best authorities.

Μηδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.] *Ne tantillum quidem; nulla ex parte; nulla tenus.* STALL. According to Phavorinus and Thom. Mag. *ὁπωστιοῦν* is the Attic form of *ὁπωσοῦν*: whence, however, it must not be concluded that the latter was unusual with Attic writers. Ducqer. ad Thucyd. vii. 49. Intpp. ad Xen. Cyr. i. 4. 15. With this opinion of the philosopher, in regard to his own powers, compare Cic. Orat. iii. 16. "Quorum princeps Socrates fuit, is, qui omnium eruditorum testimonio, totiusque judicio Græciæ, cum prudentia et acumine, et venustate, et subtilitate, tum vero eloquentia, varietate, copia, quam se cunque in partem dedisset facile princeps."

Φαινωμαι.] Ald. Bass. Norib. *φαίνομαι*; incorrectly. FISCH.

Εἰ μὴ ἄρα.] *Unless perchance.* ἄρα is very commonly subjoined to another word, and so takes nearly the signification of *που* or *ἴσως*. Aristid. Plat. Sympos. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἐν τῳ Ἡλυσίῳ πεδίῳ τὸ Συμπόσιον συνεκροτεῖτο; *Nisi forte in Campis Elysiis, &c.* VIGER.

Οὗτοι.] Correctly, instead of *αὐτοι*, which is found in several editions; because the former implies contempt; so Crit. cap. 4. a med. *τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας*, &c.

Ἔγωγε.] *I, indeed, at least,* or, *I, for one.* Although γε as well as *μὲν* may be commonly rendered by *quidem, indeed,* and both particles are of a restrictive character, yet they differ in the following respects: *μὲν* regards the whole, and γε only parts of propositions; *μὲν* excludes other things, γε distinguishes something as most remarkable among other things, but not so as to exclude them; hence, *μὲν* has *δὲ* for its opposite, but γε has no opposing particle. The distinction effected by γε may, consequently, be twofold, in expressing what is least or what is greatest; the former is more common by which γε may be rendered as above; so Dem. de Coron. *εἰ μὴ ὅλον, μέρος γε*, &c.

Οὐ κατὰ τούτους.] *Me oratorum esse istorum dissimilem, quam ego vera dicam, non falsa.* STALL. Muretus Varr. Lectt. iii. 3. would omit *οὐ*, and so understand Socrates to say, that if his adversaries made eloquence to consist in truth, he was an orator upon their principle. But, as Fischer correctly observes, Socrates evidently intends to express his assent, should such be the opinion of his accusers, to its justice, and in proof of this, he did not act as they did, and deal in falsehoods; he was an orator, according to their principle, for he spoke the truth, but not according to their practice, for they dealt in lies. V. Cousin renders *οὐ κατὰ τούτους*, by *non pas a leur manière.* Κατὰ is frequently used to express similitude: as Gen. ii. 18. *βοηθὸν κατ' αὐτὸν.* h.e. *ὅμοιον αὐτῷ*, Hesych. and Phavor., as in v. 20. *βοηθὸς ὅμοιος αυτω*, which is rendered in the Vulgate,

ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥς περ οἱ τούτων ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δή που πρέποι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, ὥς περ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ

adjutorium simile sibi. So Job, i. 8, *ὁυκ ἔστι κατ' αὐτὸν* ; and Hesych. Gloss. *κατά σε· ὅμοιός σοι.*

Οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς.] Several editions read *ἤ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθ. κ. τ. λ.* which is approved by Stallbaum, and explained, *nihil propemodum veri dixerunt.* The form *ἤ τις ἢ οὐδείς* is negative, yet with the expression of doubt, *next to none.* Herod. iii. 140, *ἀναβέβηκε δ' ἤ τις ἢ οὐδείς κεν παρ' ἡμίας ἀυτῶν* ; whence the passage may be rendered, according to this reading, *they have hardly spoken any truth.*

Πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.] *Omnem rem.* FISCH. *The whole truth ;* oppos. to *κεκαλλιεπ· λόγ.* as *εἰκῇ λεγόμενα*, infr. to *κεκοσμημ.*

Κεκαλλιεπημένους λόγους.] Valckenaer, Diatrib. in Eurip. reliquu. explains *καλλιεπειν, uti oratione venusta et eleganti, elegantet dicere ;* whence, *λόγοι κεκαλλιεπημένοι ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασι, orationes et sententiis venustis, et verbis elegantibus compositæ.* The distinction must be observed here between *ῥήματα* and *ὀνόματα* ; the former signifying the sentiments of the speaker, the latter, the terms in which they were conveyed. *Κεκοσμημένους*, sc. *λογους*, *orationes ornatas ; harangues set off by rhetorical ornament,* tropes, &c.

Εἰκῇ λεγόμενα.] *Orationem subito ac sine prævia meditatione quasi profusam.* STALL. His genius or angel prevented Socrates from preparing a formal defence, as appears from his reply when pressed to do so by Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, with whom he was on terms of the closest friendship ; *ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Διά, καὶ δίς ἤδε ἐπιχειρήσαντος μου σκοπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀπολογιας ἐναντιουταί μοι τὸ δαιμόνιον.* Xen. Socr. Apol. sec. iv. and Mem. iv. 8. 5. *Τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασι*, h. e. *nullo verborum delectu instituto, sed verba quæ sponte quasi se offerunt.* STALL. *Les termes qui se presenteront a moi les premiers.* COUSIN. The phrase is incorrectly rendered by Fischer, *verba vulgaria et trita ;* Socrates merely asserts his intention of expressing the truth in the most simple and unpremeditated language.

Τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ.] h. e. *Non decuerit senem, qualis ego sum.* STALL. The abstract term being used in the text for the concrete ; whence it is opposed to *μειρακίῳ*. Socrates was upwards of seventy years old at the time of his public accusation.

Μειρακίῳ.] A dimin. from *μειραξ* ; qu. *εἰραξ*, from *εἴρω* ; qui jam est ea ætate ut fari possit. KOEN. The period of life to which *μειράκιον* is applied, was generally considered subsequent to that of the *ἡβῶντες*.—*πλάττειν*, in music and declamation, signifies, *to follow an affected style*, in which sense it is to be taken in the text. Its derivative *πλάσμα*, in music, signifies studied ornament, as opposed to simplicity ; in declamation, an affected and delicate, as opposed to a bold and manly delivery.—*εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι*, i. e. *εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰσιεναι* ; so Demosth. adv. Spudiam init. *ἀλλ' ὁῦτος μὲν ῥαδίως φέρει, πολλάκις εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰθισμένος εἰσιέναι.* and infr. cap. 10. *οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον*, h. e. *prodiens in concionem.* Hence it appears that *πρὸς* would be incorrectly substituted, as some proposed, for *εἰς* in the text. STALL.

πάνυ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου δι' ὧν περ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὑτωσί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονὼς πλείω ἑβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥς περ οὖν ἄν

Παρίεμαι.] *I implore, conjure;* so Phavorinus: παρίεσθαι τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοῦ παραιτεῖσθαι δύναμιν ἔχειν· τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι. Timæus explains it likewise by παραίτουμαι, Gloss. Platon., upon which Ruhnken: "Hujus rarissimæ notionis ratio, nondum, quod sciam, explicata, pendet ab indole mediorum. Ut ἵημι et ἐφίημι est *mitto*, ἵεμαι et ἐφίεμαι *mitti mihi volo*, i. e. *cupio, peto*; sic παρίημι *admitto*, παρίεμαι *ad me admitti volo*, i. e. *precor, deprecor*." Some derive it from ἵεμαι, *cupio*. Abresch. Auctar. Thucyd. 376.

Καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ.] Socrates was continually before the public. Early in the morning he used to frequent the gymnasia and the promenades. When the forum was most crowded, he was sure to be found there; and throughout the day, wherever he could meet with the greatest concourse. His discussions were numerous and lengthy, to which all who wished might attend. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 10.—ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν; in some editions this is preceded by καί, which, however, is not noticed by Ficinus, as will appear by reference to the Latin translation. It does not occur either in a similar expression, Hipp. Min. p. 368. B. ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις; nor can it be correctly introduced in its ordinary sense, for the τράπεζαι were in the forum, and Socrates alludes here to his custom of resorting to the tables of the money-changers, and conversing with the noble and wealthy citizens by whom they were frequented. The corresponding phrase to the above is καὶ ἄλλοθι, h. e. *in officinis et palæstris*: upon which Fischer quotes Aristid. Orat. Platon. T. iii. p. 223. ὅτι πλεῖστα Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν καὶ τῶν ἐργαστηρίων διελέγετο. Ἄλλοθι is a form peculiar to the Attic writers, who use, however, ἀλλαχοθι in common with the rest of the Greeks. So Mœris: Ἄλλοθι—Ἀττικῶς·— ἀλλαχόθι—Ἀττικῶς, κἀι Ἑλληνικῶς.

Μήτε θορυβεῖν.] This was a common form of address adopted by the Grecian orators, when the subject of their discourse was likely to prove unpalatable to their hearers. θορυβεῖν signifies *to cause disturbance, to express disapprobation by tumult and noise*, especially at a public meeting

Δικαστήριον.] This was the βασίλειον δικαστήριον, or regal tribunal, situated in the forum, near the Στοά τοῦ Διὸς Ἐλευθέριου; and so called from the βασίλευς, or king-archon, the title of the second archon, who held his court of judicature in the royal portico, where he decided all disputes occurring between the priests and sacred families, the Ceryces, Eteotabudæ, &c., to whom certain offices in the celebration of divine worship belonged by inheritance.

Ἔτη γεγονὼς πλείω ἑβδομήκοντα.] *More than seventy years old.* When ἔλαττον, πλέον, πλείω are followed by a numeral, ἤ, *than*, is often omitted. Thucyd. vi. 95. ἡ λεία ἐπράθη ταλάντων οὐκ ἔλαττον πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν. So in Latin, *amplius*.

Ἀτεχνῶς.] Ἀληθῶς καὶ χωρὶς πανουργίας, καὶ οἷον ἁπλάστως. Tim. Lex. Platon. *I am, therefore, absolutely unacquainted with the form of language here:* fully, ξένως ἔχω ἐμαυτὸν περὶ τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ἔχω, with an adverb, is elegantly joined, in the Attic, to a genitive case, taking in such instances, for the most part, the sense and force of the adverb: so ἀδυνάτως ἔχειν, *to be unable*; τούτων ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν, *to neglect these things*. By ἡ ἐνθάδε λέξις

εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὤν, ξυνεγιγνώσκετε δή που ἄν μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐλέγον ἐν οἷς περ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἐᾶν—ἴσως, μὲν γάρ τι χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη —, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τἀληθῆ λέγειν.

§. 2. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρώτους κατηγόρους, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. Ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες· οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καί περ ὄν-

Socrates intends to designate the peculiar character of a forensic address.

Ὡς περ οὖν ἄν, κ. τ. λ.] Ἄν is sometimes redundant, when the principal proposition to which it belongs is divided by a parenthesis, as in the text, and Soph. Antig. 466. ἀλλ' ἄν, εἰ τὸν ἐξ ἐμῆς μητρὸς θανόντ' ἄθαπτον ἐσχόμην νέκυν, κείνοις ἂν ἤλγουν.—Matth. Gr. s. 600. 5.

Τοῦτο δίκαιον.] i. q. Τοῦτο ὡς δίκαιόν τι; so cap. 5. ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων.

Αὕτη ἀρετή.] The article being expressed, the sentence runs thus, αὕτη ἡ ἀρετὴ (sc. ut videat, utrum vera dicantur necne,) δικαστοῦ ἐστιν. However, when the pronoun forms the subject, and the substantive the predicate of a proposition, the article is frequently omitted. Stall. V. Engelhardt ad Lachet. s. 1. Ἀρετή here signifies *the duty;* in the Attic writers it is most commonly used to denote a moral virtue.

§ 2. Δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι.] *Me respondere par est, vel æquum est.* Marg. Steph. *I am justified in defending myself;* for δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐμὲ ἀπολογήσασθαι, or ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀπολογήσαμην· as Crit. 4. ἡμεῖς—δίκαιοι ἐσμεν—κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον. Fisch. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 297.

Πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη.] Matthiæ Gr. s. 425. c. 2. πάλαι is not always to be understood as expressing a period long past; it may be applied to years, months, or days; whence its proper meaning in the text is expressed by the addition of πολλὰ ἔτη; so Phavorinus: πάλαι οὐκ ἀεὶ μακρὸν χρόνον σημαίνει, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὗ καὶ πρόσφατον Ἀττικῶς. Vid. Abresch. Dilucidd. Thucydid. iii. 89. So with the *dudum* and *jamdudum* of the Latins. Drakenborch. ad Silium Ital. and Broukhus. ad Tibull. iii. 6. extr. Stallbaum explains the passage: καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη λέγοντες καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες: *Multi enim apud vos mei accusatores exstiterunt, qui quum jamdudum multosque per annos me criminati sunt, tum nihil veri afferunt.* Twenty-four years at least had elapsed from the time that Socrates had been brought forward by Aristophanes, in the Νεφέλαι. Forst.

Τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον.] *Anytus and his associates:* sc. Melitus and Lycon. ἀμφὶ being taken in its distributive sense. Matthiæ Gr. s. 583. 1. Anytus was the principal person who headed

τας καὶ τούτους δεινούς. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκὼς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες οἱ δεινοί εἰσί μου κατήγοροι· οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτά

and instigated the adversaries of Socrates; whence Horace, Sat. ii. 4. 3, "Anyti reum;" he was by birth an Athenian, son of Anthemion; and from the successful exercise of his trade as a tanner, had attained to great opulence, a circumstance which, together with the nature of his occupation, drew upon him the sarcastic ridicule of the philosopher, and also of Theopompus and Archippus. His considerable wealth, and the service he had rendered the republic in assisting Thrasybulus towards the expulsion of the thirty tyrants, and the restoration of public freedom, gave him a powerful and extensive influence among the citizens, of which he fully availed himself on the present occasion. He was subsequently condemned to exile, and retired to Heraclea, where he was not allowed by the inhabitants to remain a single day.—Diog. Laert. ii. 38. 43. See cap. 10.

Ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι.] It is beyond a doubt that Socrates here alludes to the invectives contained in the Nubes of Aristophanes. But many, with good reason, have conjectured that the philosopher does not intend to condemn the poet himself, whom it is unlikely that Plato would have introduced as in familiar converse with Socrates in the Symposium, had he been a bitter or implacable enemy. V. Fr. A. Wolf. Prolegomen. ad Nubes Aristoph. p. 3. sqq. and Reisig. Præfat. ad Nub. p. 12, sqq. Whence it may be concluded that the words in the text are rather intended to apply to the sophists and poets generally, who were not content with having ridiculed the philosopher and his tenets, in the first instance, but subsequently laboured to inflame against him the odium and angry passions of the ignorant crowd. It appears from the testimony of numerous ancient writers, that Socrates had proved a fertile subject for more than one of the comic poets, Eupolis, amongst the rest, who treated him with considerable severity. V. Scholiast. Aristoph. ad Nub. v. 96. See infr. c. iii. ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφ. κ. τ. λ. STALL.

Μετέωρα φροντιστὴς.] *A speculator in celestial matters.* So Horace, Epist. ii. 12, 15, "Nil parvum sapias et adhuc sublimia cures." The title in the text was one by which, amongst the ancients, natural philosophers were commonly designated. It would appear that Socrates, in early life, had not confined his attention solely to ethics, but had engaged with some zeal in the subtle discussions of the philosophers in physical science; whence he is occasionally called, simply, φροντιστὴς, and his school or study, φροντιστήριον, Aristoph. Nub. 95, sqq. STALL. FORST. See Mitch. Aristoph. 11. p. 17. n.

Ὑπὸ γῆς.] Ald. Bas. 1. Steph. Norib. Forst. ὑπὸ γῆν; but Bas. 2, ὑπὸ γῆς, which is the Attic form, and correct. FISCH. καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, κ. τ. λ. So Aristophanes, of the disciples of Socrates; Ζητοῦσιν οὗτοι τὰ κατὰ γῆς—Nub. 118, and Οὗτοι δ' ἱρεβοδιφῶσιν ὑπὸ τὸν Τάρταρον. 193. FORST.

Καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον, κ. τ. λ.] Aristoph. Nub. 113. ΣΤΡΕΨ. Εἶναι παρ' ἀυτοῖς φασὶν ἄμφω τὼ λόγω, Τὸν κρείττον', ὅστις ἐστι, καὶ τὸν ἥττονα, Τούτοιν τὸν ἕτερον τοῖν λόγοιν τὸν ἥσσονα Νικᾶν λέγοντα φασὶ τἀδικώτατα.

Ταύτην τὴν φήμην.] Heindorf proposes to read οἱ ταύτην, κ. τ. λ.; but

εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἷόν τε ἦν αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμῳδοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὤν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ

the article is unnecessary since the participle κατασκεδ. expresses the mode by which this class of the accusers became especially mischievous. *Isti quod eam famam sparserunt graves et periculosi accusatores exstiterunt.* STALL. μου would seem to be required after φήμην, but Plato appears to have omitted it, lest its subsequent repetition should offend the ears of the auditors. FISCH.

Ἐν. ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε.] "Tum ea ætate vobis hæc dicebant, qua maxime crederé *possetis.*" WOLF.; approved by Stall. who understands by ἂν—ἐπιστεύσατε, the *liability* to which childhood is subject of having its confidence abused, and not that the judges had actually been imposed upon, by those who would willingly have availed themselves of youth and inexperience to instil the more easily their unfounded prejudices. Cf. Matthiæ Gr. s. 509. c.

Μειράκια.] Serranus reads παῖδες ὄντες καὶ μειράκια ἀτεχνῶς, q. d. *inferiore etiam ætate quam pueri*; explaining μειρακια by *pueruli*, and joining ἀτεχνῶς with it, to make the phrase more emphatic; *and some of you absolutely children*; Forster, however, and after him the later editions, adopted the reading as supr. Ficinus, Lat. interp., appears to agree with Serranus.

Ἐρήμην.] Δίκη is understood in ερημη, a cause or trial, in which one of the litigants fails to appear; or in which, as above, the accused is not present. This was called, εἰς τὴν κυρίαν οὐκ ὀφθῆναι, or μὴ ἀπαντῆσαι; so Demosth. in Mid. 540. 22. ed. Reisk. Δίκην δὲ τούτῳ λαχὼν ὕστερον κατηγορίας, εἶλον ἐρήμην. (*I obtained a decision against him in his absence; on his failure of appearance.*) οὐ γὰρ ἀπήντα. Bos' Ellips. by Seager. Whence ἐρήμην κατηγορεῖν, *to accuse one in his absence.* According to the Athenian code, a day was appointed for the accused to answer the charges preferred against him; if he did not appear, he was condemned in consequence, and the sentence was called ἐξ ἐρήμης καταδικας θῆναι, and ἐρήμην ὀφλισκάνειν. But if, within the space of ten days, he presented himself, with any feasible excuse for his absence, the former sentence was annulled; and this proceeding was called δίκη μὴ οὖσα, after which the trial went on afresh. See Potter, Grec. Antiq. xxi.

Κωμῳδοποιὸς.] Ald. Bas. 1. 2. Norib. Steph. κωμῳδιοποιὸς; but the text is correct. Κωμῳδοποιοὶ, Ἀττικῶς· κωμῳδιοποιοὶ, Ἑλληνικῶς. Mœris apud Pierson. Socrates alludes here to Aristophanes and the comic poets already mentioned.

Φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι.] i. e. Φθονοῦντες καὶ διαβάλλοντες. STALL.

Ἀπορώτατοι.] *Most perplexing: tales qui minime possunt oppugnari et convinci.* STALL. Fischer explains κατήγοροι ἄποροι by *criminatores inexpugnabiles, quod oppugnare, convincere, aut omnino non aut ægre licet.* Some editions read ἀπειρότατοι; but a similar use is made of the reading in the text, in Lysid. where ἄποροι προσφέρεσθαι is applied to those whom it was difficult to manage in argument. Ficinus must have adopted the former, as he

68 ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ' ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥς περ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. Ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥς περ ἐγὼ
71 λέγω, διττούς μού τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἑτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω. καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους
75 πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον.

78 Εἶεν. ἀπολογητέον δή, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς
80 ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι
83 ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολο-
86 γητέον.

§. 3. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ᾗ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλιτός με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην.
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renders the passage, *hi omnes infiniti omnino sunt*, which is plainly incorrect.

Ἀναβιβάσασθαι.] *To bring forward.* Scap. Lex. "In voce media *ἀναβιβάζομαι*, ascensurum produco, prodire facio, produco."

Σκιαμαχεῖν.] *To contend with a shadow.*

Εἶεν.] This term was used by the Attic writers to express their having discussed sufficiently one branch of a subject, and their engaging in another. Stall. ad Euthyphr. p. 88. sqq.

Ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολήν.] h. e. *Adimere et evellere animis vestris malam de me opinionem.* STALL. who explains διαβολὴ by *mala opinio, suspicio, quatenus falsis criminationibus excitata est.* So Hesych. Gloss. Διάβολη· ὑπόπτευσις ἢ ὑπόληψις.

Πλέον τί.] Socrates was desirous to effect something further than the mere removal of the unfavorable impression caused by the calumnies of his adversaries, from the minds of his judges; he wished it to be replaced by one of an opposite character, which he trusted to establish in the course of his defence.

Γραφὴν ταύτην.] Γραφὴ means an indictment or legal accusation of a public delinquent; δίκη, as opp. to γραφὴ, is applied to a private cause, suit, or action, pleaded in a court of justice; but, taken absolutely, it signifies either public or private suits. Γράφεσθαι γραφήν is an ordinary form, as also γράφεσθαί τινα; hence the verb is often used with a double accusative, as in the text.

Εἶεν. τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὡς περ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταὐτὰ διδάσκων. Τοιαύτη τίς ἐστι· τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἑωράτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτην τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε

Ὡς περ οὖν κατηγόρων, κ. τ. λ.] *Debet accusatio eorum ut libellus accusatorum propris dictorum recitari.*— STALL. Ἀντωμοσία. Tim. Plat. Lex. γραφὴ κατά τινος ἔνορκος, περὶ ὧν ἠδικῆσθαι φησιν. At Athens, an oath was required of both parties at trial; the plaintiff swore ἀληθῆ κατηγορεῖν, *to allege the truth*; the defendant, ἀληθῆ ἀπολογήσειν, *to make true defence.* This oath, on the part of either plaintiff or defendant, was called ἀντωμοσία; a term which was also applied to the information upon oath of the accuser; *accusationis formula*, FISCH; written upon a tablet, whence ἀναγνῶναι, supr. and delivered to the judge. See Potter, Grec. Antiq. vol. i. c. 21.

Περιεργάζεται.] *Is officiously inquisitive.* Περιεργάζεσθαι, proprie est *curiose aliquam rem tractare* adeoque nimium studii in re aliqua ponere; deinde *curare ea, quæ nihil ad te pertinent: curare res inanes, vanas, inutiles*, ut supr. STALL.

Ἐπουράνια.] i. q. Μετεωρα, supr. c. 2. and infr. c. 10. So Seneca, Quæstt. Naturr. ii. 1, "*cælestia* etiam *sublimia* vocat, hoc est, nubila, imbres, nives, et humanas motura tonitrua mentes, quæcunque aer facit patiturve." FISCH.

Τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω.] Quintil. ii. 16. 3. "Nam et Socrati objiciunt comici, docere eum, quomodo pejorem causam mellorem faciat." FISCH.

Ἀεροβατεῖν.] Hesych. interp. εἰς τὸν ἀέρα περιπατεῖν. See Aristoph. Nub. 226, where Socrates is introduced as suspended in a basket in the air, and to the inquiry of Strepsiades, πρῶτον μέν, ὅ τι ὁρᾷς, ἀντιβολῶ, κατείπε μοι, replying, ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον. In like manner Abaris, the Pythagorean, was called Ἀιθροβάτης.— Porphyr. in. Vit. Pythag. sec. 29. According to Stallbaum, the learned have erred in concluding, that from Socrates having been, in the first instance, represented by Aristophanes as morose in his disposition, and ridiculous in his pursuits, he was subsequently condemned as a slanderer and a sophist. For a considerable time had elapsed since the first representation of the clouds; the play was unsuccessful, and the poet and philosopher were on such terms of intimacy afterwards, that the former could either never have intended to be seriously malicious; or, if he had been carried away so far as to commit a wanton injury upon an innocent and inoffensive object, he found good reason to regret his error. Hence Stallbaum infers that the allusion which Socrates makes to the comedy, is at once ironical and sarcastic; he appears to talk gravely upon a subject which in reality afforded only occasion for mirth, and so inflicts a severer censure upon the folly of his accusers, who, in the warmth of their animosity, availed themselves of arguments which were either unfounded in fact, or merely advanced in jest. Victor Cousin, in his Nouveaux Fragmens Philosophiques, Paris, 1829. p. 151. sqq. gives it as his opinion, that Aristophanes made a complete distinction between the doctrine of Socrates and his character and abilities. V. Aristoph. Brunck. p. 65. t. 2.

Ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν.] See Aristoph. Nub. 223. sqq.

Ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδέν, κ. τ. λ.] Ὧν is governed of περι, before ἐπαΐω, which is used in construction either with a ge-

σμικρὸν πέρι ἐπαίων· καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστι· μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελίτου τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμι! ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσι. φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις εἰ πώποτε ἢ σμικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου· καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τἆλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

§. 4. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν οὐδέ γ' εἴ τινος ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἷός τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥς περ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεον-

nitive simply, or with *πέρι* and a genitive, as supr. Οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν, is a proverbial expression; *quorum ego nihil omnino scio: quæ ego prorsus ignoro.* FISCH. So infr. ἢ σμικρὸν ἢ μέγα, *quidquam.*—Σμικρον. Mœrid. auctor. is the Attic form of μικρον.

Μή πως ἐγὼ, κ. τ. λ.] *Let me not be accused by Melitus upon so grave a charge.* The sentence is ironical, and is thus explained by Stallbaum: *Neque ego contemno et rejicio illam scientiam rerum cælestium, et artis cujus ope causa inferior fiat superior: atque utinam Melitus me nullo modo tantæ injuriæ possit reum agere.* δίκην φεύγειν signifies, *to be accused, to be the defendant in a cause,* and is so opposed to διώκειν, *to accuse, as plaintiff.* It is not clear how Ficinus understood the passage. V. Lat. Interp.

Οὐδὲν μέτεστι.] i. q. Οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι. c. 4. extr. FISCH.

Καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς, κ. τ. λ.] h. e. *Et volo s. postulo, ut vos ipsi alius alium edoceatis.* STALL.

Ἐκ τούτου.] sc. Ἐκ τοῦ διδάσκειν, κ. τ. λ. supr. Some editions read τούτων.

§. 4. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε, κ. τ. λ.] Socrates proceeds to discuss another of the charges alleged against him: that he was in the habit of instructing for hire. See Aristoph. Nub. 95. sqq.

Χρήματα πράττομαι.] *I exact payment.* πράττειν has the force of ἀπαιτεῖν, and signifies, *to demand on another's account;* πράττεσθαι i. q. ἀπαιτεῖσθαι, *to demand on one's own account.* The expression in the text was chiefly applied to those sophists who taught for money, and is equivalent to the phrase μισθὸν τῆς συνουσίας πράττομαι.—Xen. Memorr. i. 2. 60. where Xenophon declares that Socrates had never required any remuneration from his disciples: he also introduces the philosoper as speaking to the same effect, Apol. 16. ὃς παρ' οὐδενὸς, οὔτε δῶρα, οὔτε μισθὸν, δέχομαι. FISCH.

Ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό, κ. τ. λ.] This must be understood ironically; Socrates wishes to stigmatise and ridicule the avarice of the sophists.

Εἴ τις οἷός τ' εἴη.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 524. Obs. 3.

Γοργίας, κ. τ. λ.] A disciple of Empedocles, and a distinguished sophist and

116 τῖνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἱππίας δὲ ὁ Ἠλεῖος. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυ-
119 τῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσι τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιποντὰς σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσει-
122 δέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνήρ ἐστι Πάριος ἐνθάδη σο-

rhetorician, born at Leontium, a town of Sicily. According to Suidas, he was the first who moulded rhetoric to an art. His talent for extemporaneous eloquence commanded the admiration and respect of all Greece; and during an abode of some years at Athens, in the office of ambassador, he received from that state the most flattering testimonies of their consideration. He enriched himself by giving courses of public lectures, for which he exacted from each of his disciples one hundred minæ. Pausanias relates, Phoc. ch. 18, that he presented the temple at Delphi with a gilded statue of himself, and that after a life full of glory, he died, aged one hundred and five years; according to Diog. Laertius, Suidas, and Philostratus, at one hundred and nine years old. Diog. Laert. 9. 52. Cic. de Orat. i. 22. iii. 32. Platon. Gorg.—Prodicus was born at Ceos, one of the Cyclades, he was a rhetorician and physician, a disciple of Protagoras, and cotemporary of Democritus. Xenophon has preserved his beautiful allegory, the judgment of Hercules. He devoted himself with great assiduity to ascertaining and fixing the exact meaning of words. His instructions were never gratuitous, and he justified his conduct in this particular by his favourite maxim from Epicharmus: *ἃ δὲ χεὶρ τὰν χεῖρα νίζει· δός τι καὶ λαβέ τι.*—Hippias was born in Elis, a city of Peloponnesus; in wealth, reputation, and prosperity, he was in no respect inferior to Gorgias, to whose eloquence his own bore a marked resemblance. He was charged with several missions of importance by the Lacedemonians, and always acquitted himself with high credit and honourable distinction. Platon. Hipp. Min. Cratyl. passim.

Προῖκα.] Κατὰ δωρεάν, ἄνευ μισθοῦ. SCHOL.

Τούτους πείθουσι.] The usual kind of *anacoluthon* is that of a writer commencing a period in the way which the process of his speech requires, but afterwards, and especially after some interpolations which make the hearer forget the beginning of the construction, passing over to a new construction; as in the text, where the *τούτων* in the beginning of the sentence refers to the sophists already mentioned, and both the process of the speech, and its emphasis, required the new period to commence with *any one of them is capable of persuading young people, &c.* The following proposition must then have had the *infin.* *πειθειν* to correspond to *οἷός τ' ἐστίν.* But farther on, the mention of the young people being interpolated with circumstances rendered necessary to establish a contrast, (the young people, who are at liberty to have a gratuitous intercourse with any of their fellow-citizens whom they like,) the writer forsakes his construction, of which the grammatical junction is now obscured, and finds it more natural to refer with a second *τούτους* to the *νέους*, and to commence a new construction, *τούτους πείθουσι*—i. e. *those sophists persuade the young people, &c.* Buttmann's Intermed. Gr. Gr. pp. 422. 423. The terms *ξυνεῖναι* and *ξυνουσία* are applied to the habits of intercourse which existed between master and pupil; whence auditors or disciples are generally called *οἱ ξυνόντες.* STALL.

Ἀνήρ Πάριος.] Evenus, born in the island of Paros, a sophist and elegiac poet. Harpocr. in. voc. *δύο ἀναγράφουσιν Εὐήνους ἐλεγείων ποιητὰς, ὁμωνύμους ἀλλήλοις, καθάπερ Ἐρατοσθένης ἐν τῷ περὶ Χρονογραφιῶν,*

φός, ὃν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσ-
ελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὅς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ
ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἱππονίκου. τοῦτον
οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱέε—Ὦ Καλ-
λία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μέν σου τὼ υἱέε πώλω ἢ μόσχω
ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ
μισθώσασθαι ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτὼ καλώ τε κἀγαθὼ ποιή-
σειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν· ἦν δ' ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν
ἱππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώ-
πω ἐστόν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν;
τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολι-
τικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γάρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ
τὴν τῶν υἱέων κτῆσιν. ἔστι τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὔ;
Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός; καὶ
πόσου διδάσκει; Εὔηνος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, Πάριος,
πέντε μνῶν. Καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὔηνον ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὡς
ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς

ἀμφοτέρους λέγων Παρίους εἶναι· γνωρίζεσθαι δέ φησιν τὸν νεώτερον μόνον. μέμνηται δὲ θατέρου αὐτῶν καὶ Πλάτων.

Ὃν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα.] *Ad quem ego aliqando animum adverti in nostra urbe commorantem.* STALL. Socrates had not seen Evenus, but had heard from Callias what he was going to state concerning him. It is probable that Ficinus read ἤσθην or ᾐδόμην, See Lat. interp.

Ὃς τετέλεκε, κ. τ. λ.] h. e. *qui inter omnes, qui apud nos sapientiæ student, plurimum pecuniæ sophistis solvit.* STALL. The wealth of Callias was proverbial, whence it is said that he was commonly called, simply, ὁ πλούσιος. But his profligacy was extreme, and his extravagance unbounded; failings which the sophists were not slow in turning to their own advantage. Xenoph. Sympos. i. 5.

Ἦν δ' ἐγώ.] Ἔφην δ' ἐγώ. SCHOL.

Αὐτοῖν.] Ald Bas. 1. Norib. αὐτῶν. Bas. 2. αὐτοῖς.

Ἐπιστάτην.] Soph. in Ajace, ποιμνίων ἐπιστάται, *gregis curatores, ovilium magistri.* Μισθώσασθαι—μισθοῦν, *locare: μισθωσασθαι, conducere, redimere.* STALL.

Πέντε μνῶν.] The Attic mina was equivalent to a hundred Attic drachms. Hence it appears that Evenus was much less exorbitant than the sophists previously mentioned, Gorgias, of Leontium, &c. It is said of Prodicus, that he receved fifty minæ from each of his auditors, individually, for a single lecture. FORST.

Εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει.] The Greeks often quote the words of another narratively, and yet suddenly change into the *orat. recta*, as if the person himself spoke. Thus they put ὡς, ὅτι itself before the actual words of the speaker. Matthiæ Gr. s. 529. 5. So Socrates, as supr., repeats the observation he made to Callias after his comment on the good fortune of Evenus.

Ἐμμελῶς.] In Actis Erudit. a. 1749. p. 22. εὐτελῶς; but Socrates would not have expressed himself as if the value of the knowledge which the children of Callias derived from Evenus consisted in its cheapness, πέντε μνῶν, supr. The

διδάσκει. ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἄν, εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

§. 5. Ὑπολάβοι οὖν ἄν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως, Ἀλλ' ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαί σοι αὗται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δή που σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μή τι ἔπραττες ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν. Ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἀγὼ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι τί ποτ' ἔστι τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δή. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. Ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα

reading in the text is decidedly preferable: ἐμμελῶς, from μέλος, signifying literally, *harmoniously*, and thence *suitably, tastefully, &c.* Socrates meaning at the same time to convey an ironical compliment upon the zeal of Evenus, which led him to rate his instructions in such important branches of education, at a price so far below what has been already mentioned as demanded by others. STALL. ἐμμελῶς, Hesych. interpret. προθύμως. FISCH.

Ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἄν.] *I should have plumed and prided myself.* Fischer explains it; *gloriando me efferrem, jactarem me magnifice*, and refers both these expressions to that species of superfluous ornament in dress, less indicative of taste than effeminacy. Hesych. Suid. Phavor. hh. vv.

Ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι.] h. e. ἀλλ' οὐ δύναμαι καλλύνεσθαι καὶ ἁβρύνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι. v. ad cap. 3. STALL.

§. 5. Πόθεν.] Ficinus appears to have read καὶ πόθεν, *et unde*, &c. Lat. interpr.

Οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον.] h. e. *nihil curiosius quam ceteri.* STALL.

Ἔπειτα.] Εἶτα and ἔπειτα signify both *afterwards, thereupon*, and both are often used to express *reproaches in a scolding manner*, the motive of *anger* or *surprise* having been first stated. Buttmann's Intermed. Gr. Gr. p. 400; see also 144. *Obs.* 6. and Herm. *ad Viger. n.* 239.

Εἰ μή τι ἔπραττες, κ. τ. λ.] This may be considered merely as emphatic, the condition having been expressed in the beginning of the sentence, οὐ γὰρ δήπου, κ. τ. λ. Stallbaum explains the passage, *Non orta esset, opinor, hæc de te fama, quæ tamen revera orta est, nisi alia ageres atque alii;* as if the sentence in full were, λόγος γέγονεν, ὃς οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, εἰ μή τι ἔπραττες, κ. τ. λ. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 508. Obs. 2. extr. and s. 636. init.

Αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν.] Αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, *to act thoughtlessly or precipitately;* applied in the text in reference to such judges as are apt to form hasty and unfounded decisions.

Τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν.] Ὄνομα refers to the reputation of Socrates; διαβολήν to the calumnies of his adversaries. Muretus, Varr. Lectt. vii. 16. compares ποιεῖν ὄνομα with the Latin *famam conficere.*

ἔσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥ πέρ ἐστιν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὅς τίς φησι, ψεύδεταί τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καί μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ' ἐὰν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δή τίς ἐστι σοφία καὶ οἵα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που. οὗτος ἐμός τε

Μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον.] *Majorem sapientiam quam quæ in hominem cadat: sapientiam humana excellentiorem.* FISCH. When it is not a substantive that is compared with another, but the quality of a thing expressed by an adjective that is considered in its proportion to another quality, and compared in degree with it, (where in Latin *quam pro* is used), then ἢ κατά or ἢ πρός is put after the comparative. Matthiæ Gr. a. 449.

Ἢ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι λέγω.] *Alioqui non habeo quod de ea dicam.* STEPH. Forster would prefer ἤν οὐκ, κ. τ. λ. as if Socrates were at a loss by what name he should call this greater than human wisdom of the sophists. But the text is more likely to be correct as it stands; for Socrates, who was liberal of his irony whenever it could be introduced with effect, may be fairly considered to have purposely placed the sophists in a dilemma, as being either possessed of divine wisdom, or none at all. FISCH.

Ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει.] h. e. *mei calumniandi causa*, STALL. ἐπὶ frequently signifying *with the prospect*, or *in order to*. Matthiæ Gr. s. 585. The possessive pronouns are equivalent in signification to the genitives of the personal pronouns, Matthiæ Gr. 466, as appears in the above passage; so Homer, Odyss. xi. 202, σὸς πόθος. Iliad. xix. 320. ν. 336, ἐμὴν ἀγγελίην, i. e. περὶ ἐμοῦ. Sophocl. Œd. t. 969, τῷ ἐμῷ πόθῳ. Plat. Gorg. εὐνοίᾳ τῇ σῇ. Compare also Sallust. Jug. c. 14. "Vos in mea injuria despecti estis." Liv. ii. 1, "regium metum" for "metu regis," and iii. 16, "terrorem servilem" for "terrore servorum."

Μέγα λέγειν.] h. e. *admirabile quid dicere.* STALL.—Οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον. By this Socrates intends to remove all appearance of presumption or self-sufficiency on his part, and so to conciliate the good will, while he commands the attention of his auditors. Cf. Horat. Sat. ii. 2. 2. "Nec meus hic sermo est."

Ἀξιόχρεων.] Properly *solvent*, one to whom money may be safely entrusted; hence, as in the text, *creditable*. So the Latin *locuples* is asserted of a *competent witness*. Hesych. ἀξιόχρεως, ἀξιόπιστος. Suid. ἀξιόχρεως· ἱκανός, ἐχέγγυος, ἀξιόπιστος.

Τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς—καὶ οἵα.] h. e. παρέξομαι γὰρ ὑμῖν τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς μάρτυρα τῆς ἐμῆς σοφίας, εἰ δή τίς ἐστιν, καὶ οἵα ἐστιν. v. Krüger. de Attract. p. 202. STALL.—Ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς. Interpr. Schol. Thucyd. i. 134. ὁ Ἀπόλλων. Nep. Pausan. v. 5. "deus Delphicus." FISCH.

Χαιρεφῶντα.] Χαιρεφῶν οὗτος ὁ Σωκρατικὸς ἰσχνὸς ἦν καὶ ὠχρὸς, τὸ δὲ ἦθος συκοφάντης καὶ κόλαξ, πρὸς δὲ καὶ κλέπτης καὶ αὐχμηρὸς, τὴν δὲ περιουσίαν πένης. Εὔπολις μὲν οὖν ἐν Πόλεσι διὰ τὴν χροιὰν πύξινον αὐτὸν καλεῖ, Ἀριστοφάνης δ' ἐν Ὄρνισι νυκτερίδα· ἐν δὲ Τελμισσεῦσιν

ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου, καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρός τε καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὅ τι ὁρμήσειε. καὶ δή ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι,—καὶ ὅ περ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες. ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὑτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκε.

εἰς αὐχμηρὸν καὶ πένητα· Εὔπολις δ' ἐν Κόλαξιν Καλλίου κόλακα λέγει, Ἀριστοφάνης δ' ἐν Δράμασι κλέπτην. ἐν δ' Ὥραις νυκτὸς αὐτὸν παῖδα καλεῖ. SCHOL. v. Aristoph. Nub. 104. 501. sqq. Xenoph. Memorab. ii. 3.

Ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρος.] Lysias, Orat. adv. Agorat. pp. 94. 96. 99. 100. 108. makes frequent use of the term πλῆθος in reference to the advocates of the popular cause, in which sense it is to be understood in the text—Ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην. Upon the capture of Athens by Lysander, and his subsequent appointment of the thirty tyrants, a great concourse of the Athenians, disgusted with their government, retired to Thebes and Megara, whence they soon afterwards returned under the conduct of Thrasybulus, and restored the republic. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. ii. Diod. Sic. xiv. The φυγὴ took place a. 1. Olymp. 94; the return to the city, a. 4. Olymp. 94. Meursius de Archont. iii. 13. 15; and Socrates drank the hemlock a. 1. Olymp. 95. Laert. ii. 44. Gellius, xvii. 21. whence τὴν φύγην ταύτην; expressive of a recent event. The verbs κατιέναι and κατέρχεσθαι are commonly applied to those who return from exile to their native land. So Tho. Magister and Phavor. Κατέρχομαι, ὅταν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἀφ' ἧς ἐξῆλθον, ἐπανέλθω. Schol. Arist. ad Rann. 1196: ἰδίως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν φυγάδων χρῶνται τῷ κατέρχεται.

Χαιρεφῶν.] ὁ Χαιρεφων, BECK. *Chærephon ille.*

Μαντεύσασθαι.] Μαντεύεσθαι, h. l. est oraculum sibi edi jubere, h. e. *consulere, interrogare, sciscitari.* STALL.

Ὅ περ λέγω.] This phrase is to be taken parenthetically: Plato frequently using ὅ περ λέγω or ὁ λέγω in reference to an expression not long preceding; it is to be understood in the text as alluding to the θορύβησις, which Socrates had already deprecated more than once. Hence Stephanus would read, καὶ (ὅπερ λέγω) μὴ θορυβεῖτε, as in Crit. ὥστε (ὅπερ λέγω) μήτε, ταῦτα φοβούμενος, ἀποκάμῃς σῶσαι σαυτὸν, κ. τ. λ. So in Apol. εἰ οὖν με (ὅπερ εἶπον) ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, κ. τ. λ. The other mode of construction by which ὅπερ should be made to depend on θορυβεῖτε, is harsh, and at variance with its ordinary government in its present sense: θορυβῶ πρὸς τοῦτο, or ἐπὶ τούτῳ, τούτου ἕνεκα, or ἐπιθορυβῶ τούτῳ, are among its received forms, in which it will seldom be found with a simple accusative.

Ἤρετο γὰρ δή, εἴ τις.] When the Greek writers resume their subject after a parenthesis, they generally repeat the same verb, or one similar in substance to that which had preceded the interruption, with the addition of a particle γάρ, δή, or οὖν. Matthiæ Gr. s. 615. s. 616.

Ἀνεῖλεν.] Ἀναιρεῖν, *to make an oracular response;* Xen. Mem. i. 3. 1, *announce oracularly.* In Herodot. freq. *to lift up the voice,* (φωνην, or a similar word, underst.) and so *deliver an oracle* or *prophecy,* the voice rising from the depth of the sanctuary. Donn. Gr. Lex. According to Laertius, ii. 37, the response of the oracle was, Ἀνδρῶν ἁπάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος.—Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 144. Σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς, σοφώτερος δ' Εὐριπίδης· Ἀνδρῶν δὲ πάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος. Socr. in Xen. Apol. c. 14. ἀνεῖλεν ὁ Ἀπόλλων, μηδένα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἐμοῦ μήτε ἐλευθεριώτερον, μήτε δικαιότερον, μήτε σωφρονίστερον.

Ἀδελφὸς.] Chærecrates. Xen. Memor. ii. 3.

§. 6. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὑτωσί, Τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν· τί οὖν ποτὲ λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δή που ψεύδεταί γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ. καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν τί ποτε λέγει, ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην· ἦλθον ἐπί τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα, εἴ πέρ που, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι Οὗτός γ' ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—ὀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὔ. κἄπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ' οὔ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων. πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι Τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι,

§. 6. Αἰνίττεται.] Hesych. Αἰνίττεται· ἀσήμως λέγει, ἀποτείνεται, ἐπισημαίνει. Phavor. Αἰνίττεται, ἀντὶ τοῦ δηλοῖ.

Ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν.] So Eurip. Med. 495. ξυνοισθά γ' εἰς ἔμ' οὐκ εὔορκος ὤν: the participle being put in the nominative, because the same subject is continued in the person of the verb. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 548.

Ψεύδεται.] The Delphian oracle was in such high repute for veracity, that Τὰ ἐκ τρίποδος, the responses given from the tripod, came to be proverbially adopted as infallible truths. See Potter's Grec. Antiq. 1. c. ix.

Τί ποτε λέγει.] Fisch. λέγοι: but instances of similar transitions to that in the text, from the *obliqua oratio* to the *oratio recta*, are of frequent occurrence with the Greek writers, who in narration consider the main verb as well as the accompanying circumstances of an event as present, and hence use the present indic. Matthiæ Gr. s. 529. 5.

Αὐτοῦ.] sc. χρησμοῦ, or some word of similar import, which is implied in the preceding τί ποτε λέγει. Præfat. ad Welleri Gr. p. 9. s. Fisch.

Πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν—ἐλογιζόμην.] h. e. *Mecum cogitabam.* Stall. As in Phæd. c. 45. πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκεψάμενος.

Οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθόν.] *Neque bonum neque honestum*; h. e. *uterque nostrum videtur plane stultus esse, omnisque omnino sapientiæ expers.* Fisch.

ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δὲ ὥς περ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι. ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔδοξε· καὶ ἐνταῦθα κἀκείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

§. 7. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιὼς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι· ἰτέον οὖν, σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμὸν τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τούς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,—δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς

Ὡς περ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 625.

Σμικρῷ τινὶ αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ.] Cic. Academ. 1. 4. "Socrates ita disputat, ut—nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque præstare ceteris, quod illi quæ nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat; ob eamque causam se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod hæc esset una hominis sapientia, non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat."

Πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.] Hence Laertius records of Socrates, ii. 21. πολλάκις δὲ βαιότερον ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσι διαλεγόμενον κονδυλίζεσθαι καὶ παρατίλλεσθαι, τὸ πλέον τε γελᾶσθαι καταφρονούμενον, καὶ πάντα ταῦτα φέρειν ἀνεξικακῶς.

§. 7. Ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην.] This is to be referred not merely to δεδιὼς, but to αἰσθανόμενος and λυπούμενος preceding; hence Wolf correctly explains the passage; *videns quidem et dolens invisum me fieri, atque ob id metuens.* STALL.

Τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ.] The neuter of the article is often put absolutely, with the genitive of a substantive, and in that case signifies every thing to which the substantive, which is put in the genitive, refers, all that concerns it, that arises from it, that belongs to it. Eurip. Ph. 415. τὰ φίλων δ' οὐδὲν, ἢν τις δυστυχῇ, *the assistance of friends is nothing*, &c. *Ib.* 393. δεῖ φέρειν τὰ τῶν θεῶν, *the visitation of the gods.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 284.

Νὴ τὸν κύνα.] The opinions of both ancients and moderns upon the origin and efficacy of this and other equally strange oaths, by the oak, plane tree, &c. of which the philosopher frequently made use, are various and undecided. Some have supposed that the dæmon of Socrates was intended by the dog; Pet. Petit. Observatt. Miscell. 4. 7. Others, that the dog was sworn by as the emblem of fidelity; Joach. Camerar. Opusc. de R. R. p. 28; and that consequently νὴ τὸν κύνα was equivalent to the Latin *medius fidius.* Olympiodorus, in Vit. Platon. ex Gorg. explains it of the Egyptian deity Anubis. Forster coincides with those who imagine that Socrates adopted these oaths after the example and upon the authority of Rhadamanthus, who avoided swearing by the gods themselves. So the Scholiast: Ῥαδαμάνθυος ὅρκος οὗτος ὁ κατὰ κυνὸς ἢ χηνὸς ἢ πλατάνου ἢ κριοῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλου τοιούτου. Οἷς ἦν μέγιστος ὅρκος ἅπαντι λόγῳ κύων, ἔπειτα χήν· θεοὺς δ' ἰσίγων· Κρατῖνος ἐν Χείροσι. κατὰ τούτων δὲ νόμος δμνύναι, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ θεῶν οἱ ὅρκοι γίγνωνται. τοιοῦτοι δὲ καὶ οἱ Σωκράτους ὅρκοι. There are some, however, who imagine that Socrates used such oaths in ridicule of the generally received divinities.

τἀληθῆ λέγειν—ἦ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὥς περ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. Μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἦα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τούς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους,

Ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα—.] Sentences which are subjoined for the sake of explanation, are frequently added without the connexion of any conjunctive particle, as in the passage above: so in Phæd. *τί δ' οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν· ἀκολασίᾳ τινὶ σώφρονές εἰσι;*

Ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν.] *Ζητεῖν κατὰ τὸν θεόν*, est *explorare aliorum sapientiam, auctore Apolline.* FISCH. For by the oracular sanction, which conferred upon Socrates the precedency in wisdom, he was bound to investigate the claims of others so as to justify the judgment which had been pronounced upon his own.

Πλάνην.] Mœris: Πλάνος, Ἀττικῶς· πλάνη, Ἑλληνικῶς. Fischer supposes, that in *πλανην* some allusion is conveyed to the wanderings of Ulysses, which he asserts to be still further shadowed forth by the addition of *ὥς περ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος*; the wanderings and toil of the philosopher in his efforts to establish the veracity of the deity, bearing a remarkable analogy to the perilous adventures of the Ithacan prince. Forster imagines that Hercules is the intended parallel.

Ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος. κ. τ. λ.] *Ἵνα μή μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος, κ. τ. λ.* STEPH. who explains the passage; *Operæ pretium est vobis ostendere quantum oberraverim ne comperiretur oraculum esse ejusmodi quod a me refelli non posset;* as Socrates had previously expressed his intention of endeavouring to confute the oracle; *ελεγξων τὸ μαντειον, κ. τ. λ.* c. 6. But the text as it stands appears unobjectionable: for Socrates, unwilling to distrust the deity, and yet amazed that he should have been the object of his singular approval, engaged freely in all the difficulties connected with the ultimate discovery of the truth, in order that his own experience might lead to a satisfactory conviction, i. e. *ἵνα—ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γενοιτο*; *that the prediction might be incontrovertible.* So V. Cousin. "Mais il faut achever de vous raconter mes courses et les travaux que j' entrepris *pour m' assurer de la vérité de l'oracle.*"

Τῶν διθυράμβων] Suid. *Διθύραμβος, ὕμνος εἰς Διόνυσον*, i. e. Dithyramb means the Bacchic hymn. The first author of the Dithyramb was, according to some, Lasus Hermionensis, in the time of the first Darius; according to others, Arion Methymnæus, in the time of Periander. But as it appears from Pindar and his scholiast, Pind. Olymp. xiii. the antiquity of it was so great that the inventor could not be known; the very word occurring in these Dithyrambic verses by Archilochus, who was prior to both Lasus and Arion; *Ὡς Διωνύσοι' ἄνακτος καλὸν ἐξάρξαι μέλος Οἶδα Διθυράμβον, οἰνῳ συγκεραύνωθεις φρένας*, Athen. p. 628. The etymology of the word is doubtful as its import; various derivations have been assigned it, which are registered by Gerard Vossius in his Institutio Poetica, iii. 16. 2. The most common etymology is *διθύραμβος* for *διθύραμος*, *double-doored*, i. e. *he who has passed through two doors*; in which term allusion is supposed to be made to the double birth of Bacchus—from the womb of Semele and the thigh of Jove. For a copious account of the Dithyramb, see the Theatre of the Greeks, edit. 3. 1830. from which admirable work, and indispensable to the classical student, this note was compiled.

ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τἀληθῆ· ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ πεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ

Ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ.] Schol. *ἐπ' αὐτόκτω, ἐπ' ὄψει.* Suid. *ἐπ' ὀφθαλμοῖς.*

Ἃ μοι ἐδόκει—πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς.] h. e. *quæ ab iis maxima diligentia composita videbantur.* Stall. Διηρώτων ἄν. The part. ἄν frequently gives to the *indic.* the signification of *being habitual, customary;* Demosth. *pro Cor.* 301. *None of the ancient orators has been of such a various influence,* ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν γράφων οὐκ ἂν ἐπρέσβευεν, ὁ δὲ πρεσβεύων οὐκ ἂν ἔγραφε, it was not usual for him, who proposed laws, to be an ambassador, and *vice versa.* Compare also Soph. *Philoct.* 290. 92. Buttmann's Intermed. Gr. Gr. s. 139. *Obs.* 5.

Αὐτῶν.] This genitive depends on the comparat. βέλτιον, and refers to the poets; it is omitted by Ficinus. Fisch. Οἱ παρόντες ἂν βελτιον, κ. τ. λ. *Omnes qui aderant, melius istis de carminibus solebant judicare, quæ illi ipsi composuerant.* Stall. So V. Cousin: *De tous ceux qui étaient là présens, il n'y en avait presque pas un qui ne fût capable de rendre compte de ces poëmes mieux que ceux qui les avaient faits.* Wolfe renders οἱ παρόντες, *qui hic adsunt,* as if it referred to the judges; incorrectly, for Socrates evidently alludes to those who were present at his discussion with the poets.

Ἐν ὀλίγῳ.] Acts, xxvi. 28. ἐν ὀλίγῳ με πείθεις Χριστιανὸν γενέσθαι; where Michaelis understands χρόνῳ, so as to make the signification *in a short time,* which is equivalent to the ordinary interpretation, *almost.* Blackwall in Class. Sacr. v. 2. p. 84. Ficinus correctly renders ἐν ὀλίγῳ, *brevi.*

Ποιοῖεν.] Stephens omits ἃ ποιοῖεν; which is found, however, in all other copies, and translated as part of the text by Ficinus and Serranus. Fischer supposes the omission to have occurred not by the direction of Stephens, but by the negligence of the transcribers, which was not subsequently remedied.

Φύσει τινὶ, κ. τ. λ.] So Cic. p. Archia. 8. "Poetam natura ipsa valere, et mentis viribus excitari, et quasi divino quodam spiritu inflari." Compare also Horat. A. P. 408. "Natura fieret laudabile carmen an arte." Carm. iv. 3. "Quem tu Melpomene, &c." Ἐνθουσιάζοντες. Ovid. Fast. vi. 6. "Est Deus in nobis; agitante calescimus illo."

Τοιοῦτον τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος.] Hence the strictures of Aristophanes upon the dithyrambic and tragic poets, in Avib. 1388. Τῶν διθυράμβων γὰρ τὰ λαμπρὰ γίνεται Ἀέρια καὶ σκότιά γε καὶ κυνανυγία Καὶ πτεροδόνητα, κ. τ. λ.; and his Scholiast in loc. πλείστη γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ λέξις τοιαύτη· ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐλάχιστος· ὡς ἡ παροιμία· Καὶ διθυραμβοποιῶν νοῦν ἔχεις ἐλαττόνα. Forst.

ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες. καὶ ἅμα ἠσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τἆλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, τῷ αὐτῷ αὐτῶν οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι, ᾧ περ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

§. 8. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ᾖα· ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ ξυνῄδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δέ γ' ἤδη ὅτι εὑρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καί μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταὐτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἁμάρτημα, ὅ περ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἠξίου καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν. ὥστ' ἐμὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως ὥς περ ἔχω ἔχειν, μή τέ τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι

Ἠισθόμην αὐτῶν—εἶναι ἀνθρώπων.] The verbs *αἰσθάνεσθαι, πυνθάνεσθαι, γινωσκειν*, are sometimes found with the genitive, instead of the accusative, which otherwise is the more usual case with them; e. g. *Thuc.* 5. 83. *ὡς ᾔσθοντο τειχιζόντων. Plat. Apol. Soc.* c. 7. *ᾐσθόμην—οἰομένων*, for *αὐτοὺς τειχίζοντας, οἰομένους*, " that they were erecting a wall," " that they thought." Matthiæ Gr. s. 349. Obs. 2. Buttmann, L. Gr. Gr. s. 132. "A *οὐκ ἦσαν*, sc. *σοφοί*. STALL.

§. 8. Ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ ξυνῄδειν.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 548. 2.

Ἤιδη.] See cap. 19. n. *ἀπολώλη*.

Τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 332. s. 338.

Διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην.] Steph. *διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν τέχνην*, to which the Latin of Ficinus is accommodated.

Καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μέγιστα, κ. τ. λ.] Forster justly observes that Socrates makes an ironical allusion here to the administration of the republic, which in his own time was vested in the most opulent, and generally the most ignorant; whose vain and ridiculous ambition incurred not only the derision of the philosophers, but afforded a copious subject to the comic poets for the exercise of their most poignant wit. See Mitford's Greece, ed. 1829. vol. iv. pp. 132. 133. sqq.

Πλημμέλεια.] Lit. *a violation of the rules of harmony*; hence *a fault, transgression, oversight.—ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν*; h. e. *error ille atque stultitia scientiam istorum hominum ac sapientiam ita quasi obscurabat, ut hæc nulla esse videretur.* STALL.

Ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ] *In the name* or *behalf of the oracle.—πότερα δεξαίμην κ. τ. λ. whether I should prefer to continue as I am.* Δεχομαι, cum infinit. exp. *volo*, sicut et *οὐ δεχομαι, nolo.*—Scap. Lex.

Ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν.] Sc. *αὐτῶν*, i. e. *the artizans.—ἀμφοτερα*, intell. *σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν.*

ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ, ὥς περ ἔχω ἔχειν.

§. 9. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἷαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γάρ με ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ φαίνεται ταῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτην, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα

§. 9. *Καὶ οἷαι χαλαπώταται.*] h. e. *longe gravissimæ et acerrimæ.* STALL. *τοιαῦται* being understood before *οἷαι*; Xenoph. Mem. iv. 8. 11. *ἐδόκει τοιοῦτος εἶναι, οἷος ἂν εἴη ἄριστός γε ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.* See Matthiæ Gr. s. 461. Viger. de Idiot. sec. 8. v. vi.

Τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει κ. τ. λ.] h. e. *quum tamen revera deus videatur sapiens esse.* STALL. *τὸ δὲ* is an elliptical expression, not easily supplied, which introduces a proposition opposed to what has been stated before, nearly like the English *as however, but as yet.* Heind. ad Plat. Theæt. 37. Buttm. *ad Menon.* 37. and Int. Gr. Gr. s. 150. Sometimes, however, it is more fully expressed; De Repub. iv. p. 443. *τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτον μέν τι ἦν—ἡ δικαιοσύνη.* Tim. p. 86. *τὸ δὲ ἀληθές, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἀκολασία—νόσος ψυχῆς γέγονε*: in which sense it is to be taken in the text; *but as yet truly the Deity, &c.* "Etenim articulus cum *δὲ* conjunctus indicat id, quod alii cuidam ita opponitur ut pro vero haberi debeat." STALL.

Τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι.] This was in reality the grand point which Socrates was labouring to prove; the mere nothingness of human wisdom contrasted with the divine intelligence. Lactant. de Ira Dei, c. i. 7. "Vidit (Socrates) ex parte aliqua veritatem, testatusque est etiam in judicio, sicut traditur a Platone, quod nulla esset humana sapientia."

Καὶ οὐδενὸς.] *Et vero,* sc. *immo nullius pretii.* STALL. Ruding. p. 217. *ἢ καί*, or *ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον οὐδ.*; incorrectly, for *καί* by itself has the force of *atque adeo, immo, vero;* as c. 16. *ὅτου τι, καὶ σμικρὸν, ὄφελός ἐστιν.* Besides *ἢ καί* and *ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον* are not conformable to the rules of Greek construction, which would require *μᾶλλον δέ*, or *ἤ* simply; for *ὀλίγον ἢ οὐδέν* and *ὀλίγον καὶ οὐδέν*, with similar forms, occur frequently in the best writers: so infr. c. 10. *εἰδότων δὲ ἢ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν.* FISCH.

Καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν.] h. e. *atque videtur* (sc. Deus) *non de Socrate hoc dicere.* STALL. *τοῦτο* being referred to *σοφὸν εἶναι. Λέγειν τινά* for *λέγειν περί τινος*, is a usual form with Attic writers: Cf. in Criton. *φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς.* Aristoph. Acharn. v. 593. *ταυτὶ λέγεις σὺ τὸν στρατηγόν.* Some editions for *τοῦτ' οὐ* read *τοῦτον λέγειν τὸν Σ.* as if it should be understood *δεικτικῶς* for *ἐμέ*; but the adversative particle in the succeeding member of the sentence manifestly requires the negative *οὐ*, as in the text. Other editions read *τοῦτο*, as referring to the oracle, or propose *τούτου*, depending upon *ἕνεκα* or *χάριν* understood, which appears to have been adopted by Ficinus; Lat. Interpr.; however the objection already stated holds good against all but the adopted reading.

ποιούμενος, ὥς περ ἂν εἰ εἶποι ὅτι Οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅς τις ὥς περ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιὼν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων ἄν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔ τέ τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

§. 10. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἑπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολὴ ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀν-

Ὡς περ ἂν εἰ.] *As if*—these particles, in construction, take the opt. in cases merely supposed, but in such a way that *ἄν*, which precedes *εἰ*, refers to an opt. in the apodosis of the conditional proposition. *Dem. pro. Cor.* p. 293. 1. *ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ναύκληρον τῆς ναναγίας αἰτιῷτο, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐκυβέρνων τὴν ναῦν, φήσειεν ἄν*, where *ὥσπερ ἂν φήσειεν ἄν* are to be taken together, as *Plat. Gorg.* p. 465. C. *καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἰ....τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν.* Matthiæ Gr. Gr. s. 523. 2. So the Latins use both *quasi* and *quasi si*; Plaut. Asin. v. 1. 11; as *nisi si* and *nisi*; Drakenb. ad Liv. vi. 26. 5. p. 376. tom. ii.; in imitation of the Greek *ὥσπερ ἂν* and *ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ, ἂν μὴ* and *ἂν εἰ μή*.—FISCH.

Τῶν ἀστῶν—τῶν ξένων.] These genitives depend on *τίνα* following.

Τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι.] h. e. *Id agens, ut appareat responsum Apollinis esse verum.* STALL. Ἀσχόλια, Thom. Mag. *ἡ περί τι ἀναστροφή.* h. e. *occupatio, studium quod in aliqua re ponitur.* Ip.

Ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ.] *In the greatest poverty.* *πενία* and *πτωχεία* differ as the Latin *paupertas* and *egestas*; *πενία*, consequently, is applied to those who are indebted to manual labour, and its attendant wages for their daily support: *πτωχεία*, to mendicants. The poverty of Socrates was such, that he is said to have valued his whole house and substance at five Attic minæ; Xenoph. Œconom. ii. 3; whence he was commonly called Πίνης. Libanius, in Apol. Socr. p. 640., mentions that eighty minæ were bequeathed him by his father, which he lost by some mischance, and ever after lived in distress.

Διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.] *On account of my serving the god.* The gen. expresses the object of an action or feeling expressed in another noun, and is used objectively, as in Latin; a relation which in English is expressed by prepositions, e. g. *πόθος υἱοῦ, desiderium filii*, not *thy son's regret*, i. e. which the son has, but *regret for the son*, like *σὸς πόθος*. Od. λ. 202. Soph. Œd. C. 631. *τίς δῆτ' ἂν ἀνδρὸς εὐμένειαν ἐκβάλοι τοιοῦδε, good will towards such a man.* Eurip. Phœn. 1757. *ξυγγόνου ὑβρισμάτα, injuria fratris; insults offered to the brother.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 367. *διὰ τὴν τῷ θεῷ* λ. would answer equally well to express the meaning of the text, such nouns as *λατρεία, ὑπηρεσία*, &c. generally governing the case of the verbs from which they are derived.

§. 10. Οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων.] Socrates uses this expression, in order that the cause of the odium against him may be made more apparent.

θρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κἄπειτα, οἶμαι, εὑρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ἢ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, οὐχ αὑτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαρώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. καὶ ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν· τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ,

Μιμοῦνται.] Fisch. *μιμούμενοι*; (as *εἶτα, ἔπειτα, τότε,* and *οὕτως* are elegantly subjoined to participles: Matthiæ Gr. s. 608,) which has been adopted by Ficinus; but *εἶτα* and *ἔπειτα* are frequently used for *καὶ εἶτα* and *καὶ ἔπειτα,* in constructions similar to that in the text, where *εἶτα* has the force of *καὶ τότε, and then.*

Ἐπιχειροῦσι ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν.] This practice of the young men, and the indifferent repute in which philosophy came to be consequently held by the vulgar, has been thus forcibly described by Socrates; Plat. De Rep. vii. 148. Οἶμαι γὰρ σε οὐ λελῆθέναι ὅτι οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γεύωνται, ὡς παιδιᾷ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, ἀεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι· καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐλελέγκοντας, αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλελέγχουσι, χαίροντες, ὥσπερ σκυλάκια, τῷ ἕλκειν τε καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ λογῷ τοὺς πλησίον ἀεί—καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοί τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβέβληνται. Forst.

Δὲ ἢ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν.] Stallbaum prefers *δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν,* as more emphatic, explaining *ἢ, aut potius.* So Plat. Phædr. p. 244. B. *βραχέα ἢ οὐδέν.* Alciphron. iii. 4. *ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι.*

Ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῖς.] sc. *Quod se erroris et inscitiæ ab illis coargui patiantur.* Stall., who thus explains the passage, which contains a bitter irony: *mihi isti succensent, quum tamen sibi potius debeant, ut qui se patiantur refutari ab illis adolescentulis.* The sentence is far more effective in this way than by adopting with Stephens, Ficinus, and others, the common reading *οὐκ αὐτοῖς*; which should probably have been *οὐκ ἐκείνοις,* had Socrates intended to refer to the youths.

Ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα.] Steph. *ὅτι τὰ μ. καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ζητεῖ καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζει καὶ τ. ἡ. λ. κρ. ποιεῖ*; but this reading is at variance with that adopted by the greater number of copies, which sanction the text as supr., and seems to have arisen from an attempt to make the passage more obviously intelligible; which, however, is easily effected by repeating *διδάσκων* at the end of the sentence; Gell. Biblioth. Crit. Nov. Libr. iv. 417.; by which it becomes the commonplace answer which Socrates asserts to have been generally given, for want of a better, to the question *ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων*: a preceding construction being a very general cause of a deviation from the regular construction, whence that used in the question is continued in the answer. Matthiæ Gr. s. 631. 2. extr. Ficinus has adopted the reading of Stephens, omitting *ζητεῖ,* and making *τὰ μ. καὶ τὰ ὑπο γης* depend, with *θεοὺς,* upon *μὴ νομιζει,* which is evidently at variance with the sense of the passage.

Τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, κ. τ. λ.] h. e. *For I imagine, they would be unwilling to confess the truth, that they are convicted of*

οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίγνονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἅτε οὖν, οἶμαι, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ ξυντεταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὦτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλιτός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλιτος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων. ὥστε, ὅ περ

an affectation of knowledge, while they are possessed of none. Ὅτι κατάδηλοι—προσποιούμενοι. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 296. Heindorf. μέν τι εἰδέναι; but τι need not be expressed, as it is implied in οὐδέν following.

Πολλοί.] *Persevering;* so in Latin, *multi in opere* is asserted of those who are intently engaged in any occupation. Fisch. This interpretation is preferable to the ordinary one, *numerous*, or that commended in Abresch. Auctar. Thucydid. p. 328. s. *vehement*, which is expressed sufficiently by σφοδροί, preced.

Ξυντεταγμένως.] *In a well-arranged* or *orderly manner.* A metaphor taken from an army in battle array; so Æschines in Ctes. τὴν μὲν παρασκευὴν ὁρᾶτε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὴν παράταξιν ὅση γεγένηται. Socrates makes use of this term to signify the systematic proceedings of his adversaries in the diffusion of their calumnies, and the plans which they concerted to ensure their effect; hence πιθανῶς, h. e. *apte ad persuadendum.* Stall. Some copies read συντεταμένως; Ficinus appears to have united the force of both readings; Lat. Interp.

Ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὦτα.] Plat. Lysid. p. 204, C. ἡμῶν γοῦν ἐκκεκώφωκε τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἐμπέπληκε Λύσιδος. Lucian. Amor. s. 1. T. V. p. 265. ed. Bip. ἐρωτικῆς παιδιᾶς ἐξ ἐωθινοῦ πεπλήρωκας τὰ ὦτα.

Μέλιτος—ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν.] Melitus, who stood forward as the accuser of Socrates on behalf of the poets, was himself a tragic poet, but of indifferent repute; whence his σκόλια incurred the satirical censure of Aristophanes; Ran. v. 1337. He was very young at the time when he submitted the indictment of Socrates to the archon, s. Βασιλεύς; and remarkable for his excessive arrogance, which may have irritated him the more against Socrates, and led him more eagerly to resent the strictures of the philosopher upon the class to which he affected to belong. Socrates had but little personal knowledge of him; a fact which has induced many to suppose that Melitus was rather an instrument in the hands of others than one who had voluntarily made a private pique the subject of a public inquiry. But there was another circumstance which might have contributed to mature his growing enmity. When, amongst the many enormities of the thirty tyrants, an order was issued for the apprehension of Leon, Niceratus, and Antiphon, three men of distinguished eminence in the commonwealth, Critias was most anxious to involve his master, Socrates, in the execution of Leon, who was remarkable in those turbulent times, for a blameless life, and unblemished character. A message from the Thirty required the attendance of Socrates, with four others. Critias, himself, gave the order for them to go to Salamis, to apprehend Leon and bring him to Athens. Socrates resisted this order, knowing its purpose, and disobeyed it, as being most unjust. The other four, of whom Melitus was one, less scrupulous, or less courageous, fulfilled their directions; in consequence of which Leon, Niceratus, and Antiphon were apprehended and condemned. See infr. c. 22. Mitford's Greece, iv. 46. 47. Andocid. de Myster. p. 46. Orat. t. iv. ed. Reisk.

Τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.] Socrates evidently alludes again here

ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἷός τ' εἴην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονυῖαν. Ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τἀληθῆ· καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. καί τοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι. ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον, ὅτι τἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ

with some severity to that principle in the Athenian constitution by which ignorant artificers, if qualified by wealth, were permitted to intermeddle with the government of the state. Anytus, who had been banished by the thirty tyrants on account of his opulence and influence, on his return enjoyed an ample share of those civil honours in the management of the republic, which, from the time of Clisthenes, had been accessible to the above-mentioned class. And hence Socrates mentions him as the advocate not of the δημιουργοὶ merely, but with bitter irony of the πολιτικοὶ also. "Xenophon," says Mitford, "begins his memorials of his revered master with declaring his wonder how the Athenians could have been persuaded to condemn to death a man of such uncommonly clear innocence and exalted worth." Ælian, though for authority not to be compared with Xenophon, has nevertheless, I think, given the solution. "Socrates," he says, "disliked the Athenian constitution. For he saw that democracy is tyrannical, and abounds with all the evils of absolute monarchy." Σωκράτης δε τῇ μὲν Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ οὐκ ἠρέσκετο· τυραννικὴν γὰρ καὶ μοναρχικὴν ἑώρα τὴν δημοκρατίαν οὖσαν. Ælian. Var. Hist. iii. c. 17. So Aristotle, Polit. v. c. 10. Ἐναντίαι δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι Δῆμος μὲν Τυραννίδι, καθ' Ἡσίοδον, Ὡς κεραμεῖ κεραμεύς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ Δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία Τυραννίς. Socrates, moreover, as he says of himself, Xen. Apol. s. 29. had attacked Anytus, after his usual custom, with considerable warmth, because he preferred that his son, the heir of such ample wealth, should rather be instructed in his own trade, by which that wealth might be increased, than be educated on a scale suitable to the situation, which the young man was already possessed of sufficient claim and right to maintain in the control of the state. This supplied one of the pretexts against Socrates, as a corrupter of the youth, whom he was supposed to have allured from the profits of their several occupations to indulge in the ease and indolence of a philosophical life. To have been charged with an accusation of this nature at Athens, where such especial care was devoted to industry and invention in the mechanical arts, even of itself, was likely to terminate unfavourably to the accused.

Lycon, who assisted in arranging the prosecution of Socrates, was one of the ten orators, originally instituted by Solon, whose duty it was to defend the interests of the state in both senate and assembly; to recommend what was likely to result to the public advantage, and to dissuade from such measures as might endanger its security. They were called Ῥήτορες, and sometimes Συνήγοροι; but from a wanton abuse of their privileges and influence, and a ready sacrifice of principle whenever it interfered with their popularity or peculations, their very name became odious to all good men; whence it may easily be seen how Lycon became the enemy of Socrates. See Aristoph. Vesp. 1292. where Lycon is introduced with Antipho, another of his class.

Ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *hæc sunt illa, quæ me vobis vere expositurum et narraturum me esse antea dicebam.* STALL. Socrates referring here to c. 1. ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

Οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος.] Ὑποστελλέσθαι, properly signifies *to withdraw one's self, to depart secretly;* thence *to dissemble* or *disguise.* Dresig. de Verb. Med. 1. 140.

Τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι.] *Norim,*

ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ταῦτά ἐστι. καὶ ἐάν τε νῦν ἐάν τε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὑρήσετε.

§. 11. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρουν, αὕτη ἔστω ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Μέλιτον τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογήσασθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δή, ὥς περ ἑτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τούς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεούς, οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἓν ἕκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν. Φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημὶ Μελιτον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ῥᾳδίως εἰς

me ob eàdem fere in odium incurrere.—FISCH.

§. 11. Αὕτη ἔστω—ἀπολογία.] See c. 1. n. extr. Αὕτη ἀρετή.

Τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν.] Ἀγαθός was generally used by the Greeks as expressive of respect towards the individual to whom it was addressed; in the present instance it is rather ironically applied. According to Suidas and others, φιλόπολις is the common, and φιλόπατρις the Attic dialect; but this is erroneous, for both are equally familiar to the Attic writers; Ducq. ad Thucyd. vi. 92; but they differ in sense, as φιλόπατρις would be used by an Athenian to designate a lover of Greece; φιλόπολις, a lover of Athens. STALL.

Αὖθις γὰρ δή—λάβωμεν αὖ.] See c. 3. init. n. Ὥσπερ οὖν. Socrates having explained away the charges of one class of his accusers, proceeds now to the refutation of the charge upon oath, as it were, preferred against him by the other; hence αὖθις αὖ.—STALL.

Πως ὧδε.] *Someway thus.* Socrates does not profess to give the exact terms of the indictment, but merely its import. According to Diogenes Laertius, ii. 40. the bill of the indictment was extant in the time of the Platonic philosopher, Phavorinus, in the temple of Cybele, at Athens, where the δημόσια γράμματα, or public records, were kept: Ἡ δὲ ἀντωμασία τῆς δίκης τοῦτον εἶχε τὸν τρόπον· ἀνάκειται γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, φησὶ Φαβωρῖνος, ἐν τῷ Μητρῴῳ· Τάδε ἐγράψατο, καὶ ἀνθωμολογήσατο, Μέλιτος Μελίτου, Πιτθεύς, Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου, Ἀλωπεκῆθεν· Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. Τίμημα θάνατος. v. Xen. Mem. Socr. init. Socrates, in his defence, inverts the order of the charges, as thus alleged against him.

Ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται.] Schol. August. εὐτραπελίζεται, σκώπτει: Tr. *jests too seriously:* for Melitus, in charging Socrates with a crime of which he was incapable, and affecting, himself, an interest about the instruction of the youth, which he did not feel, is said χαριεντίζεσθαι, *to jest* or *jibe;* but in reference to his accusation of Socrates, for corrupting the youth, and his steady prosecution of the charge, he is said by the philosopher, σπουδῇ χαριεντ. by which

ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι.

§. 12. *Καί μοι δεῦρο ὦ Μέλιτε, εἰπέ, Ἄλλο τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται; Ἔγωγε. Ἴθι δὴ νῦν εἰπὲ τούτοις, τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὡς φῄς, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισὶ καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπὲ καὶ μήνυσον αὐτοῖς τίς ἐστιν. ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μελιτε, ὅτι*

a serious impression was attempted to be effected upon ridiculous grounds.—*ῥᾳδίως εἰς ἀγωνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, rashly putting men upon trial.*

§. 12. Δεῦρο.] "Absolute nonnunquam ponitur, (omisso imperativo *ἴθι, ἴλθε* aut simili,) pro *adesdum*. Aristoph. in pace, *δεῦρο σὺ, huc adsis tu*. Musæus, *Δεῦρό μοι εἰς φιλότητα, huc ades mihi*. Hinc factum est adverbium adhortandi, idem significans quod *φέρε, ἄγε, age, agedum*. Plato in Apol. *καὶ μοι δεῦρο εἰπὲ, agedum dic mihi*." Scap. Lex.

Ἄλλο τι περὶ πολλοῦ, κ. τ. λ.] Ἄλλο τι is used in questions, but in such only, as are intended *to elicit an acknowledgment or confession*; never in such as are employed merely for the sake of information; hence ἄλλο τι περὶ πολλου ποιῇ, ὅπως; &c. *do you not esteem it of great importance? are you not very solicitous that? &c.* The form ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πολ. or πλείστ. is also common; but when ἢ is omitted, the interrogation is in ἄλλο τι, alone, not in the other words of the sentence—ὅπως—ἔσονται. The indicative of the future (as the optative) is construed with ὅπως, when something is to be signified, which is contemplated as future at the time denoted by the principal verb. Wherefore that tense occurs in construction with a present, as in the text, a future, and a past tense: ἕτοιμοι εἰσιν, ἔσονται, ἦσαν, πράττειν ὅπως ἔσεται—χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ ἐπιμελόμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα: Plat. Apol. c. 17. *βουλευσόμεθα περὶ τῶν τέκνων, ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστα παιδεύσομεν αὐτά*. Xen. Œc. vii. 12. *ἐπεβουλεύεσθε ὅπως μήτ' ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ψηφίσεσθε, πολλῶν τε ἐνδεεῖς ἔσεσθε*. Viger. by Seager. c. VII. s. x. v. 4. III. xi. v. 8. IX. vii. 3.

Μέλον γέ σοι.] Steph. in marg. *quum id tibi curæ sit*. Those *impersonal verbs*, or *impersonal* constructions, when the preposition dependent on such a *verb* (commonly an *infin.* or a sentence with ὅτι, and the like) properly is the actual subject of the verb, are treated as *casus absoluti*, in two different ways: 1. when it is a mere relation of *time*, it is the *gen.*; 2. in any other combination, we have the *accusative neuters*, Εἰρημένον αὐτοῖς παρεῖναι οὐκ ἠκουσι, *they do not come, though they have been told* (εἴρηται) *to be present*, and this is the case with all *verbs* commonly called *impersonal*: Διὰ τί μένεις, ἐξὸν ἀπιέναι, *why do you stay when you are at liberty*, (it is allowed to you) *to go*, (ἐξεστιν.) Plat. Phæd. 28. Διὰ καὶ τρὶς τὰ αὐτὰ εἴρηκεν, ὡς οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶν—ἢ ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ τοιούτου. Buttmann. Int. Gr. Gr. s. 129. 11. s. 145. 6. obs. 7. Herm. ad Viger. n. 214. Matthiæ Gr. s. 564.

Ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισί.] The term εἰσάγειν was used either in reference to the magistrates, who, in any cause upon which they were not warranted in deciding finally, were obliged to refer to the cognizance of the judges, which was generally called εἰσάγειν τὴν δίκην εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον; or in reference to the accuser, who was said, εἰσάγειν δίκην

σιγᾷς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καί τοι οὐκ αἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον οὗ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ' εἰπέ, ὦ 'γαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὃς τις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλιτε; οἵδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἷοί τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖν; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἅπαντες ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὔ; Ἅπαντες. Εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφελούντων. τί δαὶ δή; οἵδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἢ οὔ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δαὶ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βουλευταί. Ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλιτε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κἀκεῖνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες; Κἀκεῖνοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλήν γ' ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι· ἦ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἷς δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τοὐναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἷς

κατά τινος εἰς τὸ δικ. *to impeach, to sue or bring another before the court.*—The cause itself was called δίκη εἰσαγώγιμος, and the person that entered it, εἰσαγωγεύς.—τουτοισὶ in the text is equivalent to εἰς δικαστήριον. infr. c. 17.

Πότερον ἅπαντες.] Ald. πότερον ἂν, παντές. Bas. 1. Norib. ποτερον αν παντες: both incorrectly. Fisch.

Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν.] It was usual, among the Greeks, for men to swear by the goddesses. V. Ernest. ad Xen. Mem. 1. 5. 5.

Τῶν ὠφελούντων.] i. q. τῶν βελτίους ποιούντων.

Οἱ βουλευταί.] See c. 20. n. Ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν—ἦρξα.

Ἐκκλησιασταί.] Those were so called who either took an active part in the debates, or who merely stood by and listened to the business of the Athenian Ἐκκλησιαι, or public assemblies. See Potter, Grec. Antiq. v. i. c. 17.

Ἐμου κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν.] *You convict me of great ill-fortune.* Verbs compounded with κατά (*against*, with a genitive,) which represent an action as taking place to the disadvantage of a person or thing, take the genitive of the person or thing against which the action is directed, together with the accusative of the thing which is this passive object of the verb. Matthiæ Gr. s. 378. Æschin. adv. Ctes. s. 12. τίς ἂν οὖν ὑμῶν τολμήσειε τοσαύτην ἀνελευθερίαν καταγνῶναι τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων.

μέν τις βελτίους οἷός τ' ὢν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἱππικοί· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάν περ ξυνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, διαφθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλιτε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ζώων; πάντως δή που, ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἐάν τε φῆτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἷς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλιτε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

§. 13. Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλιτε, πότερον ἔστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ πονηροῖς; ὦ τᾶν ἀπόκριναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι;

Ἐάν τε—οὐ φῆτε, κ. τ. λ.] *Whether you and Anytus deny or admit it.* It has been proposed to read μὴ φῆτε, on the grounds that μὴ is the negative particle by which εἰ, ἐάν, ὅφρα, and ὅπως should be properly followed; but εἰ or ἐάν δὲ οὐ is not equivalent to εἰ or ἐάν δὲ μή. In all passages in which the former phrase occurs, οὐ is to be referred to some following verb with which it is intimately connected in sense and construction: as εἰ δὲ οὐ μοιχεύσεις, φονεύσεις δὲ, *now if thou commit no adultery, yet if thou kill*, &c. Epist. Jac. ii. 11. εἰ δέ τοι οὐ δώσει ἐὸν ἄγγελον, *but if he will not give*, i. e. *if he refuse*, &c. Hom. Il. ω, 296. So in the text, ἐάν—οὐ φῆτε, *whether you do not confess*, i. e. *whether you deny*, &c. Seag. Viger. c. VIII.

Εἰ εἷς—διαφθείρει.] h. e. *Magna fuerit adolescentium felicitas, si unus tantum eos corrumpat, quod tu ais.*— Stall. Socrates so expressing himself, as if he founded his conclusion upon his admitting what Melitus had previously asserted to be true. Cf. c. 27. a med. πολλὴ μην τ' ἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι—εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι. c. 17. sub. fin. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά. Εἰ with the indic. and in the apodosis the opt. with ἄν, viz. when the condition contains a determinately expressed case, and the apodosis is uttered with the expression of a mere conjecture, or contains a consequence which is merely possible or probable, forms one of various deviations from the general rules affecting the opt. and conjunc. after conditional particles. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 524.

§. 13. Ὦ τᾶν.] Hesych. Ὦ τάν·—πρόσρημα τιμητικῆς λέξεως· λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ εἰρωνείᾳ πολλάκις. Tim. Gloss. Plat. Ὦ τᾶν· ὦ οὗτος. Mœris. Ὦ τᾶν, Ἀττικῶς· ὦ σὺ, Ἑλληνικῶς. Hermann, ad Soph. Philoctet. 1373. makes it a crasis for ὦ ἑτᾶν, voc. of ἕτης. Scap. Lex. "Interdum usurpatur pro, *bone vir*, Plat. in Apol. ὦ τὰν ἀπόκριναι, pro quo paulo post ἀπόκρινα ὦ γαθέ." Schol. August. Ὦ τὰν—ὦ οὗτος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὦ τάλαν, ὦ μέλε. ταῦτα παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν λέγεται μονῶν, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς παλαιοῖς καὶ ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ πλήθους φασὶ τὸ ὦ τὰν, ὡς παρὰ Κτησιφῶντι. οἱ δὲ Ἀττικοὶ τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν περισ-

Πάνυ γε. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅς τις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι; ἀπόκριναι, ὦ ᾽γαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ᾽ ὅς τις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δῆτα. Φέρε δή, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νέους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα; Ἑκόντα ἔγωγε. Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλιτε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὤν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται ἀεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἥκω, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι ἐάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακόν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἑκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φῂς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλιτε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ᾽ ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα ψεύδει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἁμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐσ-

πῶσι, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν βαρύνουσι. καὶ βέλτιον· ἀδύνατον γὰρ μίαν λέξιν εὑρεθῆναι δύο ἔχουσαν περισπωμένας. Διδυμος δὲ τὸ πλῆρες εἶναι φησιν ὦ ἔταν, ἀγνοῶν ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔτης ἡ κλητική ἐστιν ἔτα καὶ Δωρικῶς ἔταν.

Ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.] The following are the terms of the law to which Socrates alludes; Demosth. c. Steph. orat. ii. p. 1131. Νόμος. τοῖν ἀντιδίκοιν ἐπάναγκες εἶναι, ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μή. Forst.

Καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα.] Ficinus has omitted the translation of this phrase in his Latin translat.; it is implied however in διαφθείροντα preced. Fisch.

Τηλικόσδε ὤν.] Melitus was but a young man at this time, s. 14. sub. fin. καὶ νεότητι, κ. τ. λ. and Socrates was more than seventy years old, c. 1. a med. τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, and n. in loc.

Εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας.] The neuters τοῦτο, τοσοῦτο, τόδε, with a preposition, often take a genitive as a definition; Thuc. 1. 49. ξυνέπεσον ἐς τοῦτο ἀνάγκης, *they came to this, with respect to necessity*, i. e. into such necessity; where in Latin *eo* with the genitive is used, *eo necessitatis adducti sunt, eo dementiæ progressi sunt, &c.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 341. Buttmann. Interm. Gr. Gr. s. 132. Obs. 4. ἥκω is a remarkable instance of that class of verbs which appear to have something in them which disturbs the succession of the tenses; instead of being rendered *I come*, it is constantly to be considered as a præterite, *I am come*, i. e. *I am here*; Criton. init. Ἄρτι ἥκεις ἢ πάλαι. Eurip. Hec. 1. ἥκω νέκρων, κ. τ. λ. So in the text, *to such a degree of stupidity have I come, as to be ignorant, &c.* Buttmann. s. 137. Obs. 8.

Οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον—οὐδένα.] sc. πείσεσθαί σοι; a common ellipsis after οἶμαι δε καὶ, to be supplied by the principal verb from the preceding member of the sentence. Stall.

Νόμος—ἐστίν.] Νόμος, besides its primary signification of *a law*, is also affirmed of *a custom, habit*, or *usage*, founded upon natural principles, in any

τίν, ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὅ γε ἄκων ποιῶ· σὺ δὲ ξυγγενέσθαι μέν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἳ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως.

§. 14. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ἤδη ἐστιν οὐ γὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελίτῳ τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. Ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῂς διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλιτε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἦ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἣν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλιτε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστιν, εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τουτοισί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναί τινας θεούς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ, οὐ

of which latter senses it is to be taken in the text. For it is evident that private advice and admonition, and not a formal public accusation, should be adopted as the most salutary and efficient means of correcting such errors as arise from inattention and ignorance. Hence there is no need of requiring, with Rudinger, any particular law, as expressly alluded to in the text, and bearing especially upon the subject under discussion. FISCH.

Παύσομαι.] Sc. ποιῶν; which Heindorf conjectures should be supplied.

§. 14. Οὐ 'γὼ.] Steph. Ald. Bas. 1. ὁ ἐγώ. Bas. 2. Norib. Forst. But the reading in the text is preferable; the Attic writers delighting in such crases: so Aristoph. Acharn. 503. οὐπὶ for ὁ ἐπὶ. Plat. 275. οὐπίτριπτος. Eurip. Phœn. οὐμός. FISCH.

Ἦ δῆλον, κ. τ. λ.] ἦ is frequently used in a question, when, as in the text, a preceding and indefinite question is made more definite. Plat. Parm. p. 137. 13. τίς οὖν μοι ἀποκρινεῖται; ἢ ὁ νεώτατος; Matthiæ Gr. s. 619.

Ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν.] Intell. ἐμὲ φῂς διαφθείρειν τοὺς νεωτέρους.

Οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις.] Ταῦτα depends upon the part. διδάσκων following. STALL.

Ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν.] Ὧν depends here upon λόγος, and not, as Rudinger and others have supposed, upon περί, which they require either to be understood or supplied. It has been already remarked, c. 9. supr., that λέγειν τινά is an equally legitimate construction as λέγειν περί τινός; whence λόγος τινός and λόγος περί τινός may likewise be indifferently used. See c. 9. a med. λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, extr. τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν. Cf. Plat. Charmid. p. 156. A. οὐ γάρ τί σου ὀλίγος λόγος ἐστίν. Demosth. de Cor. p. 281. ed. R. τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν, i. e. περὶ αὐτῶν. Eurip. Med. 541. οὐκ ἂν ἦν λόγος σέθεν, i. e. περὶ σοῦ. Schæfer. ad Sophocl. Antig. v. 11. μῦθος φίλων, i. e. περὶ φίλων. STALL.

μέντοι οὗς πέρ γε ἡ πόλις ἀλλ' ἑτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἑτέρους· ἢ παντάπασί με φῂς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τούς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεούς. Ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλιτε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἆρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥς περ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου οἴει κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Mέ-

Ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις.] *ἵνα τί, why* or *wherefore*, is an elliptical form, to be supplied as denoting present or past time, by *γέγηται* or *γέγοιτο*. Schœttgen would rather understand *γέγονεν* in *ἵνα τι*, and supplies the phrase, *τί γέγονεν, ἵνα*, e. g. Acts, vii. 26. *Ἵνα τί ἀδικεῖτε τεἀλλήλους*; which he explains: *Τί γέγονεν, ἵνα ἀδικεῖτε ἀλλήλους*. Cf. Terent. Phorm. iii. 3. "Quamobrem *ut quidnam* facturus," where *ut quidnam* is equivalent to *ἵνα τι*. Liv. iv. 49. "*quid ut* a vobis sperent." Bos. Ellips. Gr.—*Οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην*. Dacier understands this question as ironical, and would thence infer that Socrates intended to expose the folly of the Athenians in regarding the sun and moon as divinities. But the commentator appears to have forgotten that the sun and moon were not only the principal objects of religious veneration amongst the Persians and other barbarous nations, but that they were worshipped by the Greeks also, by whom they were venerated under the titles of Apollo and Diana, and who dedicated a common temple to both in their own proper name. Now, it is well known that although Socrates was free from many of the grosser superstitions of his country, and, deeply impressed with a reverential belief in one, great, first cause, was always inclined to reprobate the absurd extremes incidental to polytheism, still he was not certainly exempt, nor could it have been expected, from the errors of a system, which unaided reason might prevail to modify, but never to destroy. It is most likely then that he put the question seriously to Melitus; the more so as he afterwards disavows the theory which should have been utterly inconsistent with the belief that he professed.

Μὰ Δί'.] Melitus replies in the negative: *Μὰ Δί'—οὐ νομίζει θεούς εἶναι, κ. τ. λ.* which is to be supplied from the question preceding.

Ἀναξαγόρου.] Anaxagoras, born at Clazomene in the first year of the seventieth Olympiad, was a disciple of Anaximenes, the hearer and associate of Anaximander, who has been generally considered the founder of the Ionic sect, having been the first to teach philosophy in a public school. At the age of twenty Anaxagoras went to reside at Athens, where he devoted himself with diligence and success to the study of eloquence and poetry, and where he became conversant with the writings of Homer, of whose merits as an author and a moralist he entertained as high an opinion as that recorded by the Roman satyrist; Horat. Epist. i. 2. The repute of the school at Miletus attracted him thither, where he studied the philosophical doctrines of Anaximenes and his predecessors with considerable zeal and distinction, and after a residence of some years returned to Athens, where he gave private lectures in philosophy, and numbered among his pupils Euripides, Pericles, and as some say, Socrates and Themistocles. His high character, and his open derision of some of the popular superstitions drew upon him the envy of his cotemporaries and the enmity of the Athenian priesthood. He was imprisoned and condemned to death, but through the influence of Pericles, the penalty was commuted to fine and banishment. He retired accordingly to Lampsacus, where he died, aged seventy-two years, and

λιτε· καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἴει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων. καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν

whose inhabitants expressed their opinion of his attainments by the following inscription upon his tomb:

Ενθάδε πλεῖστον ἀληθείας ἐπί τερμα περησας
Οὐρανίου κοσμοῦ κεῖται Ἀναξαγόρας.

According to Plutarch, whose testimony is confirmed by that of Plato and Aristotle, Anaxagoras was the first of the Ionic philosophers who separated mind from matter, and attributed the modifications of the latter to the control of a supreme and pure intelligence: Νοῦς ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος. The particular branch of his doctrine, alluded to in the text, is mentioned by Diog. Laertius, ii. 8. 9, who states that Anaxagoras conceived the sun to be a μύδρον διάπυρον, an ignited mass, of iron, as some take it, or of stone, as it appears to have been understood by Socrates, who endeavours, in Xenoph. Mem. iv. 7. 7., to refute the opinion: φάσκων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ἠγνόει, ὅτι λίθος μὲν ἐν πυρὶ ὢν οὔτε λάμπει, οὔτε πολὺν χρόνον ἀντέχει. etc. Cf. infr. καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. The moon, Anaxagoras judged to be inhabited like the earth, and divided into hills, vallies, lakes, &c. Hence the charge of asserting, τὸν ἥλιον λίθον—εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν, which Melitus urged against Socrates, whom he knew to have been the hearer of Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras, if not actually the disciple of the latter himself.—Βιβλία—Diog. Laertius, ii. 11., and Clemens Alexandr. state, that Anaxagoras was the first who βιβλίον ἐξεδωκε συγγραφῆς, *librum a se scriptum edidit*: but, according to some, Anaximander was the first who committed to writing the principles of natural science: others assert it of Pherecydes, a native of the Isle of Scyrus, the first preceptor of Pythagoras. See Lucret. i. 831. sqq.

Δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις.] Dacier understands Socrates as alluding here to the possibility of purchasing the books of Anaxagoras for a drachma in the orchestra, where they were exposed, for this price, to sale. But there is not a shadow of foundation for such a supposition. The Ὄρχηστρα, it is well known, was a part of the theatre; a level space, twelve feet beneath the lowest range of seats, partly enclosed by the sweep of the excavation, and partly extending outwards, right and left, in a long parallelogram. See the Theatre of the Greeks, cap. iii. sec. 2, and plan of the theatre of Bacchus. At Athens, both the tragic and comic writers were in the habit of introducing upon the stage, through the medium of the chorus, the precepts and doctrines of the philosophers; Euripides, for instance, was so used to the practice, especially in the case of his preceptor, Anaxagoras, that he was called by many ὁ σκηνικὸς φιλόσοφος. Forster conjectures that Socrates makes a direct allusion in the text to the speech of Electra, in Orest. 980. Μόλοιμι τὰν οὐρανοῦ μεσὸν καὶ χθονὸς Τεταμέναν αἰωρήμασι πέτραν ἁλύσεσι χρυσέαισι, φερομέναν Δίναισι, βῶλον ἐξ Ὀλύμπου, Ἵν' ἐν θρήνοισιν ἀναβοάσω Γέροντι πατρὶ Ταντάλῳ—where, under the image of the stone impending over Tantalus, the poet is said to have expressed the dogma of Anaxagoras, respecting the sun. So the Scholiast in loc. Ἀναξαγόρου μαθητὴς γενόμενος ὁ Εὐριπίδης, μύδρον λέγει τὸν ἥλιον. οὕτω γὰρ δοξάζει. μύδρον δὲ καλοῦσι τὸν πεπυρακτωμένον σίδηρον. πέτρον δὲ καὶ βῶλον κατὰ ταυτὸ ἔιρηκεν: and further on, εἰ δ' ἄρα τινες διαποροῦσι πῶς ἐξ ἁλύσεως περιηρτημένος περιῆσιν ὁ δ' ἥλιος, γινωσκέτωσαν ὅτι τὰ φυσικὰ τοῖς μυθικοῖς καταμίγνυσιν ὁ Εὐριπίδης. Hence it may be concluded, that,

προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ' ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὐτωσί σοι δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζειν θεὸν εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. Ἄπιστός γ' εἶ, ὦ Μέλιτε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὑτοσί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὕβρει τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι. ἔοικε γὰρ ὥς περ αἴνιγμα ξυντιθέντι καὶ διαπειρωμένῳ, Ἆρα γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναντί' ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὥς περ ἂν εἴ τις Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καί τοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

§. 15. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ᾗ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Μέλιτε. ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅ περ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρῃτησάμην, μέμ-

as the sentiments of the philosophers were expressed chiefly by the chorus, as supra, in Orest., and as the orchestra was the situation assigned to the chorus; *οὗ καὶ οἱ χοροὶ ᾖδον*, Phot. Lex. Ms. from whence it always took a part in the action of the drama, joining in the dialogue through the medium of its *κορυφαῖος*, or leader, so Socrates intends to say that he should bring ridicule upon himself, were he to lay claim to those doctrines as his own, which the payment of a drachma, at most, for a seat in the theatre, should satisfy the auditors had originated with another:—*Εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, even at most*, or *for the highest price*; fully, *εἰ ἀντὶ πάνυ πολλοῦ τιμήματος* or *ἀργυρίου*. Originally no payment was required for seats in the theatre at Athens, but the strife and confusion consequent upon a gratuitous admission, and the immense crowds which endeavoured to avail themselves of the privilege, occasioned the passing of a law, by which the entrance price was fixed at one drachma for each individual. This regulation, which bore hardly upon the poorer classes, was repealed by the influence of Pericles, who omitted no chance of popularity, and a decree brought in, by which the price was reduced to two oboli; and even these were made payable out of a public fund. From the text, however, it would appear that as high a sum as a drachma was demanded for the best places, while the ordinary were set at two oboli.—Harpoc. and Suid. *θεωρικά*. Theat. Greek. cap. iii. 2.

Ἔοικε—ξυντιθέντι καὶ διαπειρωμένῳ.] Expressive of the modesty of the speaker, and used elegantly for *ξυντίθησι καὶ διαπειρᾶται*; as Cyrop. viii. 8. 7. *ἐοίκασι ταῦτα διδασκομένοις*, h. e. *διδάσκονται*. FISCH.

Γνώσεται—ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζ.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 349. Obs. 2.—*Ὁ σοφὸς δή—sapiens scilicet ille.* STALL.

§. 15. *Ἥι μοι φαίνεται.*] h. e. *Quatenus, quomodo mihi videatur.* STALL. Socrates proceeds to prove the inconsistency of Melitus, who at the same time denied and admitted that he believed in the gods.

νησθέ μοί μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι.

Ἔστιν ὅς τις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλιτε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβείτω. ἔστ' ὅς τις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἱππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι. ἔστ' ὅς τις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὡς ὤνησας, ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῂς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμονιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δή που

Ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ.] In his usual method of interrogation, and deducing his conclusions from the replies of his opponent.

Καὶ μὴ—θορυβείτω.] It is to be supposed that Melitus, who was fully aware of the object which Socrates had in view, and equally so of the unerring skill by which it could not fail to be established, felt but little inclination to entangle himself in his own concessions, and sought rather by blustering upon extraneous subjects to divert the attention of the judges, and evade the hold of his too powerful adversary.

Ὡς ὤνησας—ἀναγκαζόμενος.] *Ut me juvisti eo quod ægre aliquando respondisti.* HEINDORF. Casaubon, ad Pers. Sat. i. 112, remarks, that ὀνῆσαι, as the Latin *juvare*, besides being synonymous with βοηθεῖν, *to assist*, has also the force of *delectare, to delight*, in which latter sense it is to be taken in the text. So V. Cousin; *que tu m' obliges de repondre enfin, &c.* Stephens reads ὤκνησας, which has been adopted by Ficinus, v. Lat. Interp., and approved by Fischer, who renders ὡς ὤκνησας, *quam cunctatus es! quam tergiversatus es! quam longas nexuisti moras!*—as alluding to the surprise of Socrates in having, at last, contrary to his expectation, extracted an answer from Melitus. Fischer understands, further, the succeeding part of the sentence, ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρ. ὑπὸ τουτ. ἀναγκ., as explanatory of the nature of this hesitation on the part of Melitus. This, however, is objected to by the advocates of the present reading, who, in the case of the proposed emendation, look upon the latter part of the sentence as an unnecessary repetition. Stallbaum would prefer ὥς μ' ὤνησας.

Διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ.] Most of the editions read διομόσω, in which they are followed by Ficinus, and the Latin translations, and which has been adhered to by Ruhnken ad Tim. Gloss. Plat. voc. Διωμοσία. But the reading in the text scarcely admits of a question; for Socrates wished to show that his belief in the tutelary influences of some presiding genius or divinity had not only been conceded to him in the course of the verbal admissions of Melitus, but

πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν ἐμέ ἐστιν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δή· τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῂς ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν εἴ περ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φῂς, εἰ μὲν θεοί τινές εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγώ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδή πέρ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές εἰσι νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἔκ τινων ἄλλων, ὧν δὴ

that it had been acknowledged in the very terms of the indictment, upon oath, of the accuser; cap. 11. supr. Besides the Attic writers use ὁμοῦμαι, not ὀμόσω, consequently not διομόσω. Tim. Plat. Lex. Διωμοσία. ὅρκοι ὅι ὑπὸ τῶν δικαζομένων γινόμενοι· τοῦ μὲν ὀμνῦντος, ὅτι παθὼν ἐγκαλεῖ· τοῦ δὲ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐποίησεν. So Suid. Lexicon Rhet. Ms. Διωμοσία ὅρκος' ἐστὶν, ὃν ὤμνυον οἱ φόνου ἀγῶνα διώκοντες ἢ φεύγοντες. ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ὤμνυον μετὰ τὸ εἰπεῖν τον παρόντα λόγον· (ὁ μὲν) ἢ μὴν ἀληθῆ κατηγορηκέναι καὶ δικαίως· ὁ δὲ ἢ μὴν ἀληθῆ ἀπολελογῆσθαι καὶ δικαίως. ὤμνυον δὲ καὶ πρὶν εἰπεῖν, τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρκον ἀμφότεροι, ἐπενεχθείσης ἤδη τῆς ψήφου, εἰ μὴ δικαίως νενικηκέναι, ἐξώλειαν ἑαυτῷ ἐπαρώμενος, εἰ ἐξηπάτησεν. Ἀντιγραφη, in the passage above, is equivalent to ἀντωμοσία, cap. 3. supr. Suid. Phavorin. v. ἀντιγραφή·—Πλάτων δὲ ἐν τῇ Σωκράτους ἀπολογίᾳ τὸ αὐτο καλεῖ ἀντωμοσίαν, καὶ ἀντιγραφήν. Hesych: Ἀντιγραφή· τὸ ἐν ἴσῳ τῇ ἀντωμοσίᾳ.

Εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια, κ. τ. λ.] V. Cousin Œuvres de Plat. tom. i. p. 336: "Socrate admettait une révélation surnaturelle qui lui enseignait en toute occasion ce qu'il devait faire et surtout ce qu'il devait éviter. Il croyait sentir en lui quelque chose au-dessus de l'humanité qui l'éclairait et le dirigeait. Il ne disait pas que ce fût un être positif; il s'arrêtait au fait dont il avait la conscience, et le servait de l'expression: τὶ δαιμόνιον, non pas un dieu tout-à-fait, mais une espèce d'intermédiare entre les dieux et les hommes, quelque chose qui appartient à la nature des démons que la mythologie païenne place entre le ciel et la terre. L'Orthodoxie du tems ne reconnaisant pas là précisément ses dieux, avec leur histoire et leurs noms propres, accuse Socrate de substituer à la religion établie καινὰ δαιμόνια, c'est a dire, une religion nouvelle, fondée sur un mysticisme démoniaque. Soit, repond Socrate a Melitus, du moins alors ne suis-je pas athée. Car enfin tu ne m'accuses pas d'admettre l'accident sans le sujet, l'adjectif sans le substantif. Si j'admets τὶ δαιμόνιον, quelque chose relatif aux démons, il faut que tu m'accordes que j'admets des démons, δαίμονας. Or, les démons sont enfans des dieux, ou dieux eux-memes; donc j'admets des dieux."

Νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν.] Socrates speaks thus in compliance with the popular belief, that demons were the offspring of the intercourse between the gods and nymphs, or some other class of women. [ἢ ἐκ τινων ἄλλων.] It was not his business to attack this error now, though it is certain that such was not his own opinion, for he had adopted the theory of Pythagoras, that demons or angels and heroes were descended from the deity, to whom they owed their origin, as light owes its own to a luminous body. In his Timæus, also, speaking of the generation of angels or demons, he asserts it to be beyond the reach of human nature. Dacier. See Hesiod, Ἔργ. κ. Ἡμ. 1. 120. sqq. For the opinions of Aristotle, Democritus, and Epicurus upon the subject of those inferior intelligences, see Enfield's Philosophy, B. 2. ch. ix. s. 1. ch. xiii. and ch. xv.

καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, ὥς περ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο [ἢ] καὶ ὄνων τοὺς ἡμιόνους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλιτε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην, ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ~~οὐκ~~ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρός ἐστι καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν.

§. 16. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελίτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλ' ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχ-

Ὧν δὲ καὶ λέγονται.] Eurip. Hipp. 474. Ἐς δὲ τὴν τύχην πεσοῦσ', ὅσην σύ, πῶς ἂν ἐκνεῦσαι δοκεῖς. Thuc. 1. 28. δίκας ἤθελον δοῦναι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ παρὰ πόλεσιν, αἷς ἂν ἀμφότεροι ξυμβῶσιν, for παρ' αἷς: so in the text, where the relative ὧν, referring to τινων ἄλλων joined with a preposition, is used without it. Matthiæ Gr. s. 595. extr.

Ἡγοῖτο [ἢ] καὶ ὄνων.] Forster was the first who proposed to remove the particle ἢ, in which he was followed by Schleiermacher, to whose judgment Bekker would have gladly deferred, had he not been restrained by the authority of the MSS., whence he has enclosed it in brackets as supr. Fischer defends the text as it stands, as mules may have for their sires either horses or asses. Wolf also justly preserves the ἢ, and renders it *vel asinorum*.

Οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως—οὐχὶ.] *You have by all means preferred this indictment, &c.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 482. Obs. 2.

Ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις, κ. τ. λ.] h. e. *But there is no possibility of your persuading, by any means, a man with even a moderate share of sense, that the same individual can believe in the attributes of demons and divinities, and disbelieve in the existence of demons, gods, and heroes themselves.* Stephens explains the passage: *nullo autem fieri modo potest, ut ullis, qui tantillum sane mentis habeat, persuadeas, ejusdem esse hominis, et dem. et divina* (aliqua esse), *et rursus ejusdem, neque d. n. d. n. h. esse, existimare;* and Stallbaum: *non poteris cuiquam persuadere, unius hominis esse, et credere esse dæmonium quiddam ac divinum, et rursus credere nec dæmonas nec deos esse.*

§. 16. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὦ ἄνδρες—.] Socrates having closed his defence of the particular charges alleged against him, proceeds to the discussion of some other subjects which these charges involved. And first he complains in a degree of the odium excited against him amongst the crowd, and the dangers of its terminating in his death. But at the same time, with a simple and touching eloquence, he inculcates the value which a good man should attach to his duty and integrity, and how little life should be regarded as the forfeit of adherence to high principle.

Οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκει εἶναι ἀπολ.] *Seems to me to require no great defence;* as Plat. Gorg. p. 461. A. οὐκ ὀλιγης συνουσίας ἐστι; *it requires no short conversation.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 316.

θεια γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρήσει, ἐάν περ αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλιτος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ᾕρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἱρήσειν· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ.

Ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις, Εἶτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; Ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ τι, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν, οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἕκτορα

Ἀληθές.] Ald. ἀληθής; incorrectly, for it must be referred to ὃ preceding. FISCH.

Ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρήσει.] h. e. *Quod efficiet, ut condemner neque absolvar judicum sententiis.* STALL. Ficinus, and all the Latin translations, have erred in explaining αἱρήσει by *perimet*; αἱρεῖν in its forensic sense signifying merely *to bring about a conviction*, unconnected with any penalty whatever. It is properly a term used in warfare, and applied to the capture of an enemy, or the storming of a city, whence it was transferred, like others of its class, to the forum, and means *facere ut reus condemnetur judicum sententiis.* FISCH.

Ἀλλ' ἡ—διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος.] These words, as Fischer correctly observes, might have been omitted, for they were already implied in τοῦτ' ἔστιν supr. However the ancient writers were frequently in the habit of adding, generally after a break in the sentence, some words by which the preceding member of the sentence might be better defined, or the subject more vividly recalled.

Οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ.] *For there is no danger of its stopping with me.* Steph. in marg. *haud enim timendum est*, ne hæc *in me* cessent, vel *finem faciant.* Fischer: *neque vero*, vel *enim*, (δὲ for γὰρ) *ullum periculum est, ne ego sim ultimus, quem damnet invidia et odium multitudinis.* V. Cousin: *car il ne faut pas espérer que ce fléau s'arrête à moi.* So in Phædon. cap. 34. sub fin. οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ.

Εἶτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει.] Εἶτα and ἔπειτα are used in questions of impatience and sarcasm, as supr. Matthiæ Gr. s. 603.

Ὑπολογίζεσθαι.] i. q. φροντίζειν, *movere, rationem habere.* FISCH.

Ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός.] See Iliad. xviii. 94. sqq.—Παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, *præ turpitudinis macula et opinione*, h. e. ne diceretur mortem Patrocli amici æquo animo tulisse. FISCH. παρα, *præter*, with an accusative, being one of the forms for the construction of the comparative. Matthiæ Gr. s. 455.

ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὖσα, οὑτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, Ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἕκτορα πότμος ἑτοῖμος· ὁ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, Αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὗ ἄν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

§. 17. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον,

Πότμος.] Bass. Norib. πόθμος; incorrectly. Hesych. πότμος· μόρος. Apollonius Lex. Homer. πότμος· θάνατος. FISCH.

Τιμωρεῖν.] Mudge conjectures τιμωρῶν in order to effect a similar construction to κακὸς ὢν preced. But τιμωρεῖν may depend, like, and with ζῆν upon τὸ, which reading has been adopted by Ficinus. FISCH. The infinitive ζῆν, as it expresses the object of fear, takes the article. Matthiæ Gr. s. 520. Obs. 1.

Παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν.] i. e. *in castris nauticis.*—Ἄχθος ἀρούρης, *homo nequam, homo nullius frugi.* FISCH.

Μὴ αὐτὸν οἴει.] A negative is used interrogatively for affirming more emphatically; so John, xviii. 26. οὐκ ἐγώ σε εἶδον ἐν τῷ κήπῳ μετ' αὐτοῦ. Plat. Gorg. p. 512. B. μὴ σοὶ δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι.

§. 17. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ, κ. τ. λ.] The distinction between the indicative and optative with εἰ, is particularly marked in this passage: ἐγὼ δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, . . . εἰ, ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, ... τότε μὲν, οὐ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἐμένον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις, καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος . . . . λείποιμι τὴν τάξιν; where the indic. expresses a determinate circumstance which had happened, but the opt. an action which is merely assumed and possible. Matthiæ Gr. s. 524. Obs. 2. 1. See also s. 622. 4. upon the above.

Οἱ ἄρχοντες.] Callias, Cleon, and Hippocrates; of whom the last was commander-in-chief of the Athenian forces when they were routed by the Bœotians, under Pagondas, at Delium; upon which occasion Socrates, who served in the Athenian infantry, being pressed by the pursuing enemy, was only enabled to secure a retreat for himself and those about him by the protection of his pupil Alcibiades, who came up with a body of cavalry. Cleon commanded the Athenians at Amphipolis, a town of Thrace or Macedonia, near the Strymon, where he was defeated by Brasidas, the Lacedemonian general, upon which occasion Socrates also distinguished himself. Callias, the Athenian general, was killed at the siege of Potidæa, a town situated on the isthmus which connects the penin-

οὓς ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὗ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὥς περ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. δεινὸν μέντ' ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ' ἄν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὤν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστί. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δή τῳ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου οὕτω

mula of Pallene with Macedonia, where it bordered on Thrace. While the Athenians were before the town a skirmish occurred, in which Alcibiades, who, though still very young, had joined the expedition, was wounded, and his life preserved by Socrates, who managed to have the prize of valour, which he had manifestly earned himself, bestowed upon his favourite pupil. V. Laert. ii. 22. sqq. Athen. iv. 15. Cic. de Divin. 1. 54. Plut. Alcibid. Thucyd. 1. 56. sqq.

Ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ.] sc. Τοῦ θεοῦ.

Δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι—οἶδεν.] Fully: ἔστι γὰρ ἐκεῖνο (sc. τὸ θάνατον δεδιέναι) δοκεῖν εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν.

Τοῦτο—ἀμαθία ἐστὶν.] Plat. Phædr. p. 245. C. τοῦτο πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ γενέσεως, which Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 1. 23. 53, renders *hic fons, hoc principium est movendi;* so in Phædon. c. 18. sub. fin. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις. The neuter of the demonstrative pronoun, as the subject of the proposition, seems to be used when the word to which it refers is to be emphatically distinguished.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 440. 7.—Ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι, *quæ in eo cernitur, ut quis se scire opinetur quæ non sciat.* STALL. Tr. *And how is not this the veriest reprehensible ignorance, this of thinking that one knows, &c.*; so V. Cousin: *que de croire connaitre, &c.*; Cf. Demosth. de Coron. p. 231. l. 1. ἡ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, εἴτε χρὴ κακίαν, εἴτε ἄγνοιαν, εἴτε καὶ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα εἰπεῖν.

Τούτῳ ἄν.] sc. φαίην εἶναι or εἶην.

Ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς—οὕτω.] i. q. ὅτι, ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδα ἱκ. περ. τ. ἐν Ἀιδ. οὕτω καὶ, κ. τ. λ. STALL. Οὕτω often

καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, οὐδέποτε φοβηθήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι. ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων προς ὑμᾶς ὡς εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμων οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασιν διαφθαρήσονται,—εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε Ὦ Σώ-

follows after participles, whose meaning it thus repeats for the sake of emphasis. Matthiæ Gr. s. 610. 7.

Τῷ βελτίονι.] *Ei qui vobis superior præsit.* Serran. περιφραστικῶς. Βελτίων signifying here, one who excels another in authority and influence. So *melior* is used for *potentior*, Horat. Epl. 1. 10. 34. "Cervus equum pugna melior communibus herbis Pellebat," &c.; and those are designated as *Optimates*, who are possessed of the most considerable power in a republic. Stephens renders it *meliori*, or *præstantiori*, which Fischer approves and explains by *sapientiori*, *prudentiori*.

Πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, κ. τ. λ.] Socrates had just asserted that an unwarrantable disobedience to a better than himself, either god or man, was, in his conviction, both criminal and dishonorable; he now proceeds to say that he never should feel afraid of, or inclined to fly from what, for all he knew, might be a blessing, sooner than feel so affected with regard to those things which he knew to be actually evil. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 575. voc. προ.—Φοβεῖσθαι and φεύγειν πρὸ τῶν κακῶν—ἃ μὴ οἶδα, is used for φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ κακα ἃ οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ἢ ταῦτα ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει. STALL.

Ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ με, κ. τ. λ.] Stephens considers this passage as elliptical, and reads and supplies it thus: ὥστε οὐδ' εἰ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίοιτε θέλοιμι ἂν ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἀφίεσθαι, or ἀξιώσαιμι ἄν, etc. But the force of οὐδ' may either be carried on to the firm refusal of Socrates to alter his conduct, on the condition of his acquittal, or it may be presumed that this is one of the many interruptions familiar to the philosopher, by which the sense was only meant to be suspended during one or more parentheses, and yet was neglected to be afterwards supplied, owing to the greater importance of the subjects thus introduced.

Ἀπιστήσαντες.] Ald. Bas. 1. Norib. ἀπιθήσαντες. Steph. Forst. ἀπειθήσαντες. Bas. 2. ἀπιστήσαντες, sanctioned by Eusebius, and certainly the most correct. For ἀπιστεῖν, ἄπιστος, and ἀπιστία are not merely used in reference to those who *distrust*, *who place no confidence* in others, but to those also who, from this want of confidence, *resist being led* by any whom so they mistrust.

Τὴν ἀρχὴν.] *From the first, at all.*

Ἀποκτεῖναι.] *To condemn to death, vote the death of. Sententiis damnare mortis*, STALL., in which sense it occurs also cap. 18. infr. and Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8. 5, where it is opposed to ἀπολύειν.

Ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν—διαφθαρήσονται.] Those who could not admit the use of ἄν with the future, have proposed to read διαφθαρήσοιντο: but almost all the editions support the reading in the text. Matthiæ, Gr. s. 599. *d.* states that ἄν is sometimes joined with the indicative of the future, to designate as only probable, that which the future alone would declare decidedly about to happen; but the quotations adduced in proof can be otherwise explained by anacolu-

κρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἁλῷς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ. εἰ οὖν με, ὅ περ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφιοιτε, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι Ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕως περ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσομαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος, ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷά περ εἰωθα, ὅτι Ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὤν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελόμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήσῃ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω

tha, various readings, &c. Whence he concludes, that it is even very doubtful whether the genuine Attics ever used ἂν with the future indicative; for this usage is found, in Euripides, only in lyrical passages, and perhaps was still prevalent in the old language. Dawes, Misc. Critic. p. 104, denies that ἂν is used with the future, in which he is followed by most English critics. Brunck and Wolf express themselves doubtfully; App. Crit. ad Dem. Ἀ1. 604. Sept. p. 343. See in Phædon. cap. 5. init. οὐδ' ὑπωστιοῦν ἄν, etc.

Ἐφ' ᾧτε.] For ὥστε, *upon condition that.* This should be, properly, ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὥστε, as Thucydides, 3. 114. says, σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο . . . ἐπὶ τοῖσδε, ὥστε μήτε Ἀμπρακιώτας μετὰ Ἀκαρνάνων στρατεύειν ἐπὶ Πελοποννησίους, &c. Thus ὥστε, *Thuc.* 3. 34. 75. 114. 5. 94. 7. 82. But because the relative properly refers to the demonstrative, so, according to Gr. s. 473, they said ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ᾧ, or ᾧτε, or with the preposition repeated, ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ἐφ' ᾧτε as supr. Matthiæ Gr. s. 479. *a.*

Ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ.] Ἀσπάζεσθαι, *aliquem salutare ita ut eum amplectaris;* φιλεῖν, *salutare aliquem ita ut eum osculeris;* whence the passage in the text means: *grato lætoque animo vestram hunanitatem et clementiam amplector atque veneror.* STALL.

Μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ.] Stephens compares this passage with Acts, v. 29. πειθαρχεῖν δεῖ θεῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ ἀνθρώποις.—Ἕως περ ἂν ἐμνέω. So Cicero p. red. ad Quir. 10. "dum anima spirabo mea."

Καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος.] So cap. 9. extr. τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός.

Ἰσχύν.] Ficinus has mistaken the sense of this word in explaining it *potentia*, it is here expressive of the *magnanimity* and *resolution* which consist in the contempt of wealth and worldly grandeur. The qualities of the body are not uncommonly affirmed of the mind; so Xenoph. Apol. 34, uses ῥώμη, as synonymous with γενναιότης, s. 33. It is evident, from what Socrates con-

καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετήν, φάναι δέ, ὀνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρω ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε. καὶ ἐγὼ οἶομαι οὔδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τἆλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δέ τίς μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετέ με ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

tinues to say, that ἰσχὺν is opposed to a concern about riches and an anxiety for dignity and fame.

Νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 415. Obs. 1.

Μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς ὅσῳ μου ἐγγ.] A similar construction occurs, cap. 30. a med. καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσι. Cf. Liv. ii. 51. "Quo plures erant, major cædes fuit." Ovid. Epist. iv. 19. "Venit amor gravius quo serius."

Τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.] See cap. 9. extr. τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

Μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ.] *Neither to be solicitous for the body nor for riches, prior to, nor with such zeal, as for the soul.* It is impossible not to observe in what grand and beautiful relief these noble sentiments of the philosopher stand out upon the dark ground of pagan superstition. But while this amazing exercise of self-instructed mind may well furnish a subject for surprise and admiration, it must be remembered that reason is but the dawn within ourselves, revelation the day-spring from on high, that can alone mature its light.

Εἰ μὲν οὖν—διαφθείρω—ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλ.] See cap. 12. extr. Εἰ εἰς—διαφθείρει.

Ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά.] So Xenophon, of Socrates; πῶς ἂν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια διαφθορά ἐστιν. Mem. Socr. i. c. 2. 8.

Πρὸς ταῦτα.] *Harum rerum habita ratione, quocirca.* STALL. So Soph. El. 382. πρὸς ταῦτα φράζου, *accordingly, therefore, consider.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 591. β.—Ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος.—For the construction of ἄν with the in-

§. 18. *Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ἐρεῖν ὑμῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. Εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς. ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψειεν οὔτε Μέλιτος οὔτε Ἄνυτος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο· οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μέντ' ἂν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμάσειεν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἴε-*

finitive in participle futures, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 599. *d.*

Μέλλω—*τεθνάναι.*] Stallbaum remarks upon this construction, that the Greeks, desirous to express more effectively the sadness attendant upon death, used the past tense, as if the event had actually occurred. Thom. Magister. v. *μέλλω*, suspects this form to be an error of the transcribers; he admits the present and future infinitives with *μέλλω*, and the infin. of the aor. with *ἂν*, which he would also supply before *μέλλω*, in the text. But the use of the perf. for the pres. infin. is by no means unusual; it occurs in Criton. cap. 1. sub. fin. *ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφῖκται ἐκ Δήλου, οὗ δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με.* and cap. 29. infr. a med. *ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν.* Cf. Demosth. de Coron. p. 301. *πῶς οὐκ ἀπολωλέναι πολλάκις ἐστὶ δίκαιος.* Some make *τεθνάναι*, in the text, the pres. Infin. from *τέθνημι.* See Matthiæ Gr. s. 498. *d.*

§. 18. *Μὴ θορυβεῖτε.*] Socrates proceeds to another part of his defence of common interest, like the preceding, to the Athenians and himself. For he proves that his condemnation and death should be accompanied by considerable injury and loss to the state, and in the progress of his pleading continues to exhibit that unbending fortitude in his manner, and freedom in his language, which, mingled occasionally with judicious irony, had characterized his discussions through life, and which drew from Cicero the remark, that Plato had brought forward Socrates, so defending himself, on trial for his life, that he less resembled a suppliant or a culprit, than the master and guide of his judges.

Μείζω βλάψετε.] According to the analogy of *ποιεῖν τινα κακά*, the verbs *ὠφελεῖν*, *βλάπτειν*, and others in which the idea of "doing" is implied, take, beside the accusative of the person, another accusative neuter plural of an adjective, where the English uses the adverbs "more," "very;" as supr. Matthiæ Gr. s. 415. Obs. 3.

Δύναιτο.] Stob. Trincavel. *δύναιντο*; either reading is equally admissible. FISCH.

Οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι.] h. e. *Neque enim legibus divinæ sapientiæ respondere existimo.* STALL. *Ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ*, i. q. *ἀμείνω ἄνδρα*, but used in the dative, from its proximity to *εἶναι*, on which it depends by attraction. See Buttmann. Intermed. Gr. Gr. s. 142.

Ἀποκτείνειε—ἢ ἐξελάσειεν—ἢ ἀτιμάσειεν.] Ἀποκτείνειν est *facere ut quis morte damnetur atque interficiatur: ἐξελαυνειν, facere, ut quis multetur exilio et urbe ejiciatur: ἀτιμάζειν facere ut quis vel omnem civitatem amittat* vel *certe maxima et præcipua civitatis commoda atque jura.* STALL. There were three degrees of Ἀτιμία, *infamy*, or *public disgrace.* 1. When the criminal retained his possessions, but was deprived of some privilege, which was enjoyed by

ται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἃ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτιννύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὡς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὑρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὥς περ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος· οἷον δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδί-

other citizens. 2. When he was, for the present, deprived of the rights of citizenship, and had his goods confiscated, as in the case of those indebted to the public exchequer, until the debt was discharged. 3. When the criminal, with his children and his posterity, were for ever deprived of the rights of free citizens, both sacred and civil. Potter. Grec. Antiq. v. 1. c. 25. Ficinus and Dacier, who follows him, have rendered *ἀτιμάσειεν* incorrectly; v. Lat. Interpr.

Ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον.] Intell. *οἶομαι μέγα κακόν.*

Ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτιννύναι.] Theodoret. *ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποκτεῖναι*; incorrectly, for *ἀποκτιννύναι* is the Attic form. Mœris: *Ἀποκτιννύναι, Ἀττικῶς· ἀποκτεῖναι, Ἑλληνικῶς.* Fisch.

Μή τι ἐξαμ. — καταψηφισάμενοι.] h. e. *ne temere repudietis hoc Apollinis beneficium, vobis tributum, qui me jussit vos ob errores et vitia castigare atque ad virtutis studium cohortari.* Stall. Tr. *Lest in condemning me you may offend in any wise against the gift of the God to you; περὶ* with an accus. signifying frequently *in, adversus, against*, as Aristoph. Nubb. 990. *περὶ τοὺς σαυτοῦ γονέας κακουργεῖν*: *ὑμῖν* being the dat. upon *δόσιν*; see c. 9. n. extr. *Διὰ τὴν τοῦ θ. λ.* c. 17. sub. fin. *τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.* Cf. Cic Legg. "obtemperatio scriptis legibus."

Προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει, κ. τ. λ.] The sense of this passage depends upon the signification of *μύωπός*, which may be interpreted either as *a gadfly*, according to Fischer in loc. Rigalt. ad Ones. c. 1. p. 17. and Blomfield. Gloss. ad Æschyl. Prom. 583. or *a spur*, which is approved by Ficinus, Serranus, Wolf, Schleirmacher, and others, who suppose that Socrates represents himself as a horseman or charioteer, obliged by the direction of the deity to rouse the activity and energies of a noble but indolent steed, the type of the republic, by the application of the spur, which represents his own discourses and exhortations. In the former signification, which from the preceding, *εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν*, and the customary style of the speaker, is likely to be more expressive and correct, Socrates may be understood as comparing himself to a gadfly adhering to, and rousing the dormant faculties of the fine but lazy animal, which needed such excitement to keep its powers in action and alive. This latter explanation agrees better not only with the scope, but the terms of the argument; *προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τ. θ.*, upon which see Matthiæ Gr. s. 496. 3., *προστεθεικέναι*, and *προσκαθίζων* infr. which are all in keeping with, and refer most happily to this view of the subject. —Νωθεστέρῳ, Suid. interpr. *βραδυτέρῳ.*

Οἷον δή μοι—τοιοῦτόν τινα.] Τοιοῦτ. *τιν.* is joined by apposition to *οἷον* preced. to facilitate the completion of the

ζων ἕνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥᾳδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου. ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι ὥς περ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες ἄν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε, εἶτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτ' ἄν, εἰ μή τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειε κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὢν τοιοῦτος οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἠμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεί, ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ προσιόντα ὥς περ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τἆλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ᾔτησα. ἱκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

§. 19. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλεύω περιὼν καὶ πολυ-

sentence, ὃς ὑμᾶς κ. τ. λ. STALL.

Ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως—ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε.] *At vos, offensi forsitan, velut dormitantes quum excitantur,* me ferietis, *atque Anyto obsequuti temere occidetis: posthac reliquum tempus perdormiscetis, nisi quem alium deus vobis miserit, cura permotus vestri.* WOLF. In which, it will be observed, there is a marked allusion to the simile as supr. Upon τάχ' ἄν see Matthiæ Gr. s. 599. *c.* s. 600. 5.

Οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θ.—δεδόσθαι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 536.

Οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε.] h. e. *non videtur esse consilii et arbitrii humani.* STALL. Every one being most inclined to devote his attention and regard to what most nearly concerns his own welfare and interest, and such having been especially the case at Athens, where the neglect of personal and domestic duties came little short of a crime. —Ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων, *aquo animo negligere rem familiarem, res suas perire sinere;* Matthiæ Gr. s. 550. b.

Οὐκ οἷοί τε ἐγέν. ἀπαναισχ.] *Were incapable of having the effrontery to say, that I, &c.*

§. 19. Ταῦτα ξυμβουλεύω.] i. q. ταῦ-

πραγμονῶν, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. Τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται [φωνή], ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλιτος ἐγράψατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔ ποτε. τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τἀληθῆ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅς τις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ'

τα παρακελεύεσθαι, c. 18. *cohortari ad studium sapientiæ et virtutis.* FISCH.—Πολυπραγμονῶν, *intermeddling in the affairs of others;* an expression used by Socrates to express one of the causes of the prejudice of the Athenians against him.

Θεῖον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον.] See c. 31. n. Ἡ γαρ εἰωθυῖα μοι, κ. τ. λ.—Φωνή. This word, which appears to some to have been inserted as an explanation of the preced. θεῖον τι, etc. is to be found in all the copies, and is approved by Forster. Fischer would reject it as a mere gloss, rendered wholly unnecessary by τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, following.

Ἐπικωμῳδῶν ἐγράψατο.] Socrates alludes here to the terms of the ἀντωμοσία; Ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια. c. 11.—Ἐπικωμῳδεῖν, i. q. διασύρειν, χλευάζειν; *to expose to public derision.* Κωμῳδεῖν and διακωμῳδεῖν have a similar signification, owing to the practice of the old comedy, the entire poem of which, as Schlegel remarks, is one great jest, which again contains within itself a world of separate jests. Cf. Horat. Sat. i. 4. 1. sqq.

Προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε.] Cic. Divin. i. 54: "Hoc nimirum est illud, quod de Socrate accepimus, quodque ab ipso in libris Socraticorum sæpe dicitur, esse divinum quiddam, quod dæmonion appellat, cui semper paruerit, nunquam impellenti sæpe revocanti."

Ἀπολώλη.] Ἀπόλλυσθαι, *ejici e patria,* aut *in vincula conjici,* aut *morte damnari.* FISCH. One who escaped these penalties was said σώζεσθαι.—Ἀπολ. καὶ—ὠφελήκη. The primitive termination of the pluperfect, act. and med. appears to have been εα, which occurs in Homer and Herodotus, e. g. in the perf. med. πεποίθεα, Od. ί, 44. συνῳδέατε, Herod. 9. 58. This εα was changed, as in the augment, sometimes into η, whence the Attic and Doric form ᾠδη, χεχήνη, sometimes into ει, with the addition of ν. Matthiæ Gr. s. 188. Obs. s. 198. 3.

Οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει.] See cap. 10. n. Τῶν δημιουργῶν, κ. τ. λ. a med. Γνησίως, *seriously, sincerely.*

ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

§. 20. Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δή μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵν' εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἅμ' ἂν ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. Ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἦρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχὶς πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρα-

Καὶ εἰ.] Καὶ εἰ expresses something hypothetical, *even if; εἰ καὶ*, something actual, *although, notwithstanding that; καὶ εἰ ἀθάνατος ἦν, even if I were immortal; εἰ καὶ θνητός εἰμι, although I am mortal.* Viger. c. viii. s. vi. v. 6.

Ἰδιωτεύειν.] *Vitam privatam agere, privatum esse: δημοσιεύειν*, i. q. *πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, remp. administrare, magistratum esse.* FISCH.

§. 20. Ἵν εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἄν, κ. τ. λ.] Steph. in marg. *Me eum esse, qui nemini contra jus et æquum cessurus sim, mortis metu: non cedendo autem, simul sim interiturus.*

Ὑπεικάθοιμι.] Ald. Bas. 1. Steph. Norib. *ὑπείκοιμι*; but Mœris: Εἰκάθοιμεν, Ἀττικῶς· εἴκοιμεν, Ἑλληνικῶς.

Φορτικὰ καὶ δικανικά.] *Arrogant and petulant.*

Ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν—ἦρξα.] h. l. *nullum unquam magistratum gessi.* STALL. whence, it will be observed, the term *ἀρχη* could not be properly applied to the senatorial office.—Ἐβούλευσα δέ. Socrates belonged to the senate of five hundred, Βουλὴ τῶν πεντακοσίων, out of whom were chosen fifty officers, Πρυτάνεις, to preside in the senate during thirty-five days, or five weeks. These fifty officers were divided into five *decuriæ*; each *decuria* being to govern for the space of one week, during which time they were called Πρόεδροι, out of whom one, elected by lot, presided over the rest for each of the seven days. This president of the proëdri was termed Ἐπιστάτης, and to his charge the public seal, the keys of the citadel, and the public exchequer were committed. The φυλὴ, or tribe out of which the πρυτάνεις were chosen, was called the φυλὴ πρυτανεύουσα, and Socrates was the ἐπιστάτης of the Antiochean tribe, of which his birth-place, Alopece, was a δῆμος, or borough, at the period stated in the text. See Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. c. 18. c. 9.

Τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς.] Every year ten generals were appointed at Athens, called Στρατηγοὶ, who were intrusted with the command of all the forces and warlike preparations, to be managed as they judged best. About the period of their institution, it frequently happened upon occasions of moment that they were all sent out together, but afterwards it was considered unnecessary, and perhaps inexpedient, for so many to be sent out, with equal power, to superintend the military arrangements, and consequently, though the same number continued to be appointed every year, they were not all obliged to attend the wars, but one, two, or more, as occasion required. Upon the deposition of Thrasybulus and Alcibiades, the ten generals alluded to in the text, Conon, Diomedon, Leon, Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasyllus, and Aristogenes, were appointed in their stead. Eight of these ten generals of the commonwealth were on board at the battle of Arginusæ, a small island between Lesbos and the main, where the Lacedæmonian fleet, under Callicratidas, encountered that of the Athenians under

τηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβουλεύσασθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότ' ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην· καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων

Conon. During the engagement twenty-five Athenian vessels were sunk or disabled, and at the conclusion of the battle, which terminated unfavourably to the Lacedæmonians, a council of war was held to consider what steps should be adopted next. Diomedon proposed that the wreck should be collected, and the dead, and immediate relief afforded to such as might be discovered still alive, either floating on the ruins of the galleys, or endeavouring to save themselves by swimming. Erasinides recommended that the whole fleet should at once proceed to the assistance of Conon. Thrasyllus differed from both, and prevailed in his advice, that forty-six ships should remain to collect the wreck, while the rest of the fleet proceeded to Mitylene. None of the generals took the command of the squadron appointed for the former purpose; it was committed to Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who had held high naval commands, but were then in the subordinate rank of captains of triremes. The generals were meanwhile to proceed with the main body of the fleet to Mitylene. Both designs were frustrated by a storm, which compelled all the vessels to shelter at Arginusæ, and the crews of the wreck were thus left to perish. Upon this charge, preferred against six of the eight generals who returned to Athens after the engagement, Diomedon, Pericles, Lysias, Aristocrates, Erasinides, and Thrasyllus; (the other two, Protomachus and Aristogenes, having remained with Conon at Samos;) by Archedemus, the popular orator at Athens, and Theramenes, already mentioned, who unaccountably appeared as principal accuser, they were sentenced and put to death. Socrates, as one of the prytanes, opposed this proceeding to the last for many reasons, independent of its illegality; for each of the accused should have had a separate day for trial, a provision contained in the decree of Canonus, which was strongly urged by Euryptolemus, the relative of Pericles, and intimate of Diomedon, but in vain. Xen. Hel. 1. c. 7. s. 10. Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. cap. 5. Mitford's Greece, iii. 434—459.

The battle of Arginusæ was fought in the year of *Callias*, not long before the *Apaturia* (Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. p. 427.) which were in the month of *Pyanepsion*. This action may therefore be fixed to the third month of Callias, Boedromion of B. C. 406. Clinton's Fasti Hellen. p. 271.

'Ανελομένους.] 'Αναιρεῖσθαι, *corpora mortuorum tollere, ut sepeliantur.* STALL.

'Αθροους κρίνειν.] h. e. *de omnibus simul sententias ferre.* STALL., which has been already shewn to be illegal; whence παρανόμως. Xen. Memor. i. 1. 18. ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους—μιᾷ ψήφῳ—ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας. H. Gr. i. 7. 11. ἡ δὲ τῆς βουλῆς ἦν μιᾷ ψήφῳ ἅπαντας κρίνειν: while the laws decreed that this inquiry should be held upon each individual separately; κρίνεσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας δίχα ἕκαστον. Xen. Hist. Gr. as supr.

'Ως ἐν ὑστερ. χρον.—ἔδοξε.] Xen. Hellen. i. 7. 12. καὶ οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὕστερον μετέμελε τοῖς 'Αθηναίοις, κ. τ. λ.

'Ηναντιώθην.] In allusion to the opposition which Socrates made to the unlawful resolution of Callixenus, that the people should ballot by wards; that there should be for each ward two vases; and that proclamation should be made by the herald, informing the people that whoever deemed the generals criminal, in neglecting to save from the waves those who were conquerors in battle, must put his die in the first vase; whoever deemed them innocent, in the second: that the punishment, in case of condemnation, should be death. Mitford, iii. p. 453. Xenoph. Mem. iv. 4. 2. Hellen. i. 7. 9. 14. 15. Cf. Socrat. in Æschin. Dial. iii. 12. p. 102. οὐκ ἐπη-

ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ᾤμην μᾶλλόν με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἵν' ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν. τότε μέντοι

ρόμην τὴν γνώμην, i. e. *populi sententias non rogabam vel populum suffragia ferre non permittebam.*—FORST.

Ἐνδεικνύναι καὶ ἀπάγειν.] Ἐνδεικνύναι, *aliquem in aliquo facinore deprehensum ad magistratus continuo deferre: ἀπάγειν, abducere quo puniatur.* STALL. Hence ἔνδειξις, *a prosecution*, and ἀπαγωγή, *a conveying to prison.* Fischer reads ὑπάγειν in the text, which he supports by references; but the following are sufficient to support the adopted reading: Demosth. adv. Leptim. p. 504. 24. ed. Reiske. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἔνδείξεις καὶ ἀπαγωγάς. Contr. Timocrat. p. 745. οὐδ' ὅσων ἔνδειξίς, ἐστί τινι ἡ ἀπαγωγή, προσεγέγραπτ' ἂν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, τὸν δ' ἐνδεικθέντα ἢ ἀπαχθέντα δησάντων οἱ ἔνδεκα ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ. Adv. Theocrin. p. 1325. 9. ἐάν τις ποιῇ τὰ τῶν συκοφαντούντων, ἔνδειξιν αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἀπαγωγήν.—Τῶν ῥητόρων.—See cap. 10. sub. fin. ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων.

Οἱ τριάκοντα—με πέμπτον.] See c. 10. n. Μίλιτ.—ὑπ. τ. ποιητ.—πέμπτον αὐτὸν, h. e. *me cum quatuor aliis;* so Xen. H. Gr. ii. 2. 11. ᾠρίθη πρεσβευτὴς—δέκατος αὐτὸς, h. e. *ipse cum novem aliis;* and 2 Pet. ii. 5. ὄγδοον Νῶε—ἐφύλαξε, h. e. *Noachum cum septem aliis,* FISCH., Μεταπεμψάμ. μεταπέμπεσθαι, signifies sometimes, *to send one to bring another*—and also *to send one with full powers,* as in the text, confirmed by προσέταξ. ἀγαγ. ἐκ Σαλαμῖν. following. SERRAN.

Θόλον.] Tim. Gloss. Plat. Θόλος· οἶκος περιφερὴς, ἐν ᾧ οἱ πρυτάνεις συνεισιτῶντο. Pollux, ix. 155. Ἡ Θόλος, ἐν ᾗ συνεδείπνουν ἑκάστης ἡμέρας πεντήκοντα τῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων βουλῆς, ἡ πρυτανεύουσα φυλή. Pausan. i. 5. τοῦ βουλευτηρίου τῶν πεντακοσίων πλησίον Θόλος ἐστὶ καλουμένη, καὶ θύουσι τε ἐνταῦθα οἱ πρυτάνεις. It was so named from its circular form and coved roof; and was called also Πρυτανεῖον, according to Timæus, from its having been a corn store, πορῶν ταμιεῖον.

Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον.] Leon, distinguished for his virtues as his opulence, was one of the ten generals already mentioned, born at Salamis, but a freeman of Athens. Upon the appointment of the Thirty, he retired, a voluntary exile, to his native island; the avarice, which, no less than cruelty and revenge, formed a leading characteristic of the new administration, having warned him that his life, if he remained at Athens, might become the penalty of his wealth; a result which, it appears, was only deferred, and against which his character proved no protection. v. c. 10.

Ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν.] h. e. *commaculare culpa et criminibus.*—STALL. From the united evidence of Xenophon, Lysias, and Plato, it appears that the most abominable policy guided the measures pursued at this period by the Thirty. Revenge and avarice had then full sway; many suffered death for private enmities; many merely for their wealth. Every eminent man was to be destroyed or gained: but, as means were wanting to attach a sufficient number by favours, the infernal expedient was

ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μελει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν οὔτως ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ᾤχοντο εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ᾠχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτ' ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη. καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

§. 21. Ἆρ' οὖν ἄν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὥς περ χρή, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γέ δεῖ,

practised, of forcing men to a community of interest through a participation in crime. Driven by terror to execute tyrannical orders, they became involved in the same guilt, and obnoxious to the same resentment; and thus theirs and that of the Thirty became common cause. Mitford's Greece, iv. p. 46.—Ἀναπλήσας, Suid. Interpr. *ἀναπληρώσας. ὁ δὲ* Πλάτων *ἀντὶ τοῦ μολύνας, having infected or defiled:* in which sense the verb occurs in the description of the plague at Athens, Thucyd. ii. 51. *ἑτερος ἀφ' ἑτέρου θεραπείας ἀναπιμπλάμενοι, ὥσπερ τὰ πρόβατα. — contagione infecti;* which Gesner, in Thes. L. L. v. Impleo, compares with Livy, iv. 30. "vulgatique contactu in homines morbi, et primo in agrestes ingruerant servitiaque. Urbs deinde impletur." Ruhnken. ad Tim. Lex. Plat. v. *ἀναπλήσας.*

Θανάτου μὲν μέλει—οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν.] *Moveor morte nullo prorsus modo.* Fisch. *εἰ μὴ ἀγροικ. ὡς με ἀγροικ.* Serran., which appears to have been adopted by Ficinus; the sense, however, is the same, as Socrates intends to apologize for the use of a term, which, though expressive, was considered, probably, too homely or inelegant by the refined and scrupulous Athenian.

Τὸ πᾶν μέλει.] h. e. *omnino, omnibus modis mihi curæ est.* Stall. Steph. in marg. *me nisi hoc dictu agrestius erat, nihil mortem curare: ut autem nihil injustum neque impium perpetrarem, in eo vero meam omnem curam versari:* vel *nisi hoc dictu subagreste erat* aut etiam *subrusticum.* Fisch.

Ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχή.] So *ἡ τῶν Τριάκοντα.—ἐκπλήττειν, percellere et movere aliquem ita ut quasi extra se rapiatur.* Thom. Mag. p. 186. intt. Lexic. Xenoph. s. h. v.

Ὠιχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε.] h. e. *continuo abii.* Stall. Frequently, instead of a simple verb denoting *to go away*, its participle is joined with οἴχομαι, e. g. ᾤχετ' *ἀποπτάμενος*, for *ἀπέπτατο*, Il. β'. 71. ᾤχετο *φεύγων, he escaped.* Herod. 1. 157. Matthiæ Gr. s. 559. *c.* Seneca remarks, in reference to the conduct of Socrates upon this occasion, de Tranq. Animi. c. 3. "inter triginta tyrannos liberum (Socratem) incessisse;" and Consol. ad Helv. c. 13. "aliquando solum triginta tyrannos in ordinem redegisse."

Εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρφὴ—κατελύθη.] The government of the Thirty lasted four years, from its commencement until its overthrow, by Thrasybulus.

§. 21. Ἆρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε, κ. τ. λ.] See Matthiæ, s. 508. *b.*—διαγενέσθαι, i. q. *σώζεσθαι.* c. 19.

ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε εἴ πού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὓς δὴ οἱ διαβάλλοντες ἐμέ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τις ἐμοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμοῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα. οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγώ, εἴ τέ τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα. εἰ δέ τίς φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅ τι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

§. 22. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί τινες πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; Ἀκηκόατε, ὦ

Οὐδὲ—ἂν ἄλλ. ἀνθρ. οὐδ.] sc. *διεγένετο*.

Τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι.] Τοιοῦτ. is explained by *οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχώρησας*, κ. τ. λ. following.

Ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι.] In allusion to Alcibiades and Critias, whose vices were said to be owing to the instructions of Socrates, a calumny which he now proceeds to refute. Xenoph. Mem. Socr. i. c. 2. 12. Ἀλλ' ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, Σωκράτει ὁμιλητὰ γενομένω Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, πλεῖστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποιησάτην, etc. Æschines, Orat. in Timarch. p. 217. mentions the intimacy of Socrates with Critias in his early life, as the principal cause of his condemnation.

Τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ.] The task assigned to Socrates, by Apollo, of convincing the Athenians of their errors, and rebuking them accordingly, as well as exhorting them to the study and practice of virtue.

Οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμ.] In reference to the avarice of the sophists. c. 4.

Παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.] h. e. *copiam facio et potestatem me interrogandi*, STALL., when the infin. act. is used for the passive, Matthiæ Gr. s. 532. *a*. Καὶ ἐάν τις, i. q. καὶ παντί, ὅστις ἂν βούλ. κ. τ. λ. ἐάν τις and ὅστις admitting of frequent interchanges.

Οὐκ ἂν δικ. τὴν αἰτ. ὑπέχ.] h. e. *hoc recte mihi tribui non poterit*. STALL.

§. 22. Χαίρουσί — διατρίβοντες.] Verbs which express any emotion of the mind, take in the participle the object, or operative cause, as supr., which in Latin is expressed by *quod*, or by the accus. with the infin. When the se-

ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἴπον, ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὖσι δ' οὔ· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντειῶν καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ πρόπῳ, ᾧ πέρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. Ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστὶ καὶ εὐέλεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νεωτέρων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δή που, εἴ τέ τινες αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώποτέ τι ξυνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴ περ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνῆσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ, οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὑτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατήρ· ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου τούτου

cond verb refers to a different subject from the first, then, according to the different construction of the verbs, the gen. dat. and accus. are used; χαίρειν and ἥδεσθαι take the object in the dative, as infr. χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις, κ. τ. λ. Matthiæ Gr. s. 555. *i.*

Τοῦτο—προστέτακται.] Intell. τὸ ἐξετάζειν.

Παντὶ τρόπῳ.] Divination by dreams, sacrifices, birds, cats, &c. by which the Athenians believed that the pleasure of the gods was signified to men. Steph. in marg. *qua* (ratione) *unquam ulla etiam alia sors divina quicquam ulli homini, ut faceret, imperavit.*

Καὶ εὐέλεγκτα.] *Quæ redargui possint, si non vera sint.* SERRAN. The term is more generally used in reference to what is *easily refuted* or *disproved*, but in consequence of ἀληθῆ preced. it must admit of the extension of its ordinary sense, as given by Serranus. Tr. *easily confirmed.*

Εἴ τι.] Εἴγε. FISCH. Adopted by Ficinus.

Κακὸν—τι ξυνεβούλευσα.] This, as well as κακόν τι πεπονθέναι, and κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, infr. refers to the charges advanced against Socrates of his having led his associates astray, and instilled into their minds an enmity to their country and contempt of their gods.

Πάρεισιν—ἐνταυθοῖ.] *Have come to be present here.*—Παρεῖναι ἐνταυθοῖ, *huc venisse ibique præsentem esse, ibique versari;* so Protagor. p. 310. A. τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν, εἰ μή σέ τι κωλύει, καθιζόμενος ἐνταυθοῖ; i. e. *huc considens et nobiscum sedens.* STALL.

Κρίτων οὑτοσί.] See in Criton. init. Critobulus, the son of Crito, the cotemporary of Socrates, ἡλικιώτης, and of the same borough, Alopece, δημότης; was a disciple of Socrates, and was present at the trial, as were also Lysanias, the father of Æschines, who belonged

πατήρ· ἔτι δ' Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεὺς οὑτοσί, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ. ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι, ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασι, Νικόστρατος ὁ Θεοσδοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεηθείη—, καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν Θεάγης ἀδελφός· ὅδε τε Ἀδείμαντος ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὗ ἀδελφὸς οὑτοσὶ Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινὰ ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μελιτον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τοὐναντίον εὑρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἑτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὥς φασι Μέλιτος καὶ Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοη-

to the borough of Sphettus, of the tribe of Acamas: Antiphon to that of Cephisus, or Cephisia, of the tribe of Erectheus, &c.

Ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι.] "Male ἀσύνδετος est oratio neque commodum est h. l. istud τοίνυν, *igitur*, ut depravata hæc verba videantur, sic fortasse corrigenda; ἄλλοι τε ἐντανθοῖ." So Heindorf, who seems however to have unnecessarily restricted the signification of τοίνυν, which is frequently used in oratorical transitions in the sense of *jam vero*, as Isocr. in Panegyr. τῶν τοίνυν τὰς πανηγύρεις καταστησάντων, δικαίως ἐπαινουμένων, etc.; i. e. *jam vero, cum ii suo jure laudentur, qui publicas celebritates instituerint.* Demosth. pro Coron. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἐποιήσατο τὴν εἰρήνην ἡ πόλις, etc.; *jam vero, postquam respublica pacem fecisset.* Viger, c. viii. s. 9. v. 9.

Ὥστε οὐκ ἂν—καταδεηθείη.] Steph. in marg. *Ita ut ille* (Theodotus) *non jam eum* (Nicostratum) *rogare possit, ne contra me testetur, neque testimonio suo levitatem meam et improbitatem ita ulciscatur, ut me sententiis vestris condemnandum tradat.* Καταδεῖσθαι, *aliquem precibus vincere ac commovere.* STALL.

Πλάτων—Ἀπολλόδωρος.] See in Phædon. c. 2. sub fin.; of the others mentioned above nothing is known connected with any interest, further than their having been the friends and disciples of Socrates. Plat. in Theog. and Demosth. de Repub. init. p. 357.

Ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ.] h. e. *per me ei hoc licet.* STALL. *I give him leave.* The accuser was not allowed in an Athenian court of justice to interrupt the accused in the progress of his defence. But it happened not unfrequently that, as in the present case, the defendant, when he felt that he had truth and justice at his side, challenged the accuser to refute his statement, and volunteered to resign a portion of the time allotted to himself, for his adversary to reconcile his charge with some contradictory evidence on the part of the accused. See Potter, Græc. Antiq. 1. c. 21.

Λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες.] *Would have an excuse for defending me;* lest it should appear that they had associated indiscreetly with an individual by whose impiety and iniquity their own characters had become liable to a similar imputation.

θοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὃν ξυνίσασι Μελίτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

§. 23. Εἶεν δή, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδόν τί ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα. Τάχα δ' ἄν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἱκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' ἂν οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρός με σχοίη, καὶ

Οἱ *τούτων προσήκοντες.*] *Their relatives:* so Eurip. El. 337. *ὁ ἐκείνου τεκών, his father.* Thucydides is remarkable for using participles as substantives, in which case they frequently take a genitive or possessive pronoun. Thuc. i. 128. *βασιλέως προσήκοντές τινες.* i. 36. *τὸ δεδιὸς αὐτοῦ* (*το δίος*) . . . . *τὸ θαρσοῦν* (*το θάρσος*). ii. 19. *τὰ ἐν Πλαταιᾷ τῶν ἐσελθόντων Θηβαίων γενόμενα.* Arist. Eccl. 1118. *ἡ ἐμὴ κεκτημένη.* Eurip. Iph. A. 1280. *τὸ κείνου βουλόμενον, his will.*

'Αλλ' *ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν.*] 'Αλλ' *ἤ* signifies *except, unless,* and therefore usually follows a negative, or an interrogation implying such. Οὐκ—ἀλλ' *ἤ* is to be explained by supposing a member of the sentence to be omitted on account of the doubt or ignorance of the speaker or writer, which omitted member is to be joined by means of *ἤ* to a preceding one: Aristoph. in Pac. 475. *οὐδὲν 'Αργεῖοι πάλαι ἀλλ' ἢ κατεγέλων τῶν ταλαιπωρουμένων,* i. e. *ἀλλ' ἢ κατεγέλων, ἢ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐποίουν.* So supr. *ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον λόγ. ἔχ. ἢ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅν τίνα ἄλλον, κ. τ. λ.* Seag. Viger. viii. s. ii. 10. See in Phædon, c. 30. n.

§. 23. Τί.] Ald. Bas. 1. Norib. *τοι.* Steph. *τι,* which is the more correct, the pronoun being often elegantly joined to *σχεδὸν, πάνυ,* and such particles, by Plato, Xenophon, and others. FISCH.

Τάχα δ' *ἄν τις ἀγανακ.*] Socrates proceeds to assign his reasons for not bringing forward his children, as was customary with the accused at Athens, to move the compassion of the judges in his favour, a resource which he held to be inconsistent with his own character, and opposed to the spirit of the laws. That it was not unusual to employ the tears and entreaties of wives and daughters to avert a threatened sentence will appear from Aristoph. Plut. 383. s. Vesp. 566. s.

'Ελάττω — *ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος.*] h. e. *causam agens minus periculosam.* STALL.

Οὐδὲν—*ποιήσω.*] Cic. Tusc. i. 29. "His, et talibus, rationibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quæsivit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplex fuit."

Αὐθαδέστερον—*σχοίη.*] *Should be more obstinately prejudiced against me;* the term *αὐθάδης* being applied to a a judge, who, although the accused

ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θεῖτο ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δή τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει,—οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε· εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπιεικῆ ἄν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λόγον, ὅτι Ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶ μέν πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοί μοί εἰσι καὶ υἱεῖς γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἷς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδέν αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; Οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει οὔ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχοντα, εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι

might have expected an acquittal, from the justice of his cause, should refuse his sanction thereto, from the requisite form of supplication not having been previously adopted.

Θεῖτο—τὴν ψῆφον.] Ovid. Metam. xv. "Mos erat antiquis, niveis atrisque lapillis, His damnare reos, illis absolvere culpa." See c. 25. sub. fin. Εἰ τρεῖς μον. n.

Οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν—ἔγωγε.] h. e. *Nolim equidem quenquam vestrum hoc animo esse.* FISCH. It might, probably, be more effectively rendered, *I do not take it for granted*, or, *admit and establish it as a principle;* from which latter sense of the verb ἀξίωμα derives its meaning, as a philosophical term; Socrates by no means intending to assert, that the judges should be necessarily so disposed towards one who conscientiously rejected an alternative, with which, under the circumstances, he might have been expected to comply. But addressing them *on the supposition*, εἰ δ' οὖν sc. τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει, that some amongst them might have been influenced by such a feeling, he uses the terms, as supr., in the sense proposed. Nearly in a similar sense, V. Cousin appears to have understood the text; *S' il y a ici quelqu'un qui soit dans ces sentimens, ce que je ne saurais croire, mais j'en fais la supposition*, etc.; though he fails in assigning the requisite force to ἀξιῶ. Ficinus loses sight of the meaning altogether.

Τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου.] Odyss. τ', 163. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἔσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης: where Penelope, before she recognises Ulysses, inquires into the circumstances of his birth.

Υἱεῖς—τρεῖς.] Lamprocles, by Myrto, called supr. μειράκιον, in Phædon. μέγας, Sophroniscus, and Menexenus, by Xantippe, supr., παιδία, in Phædon, σμικροί. Seneca, Ep. 104, mentions them as unmanageable, and but little resembling their father.

Οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος.] Cic. Tusc. i. 29. de Socrat. "Adhibuitque liberam contumaciam, a magnitudine animi ductam, non a superbia."

Ἄλλος λόγος.] *Alia quæstio est, ad hunc sermonem non pertinet.* STEPH.

Τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχοντα.] i. e. *Florentem tanta sapientiæ laude*, STALL., to which Socrates subjoins, to obviate the charge of presumption, εἴτ' οὖν—

τὸν Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων· εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφίᾳ εἴτε ἀνδρίᾳ εἴτε ἄλλῃ ἠτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη, οἵους περ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἑώρακά τινας, ὅταν κρίνωνται, δοκοῦντας μέν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οιομένους πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥς περ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἳ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἄν τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετήν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἔν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὁπῃτιοῦν τι εἶναι, οὔτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος.

§. 24. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ

ψεῦδος; i. q. ψευδές. Matthiæ Gr. s. 429. 4.

Τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται.] To be taken with οἵους περ εγω πολλ. etc. following: αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη being parenthetic.

Δοκοῦντας μέν τι εἶναι.] h. e. *qui viderentur esse sapientia nescio qua præditi.* STALL. Τις, without ad additional adjective, has the sense of *eminent, distinguished:* in Phæd. c. 8. εὐελπίς εἰμι εἶναι τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι. Matthiæ Gr. s. 487. 5.—Θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομενους, *qui ea faciunt, e quibus intelligi possit, ipsos commoveri morte.* FISCH.

Ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομ. πείσ.] *Quippe,* vel *utpote putantes se indigni quid esse passuros.* STALL.—Ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 568. 3.

Διαφέροντες—εἰς ἀρετήν.] Εἰς, *with respect to, quod attinet ad,* a general reference, which in English is often expressed by the more definite *on account of, in consequence of.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 578. *c.*

Οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν.] h. e. *neque nos decet talia facere—, nec, si nos faciamus, vos decet ea concedere et permittere.* STALL.

Τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα.] *These doleful tragedies;* alluding to the custom already mentioned, of endeavouring to awaken the sympathies of the judges by the tears of wives and children.—Εἰσάγοντος. See. c. 12. n. Ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις, κ. τ. λ.

§. 24. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης.] h. e. *sed præterquam quod illud existimationi meæ non responderet.* STALL.

τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὀμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὔκουν χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἃ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἄλλως τε πάντως νὴ Δία, μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελίτου τουτουί. σαφῶς γὰρ ἄν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὀμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρῖναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

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§. 25. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε,

Ἐπὶ τούτῳ—ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσ.] When the demonstrative pronoun precedes the infinitive, it seems to increase the attention to what follows. Matthiæ Gr. s. 472. 2. *b.* Καταχαρίζεσθαι τὸ δίκαιον, *justitiam donare gratiæ, jus negligere, quo alteri gratum facias.*— STALL.

Καὶ ὀμώμοκεν.] Pollux, viii. 122. Ὁ δὲ ὅρκος ἦν τῶν δικαστῶν· περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι εἰσὶ, κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφιεῖσθαι· περὶ δὲ ὧν μὴ εἰσι, σὺν γνώμῃ δικαιοτάτῃ

Μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτε.] *Nolite igitur putare.* STALL.

Ἄλλως τε πάντως—μάλιστα μέντ. κ.] h. e. *quum alias omnino, tum maxime nunc, quum impietatis accusatus sum a Melito.* STALL.

Εἰ πείθοιμι—βιαζοίμην.] Intell. χαρίζεσθαί μοι τὰ δίκαια.

§. 25. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν.] In the Athenian court, when the plaintiff and defendant had concluded their harangues, the public crier called upon the judges to announce their verdict. In the case of trial for crimes for which penalties had been assigned by the laws, ἀγῶνες ἀτίμητοι, a single verdict, declaring the guilt or innocence of the accused was sufficient; but in cases which were not so cognisable by the laws, ἀγῶνες τίμητοι, if the accused was found guilty, a second sentence was required to determine the punishment due to the offence. To the latter class the cause of Socrates must have belonged. All that he had already advanced in his behalf was with a view to the primary verdict of the judges, as to his being actually guilty or not guilty of the charges preferred against him by Melitus: upon

ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ᾤμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολύ· νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ τρεῖς μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἄν. Mé-

which, in the first instance, the judges decided against him; it remained then for Socrates, in compliance with the usual form, intended, in some degree, to exonerate the judges, and confirm their sentence, by obliging the accused to acknowledge his guilt, to condemn himself to one of three penalties, perperpetual imprisonment, a fine, or banishment. Such a confession, however, should have seriously involved the character of Socrates, and impaired, in no small degree, the truth and sincerity of his previous defence. Accordingly, in the triumph of conscious innocence, instead of submitting to a penalty, he demanded a reward, and was only prevailed on at length, from a desire of gratifying the wishes, and tranquillizing the apprehensions of his friends, to amerce himself in a fine, which, being incompetent himself, they undertook to pay.

It has been questioned whether this trial, founded upon such an indictment, should not rather have been classed with the *ἀγῶνες ἀτίμητοι*, but there were criminal causes, and degrees of the guilt imputed, in which, as well as in civil causes, the punishment was discretionary with the judge. Of such a character, it is plain, was the present trial, in which, as Cicero remarks, de Orat. l. 1. "Socrates was not only condemned by the first sentence of the judges, which determined whether the criminal should be condemned or acquitted, but by that, also, which the laws obliged them to pronounce afterwards." According to Xenophon, Apol. Socr. p. 25, Socrates, in asserting his innocence, subsequent to his condemnation, declared that if every charge had been completely proved, still, all together did not amount, pursuant to any known law, to a capital crime. In the Public Economy of Athens, by Boeckh, one of the most valuable works in classical literature, the subject of damages, fines, and penalties for illegal acts is ably and comprehensively discussed. And though with a particular view, as affecting the public revenue, still the general question is made easily intelligible. See vol. ii. 97. sqq.

Παρὰ πολύ.] h. e. *non sperabam futurum ut numerus calculorum, quibus absolverer, tam parum differret ab eorum quibus damnarer, numero: immo putabam, numerum calculorum absolutoriorum longe superatum iri damnatoriorum numero.* Fisch.—*παρ' ὀλίγον, so little different; αλλα παρα πολυ, but different by a great excess.* Viger. c. ix. s. 6. v. 7. Matthiæ Gr. s. 588. *c.*

Εἰ τρεῖς μόναι.] According to Fischer, who has taken considerable pains in comparing and reconciling the conflicting authorities, the judges of Socrates were in number 556. Of these, 281 were for conviction, and 275 for acquittal; had three more from the former been added to the latter, the votes on either side had been equal, and, according to the Athenian law, he should have been discharged. Eurip. Elect. 1265. and Iphig. Tauric. 1469. Stephens, Dacier, and others, read *τριάκοντα τρεῖς*, of which Fischer justly disapproves; as it is scarcely possible that such a majority could have been followed by *μόναι*.—Μετέπεσον, *had fallen to a different side: μεταπίπτειν, aliter cadere*, h. e. *in aliam urnam incidere.* Fisch. The judges took the *ψῆφοι*, or pebbles, which were succeeded by the *σπόνδυλοι*, small balls of brass, and later, by the *κυάμοι*, beans, all employed for a similar purpose, and cast them through a small tunnel, called *κημὸς*, into two urns, one for receiving the condemning, and the other, the absolving votes, called *κάδοι* or *καδίσκοι*; whence the meaning of the term, as supr. is obviously correct. Cf. Potter, Grec. Antiq. l. c. 19. c. 21.

λιτον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὤφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

§. 26. Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. Εἶεν. ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτῖσαι, ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὧν περ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ'

Κἂν ὤφλε χιλίας δραχμάς.] *He should have been liable to a penalty of a thousand drachms, not having obtained a fifth part of the suffrages.* Melitus escaped the fine to which those who, having commenced a prosecution, failed in obtaining a fifth of the suffrages, were liable, in consequence of Anytus and Lycon having devoted their interest and advocacy to the cause, which, without them, should have terminated in the discomfiture and disgrace of the prominent accuser.

§. 26. Τιμᾶται, κ. τ. λ.] The accuser was accustomed to subjoin to the indictment, *ἀντωμοσία*, whatever penalty appeared to him to have been deserved by the accused, unless the law had already prescribed what the precise penalty should be. For which *τιμᾶσθαι, to estimate a crime at such a price*, with a dat. of the person and a genit. of the punishment, was the technical phrase; and to which were opposed *ὑποτιμᾶσθαι, to estimate or assign a penalty for one's self*, and *ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι*, which has a similar purport, Pollux. viii. 150. Xen. Apol. 23. Melitus, c. 11, supr. made death the consequence of Socrates' conviction. See Boeckh, Econ. of Athens. ii. 99.

Παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτῖσαι.] The question put to the accused was, Ὅτι χρὴ, or *τί ἄξιος εἶ, παθεῖν, ἢ ἀποτίσαι*: the former referring to corporeal, the latter to pecuniary punishment.

Ὅ τι μαθὼν—οὐκ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον.] *Quod non remisi a discendo.* Boeckh. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 567. Ficinus misunderstands the passage altogether. Tr. *What penalty do I deserve to suffer or pay*, because [*ὅ τι μαθὼν*] *during my life I have not kept quiet*, etc.

Ὧν περ οἱ πολλοί.] Intell. *ἐπιμελοῦνται*; a word being sometimes obliged to be supplied of an opposite tendency to the preceding one expressed.—Matthiæ Gr. 634. 3.

Δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν.] Τῶν ἄλλων is used here as in Gorg. s. 54. *ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων*, h. e. *ξένων ὄντων*: *δημηγορία*, signifying *a popular harangue*, or the province of one who dealt in such, which could not be properly designated by *ἀρχη*. Fischer reads *δημιουργιῶν*, but on the strength of a conjecture, which he fails in establishing, that at Athens *δημάρχοι* and *δημιουργοὶ* were synonymous. By *ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων* Socrates intends an allusion to the troubles of his own times, in which he was not otherwise engaged than, as has been already shown, in a manner which was creditable to his country and honorable to himself.

Ἐπιεικέστερον.] i. e. *Supposing myself to be possessed of too much integrity*

ἰόντα σώζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα οἷ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως· τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὤν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον ὅ τι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτῃ, δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολύ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπιάσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς

to ensure my security by having recourse to such practices.

Εὐεργέτῃ.] This was an honorary title conferred upon such as had deserved well of the state, and to which σωτήρ was not unfrequently joined: Dorvill. ad Charit. p. 317. ed. Lips. "Viri principes, immo reges reipublicæ Atheniensis εὐεργέτας τοῦ δήμου γραφῆναι ceu eximium decus adfectaverunt."

Μᾶλλον—οὕτως' ὡς.] This was not an unusual form with the Greek writers; Cf. Min. 318. E. Οὐ γὰρ ἴσθ' ὅ, τι τούτου ἀσεβέστερον ἔστιν, οὐδ' οὕτω χρὴ μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰς θεοὺς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν. Dial. Eryx. p. 392. C. Ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν σμικρῶν τούτων ἂν μᾶλλον ὀργίζοιντο οὕτως ὡς ἂν μάλιστα χαλεπώτατοι εἶησαν. HEUSD.

Ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι.] This was one of the highest honours in the Athenian commonwealth; to be supported at the public expense in the Prytaneum, or common hall. Cic. Orat. i. 54. Demosth. de fals. Leg. ii. 267. Pollux. ix. 40.

Ἵππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι.] Horse-races were performed with single horses; whence ἵππῳ, supr., *equus singularis*, FISCH., which were called κέλητες, or μονάμπυκες; chariot races, with a pair of horses yoked, ξυνωρίς, *bigæ*, Hesych. interpr. συζυγία, ἢ ἅρμα ἐκ δυοῖν ἵπποιν συνεζευγμένον. Suid. ἐκ δύο ἵππων: and with three or more, ζεῦγος, *trigæ, quadrigæ*, Hesych. interpr. πᾶν τὸ ἐζευγμένον, καὶ ὄχημα, καὶ ἐπὶ τριῶν, καὶ τεσσάρων, ἔτασσον. For the Olympic games see Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. c. 22. The victors enjoyed little short of divine honours.—Ὀλυμπιάσιν.—The following distinction, arising from the accenting of this term, is stated by Phavorinus, from the Scholiast in Aristoph. Vesp. p. 361. Ὀλυμπίασι· νῦν προπαροξύνεται· λέγεται γὰρ περὶ τόπου· ἐὰν περὶ πράγματος ᾖ δηλοῦσα ἡ λέξις, οἷον ὡς εἰ λέγοι

οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

§. 27. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥς περ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἑκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα, ἐπεί, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥς περ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνην κρίνειν ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπείσθητε ἄν· νῦν δ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτὸς ὡς ἄξιός εἰμί του κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιούτου τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ. τί δείσας; ἦ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο,

τις, δίκα Ὀλυμπιάσιν· ἐφεξῆς ἐνίκησεν ὁ δεῖνα, προπερισπᾶται.

Τούτου τιμῶμαι.] h. e. *si conferi me oportet, quam æstimationem maxime commeruerim, fateor, me meruisse, ut quotidianus mihi in Prytaneo victus publice præbeatur.* Fisch. Cf. Lucian. Prometh. iv. p. 188. tom. 1, ἐφ' οἷς ἔγωγε τῆς ἐν Πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως, εἰ τὰ δίκαια ἐγίγνετο, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν ἐμαυτόν.

§. 27. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν, κ. τ. λ.] *Perhaps in addressing you thus, I appear to express myself with a similar presumption as on the subject of pity and supplication.* v. c. 23. Ἀντιβολεῖν, i. q. ἱκετεύειν, whence ἀντιβόλησις, i. q. ἱκετεία. Stall.

Ἑκὼν εἶναι.] h. e. *quantum quidem a mea pendeat voluntate.* Stall. Ἑκὼν εἶναι non est simpliciter *sponte sed quantum quis sponte quid faciat.* Οὐδὲ μὴν φίλοις γε, οὐδὲ ξένοις ἑκὼν εἶναι γέλωτα παρέχεις: Xen. Cyrop. ii. 2. 15. *ut id quidem sponte faciat,* [*by choice; if you can help it.*] Hermann. ad Viger. p. 888.

Ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα.] In allusion to the preceding portion of the Apology.

Ὡς περ.] Steph. ὅσπερ: adopted also by Ficinus and Forster.

Μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνην.] S. Petit enumerates in the Athenian code the following law: "Sol occasus suprema in judiciis tempestas esto." Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. p. 192.

Εἶμι του.] Εἶμι του, h. e. τινος κακοῦ, Kœhl. Bekk. Heind. in preference to τοῦ; the necessity of the correction being evident from c. 28. οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ οὐδενός. Socrates expresses himself as supr. in Xenoph. Apol. s. 23. ὅτι τὸ ὑποτιμᾶσθαι ὁμολογοῦντος εἴη ἀδικεῖν.

Τί δείσας; ἦ μὴ πάθω.] *Through fear of what?* [should I acquiesce in the order to assign a penalty for myself?] *is it lest I should suffer what Melitus assigns me?* i. e. Socrates would not allow the probability of his being sentenced to death, as proposed in the indictment, to divert him from the unwavering assertion of his innocence, which he felt that it would be an injustice to himself to render dubious, under the influence of fear, by a voluntary amercement.

οὗ Μέλιτός μοι τιμᾶται, ὅ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακόν ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἕλωμαί τι ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, τούτου τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ [τοῖς ἕνδεκα]; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν μοι ἐστιν ὅ περ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω. Ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσομαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἄν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλὴ μέντ' ἄν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖταί μου οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἆρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥᾳδίως. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη, ἐξελθόντι τηλικῷδε ἀνθρώπῳ, ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλιν πόλεως ἀμει-

Μέλιτός—τιμᾶται.] This verb is used in the middle voice in reference to the accuser and accused; *τούτου τιμησάμενος*, infr. in the active of the judges; *ἴσως γὰρ ἄν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε*, infr.

Ἕλωμαί τι ὧν εὖ οἶδ. ὅτι.] i. q. ἕλωμαί τι τούτων, or ἐκείνων, ἃ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν: or, ἕλωμαί τι τῶν εὖ οἶδα, κακῶν ὄντων; both of which constructions appear to be combined in the text. STALL. Cf. Gorg. p. 481. D. *αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἑκάστοτε καί περ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι, ὑπόσ' ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικά, καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου.*

Τοῖς ἕνδεκα.] These magistrates were selected from the ten tribes, one from each, to whom was added a registrar, γραμματεύς, to complete the number, eleven. They were called also *νομοφύλακες*, *keepers of the laws*, from the nature of their office, which consisted in superintending the execution of malefactors, and taking charge of such as were committed to the public prison. Hesych. Ἕνδεκα· ἄρχοντες, οἷς παρεδίδοντο οἱ θανάτῳ καταδικασθέντες. Etymol. M. e Lex. Rhetor. Ἕνδεκα—προεστηκότες τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. Cf. in Criton. c. 2. οἱ τούτων κύριοι. in Phædon. c. 2. οἱ ἄρχοντές. These magistrates sat as judges in a court called Παράβυστον μέσον; see Potter, Græc. Antiq. 2. c. 21.

Δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω.] Those upon whom a pecuniary fine was imposed, were imprisoned until it was discharged; which in the case of Socrates would have been a perpetual confinement, as he had not the means of paying it, so that this would be the same as if he had sentenced himself to the custody of the eleven at once; *ταὐτόν μοί ἐστιν ὅ περ*, etc.

Εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι.] Cf. c. 12. supr. extr. Εἰ εἰς—διαφθείρει; and c. 17. extr. Εἰ μὲν οὖν—διαφθείρω—ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλ.

Ἄλλοι δὲ ἆρα αὐτάς, κ. τ. λ.] This is to be taken ironically, as also infr. *καλὸς οὖν ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη*. FISCH.

βομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε. κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι, πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

§. 28. Ἴσως οὖν ἄν τις εἴποι, Σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; Τουτὶ δὴ ἔστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον πεῖσαί τινας ὑμῶν. ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐάν τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἑκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἔτι ἧττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδια. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμ' οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτίσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δέ —οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην

Ἐξελῶσι.] Ἐλάω, the th. of ἐλαύνω, seldom occurs in the present tense, but ἐλῶ, ἐλᾷς, ἐλᾷ, &c. infin. ἐλᾶν, is in prose the Attic future. Buttm. Int. Gr. Gr. p. 252. So Mœris: Ἐλῶ, Ἀττικῶς· ἐλάσω, Ἑλληνικῶς.

§. 28. Ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ.] Εἰρωνεία, as applied particularly to Socrates, signifies a method of argument conducted chiefly by affecting ignorance, and putting captious questions; the answers of the antagonist furnishing their own refutation, and often exposing him to ridiculous contradictions. Donneg. Gr. Lex.

Μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὄν.] Many editions omit the particip. ὄν, incorrectly; Phrynic. p. 120. Τυγχάνω· καὶ τοῦτο προσεκτέον. Οἱ γὰρ ἀμελεῖς οὕτω λέγουσι, φίλος σοὶ τυγχάνω, ἐχθρός μοι τυγχάνεις· δεῖ δὲ τῷ ῥήματι τὸ ὢν προστιθέναι, φίλος μοι τυγχάνεις ὤν, ἐχθρός μοι τυγχάνεις ὤν. Οὕτω γὰρ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἐχρήσαντο. Cf. c. 17. supr. οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κ. τ. λ.

Ἀνεξέταστος βίος.] *Vita ea, quum quis, neque ipse suum animum excutit neque eum ab aliis excuti jubet, ut videat, verene sapiens sit et virtute ornatus, an sibi videatur tantum talis esse; ut videat, quam longe progressus sit in studio sapientiæ et virtutis, quantum spatii restet quod sit conficiendum.* Fisch. Βίος οὐ βιωτὸς· i. q. βίος ἀβίωτος, Hesych. interpr. ἀηδής: *a joyless existence.* Cf. in Criton. c. 8.

Νῦν δέ—οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν.] After νῦν δὲ intell. οὐ δύναμαί μοι τιμήσασθαι

ἐκτῖσαι, τοσούτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτῖσαι ὑμῖν που μνᾶν ἀργυρίου· τοσούτου οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι. τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου· ἐγγυηταὶ δ' ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεῳ.

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§. 29. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἕνεκα χρόνου, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἕξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτην ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν· φήσουσι γὰρ δή με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν. εἰ γοῦν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς

χρήματων. Most editions join νῦν δε with what follows, but do not attempt any explanation of γάρ. The aposiopesis, as in the text, is decidedly the more correct. Cf. Plat. Sympos. 8. Εἰ μέν γὰρ εἷς ἦν ὁ Ἔρως, καλῶς ἂν εἶχε· νῦν δέ— οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν εἷς· intell. οὐ καλῶς ἔχει. —Εἰ μὴ ἄρα. Sometimes εἰ μὴ expresses, not so properly a condition as the sarcastic *nisi forte, unless forsooth.* Matthiæ, Gr. s. 617. c.

Ἐγγυᾶσθαι.] Intell. φασί, ὑπισχνοῦνται, or some such word, the sense of which is implied in κελεύουσί preced. —Ἐγγυητής, Etymol. M. ὁ ἀναδεχόμενος δίκην.—Ἀξιόχρεως μέν ἐστιν ὁ ἐπιλῦσαι τι ἱκανός. Ammon. FISCH.

§. 29. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἕνεκα χρόνου.] Socrates having amerced himself, in obedience to the laws, in a penalty of thirty minæ, it remained for the judges to pass the decretory sentence confirming the fine. But irritated by the independent spirit and dauntless energy of his demeanour and defence, and too successfully tampered with by the persevering assiduity and art of his accusers, they decided upon his death. What follows Socrates is supposed to have addressed to them when acquainted with the result. Οὐ πολλ. γ' ἕνεκ. χρόν. *propter non longum temporis spatium.* Steph. i. q. εὐτελεστάτου ἕνεκα κέρδους. SERRAN. Socrates having arrived at a very advanced period of life, his accusers, by succeeding in their malicious designs, secured but an unenviable triumph, that of anticipating by a very short interval his natural decease, εἰ γοῦν περιεμ. &c. infr.—Ὄνομα ἕξετε καὶ αἰτίαν, *you shall incur, from those who are anxious to calumniate the city, the censure and reproach, etc.*

Ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο.] Sc. ἐμὲ τεθνάναι.

Πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου.] h. e. *ætatem meam eo provectam esse, ut non longum sit reliquæ vitæ spatium.* STALL. So Plutarch. Vit. Demosth. p. 846. E. ὀψέ ποτε καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας ἠψάμεθα Ῥωμαϊκοῖς γράμμασιν ἐντυγχάνειν. Cf. Matthiæ Gr. s. 340. 3.

τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. Ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀπορίᾳ λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ᾠμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορίᾳ μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οἳ' ἂν ὑμῖν μὲν ἥδιστ' ἦν ἀκούειν, θρηνοῦντος τ' ἐμοῦ καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγώ φημι· οἷα δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε ᾠήθην δεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἄν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφεὶς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαί εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἐάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ᾖ χαλεπόν, ὦ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν· θᾶττον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἅτε βραδὺς ὢν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἑάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἅτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν

Ἴσως με οἴεσθε, κ. τ. λ.] *Perhaps you imagine that I have been convicted from a deficiency in arguments such as I could have persuaded you by, had I thought it incumbent on me to make every exertion by word and deed to escape from punishment.—ἅπαντα ποιεῖν, πᾶν ποιεῖν, omnem lapidem movere, nihil intentatum relinquere.* STALL.

Ἐκείνως.] Intell. ἀπολογησάμενος.

Ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 540. Obs. 3.

Ἐάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν.] Steph. in marg. *si quis sustinuerit quidvis facere et dicere:* q. d. *si quem non pudeat quidvis f.*

Ἑάλων.] Socrates plays upon this word, which signifies properly *to overtake and seize one by running*, and uses the phrase ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἁλῶναι in reference to his having been condemned himself to death by the judges; and ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας, in reference to his accusers, who were consigned to infamy by the voice of truth.

ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὄφλων, οὗτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγώ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν που ἴσως οὕτω καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

§. 30. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμῳδῆσαι, ὦ καταψηφισάμενοί μου· καὶ γαρ εἰμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι χρημῳδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἥξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νὴ Δί' ἢ οἵαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε. νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἴργασθε οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου. τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγώ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἠσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσῳ νεώ-

Ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν.] h. e. *a veritate improbitatis et injustitiæ convicti et condemnati.* STALL.—Τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω, *paratus sum pœnam, qualis a vobis æstimata est subire*, h. e. *mori.* FISCH.—Μετρίως ἔχειν, h. e. *recte se habere: μέτρια, quæcunque conveniunt, et decent viros honestos et bonos: recta, honesta.* FISCH.

§. 30. Ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησμῳδ.] The ancients believed that as death, and consequently the period of disunion between soul and body, approached more nearly, the dying were endued with the faculty of foresight, and the spirit, freed from its material fetters, and mingling with the more congenial elements of the celestial world, was thus enabled to prophesy the course of human events. See Cic. de Divin. i. 30. Davis, interpr. Cf. Eustath. in Iliad. p. 1089. Ἔστι δὲ δόγμα παλαιὸν, ὡς ὅτι ἀπαλλασσομένη σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ θεία φύσει ἐγγίζουσα, ἔχει τι μαντικῆς. Ἀρτέμωνα δέ φασι, τὸν Μιλήσιον, λέγειν ἐν τῷ περὶ Ὀνείρων, ὡς ὅτε ἀθροισθῇ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος, πρὸς τὸ ἐκκριθῆναι μαντικωτάτη γίνεται. Cf. Iliad. xxii. 358. Æneid. iv. 622. Instances of prophetic inspiration, towards the close of life, are not rare in Holy Writ; See Genesis, c. 49. Deuteronomy, c. 33. etc.

Τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἥξειν.] According to Laertius, and others, this prediction of Socrates was borne out by the result. The Athenians, with their characteristic fickleness, soon found cause for a bitter repentance of their most iniquitous and merciless proceeding. Melitus was torn in pieces, and the rest of the accusers, and their party, were either expelled the state or died by their own hands, while every possible respect was paid to the memory of Socrates, as a benefactor of the republic.

Ἢ οἵαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε.] h. e. *quam qua me affecistis.* STALL.—Τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, h. e. *ne vita exploretur, eoque reprehendatur.* ID.

Χαλεπώτεροι.] sc. τοσούτῳ. See c. 17. supr. sub. fin. Μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστ. κ. τ. λ. n.—Ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους—Steph. in marg.—*homines interficiendo, fore, ut deterreatis omnes ab exprobanda inhonesta vita, non recte sentitis.* Ficinus omits ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθ. ζῆτ. See Lat. Interpr.

τεροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχήσειν τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐ καλῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γάρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥᾴστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

§. 31. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουὶ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὔπω ἔρχομαι οἷ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλά μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἕως ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνί μοι ξυμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. Ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοίην—θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἅ περ

Μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν.] This verb signifies, literally, *to amputate*, or *maim by cutting short*, thence *to hinder, prevent*, or *suppress*. Κολούει, Hesych. interpr. κωλύει.

§. 31. Οἱ ἄρχοντες.] sc. οἱ Ἕνδεκα. c. 27. supr. Into their custody the condemned were committed by the judges; upon which they gave the necessary directions to the attendants, ὑπηρέταις, to prepare every thing for the execution of the sentence. By ἀσχολιαν ἄγουσι Socrates alludes to their having been so occupied at the time, as by οἷ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθ. to the prison whither he was to be immediately led. Διαμυθολογῆσαι, *confabulari*; h. e. *disserere, colloqui*: Cf. in Phædon. c. 14. sub. fin.

Δικαστὰς καλῶν.] *If I called you judges.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 558.

Εἰωθυῖα μοι μαντική.] Intell. φωνή—Ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου, h. e. *ea* (vox vaticinatrix) *videlicet, quam dæmonio illi, de quo mentionem supra injeci, debeo.* STALL. Socrates, c. 19. supr., speaking of this φωνή, calls it θεῖον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον, something of a celestial and angelic character; in the text he mentions it more directly as the warning and admonitory influence, τοῦ δαιμονίου, of his guardian genius. Schleiermacher would omit ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου, as a mere gloss upon μαντική; but Socrates evidently intends to express here the mode in which the agency of his genius was made effectual, and the nature of the result.

Εἴ τι μέλλοιμι.] h. e. *quotiescunque in eo essem, ut*, etc. STALL.

ὁρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτί, ἅ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καί τοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ. νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντίωταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἠναντιώθη ἄν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μή τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

§. 32. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. Δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστι

Οἰηθείη ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται.] i. e. *which any one would imagine to be, and are actually considered as the very verge of misfortune.* Ficinus appears to have read *νομίσαιτο*, but the members of the sentence are distinct, as already stated. For the construction, *ἅ*, put once with verbs of different government, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 428. 2.

Ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον.] Cic. de Divin. i. 54. "Illud tamen ejus philosophi (Socratis) magnificum, ac pæne divinum, quod, cum impiis sententiis damnatus esset, æquissimo animo se dixit mori: neque enim domo egredienti, neque illud suggestum, in quo causam dixerat, adscendenti, signum sibi ullum, quod consuesset, adeo, quasi mali cujus impendentis datum."

Λέγοντα μεταξύ.] h. e. *eo ipso tempore, quo dicebam, inter dicendum.* STALL. *μεταξὺ* is elegantly joined with participles in any case with the signification of *inter*, and gerunds in *dum* in Latin, and of *while, during, in the middle of, &c.* in English. Æschin. Ctesiphon, p. 306. l. 28. *τίς ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτος ἰατρὸς, ὅστις τῷ νοσοῦντι μεταξὺ ἀσθενοῦντι μηδὲν συμβουλεύοι; during his illness.* Demosth. pro Cor. p. 284. ed. Reisk. *εὐθὺς ἐξαναστάντες μεταξὺ δειπνοῦντες; in the middle of supper.* Seag. Viger. c. vii. s. 9. r. 1.

Τί οὖν—ὑπολαμβάνω;] Stephens and Ficinus omit the note of interrogation, but as Stallbaum correctly observes, this mode of self-interrogation not only adds to the point and spirit of the subject, but is quite in conformity with the style of Plato's dialogists.

Τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον.] Sc. *ἡ εἰωθυῖα μαντική*, supr.

§. 32. Ἐννοήσωμεν, κ. τ. λ.] This chapter has attracted the peculiar attention of many of the ancient writers. V. Euseb. Præpar. Evang. xiii. 10. p. 661. Stob. Serm. c. 119. p. 606. Theodoret. Therapeut. Serm. xi. p. 651. Cic. Tuscul. Disput. 1. 41. &c.

Δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστι τὸ τεθνάναι.] It is not to be supposed that Socrates calls in question here the immortality of the soul; his own conviction on the subject is fully and satisfactorily demonstrated through the course of the Phædo. But he alludes in the text to the two conflicting opinions of philosophers, some of whom supposed that the

τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδ' αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἴσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὕπνος, ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων μηδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὁρᾷ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα ἐν ᾗ οὕτω κατέδαρθεν ὥστε μηδ' ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας

soul survived, and others that it perished with the body. In either case he argues that death is not an evil; as an eternal and dreamless sleep it should of necessity be unaccompanied by any feeling of either pleasure or pain arising from past or present circumstances, whereas if death were merely an affection of the body by which the spirit was wholly uninfluenced, it should not only outlive its mortal frame, but enjoy the pure and perfect happiness arising from communion with the just. It must be understood, however, that Socrates only treats of this alternative with reference to those whose lives, like his own, had been such as to warrant them in the anticipation of future felicity; the eternal punishment of the guilty, in the world beyond the grave, was a no less prominent feature than the former in the doctrine and discipline of this exalted sage.

Ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι.] h. e. *τοιοῦτόν τι ὥστε μηδὲν εἶναι*, as also infr. *εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαι ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος*. Eusebius and Theodoret, in quoting this passage, read *μηδέν τι εἶναι*, whence the conjecture of Heindorf, *μηδὲν ἔτι εἶναι*.

Μετοίκησις τῆς ψυχῆς.] Stob. Cod. Euseb. Oxon. *τῇ ψυχῇ*; approved by Stallbaum, who refers to Matthiæ Gr. s. 389. 1. Cf. Cic. Tusc. 1. 12. "Mortem non ita interitum esse omnia tollentem atque delentem, sed quandam quasi migrationem commutationemque vitæ." Antonin. Philos. vii. 32. *Περὶ θανάτου —ἤτοι σβέσις, ἢ μετάστασις*. Senec. ep. 65. "Mors quidem est, aut finis aut transitus."

Καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία—.] Εἴτε refers to the second hypothesis, *εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον*, κ. τ. λ., further on.

Θαυμάσιον κέρδος.] Aristotle, though brought up in the school of Plato, deduces, from the same principles as those in the text, a very different conclusion: Eth. Nicom. iii. 6. *φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ· καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν, οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι*. Epicurus, however, uses this Socratic argument against the fear of death, which he asserts that philosophy is able to conquer by teaching that it is not a proper object of terror, since while we are, death is not, and when death arrives we are not: so that it neither concerns the living nor the dead. Enfield's Philosophy, v. 1. p. 514.

Ἐγὼ γὰρ ἄν οἶμαι, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *For I imagine that if one were obliged; having selected the particular night during which he slept without dreaming, and having contrasted with this the other nights and days of his life; were obliged* [I repeat] *to consider and say how many days and nights he had passed, through his existence, better and more agreeably than this night; I think* [I say] *that not only a private person, but the mighty sovereign himself, would find them easily counted* [i. e. very few] *in comparison with other days and nights;* i. e. in a life where sorrow and suffering are admitted to be so widely disproportionate to its pleasures and tranquillity, it must be also conceded that the enjoyment of the latter is as limited and transient as the influence of the former is extended and enduring.—Μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην, h. e. *ne privatum aliquem*. STALL. On *μὴ ὅτι*, for *οὐχ ὅπως*, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 624. 4.—Τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα, the king of Persia, so called *κατ' ἐξοχήν*.—*εὐαρίθμητοι ἡμέραι, dies admodum perpauci*. Pollux. iii. 88.

τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινὰ ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστι τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσὶν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἅιδου, ἀπαλλαγεὶς τουτωνὶ τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὑρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵ περ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος, καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἆρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ Ὀρφεῖ ξυγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὁμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐ-

Οὐδὲν πλείων.] Fischer, from Eusebius, reads πλεῖον; adopted by Ficinus; but πλείων is preferable in the sense of *longior, more lasting.*

Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς, κ. τ. λ.] For this construction see Matthiæ Gr. s. 474. *b.* and the parallels adduced. Triptolemus, and the demigods alluded to in the text, were classed among the judges of the lower regions, probably from some popular superstition originating in, and connected with the Eleusinian mysteries. For Triptolemus was said not only to have instructed the Athenians in agriculture, but to have suggested a code of laws, especially relating to the boundaries and division of lands, whence he obtained the title of θεσμοφόρος. Creuzer, Mytholog. iv. p. 101. sq.

Μὲν γὰρ.] *Profecto sane.* BUTTM.

Θαυμαστὴ—ἡ διατριβὴ, κ. τ. λ.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 636. p. 1145. *Conversatio delectabilis, si colloqui licebit cum P.* etc. WOLF. opp. to φαύλη ἡ ἀποδημία, supr. *vita, peregrinatio, injucund. neque beata.* FISCH.—Παλαμήδει—stoned by the Greeks, through the stratagems of Ulysses, v. Æneid. ii. 81. sq. Socrates, in Xenoph. Apol. s. 26, mentions the similarity between the cause of Palamedes and his own. Lucian, in allusion to this, as also to the passage in the text, makes Palamedes the sole companion of Socrates in the infernal regions. Ajax, son of Telamon, slew himself when Ulysses was adjudged, in preference, the armour of Achilles, Homer. Odys. λ'.

τόθι, ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν· ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥς περ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστι καὶ τίς οἴεται μὲν, ἔστι δ' οὔ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἄν τις, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας πάντως. οὐ δή που τούτου γε ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴ πέρ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἐστίν.

§. 33. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἕν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται

Ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι — ἀηδὲς εἴη.] This is to be understood as an explanation of θαυμαστὴ διατριβή, supr. whence there is no necessity for inserting, with Viger, καὶ before ἀντιπαραβαλλ. or of reading with Stephens, ἀντιπαραβάλλοντα, and consequently explaining the passage, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη ἐμὲ διάγειν ἀντιπαραβάλλοντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐξετάζοντα, κ. τ. λ.— FISCH.

Ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι.] Stephens proposes οὓς μυρίους, probably following Ficinus. v. Lat. Interpr. Fischer would separate the passage from what preceded altogether, and so make a new sentence of it. But the construction is fully explained in Matthiæ Gr. s. 474. *d.* s. 472. 3. Cf. Gorg. 483. D. Ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν; ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς Σκύθας; ἢ ἄλλα μυρία ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. Phædon. c. 43. καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία, κ. τ. λ. HEUSD.

Ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας.] h. e. *immensum esset respectu felicitatis.* STALL. i. q. ἀμήχανος ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονία. Cf. Theætet. p. 175. A. ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 320.— Ἐξετάζειν— Socrates intends by this, that he would examine into the principles and feelings, by which those with whom he expected to associate had been influenced during their lives, and the wisdom of which they actually were, or imagined themselves to be then possessed of; not that he would make such inquiries, and promote such discussions, as if their errors and inexperience had continued to attend them, and were still liable to be confuted, when their earthly ordeal was past.

§. 33. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή.] i. e. *Vos judices qui me absolvistis.* CIC. Tusc. 1. 41.

ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλά μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω. καί τοι οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι.

Τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι. τοὺς υἱεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἡβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἃ περ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς· καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς ὥς περ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ καὶ οἴονταί τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανου-

Ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι — βέλτιον ἦν μοι.] Cf. Young, N. T. iii. 495—500. 511—515.

—— Death is victory;
It binds in chains the raging ills of life:
Lust and Ambition, Wrath and Avarice,
Dragged at his chariot-wheel, applaud his power.
That ills corrosive, cares importunate
Are not immortal too, O Death, is thine.
And feel I, then, no joy from thought of thee,
Death, the great Counsellor, who man inspires
With every nobler thought and fairer deed!
Death, the deliverer who rescues man!
Death, the rewarder who the rescued crowns!

Οὐ πάνυ.] *Non magnopere.* STALL.

Δέομαι, κ. τ. λ.] *Peto a vobis, Athenienses, quum filii mei adoleverint, ut eos ulciscamini, easdem illis molestias exhibente* [λυποῦντες, h. e. eos ad virtutem cohortantes, tentantes eorum sapientiam, convincentes eos stultitiæ. STALL.] *quas ego vobis exhibere consueveram, si, aut pecuniæ, aut ullius omnino rei, quam virtutes studiosiores esse videantur.*— FISCH.—Τιμωρήσασθαι — λυποῦντας, Salvin. adopted also by Ficinus.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα.] This simple but essentially sublime conclusion is in perfect accordance with the tone of the entire Apology. It was in vain to present the intrepid front of integrity and innocence to the iniquitous array of those dark and malignant [passions, which were the more effective and successful because unscrupulous in the extent and character of their resources. The vaguest and most unfounded falsehoods were brought to bear upon the clearest truth; detraction and envy were busied in misinterpreting the amiable proposals of a wise and beneficent philosophy: the language and exhortations that were addressed with a moral, were received as with a depraved intent: the correction of vice was stigmatized as presumption, and encouragement to virtue condemned as a crime. The accusers prevailed, and the annals of Athens were stained with a reproach perhaps unparalleled. But the object of this deadly persecution, undaunted through its progress, met calmly its result. He forgave the act of his accusers, for, so far, he was alone concerned, but he deprecated the motive, for it affected the well-being of society

μένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

at large. In fine, he addresses them: "It is now time to depart—for me, to die; for you, to live; but which to the happier destiny, the Deity alone can tell."

How admirable, observes Dr. Brown, is that goodness which knows so well how to adapt to each other feelings that are opposite, which gives to man a love of life, enough to reconcile him, without an effort, to the earth, which is to be the scene of his exertions; and which, at the same time, gives those purer and more glorious wishes which make him ready to part with the very life he loved.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ARGUMENT.

THE scene of this dialogue is the prison to which Socrates was committed, previous to the execution of his sentence. Crito, his friend and disciple, enters for the purpose of persuading him to take advantage of the means provided for his escape. He finds Socrates in a tranquil slumber, and gazes for a while with wonder upon so calm a rest, unbroken by any dread of impending death. The philosopher awaking, expresses his surprise at the unusual earliness of his friend's customary visit; and learns that he came as the harbinger of dismal tidings, the sacred galley, whose return was the signal for the death of Socrates, having been that day expected to arrive from Delos. He implores his master, in terms of the strongest affection, to secure his safety by immediate flight, and seeks to shew by arguments of no ordinary weight, that Socrates was called upon by the obligations due to his friends, his family, and himself, not to reject this favourable chance, which devoted affection had laboured to procure. But the efforts of the most sincere attachment, and most tender expostulation, proved as ineffectual as the dread of positive and instant danger, the noble firmness of Socrates could not be undermined, and by the example of his death, he gave the last great lesson in that wisdom and virtue which he had inculcated by precept during life.

He opposes the arguments of Crito upon the following grounds:

That the opinions of men should be disregarded in comparison with the judgment of the Deity.

That not life, but to live virtuously, should be the object of our desires.

That justice is the life, and injustice the death of the soul.

That we should not requite evil for evil, or resent the wrongs we may receive.

That it is better to die than live unrighteously.

That we must obey the laws of our country, which the injustice of man furnishes no pretext for treating with disrespect. And that the laws of this world have kindred laws in that to come, which revenge the insults put upon them here.

Stallbaum supposes Plato to have composed this dialogue for a double purpose: one, and his primary design, being to defend Socrates from the charge of corrupting the Athenian youth; and the other, his secondary, to teach, from the precedent of Socrates, that a good man, under any circumstances, should render implicit obedience to the dictates of established law.

Crito is eventually overcome by the cogency and truth of the philosopher's objections, and abandons his design as untenable, when brought to the test of a strict and unyielding morality.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

§. 1. Τί τηνικάδε ἀφῖξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρῲ ἔτι ἐστίν;

ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;

ΚΡ. Ὄρθρος βαθύς.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.] This dialogue is also entitled Κρίτων, ἢ περὶ πρακτέου in several editions; in others, ἢ περὶ δοξης ἀληθοῦς καὶ δικαίου, for which Thrasyllus is adduced as authority, quoted by Laertius, iii. 57. διπλαῖς δὲ χρῆται ταῖς ἐπιγραφαῖς ἑκάστου τῶν βιβλίων· τῇ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος· τῇ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος. RAABE. According to Idomeneus, Diog. Laert. iii. 35, the part imputed to Crito in this dialogue belonged in reality to Æschines, but as the latter was the friend of Aristippus, who was Plato's enemy, it was inscribed as above.

§. 1. Τί τηνικάδε.] *Why have you arrived so very early.*— Τηνίκα and πηνίκα are used properly, and by the Attic writers, to signify a certain time of the day, as the *morning*, *noon*, or *evening*. Cf. Phrynic. p. 14. s. Πηνίκα μὴ εἴπῃς ἀντὶ τοῦ πότε· ἔστι γὰρ ὥρας δηλωτικόν· οἷον, εἰπόντος τινὸς, πηνίκα ἀποδημήσεις; ἐὰν εἴπῃς, μετὰ δύο, ἢ, τρεῖς, ἡμέρας, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐρεῖς· ἐὰν δὲ εἴπῃς, ἔωθεν, ἢ περὶ μεσημβρίαν, ὀρθῶς ἐρεῖς.—Τηνίκα, in its ordinary usage, signifies *then*, *this*, or *that time*.—Πρῲ, *before day*.

Πηνίκα μάλιστα.] *Quota hora est quum maxime.* STALL. μάλιστα being used here in the same sense as when adjoined to numerals, of *nearly*, *pretty nearly*, *almost exactly*. Seag. Viger. vii. 8. 7. Aristoph. Ran. 659. πηνίκα ἐστὶ τῆς ἡμέρας, *quodnam diei tempus est*, seu, *quænam hora*. Scap. Lex. in voc.

Ὄρθρος βαθύς.] *Early dawn.* Crito answers more accurately the general question of Socrates, ἢ οὐ πρωὶ ἔτι ἐστι; supr., for πρῲ, like the Latin *mane*, signifies any period of the early morn, ὄρθρος, *the very point of day break*, *primum diluculi punctum*. Scap. Lex. "Ubi nox abiit, nec tamen orta dies." Ovid. Amat. 1. 5. 6. Cf. Phrynic. p. 120. Οἱ δὲ ἀρχαῖοι ὄρθρον, καὶ ὀρθρεύεσθαι, τὸ πρὸ ἀρχομένης ἡμέρας, ἐν ᾧ ἔτι λύχνῳ δύναταί τις χρῆσθαι.—ὄρθρος βαθύς, *primum diluculum*, as in Luke, xxiv. 1. FISCH.

ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακοῦσαι.

ΚΡ. Ξυνήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρτι δὲ ἧκεις ἢ πάλαι;

ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ παρακάθησαι;

ΚΡ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος ὡς ἡδέως κα-

Θαυμάζω ὅπως ἠθέλ.] *Miror qui factum sit ut.* STALL. Cf. Xen. Mem. I. 1. 20. θαυμάζω οὖν, ὅπως ποτὲ ἐπείσθησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. Eurip. Med. 51. πῶς λείπεσθαι θέλει. Socrates expresses his surprise at Crito having obtained admission into the prison so early; cf. in Phædon. c. 3. ἀνεῳγνυτο γὰρ οὐ πρῳ.—Ὑπακούειν, which in its primary sense means, *to listen* to those knocking, τοῖς κρούουσιν, signifies thence *to open the doors*, and *admit them*. Buttmann reads ἤθελε for ἠθέλησε, but the imperfect denotes a custom of doing any thing, and it was not usual for the gaoler to open the doors so early; he made the exception in favour of Crito, as appears above.

Τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου.] At Athens there were three public prisons; the first was in the vicinity of the forum, and was designed for debtors and such as were guilty of minor offences; the second was called σωφρονιστήριον, or house of correction; the third was situated in a wild and uninhabited place, and was designed for malefactors guilty of capital crimes; ὅπη περ ἂν ἔρημός τε καὶ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἀγριώτατος ᾖ τόπος, τιμωρίας ἔχων ἐπωνυμίαν φήμην τινά. Plat. de Legg. x. c. 15.; in the last of which it is probable that Socrates was imprisoned. He was fettered also, as appears in Phædon. c. 3. but whether with the χοινιξ or ποδοκάκη, a wooden instrument in which the feet and legs were placed and fastened with cords; the ξύλον, N. T. Acts, xxvi. 24., which Luther correctly renders *the stocks;* or with the πέδη, a chain which confined the legs, is not sufficiently clear. RAABE.

Φύλαξ.] Phædon. c. 3. θυρωρὸς.

Φοιτᾶν.] This verb, which answers to the Latin *itare, ventitare*, is used especially of scholars *frequenting* a school, thence called φοιτηταί. It is also used to express the recurrence of a dream in Phædon. c. 4. πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον, &c. LOEWE.

Καί τι καί.] The latter καὶ signifies *even* or *too*. Cf. Pausan. in Lacon. p. 168. οὐ παρίει σείων ὁ θεὸς, καί τινες καὶ ἀπώλοντο τῶν στρατιωτῶν κεραυνωθέντες.—Εὐεργέτηται—εὐηργέτ. is the common form: Buttmann prefers εὐεργετεῖται.

Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.] *Pretty long since.* Seag. Viger. vii. 6. Cf. in Phædon. c. 29. ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον.

Εἶτα.] See Apolog. Socr. c. 16. Εἶτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει. n.

Οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον, κ. τ. λ.] h. e. *neque ipse vellem tamdiu insomnis esse in tanto quidem mœrore.* FISCH. Crito alleges as his motive for not having awakened Socrates, that he should not himself have wished, were he in so great affliction, to be also deprived of rest.

Θαυμάζω.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 317. Obs.

Ὡς ἡδέως.] i. q. ὅτι οὕτως ἡδέως καθ. Cf. infr. ὡς ῥᾳδίως αὐτὴν, κ. τ. λ. in Phædon. c. 2. a med. ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ

θεύδεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἥδιστα διάγῃς. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δή σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεούσῃ ξυμφορᾷ, ὡς ῥᾳδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πράως φέρεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελὲς εἴη ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τελευτᾶν.

ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἁλίσκονται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρῳ ἀφῖξαι;

ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπήν, οὐ σοί, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτη-

γενναίως ἐτελεύτα; c. 38. a med. ὡς ηδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς, &c. Matthiæ Gr. s. 480. Obs. 3.

Ἵνα ὡς ἥδιστα διάγῃς.] The conjunctive is frequently used after ἵνα, ὅπως, ὅφρα, and ὡς, although the preceding verb be in the time past, when the verb which depends upon the conjunction denotes an action which is continued to the present time; e. g. Iliad. έ. 127. ἀχλὺν δ' αὖτοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλον, ἣ πρὶν ἐπῆεν, Ὄφρ' εὖ γινώσκῃς ἠμὲν θεὸν, ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα, because at the time at which Minerva is speaking, γινώσκειν is a consequence still continuing of the past action, ἀφαιρεῖν ἀχλύν. Matthiæ Gr. s. 518. 1.—τὸν βίον must be understood to διάγῃς: Cf. Persius, v. 139. "Contentus perages, si vivere cum Jove tendis."

Εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου.] Plat. Sympos. p. 194. C. . . . . τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εὐδαιμονίζειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὧν ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς αἴτιος. Matthiæ Gr. s. 368. a. Cf. Virgil. Æneid. xi. 126. "Justitiæne prius mirer belline laborum."—Τρόπος, h. l. *sentiendi agendique ratio in ipsa vita conspicua; mores.* STALL.

Πλημμελὲς εἴη.] *It would be incongruous.*

Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς, κ. τ. λ.] *Neque tamen senectus eos liberos reddit quod attinet ad illud, ne morte non indignentur,* STALL, or *quo minus* [τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ] *morte indig.* v. Herm. ad Viger. n. 265. p. 772. Stephens, following Ficinus, reads τοῦ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακ. But the correction is superfluous: in its primary sense, ἐπιλύεσθαι, referring to ἁλίσκεσθαι preced. signifies *to loose,* or *unbind,* thence *to concede* or *allow;* a meaning omitted in Stephens' Thes. Ling. Græc., but taken by Phavorinus from Suidas: Ἐπιλυομένου, i. e. συγχωροῦντος, whence τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγ. may be taken as an accusative. Tr. *But not in any degree does old age admit of their feeling no sense of annoyance at their present distress.* Cf. Herod. 5. 101. τὸ μὴ λεηλατῆσαι σφεας ἔσχε τόδε. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 543. Obs. 2. Buttmann proposes οὐδὲν αυτοῖς ἐπιλ. as the verb taken in the sense assigned by Suidas supr. might better govern a dative, and in the case of such a trifling variation in the reading as between αὐτοῖς and αὐτοὺς in the text, the authority of the best copies should be of little weight.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.] i. q. c. 4. ταῦτα μὲν δὲ οὕτως ἐχέτω, and εἶεν elsewhere. So Cic. Læl. ii. "sunt ista."—Ἀλλὰ τί δή, h. e. *sed ut ad superiora revertar, cur tandem, &c.* STALL.

Τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις.] The friends and disciples of Socrates, who are frequently so designated, cc. 3. 5. 6. 15. Phædon. c. 2.

δείοις πᾶσι καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἣν ἐγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.

ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφῖκται ἐκ Δήλου, οὗ δεῖ ἀφικόμενον τεθνάναι με;

ΚΡ. Οὔ τοι δὴ ἀφῖκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μέν μοι ἥξειν τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἥκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων ὅτι ἥξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ ἐσαύριον ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

§. 2. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ. εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἥξειν αὐτὸ τήμερον.

ΚΡ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρει;

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραίᾳ δεῖ με ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ᾗ ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἥξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἔκ τινος

Ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα.] h. e. ἐν τοῖς φέρουσιν ἐγὼ βαρύτατα ἂν ἐνέγκ. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 290.

Τίνα ταύτην.] Intel. φερίις, h. e. τίς ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ ἀγγελία ἣν φέρεις.

Τὸ πλοῖον.] See in Phædon. c. 1. Τοῦτο ἐστι τὸ πλοῖον, n.

Ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν.] i. e. q. ἐκ τούτων ἃ ἀπαγγέλλουσι: *secundum ea, quæ illi nuntiant.* STALL. Cicer. Epist. xvi. 22. "ex tuis epistolis."

Σουνίου.] A promontory of Attica, looking towards the Cyclades. Odys. γ', 278. Σούνιον ἱρὸν—ἄκρον Ἀθηνῶν. Strab. ix. p. 598. τὸ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἄκρον. now C. Colonna.

§. 2. Τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ.] h. e. *quod bene feliciterque vertat.* RAABE. Cf. Plaut. Aul. iv. 10. 57. "quod bonum, faustum, felix, fortunatumque sit."

Ταύτῃ.] Οὕτως, τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ. Hesych.

Ὑστεραίᾳ—ἢ ᾗ.] Lit. *I must die on the day later than* (i. e. the day subsequent to) *that on which the vessel arrives:* ἢ being used on account of the comparative signification of ὑστεραίᾳ. Cf. Sympos. p. 173. A. τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἢ ᾗ τὰ ἐπινίκια ἔθυεν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ χορευταί.

Γέ τοι δή.] These particles are to be taken in an affirmative sense, but with restrictions. See Seag. Viger. viii. s. 4. 6.—Οἱ τούτων κύριοι. The eleven, Apol. Socr. c. 28., who took charge of prisoners, and superintended the punishment of the condemned, as expressed by τούτων, *such matters*, supr.

Τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας.] Thom. Mag. and Phavor. Τῇ ἐπιούσῃ ἐρεῖς, οὐ προσθεὶς τὸ ἡμέρᾳ· τῆς ἐπιούσης δὲ ἡμέρας.

Ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑτέρας.] *But the day after.*

Ὀλίγον πρότερον.] i. e. *Which I saw this very night a little before you arrived:* consequently after midnight, when the ancients supposed that dreams were true. Cf. Horat. Sat. i. 10. 33. "Quirinus Post mediam noctem visus quum somnia vera."

ἐνυπνίου ὃ ἑώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυνεύεις (ἐν καιρῷ τινὶ) οὐκ ἐγεῖραί με.

ΚΡ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον;

ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἥματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἵκοιο.

ΚΡ. Ὡς ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.

§. 3. ΚΡ. Λίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ' ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ σώθητι, ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ξυμφορά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ

Κινδυνεύεις.] Κινδυνεύει. ἐγγίζει. Tim. Plat. Lex. So the Latins use *periculum est, ne hoc ita sit*, for *parum abest, quin ita sit*. RUHNK. Ἐν καιρῷ τινι, *per-opportune: ἐν καιρῷ, opportune*. FISCH.

Ἐδόκει.] Δοκεῖν is used properly in reference to dreams and visions: Eurip. Iphig. Taur. v. 44. ἐδοξ' ἐν ὕπνῳ. Orest. v. 402. ἐδοξ' ἰδεῖν τρεῖς νυκτὶ προσφερεῖς κόρας. These who appeared in dreams or visions were believed by the ancients to partake of the divine nature, and were therefore in general represented of a semblance more noble and imposing than human: Cf. Juvenal, 13. 221. "Te videt in somnis: tua sacra et major imago Humana," &c. Xen. Cyrop. viii. 7. κρείττων τις ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον. Dion. Cass. lv. 1. γυνὴ γάρ τις μείζων, ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπου φύσιν. Tacit. Annal. xi. 21. "Species muliebris ultra modum humanum." Plin. vii. ep. 27. "Muliebris figura humana grandior pulchriorque." So supr. καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, *beautiful in countenance, and graceful in mien*. They were also said to be dressed in white, a sign that the dream was favourable: Plin. ibid. "venerunt per fenestras in tunicis albis duo." Cf. Matth. xxviii. 3. τὸ ἔνδυμα—λευκὸν ὡσεὶ χιών. Mark, xvi. 5. John, xx. 12. Supr. λευκὰ, i. e. λαμπρὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, *clothed in robes of radiant white*.

Ἥματι κεν τριτάτῳ.] Hom. Iliad. *i*, 163. Phthia, a city of Thessaly, the birth-place of Achilles, where he tells Ulysses he hoped to arrive on the third day after his departure from Troy, is to be understood in the language of the vision as the *abode* of Socrates after his decease: v. Apol. Socr. c. 32. and to which his life was merely *the passage*. So Aristotle interpreted the dream of his friend Eudemus of Cyprus, to whom a youth of remarkable beauty appeared, and told him that in five years more *he should return home*. Cic. Div. i. 25. Laert. ii. 35. Cf. Antonin. iv. 47. Ὥσπερ εἴ τίς σοι θεῶν εἶπεν, ὅτι αὔριον τεθνήξῃ, ἢ πάντως εἰς τρίτην.

Ὡς ἄτοπον—.] Ὡς θαυμαστὸν καὶ παράδοξον, Thom. Mag.—Ἐναργὲς, *so clear*, that there could be no mistake as to its import. Cf. Lucian. Somn. tom. i. p. 4. Græv. ὄνειρος—ἐναργὴς οὕτως, ὥστε μηδὲν ἀπολείπεσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας.

Ἔτι καὶ νῦν.] It would hence appear that Crito had made some previous efforts to prevail upon Socrates to save himself by flight. Unless ἔτι may convey an allusion to the advice which Crito and others had formerly given upon the subject of the fine, v. Apol. Socr. c. 28.—Ὡς ἐμοί, κ. τ. λ., i. e. *Since, if you die, not one calamity only shall befal me; but besides my having lost a friend, such as I never may obtain again, I shall, further, seem to many who do not thoroughly know both, to have neglected when I might have preserved you, had I been willing to encroach upon my wealth*. Upon the construction ὡς οἷος τ' ὢν σε σώζειν, κ. τ. λ. the terms in which it is to be supposed that Crito would be reproached for his apathy, see Matthiæ, Gr. s. 529. 5.

χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μή ποτε εὑρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασιν, ὡς οἷός τ' ὢν σε σώζειν, εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελῆσαι. καί τοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα, ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, οἷς μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπρᾶχθαι ὡς περ ἂν πραχθῇ.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνὶ ὅτι οἷοί τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, ἐάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἷοί τε εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἷοί τε ἦσαν αὖ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα· καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχε.

Ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν.] *And what more disreputable character could there be than this, namely* [ἡ], *to appear to value money more than one's friends.* The genitives τούτου, οὗ, which are governed by a comparative, are often followed by an explanation with ἤ, instead of the infinitive with the article. Matthiæ Gr. s. 450. Obs. 2.

Οἱ πολλοί.] *The many.* i. e. the vulgar and illiterate, to which is opposed ἐπιεικέστατοι, infr. *the wisest, most reasonable,* or *intelligent.*

Αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα.] Intell. εἶσι: *the very circumstances of the immediate case are self-evident, that the many,* &c. ὅτι οἷοι, κ. τ. λ. being subjoined in explanation of the preceding. Stephens, Forster, and Cornarius read δηλοῖ, which seems to have been also adopted by Ficinus.— Fischer receives δῆλα, but in the sense of δηλωτικά. Buttmann defends the reading as supr. in its ordinary signification. Scap. Lex. in voc. Sæpe, δῆλον, esse dicitur, quod manifestum est adeo ut de eo constet.

Διαβεβλημένος.] i. e. *qui est in odio et invidia vulgi, quem odit vulgus.*— FISCH.

Εἰ ὤφελον.] A mode of expressing a wish, especially familiar with the poets; with the infinitive present of actions which should have taken place but have not. Matthiæ Gr. s. 513. Obs. 3.

Ἵνα οἷοί τε ἦσαν.] *Quo efficere possent, etiam id quod non est in eorum potestate.* STALL. ἵνα, ὡς, μή, (more rarely ὅπως,) are found very frequently with the indicative of a past tense of actions which should have happened but have not. Matthiæ Gr. s. 519. 6. Οἷος, and οἷός τε, *able,* is a shorter phrase for the equivalent and more regular τοιοῦτος ὥστε: τε being a remnant of the antique language, signifying

νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἷοί τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν.

§. 4. ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω· τάδε δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι. ἆρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ συκοφάνται ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὡς σε ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασι, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τ

fere, as the Latin adjunct *que*. Seag. Viger. c. iii. 8. 1.

Τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν.] h. e. *non rationem sequuntur sed cæcum quendam animi impetum.* STALL. Cf. c. 5. init. ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν, τοῦτο πράξουσι.—Protagor. p. 353. A. ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο λέγουσι.

Ἆρά γε μή.] The difference between ἆρ' οὐ and ἆρα μὴ is, that ἆρ' οὐ, *nonne*, requires an affirmative answer, ἆρα μή, *num*, a negative, as ἆρα does by itself; but μὴ imparts some degree of dubiousness to the question, and that for the purpose, sometimes, of irony. Seag. Viger. c. viii. 4. 4.—Προμηθεῖ—the Attic form, as αἰσχύνει and ἐντρέπει. c. 14. a med.

Οἱ συκοφάνται.] The proverbially litigious disposition of the Athenians, and the gross mismanagement of their government and judicature, gave birth to the evil which, with the name of SYCOPHANCY, so peculiarly infested the state. The term συκοφάνται, which sometimes signifies false witnesses, but more properly denotes common *barrators*, derived ἀπὸ τοῦ τὰ σῦκα φαίνειν, was originally applied to those who gave information of clandestine exportation of figs; a law having been procured by some demagogue, apparently to gratify the populace at the expense of the landholders, which forbid the exporting of this plentiful production of the Attic soil. This law being allowed to continue in force, afforded ample occasion for the mean and malicious to make its attendant accusations, whether true or false, the screen of their invidious attacks upon the objects of their envy and dislike; whence the term sycophant came into use as a general appellation for all vexatious informers, many of whom had but little hesitation in advancing their own interests, by preferring the most frivolous and unfounded charges. Cf. Lys. Δήμ. καταλύς. ἀπολογ. p. 171. Τούτων γὰρ (τῶν συκοφάντων) ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἡμαρτηκότας εἰς αἰτίαν καθιστάναι. ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα χρηματίζειν. According to some authorities, the name originated from the numerous informations occasioned by a law which prohibited the stealing of figs. Mitford's Greece, iv. p. 25. sq. 77. 78.

Boeckh asserts, that the prohibition of the export of figs did not exist in the times of which anything is known with certainty; all that occurs in the ancient writers upon this subject serving only to explain the meaning of the term sycophant. He supposes that if the ancients had possessed an account of any such law, that could be at all depended upon, they would not have spoken in a manner so vague and indefinite concerning the origin of the appellation, and conceives the account to be far most probable, which states that the sacred fig-trees were robbed of their fruit during a famine, and that the wrath of the gods having been felt in consequence of this sacrilege, accusations were brought against the suspected. Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 31. Boeckh, Pub. Econ. Athen. i. 59. 60.

Πράγματα παρέχωσιν.—πράγματα παρέχειν, *molestiam alicui creare, negotium alicui facessere.* STALL.

Ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, κ. τ. λ.] h. e. *aut omnem adeo rem familiarem amittere, aut certe magnam partem opum*

πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν; εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοί ἐσμεν σώσαντές σε κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον καὶ ἐὰν δέῃ, ἔτι τούτου μείζω. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΚΡ. Μήτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τἀργύριόν ἐστιν ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σῶσαί σε καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὁρᾷς τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας, ὡς εὐτελεῖς καὶ οὐδέν ἂν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἱκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἴει δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τἀμά, ξένοι οὗτοι ἐνθάδε ἕτοιμοι ἀναλίσκειν. εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργύριον ἱκανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἕτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὥστε, ὃ περ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος ἀποκάμῃς σαυ-

nostrarum. STALL. Ἄλλο τι παθεῖν, h. e. *ne ipsi in vincula conjiciamur, exilio multemur, necemur.* ID.

Ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν.] *Bid adieu to*, or *take leave of it.*

Δίκαιοί ἐσμεν—κινδυνεύειν.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 297.

Ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε.] Senec. ep. 24. "In carcere Socrates disputavit, et exire, cum essent, qui promitterent fugam, noluit, remansitque ut duarum rerum gravissimarum hominibus metum demeret, mortis et carceris."—Τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας, expressive of contempt. v. Apol. Socr. c. 1. a med. Οὗτοι. n. infr. c. 9. τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. Demosth. Philipp. 1. p. 41. παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τῇ τε τότε ῥώμῃ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων—καὶ τῇ νῦν ὕβρει τούτου.

Ὡς εὐτελεῖς.] *Criminatores, accusatores, ad quos placandos non opus est magna pecuniæ vi.* FISCH.—*Ces délateurs sont à bon marché, et ne nous coûteront pas grand' chose.* V. COUSIN.—Ἐπ' αὐτοὺς, h. e. *ad eos corrumpendos.*—STALL.

Ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα.] *Tibi meæ opes paratæ sunt*, sc. *suppetunt.* STALL.

Ξένοι οὗτοι ἐνθάδε.] *Peregrini* ecce *hic adsunt: are at hand here;* by the demonstrative οὗτοι, Crito does not mean to say that they were then *present*, but that they resided in the city, and were in the habit of constant intercourse with him. BUTTM.

Σιμμίας—Κέβης.] Both Thebans, and on terms of close intimacy with Socrates; v. in Phædon. c. 2. sub. fin. c. 6. a med. Diog. Laertius mentions the titles of thirty-three dialogues which were ascribed to the former, and of three by Cebes, of which the Πίναξ, or Picture of Human Life, only remains, and to which his claim is disputed. It is a very able allegory, truly Socratic in its moral spirit and character, but containing some sentiments which appear to have been borrowed from the Pythagorean school.

Μήτε—ἀποκάμῃς.] *Do not despond.*—ἀποκνήσῃς, *ne cesses.* Jacobs; who thought that the reading as supr. would make Socrates appear to have despaired

τὸν σῶσαι, μήτε ὁ ἔλεγχὲς ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὅ τι χρῷο σεαυτῷ. πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκῃ, ἀγαπήσουσί σε. ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ εἰς Θετταλίαν ἰέναι, εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἵ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφάλειαν σοι παρέξονται, ὡς τέ σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

§. 5. Ἔτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι ἐξὸν σωθῆναι, καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σεαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἃ περ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθρόί σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσάν σε διαφθεῖραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὓς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχήσει καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσι· τεύξονται δέ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, τοιούτων οἷά περ εἴωθε γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρὴν ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας ἢ ξυνδιατελαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σὺ δ' ἐμοὶ

of his escape as impracticable, instead of, as was actually the case, declining it as unjust, and proposed the emendation ἀποκνήσ. But Crito may have easily used the term in the text, for he was as yet but little acquainted with the views of Socrates on the subject, and might have readily imagined that the objections which he endeavoured to meet were rather the results of some doubts which were only proposed with the hope of being dissolved, than of a steady determination, on the part of the philosopher, to abide by the decision of his country's laws.

Ὅ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικ.] V. Apol. Socr. c. 27. a med. Ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς, &c.

Ὅ τι χρῷο σεαυτῷ.] Steph. in marg. *incertum fore, quid de te ipso statuere debeas.* Tr. *That if you had gone out of the city, you would not have known what to do with yourself, whither to betake yourself.* So V. Cousin; *que si tu sortais d'ici, tu ne saurais que devenir.*—Matthiæ Gr. s. 409. 6. Cf. Lucian. Necyom. s. 3. οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅ τι χρησαίμην ἐμαυτῷ.

Ἀλλόσε.] The corresponding form to ὅποι, otherwise the verb ἀγαπήσουσί would have required ἀλλαχοῦ after πολλαχοῦ; upon this species of attraction see Buttmann, Larg. Gr. Gr. s. 138. i. 4.

Κατὰ Θετταλίαν.] According to Laertius, and Libanius, in Apol. Socr., the acquaintance of Socrates was sought by some of the most noble in Thessaly.

§. 5. Τὸ σὸν μέρος.] *Quantum in te est, quod ad te attinet,* STALL. as cc. 11. 16.

Ὅ τι ἂν—πράξουσι.] h. e. *eam sortem habebunt quam iis fortunæ arbitrium tribuerit; quidvis iis accidere poterit. They shall endure whatever they may meet with.* STALL.—πράττειν, especially with εὖ or κακῶς, is used to express good or evil fortune. Eurip. Iphig. Aul. 345. πράσσειν μεγάλα i. q. μάλ' εὐτυχεῖν.

δοκεῖς τὰ ῥᾳθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι. χρὴ δέ, ἃ περ ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἑλοῖτο, ταῦτα αἱρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δοξῃ απαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρίᾳ τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπρᾶχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθες ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, ὥς περ κατάγελως τῆς πράξ-

Τὰ ῥᾳθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι.] *Tu autem mihi videris ea, quæ cum maxima pigritia atque supinitate conjuncta sunt elegisse.* SERRAN.

Ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης.] Forster and others suspect τῆς δίκης, which has been omitted by Ficinus, to be a mere gloss. But as *a suit*, ἡ δίκη is said εἰσιέναι or εἰσέρχεσθαι, *to be brought into court*, ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης appears to be obviously admissible. Schleiermacher would omit εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, but there is a precedent for this also; Cf. Demosth. adv. Phormion. ii. p. 912. 27. μελλούσης τῆς δίκης εἰσιέναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον.—Ὡς εἰσῆλθες, added in explanation of the preceding: Wolf and others read ὡς εἰσῆλθεν, sc. δίκη, but εἰσελθεῖν may be affirmed indifferently of the litigants and the suit.—Ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν. It is not clear how Socrates could have avoided his trial; Libanius, in Apol. i. p. 644, mentions that Anytus, after the accusation had been preferred, had offered to be reconciled to Socrates upon certain conditions; but the παραγραφή, or παραμαρτυρία, the defendant's plea, when he alleged by competent witnesses, that the action brought against him was not δίκη εἰσαγώγιμος, a cause which could then be lawfully tried, and by which he could defer the trial, or institute a cross cause and so protract the threatened judgment, should be put in before the cause had been submitted to the magistrate who proposed it for the decision of the judges. It is more likely that Crito alludes to a law of which Socrates might have availed himself, commended by Lysias, p. 354. ed. Reisk. and by which it was allowed δεδιότι δίκης ἕνεκα δρασκάζειν, *causæ suæ diffidenti fuga se subtrahere.* This seems accordant with the tenor of Crito's present arguments; he is now recommending Socrates to fly, and ensures him a kind and honourable reception among his friends in Thessaly; such a course was at the option of Socrates in the first instance, and could have been scarcely less obvious than at the present, aware, as he must have been from the beginning, of the number and influence of his enemies, and the nature and extent of their design.

Ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης.] *The conduct of the trial;* referring particularly to the defence of Socrates. V. Cousin: *la manière dont le procès lui-même a été conduit.*

Ὡς περ κατάγελως.] Cornarius compares the case of Socrates to a dramatic representation, of which the impeachment formed the πρότασις, the trial the ἐπίτασις, and his death in the gaol the καταστροφή. Crito, as yet unconvinced by the arguments of Socrates, and unable to understand why he would not take advantage of the proffered means of flight, endeavours to influence him by a sense of the utter absurdity and ridicule which should be imputed in consequence to himself and his friends. He sets out with a general proposition, that it was possible to suspect a mismanagement about the whole affair, which made him feel ashamed for both Socrates and his friends. Their supineness betraying itself in three special instances; the first in permitting the indictment at all, which it is to be supposed might have been counteracted by due precaution; the second in not avoiding its being put to issue, which appears to have been considered practicable; and the third, which crowned all, τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, the

εως, κακίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οἵ τινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσῴσαμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν, οἷόν τε ὂν καὶ δυνατόν, εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν· ταῦτ' οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα μὴ ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρά σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βουλεύου. μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι ἔτι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεῦσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς ταῦτα πάντα δεῖ πεπρᾶχθαι. εἰ δέ τι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἷόν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει.

§. 6. ΣΩ. Ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία, εἰ μετά τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσῳ μείζων, τοσούτῳ χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς, εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή, ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον

ridiculous dénouement of the piece was, his appearing to have slipped through their fingers, as it were, from their fear and hesitation which prevented their making more efforts for him, than he did for himself, when they could have preserved him had they been of the smallest worth, or, the least assistance. There is some difficulty about the dependence of δοκεῖν supr. Buttmann and others understand an anacoluthon in the sentence, and so refer it to μὴ δόξῃ preced. Stallbaum considers it to be redundant, as c. 3. καί τοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν, κ. τ. λ. Buttmann compares it with Alcib. Secund. c. 17. extr. μεταβαλλόμενος γέ τοι ἄνω καὶ κάτω οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν παύει, ἀλλ' ὅ περ ἂν μάλιστά σοι δόξῃ, τοῦτο καὶ ἐκδεδυκέναι αὖ καὶ οὐκέτι ὡσαύτως δοκεῖν: which he professes only to be able to explain by an anacoluthon as above; as also the following passage from Plat. Menon. c. 22. init. ὁ περ ἠρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκεψαίμην καὶ ἀκούσαιμι, πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ὡς φύσει ἢ ὡς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ παραγιγνομένης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς: where the genitive is in anacoluthon after the dative; αὐτῷ and ἀρετῆς appearing to be distinct, and yet being the same, and an anacoluthia in the sense also, for if φύσει προσγίνεται ἡ ἀρετή, how can it be said δεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν αὐτῇ. V. Cousin takes δοκεῖν absolutely for δόξει, ὡς δοκεῖν, *de sorte que l'on croira .... et l'on croira .... Oui, on va croire que*, &c.—Διαπεφευγέναι, Scap. Lex. Dicitur et διαφεύγειν ἡμᾶς illa res, qua excidimus, quæve e manibus quasi nobis elabitur: apud Æschin. in Ctesiph. Item quod nobis e memoria elabitur et excidit, quo modo usus est Isocrat. et Plutarch.—Οἵτινες σε οὐχί, *qui te non conservaverimus, quemadmodum nec tu teipsum, quum tamen fieri illud potuisset.* STALL.

Ἀλλὰ βεβουλεῦσθαι.] The time had arrived when deliberation should have ceased, and at which Socrates should have adopted, if so inclined, the suggestions of his friend, and the plan for his escape, to be put in execution on the coming night, or the opportunity was lost.

Εἰ δέ τι.] Ficinus appears to have read εἰ δ' ἔτι: Lat. Interpr.

Περιμενοῦμεν.] See in Phæd. c. 3. περιμένειν.

§. 6. ἡ προθυμία σου, κ. τ. λ.] h. e. *studium tuum mei servandi valde probandum est et laudandum, si cum recta ratione conjuncta sit.* STALL. Εἰ μετ. τιν. ορθ. εἴη. V. Matthiæ Gr. s. 524. Obs. 3.

νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος ἐγὼ ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἄν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδή μοι ἥδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὁμοίους φαίνονταί μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ οὓς περ καὶ πρότερον· ὧν ἐὰν μὴ βέλτιω ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐ μή σοι ξυγχωρήσω, οὐδ' ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὡς περ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. Πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα αὐτά; Εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἑκάστοτε ἢ οὔ, ὅτι

Οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν.] h. e. ὥστε—πείθεσθαι: V. Matthiæ Gr. s. 479. Obs. 2. *a.* s. 617. 5.—Τὰ ἐμά, *quæ ad me pertinent, tum animi affectiones et cupiditates, tum externæ rerum conditiones.* STALL.

Οὐδ' ἂν πλείω τῶν, κ. τ. λ.] Buttmann arranges the passage: οὐδ' ἂν ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις μορμολύττηται ἡμᾶς ὥσπερ παῖδας, ἐπιπέμπουσα πλείω, δεσμούς, κ. τ. λ. Stallbaum joins πλείω, as an accusative absolute, taken adverbially, with μορμολύττηται, which appears to agree better with the position of the words in the text. Cf. c. 14. infr. sub fin. αλλ' ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας, etc.

Μορμολύττηται.] Ruhnken, in Tim. Plat. Lex. μορμολύττεσθαι, *gestu quodam et pronuncianda voce* Μορμὼ *pueros terrere.* V. Gesner, ad Claudian. Carm. xxxi. 111. Cf. Schol. Basil. in Gregor. Nazian. Or. xxxv. p. 563. C. Μορμολύττειν ἐστὶ, τὸ ἐκφοβεῖν, καὶ Μορμολυκεῖον, προσωπεῖον εἰς φόβον παιδίων ἀνοήτων, καὶ τύπος τις ἀλλόκοτος ὄψεως. εἴρηται ἀπὸ τῆς Μορμοῦς, τῆς καὶ Λαμίας. In order to hush and soothe their crying infants the nurses at Athens used to sing a lullaby called λαλά, Ovid. Fasti, ii. 599, or βαυκαλᾶν; but when they were peevish and fretful they endeavoured to quiet them with threats of a bugbear or spectre called μορμολύκειον, μορμολύκη, and more briefly μορμώ, whence the verb as supr., which is always used by the Attic writers in the middle voice.

Ἐπιπέμπουσα.] Ἐπιπέμπειν frequently signifies emphatically *to visit with good* or *evil fortune.*—Καὶ θανάτους—καὶ ἀφαιρέσεις. The plural is used to increase the force of the expression. Cf. Plat. Lachet. p. 191. D. ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι. The punishments of infamy, banishment, slavery, or death, were always attended with the confiscation of property. V. Boeckh, Pub. Econ. ii. c. 14.

Μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα.] Μετρίως σκοπεῖσθαι, *quærere ita ut par est, ut rei convenit, ut res postulat,* h. e. *recte, bene.* STALL.

Πρῶτον μέν.] V. infr. c. 8. a med. ὥστε πρῶτον μέν, κ. τ. λ. where this first part of the discussion concludes, and the second is immediately subjoined, ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, &c.—Τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν—ἀναλαμβάνειν, *disputationem retractare, iterum diligentius tractare,* WYTTENBACH; correctly, for Socrates alludes to what had been already said upon this subject, c. 3. supr., which he now proposes to resume.

Πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγ. ἑκάσ. ἢ οὔ.] h. e. *Utrum quotiescunque superiore tempore de hac re disputabamus, recte a nobis dictum sit, necne, alias hominum opiniones respiciendas esse, alias non.* STALL.

ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὔ· ἢ πρίν μέν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο ὅτι ἄλλως ἕνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἦν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς. ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἔγωγε ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὦ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ, εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ὧδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομέν χαίρειν ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δέ πως, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἑκάστοτε ὧδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὥς περ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ἃς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσι, δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή. τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια, ἔκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρούοι ἡ παροῦσα ξυμφορά. σκόπει δή· οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾷν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μέν, τὰς δ' οὔ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μέν, τῶν δ' οὔ; τί φῄς; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;

ΚΡ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾷν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μή;

ΚΡ. Ναί.

Wieland, Mus. Attic. iii. 2. p. 159. sqq. would omit ἢ οὔ, and understand καλῶς ἐλέγετο after ἀποθνήσκειν ironically. In the text ἢ οὔ refers to καλῶς preced.

Νῦν δὲ—ἐγένετο.] Νῦν, signifying time either actually present, or bordering on the present, is often placed in contraposition to πρίν, τότε, or other particles expressive of time past. With a past tense, as supr. it means *lately, just now*, as in Phædon. οὐκοῦν ὅπερ νῦν προυθέμεθα σκέψασθαι—σκεπτέον. Cf. Horat. Od. i. 37. 2. "Nunc taliaribus Ornare pulvinar deorum Tempus erat dapibus." See Matthiæ Gr. s. 506. V.—Κατάδηλος, sc. ὁ λόγος.

Ἄλλως.] *Idly, vainly.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 597.—Ἕνεκα λόγου, *for argument's sake.*—Ἐπειδὴ ὧδε ἔχω, *postquam mortis periculum mihi imminet, postquam veni in periculum vitæ.* STALL.

Τι λέγειν.] Opp. to παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία preced.

Ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια.] h. e. *ut quidem sunt res humanæ*, i. e. *quantum quidem ex iis, quæ hominibus solent fere contingere, conjicere licet.* STALL.

Παρακρούοι.] Παρακρούειν, Hesych. interpr. ἐξαπατᾷν, πλανᾷν: FISCH. *facere, ut quis male statuat, et existimet, ut erret, ut non ponderet satis et examinet aliquid;* properly, *to trip in wrestling*, or *to cheat* by touching the beam in weighing. Stallbaum explains the passage: *Te enim præsens calamitas non ita conturbaverit ut a recta judicandi ratione abduci te patiaris.*

Τιμᾷν.] *To respect.*

ΣΩ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;

ΚΡ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

§. 7. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο; γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἑνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὤν;

ΚΡ. Ἑνὸς μόνου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δή.

ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ᾗ ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαΐοντι μᾶλλον ἢ ᾗ ξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις.

ΚΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαιόντων ἆρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;

ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἔστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;

§. 7. Γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων.] i. e. *Practising athletic exercises, and wholly intent upon them:* —τοῦτο πράττε, a proverbial form, the *Hoc age* of the Latins. v. Horat. Sat. ii. 3. 152.

Ὅς ἂν τυγχάνῃ—ὤν.] i. e. *whoever he may be that is*, &c. See Viger, de Id. Gr. viii. 2. 1. sqq.—Ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης. The former gave the necessary directions for the diet, &c. of the future athletes, whence ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον infr. The office of the latter consisted chiefly in exercising the bodies of their scholars in the palæstra, whence πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον. Both professions were practised together first by Herodicus, of Selybria, of whom Plato, in Repub. iii. p. 406. A.—παιδοτρίβης ὢν καὶ νοσώδης γενόμενος, μίξας γυμναστικὴν ἰατρικῇ ἀπέκναισε πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτὸν, ἔπειτ' ἄλλους ὕστερον πολλούς. V. Intpp. ad Aristoph. Nub. 969.

Τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαΐοντι.] V. Cousin: *celui qui préside à la gymnastique et qui s'y connaît;* referring to ἰατρὸς and παιδοτρίβης, preced.

ΚΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσιν.

ΣΩ Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα, ὦ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διίωμεν. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἡ βουλή, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἕπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτήν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἑνός, εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαΐων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους; ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθησόμεθα, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο;

ΚΡ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

§. 8. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ, ἆρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ (διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ;) ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα. ἢ οὐχί;

ΚΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρα ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρ-

Ἕπεσθαι.] i. q. *προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν* supr.

Τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο.] i. e. *βέλτ. γίγνεσθαι ἐλέγομεν.* See Matthiæ Gr. s. 505. 2. whence it will appear that the proposed emendation of Buttmann, who reads, after Theodoret, (Θερ. Παθ. p. 27.) *ἐγένετο—ἀπώλετο*, is wholly unnecessary. Tr. *was being improved, was in progress towards improvement, by justice*, &c. The imperfects, according to Lange, bear a distinct and definite relation to the period at which this subject came first under discussion, whence he explains the passage; *quod justo quidem melius fiebat* (sc. ex sententia, priusquam in mortis periculum incideram a nobis proposita,) *injusto autem depravatur.*

§. 8. Πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ.] Fischer supposes here a synchysis, or hyperbaton, and understands the passage, *τῇ τῶν μὴ ἐπ.* as also Ficinus. Lat. Interp. But Lange, more correctly, explains *μὴ* as opposed by *ἀλλὰ* in a corresponding sentence not expressed. sc. *πειθόμ. μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπ. δόξ. ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν μὴ ἐπαϊόντων*: approved by Buttmann.

βιωτὸν.] i. q. *βιωτὸς ὁ βίος.* See Apol. Socr. c. 28. a med.

Μοχθηροῦ.] *Miserable.*

μένου, ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν; ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἥ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τιμιώτερον;

ΚΡ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον ὅ τι ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ὁ ἐπαΐων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, φαίη γ' ἄν τις, οἱοί τ' εἰσὶν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτιννύναι;

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Ὧι τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται.] For the relative preceding verbs of different construction, ὀνίνημι always governing an accusative, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 391. Eusebius, Stephens, and others, read δ, approved by Fischer, who construes λωβᾶσθαι with an accusative only, incorrectly. Cf. Phrynich. in Bekk. Anec. i. p. 50. Λωβᾶσθαι τόνδε καὶ τῷδε, αἰτιατικῇ καὶ δοτικῇ. Dion. Halic. Antiq. Rom. vii. 77. fin. p. 1561. ed. Reisk. (ἡ βουλὴ) ἀναζητήσασα τὸν τῷ θεράποντι λωβησάμενον.

Ἢ φαυλότερον.] *Or do we imagine that to be of less importance than the body, whatever it is belonging to us, about which justice and injustice are concerned.* If, in order to enjoy the many and important blessings connected with bodily health, we should conform to that regimen by which they might be best secured; arguing from its success the capabilities and skill of the adviser; that life should then be worth living, whose termination should be equally desirable, were the means of its enjoyment neglected, or the voice of the adviser to be mistrusted and contemned. So with the soul, the TRUTH alone, the test of justice and injustice, should decide upon their effects in relation to this their primary object. Is it then possible to make light of a bodily infirmity which poisons life, and give no heed to its obvious cause? or is the soul more trivial still, and is the voice of the many to drown the solemn and sober dictates of this omniscient truth, which dispels the cloud of mental error, and so removes the possibility of moral taint?

Ὅ τι ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς.] V. Apol. Socr. c. 9. Καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὕ, κ. τ. λ.

Οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ.] Εἰσηγεῖσθαι, *legem vel conditionem aliquam ferre et suadere; auctorem esse alicujus rei.*—Sturz. Lex. Xenoph. s. h. v.

Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα, κ. τ. λ.] Several editions ascribe δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα to Socrates, which is approved by Buttmann. But it would seem strange for Socrates so to affirm his position in the first instance, that it should be consented to by Crito, and then confirmed anew.—ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, κ. τ. λ. Bekker's reading, as supr., obviates the difficulty. For when Socrates had as-

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὅμοιος εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει, εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὔ, ὅτι οὐ (τὸ ζῆν) περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ μένει·

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστι, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

ΚΡ. Μένει.

§. 9. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῶμεν. ἃς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περί τε χρημάτων ἀνα-

serted that the objection might possibly be made, that the opinion of the many ought to be rejected, because its influence prevailed, even to the deprivation of life, Crito caught up the idea, as favourable to his own views, and at once pronounces the argument to be valid. Socrates accepts his admission, but proceeds to show that the impression was false, and its result unfounded. Stephens and Cornarius read δηλαδή, but γάρ, which is emphatically affirmative in the text, is to be found in all the editions, which would render the former superfluous.

Οὗτος τε ὁ λόγος.] i. e. The discussion which Socrates had just concluded, concerning the opinion of the multitude; one which he set no value on, nor thought the many a more competent judge because they exercised control over life and death. Especially as they had no power over the conduct of life, which was not to be desired for itself alone, but should rather be reckoned as consisting in the amiable development of chastened and virtuous feelings, which are always independent of external sway, and must reconcile all who are so actuated to the anticipation of that unwelcome reception in most instances, and that unmitigated persecution in many, to which excellence is ever liable from powerful and petulant vice. By τῷ καὶ πρότερον, the philosopher must allude either to his previous argument on the subject, c. 3. which he subsequently discussed in detail, or to some debate which he had held with his disciples previous to his accusation. Stallbaum adopts the latter conjecture, which appears to be more in consonance with what follows; καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει εἰ ἔτι μένει, κ. τ. λ. For Socrates being about to speak of the love of life, and a due moderation of the passion to preserve it, desires Crito to consider further, whether what they had formerly agreed to on the subject ought still to be abided by as true.

§. 9. Ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων.] h. e. *ex iis, de quibus consentimus.* STALL.

Μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων.] *Without leave of the Athenians:* ἀφιέναι, *sinere, permittere.* FISCH. Cf. Eurip. Med. 374. τήνδ' ἀφῆκεν ἡμέραν μεῖναί με, *allowed me to remain this day.* Cod. Tubing. ἐφιέντων as in c. 13. extr.

Ἐῶμεν.] *Let us give it over.*

Περί τε χρημάτων ἀναλώσεως.] See c. 4. a med.—Καὶ δόξης; Ficinus appears either to have read καὶ τῶν πολλῶν δόξης, or to have given the sense of the text as supr. in full. Socrates alludes here to the argument of Crito, c. 3. init.

λώσεως καὶ δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ῥᾳδίως ἀποκτιννύντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν, εἰ οἷοί τε ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῷ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ὃ περ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσι καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν ταῦτα πάντα ποιοῦντες· κἂν εἰ φαινώμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέῃ ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὔτ' εἰ ἄποθνήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Καλῶς μέν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν.

Μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς.] The imperative ὅρα is understood in *μὴ* here and infr. *μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο*: *Vide ne aliud nihil considerandum sit—μὴ οὐ δέῃ*: *Vide, ne nulla ne mortis quidem habenda sit ratio.* STEPH.

Σκέμματα.] i. q. *σκέψεις* supr.

Καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων.] *Ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, in vitam revocare, vitam reddere, si tua intersit, si tibi ipsi prosis.* FISCH. Cf. in Phædon. c. 38. sub. fin. *καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι.* Wyttenbach, Ep. Crit. 232. ed. Lips., proposes *ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' αὖ*, incorrectly, for *ἄν*, subjoined to participles and infinitives, gives to these moods (not the sense of the future, although in Latin it can only be expressed by this sense, but) the same signification as the optative, conjunctive, or indicative, with *ἄν*, would have in the resolution, by means of the finite verb. Whence the passage above is to be explained; *καὶ τούτων, οἳ ἀνεβιώσκοντό γ' ἄν, εἰ οἷοί τε ἦσαν, and who would restore to life again, were they capable.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 598. 1.—Τούτων τῶν πολλῶν; contemptuously, cf. c. 4. supr. *τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας.*

Ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεῖ.] *Quum res, quum ratio, ita postulet et dictet.* FISCH. Cf. Horat. Sat. ii. 3. 250. "Si puerilius his, *ratio* esse *evincet* amare."

Χρήματα τελοῦντες.] It is to be observed that *τελειν* is applied with propriety to *χρηματα* only; *χάριν ἔχειν*, and *χάριν εἰδέναι* or *προσειδέναι*, also *χάριν ἀποδιδόναι* and *ἐκτίνειν* are usual forms, but not *χάριν τελεῖν*. It should have been written *χρήματα τελοῦντες — καὶ χάριτας προσειδότες*; Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 4. init. The Greek writers, however, not unfrequently accommodated the same verb to several nouns, to one only of which it should have been joined, but at the same time, in a sense so extended, that it contained the force of the verbs which belonged properly to the other nouns. This practice originated with the Hebrews, by whom it was transmitted to the Greeks, and so to the Latins. Cf. Cic. pro. Arch. 3. "Quorum alter res ad scribendas maximas, alter, cum res gestas, tum etiam studium, atque aures adhibere posset."

Κἂν φαινώμεθα ἄδικα, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *And if we should so appear to act unjustly, observe that we are not to take into account the death that must result from our remaining and keeping quiet here, nor any other suffering whatever, in preference to the injustice of the act*; [i. e. should we accomplish our es-

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ ᾽γαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πῃ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε καί σοῖ πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μή, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι, ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πεῖσαί σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐάν σοι ἱκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, ἢ ἂν μάλιστα οἴῃ.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

§. 10. ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὔ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὡμολογήθη; ὅ περ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο. ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσί, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ Κρίτων, ἄρα τηλικοί-

cape.] Παραμένειν, *manere in vinculis neque inde aufugere.* STALL. It is properly applied to faithful slaves, παραμόνοι, opp. to ἀποδιδράσκοντες.

Ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ.] Commentators have varied considerably in their explanations of this passage, of which they severally propose such emendations as may best accord with their own views. The text as it stands is interpreted accurately by Stallbaum: *Magni æstimo te mihi iterum iterumque persuadere conari, ut id agam,* h. e. *ut fugam capessam, modo ne me invito hoc facias,* i. e. more fully, *generosam tuam amicitiam, qua fit, ut mihi hoc consilium identidem suadeas* (the aorist being expressive of an action repeated) *utique plurimi facio, sed noli hoc committere, ut meæ ipsius voluntati ac sententiæ nihil tribuas, quum ego soleam non rerum externarum momentis commoveri, sed solius veritatis virtutisque rationibus.* Socrates attached a due importance to the benevolent efforts of his faithful friend, but he could not allow himself to be persuaded against his own conviction, ἀλλὰ μὴ [μού] ἄκοντος, which being not at all likely to be overcome by the arguments of Crito, he begs of him to resign the vain attempt. So V. Cousin: *Cesse enfin, je te prie, de me presser de sortir d'ici malgré les Athéniens; car je serai ravi que tu me persuades de le faire, mais je n'entends pas y être forcé.* Ficinus has strayed altogether from the sense and spirit of the passage. V. Lat. Int. For μὴ ἄκοντος several editions read μὴ ἄκοντα, which is probably more correct, but the genitive absolute is often found, though the subject is another case, in the principal proposition, especially if it is to be distinguished by the emphasis. Cf. Thucyd. vii. 48. χρημάτων μὲν ἀπορίᾳ αὐτοὺς ἐκνυχώσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον ἤδη ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις ναυσὶ θαλασσοκρατούντων.

Ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 409. 6.

§. 10. Ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι.] Cf. Plat. Repub. 7. p. 520. D. καταβατέον ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ξυνοίκησιν. For this construction, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 447. 4.

Ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσί.] *Profusæ,* i. e. *abjectæ sunt.* STALL. Jacobs elegantly compares the forms ἐκχεῖν πλοῦτον, ἐκχεῖν χρήματα.—Γέροντες ἄνδρες is

δε γέροντες ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς περ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν; εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πραότερα, ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὂν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμὲν ἢ οὔ;

ΚΡ. Φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί δαὶ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὔ;

ΚΡ. Οὐ δεῖ δή που, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοί φασι, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

ΚΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

redundant, but contrasts more strongly with *παίδων* seq. Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 23. *τηλικόνδε ὄντα*. c. 27. *τηλικῷδε ἀνθρώπῳ*.

Παντὸς μᾶλλον.] *Unquestionably, beyond all doubt:* a particularly emphatic affirmation. Cf. in Phæd. c. 17. c. 56.

Ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν.] So, in Gorg. p. 469. when Socrates is asked by Callicles; *σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν*, he makes answer: *βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ ἀδικεῖν.*

Ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται.] Cf. Archil. apud Theophil. ad Autolyc. ii. 37. *ἓν δ' ἐπίσταμαι μέγα, τὸ κακῶς τι δρῶντα δεινοῖς ἀνταμείβεσθαι κακοῖς*. Solon, in Brunck. Poet. Gnom. p. 73. *εἶναι δὲ γλυκὺν ὧδε φίλοις, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ πικρόν· τοῖσι μὲν αἰδοῖον, τοῖσι δὲ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν*. Fragm. Eurip. ap. Valcken. p. 157. *ἐχθρὸν κακῶς δρᾶν ἀνδρὸς ἡγοῦμαι μέρος*. That such was the opinion of the vulgar can be proved by many ancient authorities, forbearance having been commonly deemed inconsistent with fortitude.

Οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ.] *Si vel maximis et gravissimis injuriis efficiatur.* STALL. Euseb. Theodoret. *πάσχῃ τις ὑπ.* Ficinus reads *πάσχῃς, passus fueris*, but it is more correctly taken in the person of *κακῶς πάσχοντα* preced., besides that it refers to the indefinite subject of the infinitive *ἀνταδικεῖν*.

καὶ ὅρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογῇς. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μή, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ· σοὶ δ' εἴ πῃ ἄλλῃ δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δὲ ἐμμένεις οἷς πρόσθεν, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ. πότερον ἃ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ ἐξαπατητέον;

ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

§. 11. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινὰς ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὓς ἥκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὔ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὡμολογήσαμεν δικαίοις οὖσιν ἢ οὔ;

Matthiæ Gr. 205. 2. For an analysis of the principle deprecated by Socrates as supr. see Dr. Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind, sect. 63. and Dugald Stewart, Philos. of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, c. 3. sec. 6.

Βουλεύματα.] i. q. *σκέψεις* and *σκέμματα*, c. 9. supr.

Οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα.] i. e. *Nor that one who is ill-used should revenge himself, requiting evil for evil.* Ficinus incorrectly refers *ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς* to the aggressor.

Τῆς ἀρχῆς.] *The principle: disputationis principium.* STALL.

Τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο.] The conclusion deduced from the principle, as supr.—Ἀλλὰ λέγε, omitted by Ficinus, but incorrectly, as appears from λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο seq.

§. 11. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει.] h. e. *jam si hæc vera sunt, nefas esse lædere quenquam ullo modo, vide quid inde sequatur.* STALL.

Μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν.] i. q. *ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων*, or *μὴ ἀφέντων Ἀθηναίων*, c. 9. supr.

Οἷς ὡμολογήσαμεν.] h. e. *de quibus ut justis et æquis nobis cum civitate convenit.* STALL.

ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὃ ἐρωτᾷς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, ἐπιστάντες ἔροιντο, Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ ᾧ ἐπιχειρεῖς, διανοεῖ τούς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ᾗ ἂν αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἰσχύωσιν ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίγνωνται καὶ διαφθείρωνται; Τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἄν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάττει κυρίας εἶναι. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι Ἠδίκει γὰρ

Ἀποδιδράσκειν.] This term was generally applied to fugitive slaves, but its harshness is qualified by εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, h. e. *vel quo alio nomine istud nobis appellandum erit.* STALL.

Ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι.] This beautiful passage has been imitated by Cicero, in Catil. i. 7. "Patria—quæ tecum, Catilina, sic agit et quodam modo tacita loquitur, &c." Cf. Œuvres de Frederic II. iii. p. 54. "Que pourroient répondre ces cœurs tièdes et lâches—si la patrie personifiée se présentoit subitement devant eux, est leur tenoit à peu près ce langage, &c." BIEST. Quintilian, ix. 2. observes on the effects of this figure προσωποποιία: "Mire quum variant orationem, tum excitant—urbes etiam populique vocem accipiunt."

Τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως.] i. q. Σύμπασα ἡ πόλις, *universa civitas.* Xen. Cyrop. τὸ Περσῶν κοινὸν, Persarum civitas *universa.* FISCH. Cf. Cic. Verr. ii. 46. 63. "Commune Siciliæ," i. e. Sicilia universa; Siculi omnes. V. Cousin, *La République elle même.*

Ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ.] See Apol. Socr. c. 12. init. and Matthiæ Gr. s. 487. 9.

Τὸ σὸν μέρος.] i. q. καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι, c. 12. infr.

Εἶναι.] i. q. σῶν εἶναι, σταθῆναι, Mark, iii. 24. opp. to ἀνατετράφ. infr. *To continue, to exist;* Cf. Cic. de Off. i. 12. 38. "bellum gerebatur, uter esset, non uter imperaret."—Μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, h. e. *neque eversam jacere.* STALL.

Αἱ γενόμεναι δίναι.] Sc. αἱ δίκαι δικασθεῖσαι, infr. *judicia e legibus facta, judicata.* STALL. V. Cousin; *les jugemens rendus.*

Τούτου τοῦ νόμου.] See Robinson's Grec. Antiq. c. xxx. extr. Demosthenes commends this law, Orat. adv. Timocrat. p. 782. Τὰς δίκας καὶ τὰς διαίτας, ὅσαι ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ πόλει κυρίας εἶναι.

Ὅτι Ἠδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις.] The particle ὅτι is used when the very words of the speaker are quoted *in oratione recta,* whereas these in other languages can be only quoted in the way of narrative. Matthiæ Gr. s. 624. *b.* Heindorf preferred ὅτι ἀδικεῖ γὰρ, &c., however Socrates is not speaking in general terms of the injustice of the state, but in reference to his own peculiar case, as appears from καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε, seq. The latter verb Buttmann correctly understands as the aorist. Stallbaum explains the passage: *Enimvero injuste nobiscum civitas agebat, quum nos*

ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε; Ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νὴ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.

§. 12. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἐὰν εἴποιεν οἱ νόμοι, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἦ καὶ ταῦτα ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι Ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν τε καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μέν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἔλαβε τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέ σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους μέμφει τι ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; Οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην ἄν. Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν ᾗ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης; ἦ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ

damnaret et in carcere retineret.

Ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;] h. e. ἢ τι ἄλλο ἐροῦμεν.

§. 12. Ἦ καὶ ταῦτα ὡμολόγητο.] Various readings and interpretations have been proposed for this passage, which however has been fully and correctly explained by Fischer, as it stands in the text; ταῦτα being understood to refer to ἠδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις, κ. τ. λ. supr. and so opp. to ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις seq. Whether, say the laws, was this the compact which was made between us, that you should charge the state with injustice, and its proceedings as illegal; or was it, that you would abide by the decisions which the state, with our sanction, might pronounce? At Athens, before the ephebi were permitted to be enrolled among the citizens, they were bound by an oath, in which, among other things, they promised calling the gods to witness; Τοῖς θεσμοῖς τοῖς ἱδρυμένοις πείσομαι, καὶ οὓς τινας ἂν ἄλλους τὸ πλῆθος ἱδρύσηται ὁμοφρόνως· καὶ ἂν τις ἀναιρῇ τοὺς θεσμούς, ἢ μὴ πείθηται, οὐκ ἐπιτρέψω, ἀμυνῶ δὲ, καὶ μόνος, καὶ μετὰ πάντων. Stob. Eclog. Eth. c. 41. p. 243. Gesner. It is not clear how Ficinus read the passage in the text, but he has lost sight of the meaning.

Τῷ ἐρωτ. τε κ. α.] *Question and answer.*

Οὐ πρῶτον μέν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν.] Πρῶτον μέν should properly be followed by ἔπειτα, but the sense of the latter is implied in Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου, κ. τ. λ. seq. where it might have been written: ἔπειτα οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ τροφῇ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγ.—παιδεύειν; ἢ καὶ τούτοις μέμφει;—Καὶ δι' ἡμῶν—this explains σε ἐγεννήσαμεν preced. The Athenian law obliged all citizens, especially such as held any important office in the state, to be married, with a view to the procreation of children, which were considered as a kind of security for the good conduct of the parents, and their being well affected towards the interests of the republic. Dinarch. contr. Demosth. Meurs. Them. Att. i. 14. ii. 6.—Ἔλαβε. Cf. Mark, 12. 19. sqq.

ἢ οὐ καλῶς, κ. τ. λ.] The laws repeat here emphatically the subject of the preceding question, Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τ. τ. γ.—ἐπαιδεύθης.

ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν; Καλῶς, φαίην ἄν. Εἶεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δοῦλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἆρ' ἐξ ἴσου οἴει εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἅττ' ἂν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἴει δίκαιον εἶναι; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, εἴ σοι ὧν ἐτύγχανεν, ὥστε ἃ περ πάσχοις, ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν, οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τυπτόμενον ἀντιτύπτειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά· πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐξέσται σοι, ὥστε ἐάν σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; ἢ οὕτως εἶ σοφὸς ὥστε λέληθέ σε ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἁπάντων τιμιώτερόν ἐστι πατρὶς καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἁγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ καὶ

Ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ.] The Greeks, with the exception of the Lacedæmonians, were accustomed to have their sons instructed in letters, γράμματα, or γραμματικὴ τέχνη, which at first denoted ἐπιστήμην τοῦ γράψαι καὶ ἀναγνῶναι, the art of writing, and with propriety. This became subsequently so extended as to be designated by the term φιλολογία, which implied a knowledge of history, poetry, eloquence, and general literature. They were also taught the gymnastic exercises, music, and, not unfrequently, painting. See in Phædon, c. 4. a med. μουσικὴν ποίει.

Καὶ δοῦλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρ.] For this species of apposition, see also Sophocl. Œd. Colon. 452. ἐπάξιος μὲν Οἰδίπους κατοικτίσαι, αὐτός τε παῖδες θ' αἱδ'. 864. τοιγάρ σέ, καὐτὸν καὶ γένος τὸ σὸν, θεῶν ὁ πάντα λεύσσων Ἥλιος δοίη βίον τοιοῦτον.

Οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν.] This is added in explanation of ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν preced., consequently it is not joined by any connecting particle with what goes before.

Ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετ. ἐπιμ.] A form particularly expressive of indignation and sarcasm; see Matthiæ Gr. s. 276. V. Cousin; *Toi qui as réellement consacré ta vie à l'étude de la vertu.*

Ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ.] *Quod pluris æstimatur: quod in majore pretio et honore est.* Fisch. Cf. Herodot. iii. p. 99. 25. Steph. Αὐτὸν ἐν οὐδεμίῃ μεγάλῃ μοίρῃ ἡγον. Hom. Il. ί, 818. ἴσῃ μοῖρα μένοντι, καὶ εἰ μάλα τις πολεμίζοι.

παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ, καὶ πάσχειν, ἐάν τι προστάττῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, ἐάν τε τύπτεσθαι ἐάν τε δεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον· ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχι ὑπεικτέον οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε· βιάζεσθαι δ' οὐχ ὅσιόν οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι ἧττον τὴν πατρίδα. Τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὔ;

ΚΡ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

§. 13. ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν, ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἁπάντων ὧν οἷοί τ' ἦμεν καλῶν σοί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι πολίταις; ὅμως προαχορεύομεν τῷ

προαγορευω

Θωπεύειν.] *Blande palpari, verbis blandis precari*, FISCH., *to conciliate, to caress.* Θώψ, *adulator, palpo*, whence Theætet. p. 128. E. θῶπας λόγους, *wheedling or flattering discourses.* V. Wesseling. ad Herodot. iii. 80. Both these terms have a common origin with θαυμάζω, Ion. θωμάζω, the former through θάπω, Ion. θήπω, from θεάομαι, *to wonder, to admire*; thus θώψ, *one who affects admiration*; Th. θάομαι, act. θάω, obsol.

Καὶ ἢ πείθειν, ἢ ποιεῖν.] *Aut persuadendo contendere te oportere.* WOLF. πείθειν, *placare oratione, ita ut doceas quomodo res habeat; meliora docere.* STALL.

Εἰς πόλ. ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον.] Steph. in marg. *ad bellum ubi vulnera sis accepturus.*

Ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ᾗ τὸ δίκ. πέφ.] *Plane docere eam, quomodo justum sese natura habeat*, i. e. *plane docere naturam justi.* FISCH. The infin. πείθειν is used as if the verbal ποιητέον preced. had been resolved into ποιεῖν δεῖ. Matthiæ Gr. s. 447. 2. Cf. Gorg. p. 492. D. τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῂς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἷον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν ἀλλοθέν γέ ποθεν ἑτοιμάζειν: where Heindorf, "Supplendum δεῖν, quod latebat in illo κολαστέον."

Ἧττον τὴν πατρίδα.] Cic. ad Famil. i. ep. ix. 44. "Id enim jubet idem ille Plato, quem ego vehementer auctorem sequor: Tantum contendere in republica quantum probare tuis civibus possis: vim neque parenti neque patriæ afferre oportere."

ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἴδῃ τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅπου ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδών ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύει, ἐάν τέ τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἰέναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, ἐάν τε μετοικεῖν ἀλλοσέ ποι ἐλθών, ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅποι ἂν βούληται, ἔχοντα τὰ αὑτοῦ. ὃς δ' ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὁρῶν ὃν τρόπον ἡμεῖς τάς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τἆλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἤδη φαμὲν τοῦτον ὡμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν, ἃ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν, ποιήσειν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τρίχῃ φαμὲν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὖσιν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεῦσι, καὶ

§. 13. Τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι.] i. e. *Nevertheless we proclaim, in having granted the indulgence to any of the Athenians who may desire to use it as soon as he has arrived at the years of discretion and become acquainted with the business of the state, and us, the laws, that it is lawful for him, having collected his effects, to depart whithersoever he pleases.*—Δοκιμασθῇ, *postquam sui juris factus est, et res publicas cognovit.*—STALL. i. e. The age at which one became competent to decide upon such matters as affected the republic. Allusion is made here to the δοκιμασία εἰς ἄνδρας. For the names of those who wished to enjoy the full privileges of an Athenian citizen, and to participate in those honours to which they became entitled by their freedom, were obliged to be enrolled, in the first instance, in the κοινὸν γραμματεῖον, or register of their particular φρατρία, or ward, with an oath on the part of the parents, that every son so registered was lawfully born, or lawfully adopted. At what age children were thus enrolled does not appear; some suppose at one, others, at three or four years old. The second enrolment was at the age of eighteen, when young persons were admitted into the number of the ephebi. The third, before the festival of the Panathenæa, when those who were twenty years old were introduced at a public meeting of the δημόται, and entered in the register called ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον, in which were inserted the names of all persons of that borough, who were of age to succeed to the ληξις, or inheritance of their fathers. This was called εἰς ἄνδρας ἐγγράφεσθαι, or δοκιμ. εἰς ἄνδ. as supr. The persons so enrolled were thenceforward at their own disposal, and not subject to the control of guardians. Cf. Æschin. adv. Timarch. p. 26. ed. Bremi. ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐγγραφῇ τις εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον, καὶ τοὺς νόμους εἰδῇ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ἤδη δύνηται διαλογίζεσθαι τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ μή, οὐκ ἔτι ἑτέρῳ διαλέγεται (ὁ νομοθέτης.) v. Demosth. in Midiam. c. 43. Ulp. Boeckh, de Epheb. Attic. in lib.—Τῷ βουλομένῳ—λαβόντα, Cf. Sophocl. Electra, 470. Brunck. ὕπεστί μοι θράσος, ἀδυπνόων κλύουσαν ἀρτίως ὀνειράτων. Lysias Epitaph. p. 28. ἄξιον γὰρ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις—ὑμνοῦντας.

Εἰς ἀποικίαν ἰέναι.] i. e. To emigrate into a Grecian, and that an Athenian colony; μετοικεῖν,—into a foreign country, Grecian or barbarian; παραμένειν, to continue to abide at Athens. FISCH.

Ὡμολ. ἔργω.] *Has virtually agreed.*

ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἢ μὴν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμας, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιτασσόντων ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων ὁμεῖν θάτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

§. 14. Ταύταις δή φαμεν καὶ σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἰ περ ποιήσεις ἃ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. Εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἶποιμι διὰ τί δή; ἴσως ἄν μου δικαίως καθάπτοιντο, λέγοντες ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὡμολόγηκως τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαίεν γὰρ ἂν ὅτι Ὦ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήρια ἐστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἠρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἁπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μή σοι διαφερόντως ἤρεσκε, καὶ οὔτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτε ἐκ τῆς

Ὁμολογήσας — πείθεσθαι.] Cf. c. 14. infr. ὡμολόγεις — πολιτεύεσθαι. n.

Οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς.] Intell. *that we are acting unjustly*, implied in εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, seq.—Προτιθέντων ἡμῶν, &c. h. e. *Quum nos et potestatem faciamus eorum, quæ publice jubentur cognoscendorum atque indicandorum, neque immani severitate quemquam cogamus, ut faciat quæ fieri velimus, imo vero concedamus, ut aut doceat meliora, aut, si hoc non potuerit, nobis pareat, tamen iste neutrum horum facit.* STALL. The laws are said here προτιθέναι, in allusion to the proposing of a law in public, written upon a white tablet, and suspended at the statues of the ἐπώνυμοι, for due consideration, and subsequent approval or rejection on the part of the people, upon the former of which it became either a νόμος, a general and perpetual law, or a ψήφισμα, which was limited to particular places and times, but the obligation of both was the same.

Τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.] Ficinus appears to have read ποιεῖς; but the text is correct. BUTTM.

§. 14. Ἐνέξεσθαι.] *Would become liable:* whence ἔνοχος, *reus; obnoxious.*—Ἐπινοεῖς,—ἐπινοεῖν and ἐπίνοια, are generally taken in a bad sense as expressive of evil or mischievous contrivance.

Ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα.] Intell. ἐνεχομένοις. See Matthiæ Gr. 290. 3.

Καθάπτοιντο.] Καθάπτεσθαι, Hesych. interpr. λοιδορεῖσθαι, ὀνειδίζειν, πραΰνειν. Homer uses it in this sense, as also in the opposite one, *to soothe, to pacify*. Cf. Iliad. ά, 582. Odys. β', 39. 240. κ', 70. Plato uses it as supr. in conformity with the delicacy of the Attic writers, who generally adopted such equivocal terms as might temper their severity in rebuke with the mildness they should have otherwise implied.

Ἐπὶ θεωρίαν.] Ἐπὶ is often put after verbs of motion with substantives which do not denote a place, but an action which is the end of one's going, &c. as Herod. i. 37. ἰέναι ἐπὶ θήραν, and supr. Matthiæ Gr. 586. c. Θεωρία means here the Olympic, Nemean, Isthmian, and Pythian games, for which see Robinson's Grec. Antiq. book iii. c. 21. 22. 23. 24.

πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, [ὅ τι μὴ ἅπαξ] εἰς Ἰσθμόν, οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μή ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἐπιδημίαν, ἀποδημίαν) πώποτε ὡς περ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδ' ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἠροῦ, καὶ ὡμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅ περ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἑκούσης ποιῆσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλ' ἠροῦ, ὡς ἔφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὔτ' ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐπιτρέπει ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθεῖραι, πράττεις τε ἃ περ ἂν δοῦλος ὁ φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ἃς ἡμῖν ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν φάσκοντές σε ὡμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ. Τί

"Ο τι μὴ ἅπαξ.] *Except once.* See Matthiæ Gr. 624. 3. *b.* Seag. Viger. c. viii. 10. 5.

Εἰ μή ποι στρατευσόμενος.] See Apol. Socr. c. 17. init.

Οὐδ' ἄλλων—εἰδέναι.] h. e. ὥστε εἰδέναι αὐτούς. See Matthiæ Gr. 630. h.

Ὡμολόγεις — πολιτεύεσθαι.] Stallbaum meets the corrections proposed by Stephens, here, πολιτεύσεσθαι, infr. ξυνέθου πολιτεύσεσθαι, and ὡμολογηκέναι πολιτεύσεσθαι, as c. 13. extr. ὁμολογήσας — πείσεσθαι, the futures for the present, by supposing the case of a citizen who was binding himself, by an oath, to conform to the laws of his state, and contrasting the effect of the two constructions, in either of which he might acknowledge his submission: ἢ μὴν ὁμολογῶ κατὰ τούς νόμους πολιτεύσεσθαι; or ἢ μὴν ὁμολ. κατὰ τοὺς νόμ. πολιτεύεσθαι; the latter of which he justly prefers as the more emphatic; the restraint of the law being felt simultaneously with the consent to abide by it. There remains no difficulty then in applying a rule which so holds good in the *oratio recta* to the *oratio obliqua*, as in the text supr. and similar passages.

Ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμῆσ.] See Apol. Socr. c. 25.

Ἐκαλλωπίζου.] Properly, *to beautify* or *embellish*; thence *to assume airs of pride or affectation, to vaunt one's self.* For τεθνάναι, which is present in sense, but past in form, see Apol. Socr. c. 17. extr.

"Α περ.] Euseb. ὅ περ, adopted also by Ficinus; v. Lat. Interpr.

Ξυνέθου.] *You covenanted.*

φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν;

ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἂν φαῖεν, ἢ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεὶς οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἑβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἠρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι. σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα προῃροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ ἑκάστοτε φῂς εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλ' ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοί τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὕτω σοι διαφέροντος τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι· τίνι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὡμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθών.

§ 15. Σκόπει γὰρ δή, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτών τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπι-

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Ἃς δὴ ἑκάστοτε φῂς εὐνομ.] Cf. Alcib. Prim. c. 38. ΣΩΚ. Εἰ δ' αὖ ἐθελήσεις εἰς σωφροσύνην τε καὶ κοσμιότητα ἀποβλέψαι καὶ εὐχέρειαν καὶ εὐκολίαν καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην καὶ εὐταξίαν καὶ ἀνδρίαν καὶ καρτερίαν καὶ φιλοπονίαν καὶ φιλονεικίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίας τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων, παῖδα ἂν ἡγήσαιο σαυτὸν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. In Minos. c. 17. a. med. ΣΩΚ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, δοκοῦσι σοι παλαιοτάτοις Κρῆτες οἱ Μίνωος καὶ Ραδάμανθυος πολῖται νόμοις χρῆσθαι; ΕΤ. Φαίνονται. ΣΩΚ. Οὗτοι ἄρα τῶν παλαιῶν ἄριστοι νομοθέται γεγόνασι, νομεῖς τε καὶ ποιμένες ἀνδρῶν, ὡς περ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔφη ποιμένα λαῶν εἶναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν στρατηγόν.

Οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι.] Pollux, ii. 61. Ἀνάπηρος δὲ ἔστιν ὁ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα πεπηρωμένος. Schol. min. ad Iliad. β', 599. Πηρὸς καλεῖται ὁ κατά τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος βεβλαμμένος. See Luke, xiv. 13. 21.

Οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι.] i. e. *So particularly with you beyond the rest of Athenians, did both the state find favour, and ourselves, the laws to wit; for to whom could a state without laws recommend itself?* Buttmann, in explan. δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι ἠρεσκομέν σοι; whence the effect of τίνι γὰρ ἂν, κ. τ. λ., is considerably increased.— Stephens would reject οἱ νομ. δῆλ. ὅτ. as a gloss; it is plain in the case of either explanation as supr., which are both equally admissible, that much of the spirit and force of the passage depends on the phrase being retained.

Ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ.] The laws answer themselves: *But you will remain* (ἀλλ' ἐμμενεῖς underst.) *if you obey us, Socrates, and will not become contemptible by departing from the state.*

τηδείους τοὺς σαυτοῦ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύσουσί γέ σου οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδόν τι δῆλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πολεων ἔλθῃς, ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ Μέγαράδε,—εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφότεραι—πολέμιος ἥξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὅσοι περ κήδονται τῶν αὑτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψονταί σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὃς τις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεύς ἐστι, σφόδρα που δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τάς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντί ἆρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος—τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ οὕς περ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἴει ἄσχημον ἂν φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἴεσθαί γε χρή. Ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἡδέως σου ἀκούοιεν, ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες σκευήν τέ τινα περιθέμενος ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἢ

§. 15. Ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ Μέγαράδε.] Cf. in Phædon. c. 47. a med. πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν.

Ὑποβλέψονται.] Ὑποβλεπόμενος. Hesych. interp. ὑπονοῶν, ἐχθραίνων: *ὑποβλέπεσθαι, to look upon one with anger or suspicion.* V. Cousin: *tout bon citoyen t'y regarderad' un œil de défiance.*

Τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους.] Κόσμιοι.—Fisch. interp. *qui vitam, mores, studia diligenter dirigunt et componunt ad legum normam; modesti, probi.*

Ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται.] Cf. in Phædon. c. 9. extr. ᾧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν.

Ἢ οὕς περ ἐνθάδε.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 619.

Τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι.] *Usages and laws.*

Ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία.] Steph. in marg. *maxima licentia est et petulantia.* The luxury, licentiousness, and intemperance of the Thessalians have been recorded by several of the ancient writers. Athenæus. pp. 137. 418. 527. 663. Xen. Mem. i. c. 2. 24. &c.

Σκευήν τέ τινα.] Σκευή, Hesych. Suid. interp. στολή. Phavorin.: Σκευὴ

ἄλλα οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας. ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνὴρ σμικροῦ χρόνου (τῷ βίῳ) λοιποῦ ὄντος, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρως ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάς; οὐδείς σ' ἔρει; ἴσως, ἂν μή τινα λυπῇς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀκούσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων, τί ποιῶν ἢ ἐνωχούμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ, ὥς περ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θετταλίαν. λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; Ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δαί; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτό σου ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέψον-

ὀξυτόνως, τὸ ἔνδυμα· ὅθεν καὶ σκευάζομαι τὸ ἐνδύομαι. A robe which enveloped the whole person; whence περιθέμενος and ἐνσκευάζεσθαι infr.

Τὸ σχῆμα.] Σχῆμα, Hesych. interp. ἱματισμός, *habitus et vestitus.*

Ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρως, κ. τ. λ.] *Had you the assurance to be so tenaciously desirous of life?*—γλίσχρως ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν, *quum quis omnia molitur et machinatur ut vitam servet.* Fisch. Ficinus misinterprets γλίσχρως; Lat. Int.

Εἰ δὲ μή.] *Otherwise:* negative propositions, especially with the Attic writers, being usually followed in the antithesis by a negative condition, as supr. instead of an affirmative. Matthiæ Gr. s. 617. b. Cf. in Phædon. c. 8. sub. fin. δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς πίνειν τούς τι τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας.

Ὑπερχόμενος.] Ὑπερχέσθαι, properly, *to go under, to creep into;* thence *to insinuate one's self* into the favour of another by abject submission and flattery. So Phavorin. Ὑπέρχομαι· τὸ ὑποκάτω τινὸς ἔρχομαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου κολακεύω. Schol. Aristoph. ad Equit. 269. Οἷον ὑπέρχεται· ὡς ὑπάγεται τὸν δῆμον ὑποτρέχων, καὶ κολακεύει, καὶ καταπραΰνει: Schleiermacher would omit δουλεύων seq. but incorrectly, as it implies either a gradation or a consequence of the quality implied in ὑπερχόμενος preced. Stallbaum explains the passage: *Vives igitur adulator adeoque servus aliorum: quid quæso aliud faciens quam convivans in Thessalia, quasi ad epulum quoddam e patria profectus sis in Thessaliam.*

Ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται.] Cf. Soph. Œd. Tyr. 965. ὦ θεῶν μαντεύματα, ἵν' ἐστέ; Eurip. Supplic. 127, τὸ δ' Ἄργος ὑμῖν ποῦ 'στιν; ἢ 'κόμπει μάτην.

Ἀπολαύσωσιν.] Ἀπολαύειν is, properly, *to enjoy anything*, in a favourable sense; it is in frequent use with the Attic writers in the opposite. Cf. de Legg. p. 910, B. καὶ πᾶσα οὕτως ἡ πόλις ἀπολαύῃ τῶν ἀσεβῶν τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως. Lucian. Dialog. Deor. 10. Sol. τοιαῦτα ἀπολαύσονται τῶν Διὸς ἐρωτῶν. Mercur. Σιώπα, ὦ Ἥλιε, μή τι κακὸν ἀπολαύσῃς τῶν λόγων.

Αὐτοῦ.] At Athens. Αὐτοῦ Hesych. interp. ἐκεῖ, αὐτόθι· ἐπὶ τόπου.—Θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται, have the force of passives here. v. Kuster, Voc.

ται καὶ παιδεύσονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν; πότερον ἐὰν μὲν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται· ἐὰν δὲ εἰς Ἅιδου ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται, εἴ πέρ γέ τι ὄφελος αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τῶν σοὶ φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι; οἴεσθαί γε χρή.

§. 16. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεῦσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἅιδου ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς ταῦτα πάντα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὁσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν σῶν οὐδενί, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένῳ ἄμεινον ἔσται· ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἠδικημένος ἄπει, ἐὰν ἀπίῃς, οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὓς ἥκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ὑπέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν Ἅιδου νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μή ὅτῳ πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς.

§. 17. Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι

Med. c. 3. Matthiæ Gr. 496. 8. Steph. in marg. *An hoc quidem non facies, sed, si hic* (Athenis) *ducentur, te superstite, melius educabuntur et instituentur, te cum illis non versante? tui enim necessarii illorum curam gerent.*

Πότερον ἐὰν.] Ficinus appears to have read πότερον δὲ ἐὰν, approved by Fischer, rejected by Buttmann, as impairing the effect of the asyndeton, caused by omitting the adversative particle, as supr.

§. 16. Πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου.] Cf. c. 9. a med. πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

Οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε.] *For neither in this life, &c.* Ταῦτα πράττοντι, sc. pursuing the course proposed by Crito. Ἄμεινον εἶναι; a common form for ἀγαθὸν εἶναι: See Matthiæ Gr. s. 457. p. 757. Cf. in Phædon. 63. extr.; whence by a kind of attraction οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὁσιώτερον, seq.

Ἀλλὰ νῦν μέν.] Sc; now that he had declined to adopt the counsel of Crito.

Ἀδελφοί.] The Greek writers elegantly applied the terms ἀδελφοὶ and ἀδελφὰ to things which were the same or similar in character and kind.

Τὸ σὸν μέρος.] C. 11. supr. a med.

ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥς περ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν ἀλλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἠχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐάν τι λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὅμως μέντοι εἴ τι οἴει πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγε.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἔα τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπειδὴ ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

§. 17. Κορυβαντιῶντες.] The Corybantes, priests of Cybele, used to disturb, with the clash of cymbals, and especially with flutes, the reason of those who took part in their frantic orgies, and so rendered them insensible to every other impression except the sound of the instruments; whence κορυβαντιᾷν, Tim. Plat. Lex. παρεμμαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικῶς κινεῖσθαι. The term was properly applied to those who were troubled with delirium, noises in the ears, and broken rest, for which the most efficient cure was in rocking the patient like a child, and soothing him with music to sleep: so Plat. de Legg. vii. p. 628. D. V. Lucret. ii. 617. "Tympana tenta tonant palmis, et cymbala circum Concava, raucisonaque minantur cornua cantu, et Phrygio stimulat numero cava tibia menteis, Telaque præportant violenti signa furoris, Ingratos animos, atque impia pectora vulgi Conterrere metu quæ possint numine Divæ."

Ἡ ἠχὴ—βομβεῖ.] Cf. Horat. Ep. i. 1. 7. "Est mihi purgatam qui crebro personet aurem." Mœris. ἠχή, Ἀττικῶς· ἦχος, (for which Thom. Mag. ἠχώ) Ἑλληνικῶς.

Ἀλλὰ ἴσθι—μάτην ἐρεῖς.] Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 5. εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ; ibid. c. 17. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει εὖ ἴστε.

Καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτῃ.] Under the direction of the Deity Socrates expresses his purpose of adhering to the principle of which Crito is finally induced to approve. The grand point in the dialogue, the moral obligation imposed upon every citizen to submit under all circumstances to the laws of the state, is argued by the philosopher with a zeal and distinctness, which show sufficiently how deeply his thoughts were engaged, and his feelings were interested, upon a subject of such moment to his country and himself.—To his country, because a government could not be supposed to be otherwise than indifferently administered, whose laws it would be possible for one with impunity to evade; and to himself, because there could be no more effective refutation of the falsehoods of his adversaries, than his persisting, on the forfeit of his life, to uphold by the sanction of example, the respect and reverence due to those laws, whose restraint he was said to contemn. Through a long and arduous life, their friend and instructor as the advocate of virtue at home, and their no less competent champion and model of valour in the field, Socrates made the civil and military glory of the Athenians the object of his indefatigable exertions. It was not then to be otherwise expected than that the voice of his country should have been obeyed at the last, and that the existence which had long been devoted to the improvement, and often exposed for the safety of Athens, should have been willingly and obediently resigned when its services had ceased to be felt, and when an implicit submission at the present could not fail to furnish a triumphant and irrefragable proof of the upright sincerity that had ever influenced the past.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΩΡΟΣ,
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΕΒΗΣ, ΣΙΜΜΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ,
Ο ΤΩΝ ΕΝΔΕΚΑ ΥΠΗΡΕΤΗΣ.

ARGUMENT.

THIS dialogue, like the former, was held in the prison in which Socrates was confined. The last hours of his life were devoted to the discussion of the momentous subject, the immortality of the soul; Phædo, with whose name the dialogue is inscribed, is introduced as the historian of the scene and the arguments of the respective actors.

The first part of the dialogue is occupied in establishing the incorruptibility of the intellectual principle, and its total independence of organic decay.

The second contains a review of the popular and mythological creeds, respecting the ultimate condition of the soul when removed from the sphere of its earthly existence, and concludes with a circumstantial account of the philosopher's death.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

§. 1. *Αὐτός, ὦ Φαίδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ ἤκουσας;*

ΦΑΙΔ. *Αὐτός, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες.*

ΕΧ. *Τί οὖν δή ἐστιν ἅττα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἡδέως γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσαιμι.*

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.] Entitled also, *Φαίδων, ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς, Ἠθικός*, on the authority of Thrasyllus, Diog. Laert. iii. 58. *Αὐτός ὦ Φαίδων*—Hermogenes, *περὶ μέθ. Δειν.* i. p. 518, remarks upon the singular force of *αὐτός* in the question and reply: *καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι.—Αὐτὸς, ὦ Φαίδων, παρεγένου; Αὐτὸς ὦ Ἐχέκρατες.' Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἤρετο ὡς θαυμάζων καὶ μακαρίζων τὸν παραγενόμενον, ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο σεμνυνόμενος καὶ μέγα φρονῶν.* WYTTENBACH.

Phædo, of Elis, was a disciple of Socrates; he was nobly descended, but having lost his property in early life, he was sold at Athens as a slave. Socrates, in passing the house where he lived, was struck with his intelligent and ingenuous look, and persuaded one of his friends, Alcibiades or Crito, to redeem him. Thenceforward Phædo applied himself diligently to the study of moral philophy, under Socrates, and adhered to his master, with the most affectionate attachment, to the last. He instituted a school at Elis, after the Socratic model, which was continued by Plistanus, an Elean, and afterwards by Menedemus, of Eretria. — Echecrates, of Phlius, a town of Achaia, in the territory of Sicyon, is supposed to have been the same alluded to by Diogenes Laertius, viii. 46. and Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. i. 35. Plat. Epist. ix. p. 726. A., as one of the last of the Pythagorean School.

Τὸ *φάρμακον.*] *The hemlock; κώνειον*, Laert. ii. 35. Senec. Ep. 13. "Cicuta magnum Socratem fecit." Ep. 67. "Calix venenatus, qui Socratem transtulit e carcere in cælum." Cf. Persius, iv. 1.—"barbatum hæc crede magistrum Dicere, sorbitio tollit quem dira cicutæ."

Τί *οὖν δή ἐστιν ἅττα.*] Cf. Theæt. c. 10. *τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ διανοούμεθα.* Gorg. c. 136. *σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα*, and infr. c. 2. *τί ἦν τὰ λεχ-*

καὶ γὰρ, οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήναζε, οὔ τέ τις ξένος ἀφῖκται χρόνου συχνοῦ ἐκεῖθεν, ὅς τις ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἀγγεῖλαι οἷός τ' ἦν περὶ τούτων, πλήν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὼν ἀποθάνοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχε φράζειν.

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τά περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύθεσθε ὃν τρόπον ἐγένετο;

ΕΧ. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἤγγειλέ τις, καὶ ἐθαυμάζομέν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανών. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο, ὦ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.

θέντα καὶ πραχθέντα. Τί as predicate, with ἐστί following, is sometimes accompanied by the subject in the neuter plural. Matthiæ Gr. s. 488. 7.

Ἐπιχωριάζει — Ἀθήναζε.] Phædo is supposed to narrate to Echecrates, at Phlius, the circumstances connected with the death of Socrates, of which little was known beyond the event having actually occurred, owing to the infrequent intercourse between the Phliasians and Athenians. See Mitford's Greece, c. xxv. s. 4. p. 408.

Οὐδείς πάνυ τι.] Ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐδαμῶς. ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐξῆς οὕτως· πάνυ οὐδεὶς ἐπιχωριάζει. Schol. Cod. Bodl.

Ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν—οἷός τ' ἦν.] Οἷος τ' ᾖ. Edd. Cod. Aug. But the imperfect is correctly used here, both in reference to ἀφῖκται, preced. which is to be taken in a past sense, because of χρόνου συχνοῦ subjoined, and also to εἶχε seq. HEIND. Cf. Aristoph. Lysistr. 109. Οὐκ εἶδον οὐδ' ὀλισβον ὀκτωδάκτυλον, ὃς ἦν ἂν ἡμῖν σκυτίνη πικουρία.—Πλήν . . . ὅτι . . . ἀποθάνοι, *except that he was dead, &c.*

Περὶ τῆς δίκης.] Not περὶ τὴν δίκην, as infr. c. 2. περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, but in the genitive, as Fischer justly observes, on account of ἐπύθεσθε, seq. Cf. Xenoph. Cyrop. V. 3. 26. ὡς—ἐπεὶ πύθοιτο τὰ περὶ τοῦ φρουρίου χαλεπῶς ἐνέγκοι. Anab. ii. 5. 37. ὅπως μάθῃ τὰ περὶ Προξένου. Herod. 2. 102. ἀριθμοῦ δὲ πέρι, μὴ πύθῃ, &c. Matthiæ Gr. s. 589. 5.

Πολλῷ ὕστερον.] Thirty days after; Xenoph. Mem. iv. 8. 2.

Τύχη τις—ἔτυχε γάρ.] An agreeable paronomasia, referring the event to its cause. Cf. Achil. Sat. i. p. 55. (speaking of the Phœnix,) ἔτυχε γὰρ τύχῃ τινὶ συμβὰν τότε τὸν ὄρνιν ἀναπτερῶσαι τὸ κάλλος. Upon the force of συνέβη, which implies a combination of circumstances, Plutarch, having quoted the passage as supr. observes: Ἐν γὰρ τούτοις τὸ ΣΥΝΕΒΗ οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ ΓΕΓΟΝΕΝ ἀκουστέον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκ συνδρομῆς τινος αἰτιῶν ἀπέβη, ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο γεγονότος. Simplic. ad Aristot. Phys. ii. p. 79. B. καὶ Πλάτων δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τύχην καλεῖ, λέγων ἐν Φαίδωνι, Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπὸ τύχης τὶ αὐτῷ συνέβη.—WYTT.

Τῇ προτεραίᾳ.] Thom. Mag. and Phavor. Προτέρα, ἐπὶ τάξεως· προ-

ΕΧ. Τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστιν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὥς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δὶς ἑπτὰ ἐκείνους ᾤχετο ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὔξαντο, ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἑκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἣν δὴ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. Ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτιννύναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλόν τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο· τοῦτο δ' ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτούς. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς

τεραῖα δὲ, ἐπὶ μόνης ἡμέρας. Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι· ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης.

Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πλοῖον.] Minos, king of Crete, to avenge the death of his son Androgeos, besieged Athens, and withdrew his forces only on condition that seven virgins, and so many boys [ἠϊθέους ἑπτὰ καὶ παρθένους τοσαύτας. Plutarch. Thes. p. 6. παρθένους ἑπτὰ καὶ παῖδας ἴσους. Pausan. i. 27. extr.] should be sent every ninth year to Crete, to be devoured by the Minotaur; δὶς ἑπτὰ ἐκ. supr. The third time of paying this tribute, Theseus was included in the number to be so sacrificed, but he succeeded in killing the Minotaur, and preserving himself and his companions. Cf. Virgil Æn. vi. 20. In commemoration of this event, and pursuant to their vow, as supr. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι, &c., the Athenians sent every year a solemn deputation, θεωρία, to Delos. The individuals who composed it were called θεωροὶ and δηλιασταὶ, their principal, ἀρχιθέωρος, and the vessel in which they sailed, θεωρὶς or δηλιάς. See Robinson's Grec. Antiq. B. iii. c. 9. and Mitford's Greece, i. c. 1. s. 3. p. 60.

Θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν.] Schol. ad h. l. ἀντι τοῦ θυσίαν ἀπενεγκεῖν. Θεωροὶ δέ εἰσιν οἱ πεμπόμενοι θῦσαι καὶ θεραπεῦσαι τὸν θεόν· ὅθεν καὶ αἱ ὁδοὶ δι' ὧν ἐπορεύοντο, θεωρίδες κίλευθοι ἐκαλοῦντο, καὶ τὰ διδόμενα Θεωρικὰ, καὶ ἡ ναῦς ἡ εἰς Δῆλον πεμπομένη Θεωρὶς, καὶ ὁ ἱερεὺς Θεωρός. There was another Δήλια, a quinquennial festival, held to commemorate the purification of Delos by Pisistratus; for which see Thucyd. iii. 104. See also Potter, Grec. Antiq. i. p. 438.

Ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι.] Plutarch. Thes. p. 10. C. τὸ δὲ πλοῖον ἐν ᾧ μετὰ τῶν ἠϊθέων ἐπλευσε καὶ πάλιν ἐσωθη, τὴν τριακόντορον, ἄχρι τῶν Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως χρόνων διεφύλαττον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. The materials of the vessel were hence called ἀειζώοντα, Callim. Hym. in Bell., but, in reality, it had undergone so many repairs and alterations, that it might have been reasonably doubted whether it was the same ship, in consequence of which it afforded the sophists an opportunity for a zealous discussion on the subject of its identity. See a parallel case quoted by Brown, Philos. Lect. xii.

Ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται.] The priest of Apollo decorated the poop of the vessel with garlands of laurel, as a signal for the commencement of the voyage, and the purification of the city.—Ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, during the celebration of the Δήλια.

Ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτούς.] Ἀπολαμβάνειν is used sometimes of contrary winds which intercept and de-

θεωρίας ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψῃ τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τοῦτο δ' ἔτυχεν, ὥς περ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

§. 2. ΕΧ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρί; ἢ οὐκ εἴων οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες, καὶ πολλοί γε.

ΕΧ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀσχόλια τυγχάνει οὖσα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω τε καὶ πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε ἀεὶ πάντων ἥδιστον.

ΕΧ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους γε τοιούτους ἑτέρους ἕξεις. ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διελθεῖν πάντα.

tain those at sea. Cf. Herodot. ii. 115. ὅσοι ὑπ' ἀνέμων ἤδη ἀπολαμφθέντες ἤλθον, κ. τ. λ. and Wesseling in loc. Demosth. de Chers. p. 98. δέκα μῆνας ἀπογενομένου τἀνθρώπου καὶ νόσῳ καὶ χειμῶνι καὶ πολέμοις ἀπολῃφθέντος, ὥστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἐπανελθεῖν οἴκαδε. So the Latins use *deprendere* and *prendere*.—Αὐτούς, sc. τοὺς πλέοντας implied in πλοῖον preced.

Ὥς περ λέγω.] See Apol. Socr. c. 5. sub. fin. ὁ περ λέγω.

Πολὺς χρόνος.] Xen. Memor. iv. 8. 2. Ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ ἐγίνετο αὐτῷ, μετὰ τὴν κρίσιν τριάκοντα ἡμέρας βιῶναι, διὰ τὸ Δήλια μὲν ἐκείνου τοῦ μηνὸς εἶναι, τὸν δὲ νόμον μηδένα ἐᾶν δημοσίᾳ ἀποθνήσκειν, ἕως ἂν ἡ θεωρία ἐκ Δήλου ἐπανέλθῃ. Suidas v. Σωκράτης· — ἐδίδετο οὖν ἐπὶ πολὺ, μέχρις ἂν ἡ ἀπὸ Δήλου θεωρὶς ἀφίκηται.

§. 2. Τῶν ἐπιτηδείων.] Mœris. Gl. p. 164. Ἐπιτηδείους, οὐκ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Ὑπομνήμασι [i. e. Scholiis Grammatic.] μόνους τοὺς ἐκ γένους προσήκοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἑταίρους, ὡς Πλάτων Φαίδωνι. WYTT.

Οἱ ἄρχοντες.] sc. οἱ ἕνδεκα. Apol. Socr. c. 27. c. 31. Crit. c. 2.

Τινὲς, καὶ πολλοί γε.] *Aderant aliqui, imo vero multi.* STALL. Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 9. Καὶ οὐδενὸς n. Wyttenbach loses the force of καί in explaining the passage *Aderant quidam, et multi adeo.* See Matthiæ Gr. s. 602.

Ὡς σαφέστατα--ἀπαγγεῖλαι.] *Quam diligentissime referre, narrare.* FISCH.

Τοιούτους ἑτέρους ἕξεις.] *Even such have you to listen to you,* i. e. si-

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῄει· εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὥστ' ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖνον παρίστασθαι μηδ' εἰς Ἅιδου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖσε ἀφικόμενον εὖ πράξειν, εἴ πέρ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι

milarly affected with yourself; so Heindorf; *At vero etiam qui te audituri sint, similiter affectos habes;* who compares de Repub. vi. p. 498. G. *ἀνδρα ἀρετῇ πάρισωμένον καὶ ὁμοιωμένον μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελέως, ἔργῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ δυναστεύοντα ἐν πόλει ἑτέρᾳ τοιαύτῃ, οὐ πώποτε ἑωράκασι.* Lach. p. 200. A. *αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἐφάνης ἀνδρίας πέρι οὐδὲν εἰδώς· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἐγὼ ἕτερος τοιοῦτος φανήσομαι,* &c. Phædr. c. 45. *γεννάδας καὶ πρᾶος τὸ ἦθος, ἑτέρου δὲ τοιούτου ἐρῶν.* Cf. infr. c. 29. a med. *τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον.*

Παρόντα με—εἰσῄει] Εἰσιέναι and εἰσέρχεσθαι, like the Latin *subire*, are used to express the affection of the mind by the passions of hope, joy, sorrow, compassion, &c. Eurip. Med. 931. *εἰσῆλθε μ' οἶκτος.* Iphig. Aul. 491. *μ' ἔλεος εἰσῆλθε.* v. Valckenar. ad Phœniss. 1378. p. 464. sq. This construction is varied infr. *οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἐλεεινὸν εἰσῄει*; verbs compounded with prepositions which never govern a dative, sometimes taking the dative, when they express such a direction to an object, as *εἰσέρχεσθαί τινι.* Matthiæ Gr. a. 402. c.

Τῶν λόγων.] Aug. Int. *τοῦ λόγου*, adopted by Ficinus; but the former is the more correct. Cf. infr. *καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοι τινες ἦσαν*, and extr. *τίνες, φῂς, ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι.*

Ὡς ἀδεῶς.] For ὅτι οὕτως ἀδεῶς. Cf. Criton. c. 1. Ὡς ἠδέως. n.—Γενναίως; Xen. Apol. 33. *ἐπεδείξατο δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ῥώμην—οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν θάνατον ἐμπλακίσατο, ἀλλ' ἱλαρῶς, καὶ προσεδέχετο αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐπετελέσατο.*—Παρίστασθαι is frequently used by itself, in reference to the thoughts which arise from present circumstances. Hemsterhuis. ad Lucian. Contempl. c. 13. Taylor. ad Lysiam ed. Reiske, p. 83. It is found, too, with δόξα or τοῦτο, as Lys. in Eratosth. p. 424. *καὶ μηδενὶ τοῦτο παραστῇ, ὡς—Θηραμένους κατηγορῶ*; and without any such addition as in the text, and Thucyd. vi. 68. *καὶ παραστήτω παντὶ, τὸ μὲν καταφρονεῖν,* &c.

Εἰς Ἅιδου.] See infr. c. 29. a med. *εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς.* Socrates, in Cratyl. cc. 44. 45. p. 45. 46., argues against the common acceptation of Ἅιδης, and its attendant prejudices. ΣΩΚ. *Καὶ τό γε ὄνομα ὁ Ἅιδης, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς ἐπωνομάσθαι· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντα τὰ καλὰ εἰδέναι, ἀπὸ τούτου ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου Ἅιδης ἐκλήθη—οὕτω καλούς τινας, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπίσταται λόγους λέγειν ὁ Ἅιδης, καὶ ἔστιν ὥς γε ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τούτου ὁ θεὸς οὗτος τέλεος σοφιστής τε καὶ μίγας εὐεργέτης τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ, ὅς γε καὶ τοῖς ἐνθάδε τοσαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἀνίησιν· οὕτω πολλὰ αὐτῷ τὰ περιόντα ἐκεῖ ἐστί, καὶ τὸν Πλούτωνα ἀπὸ τούτου ἔσχε τὸ ὄνομα*: whence he infers that the manes of the just should be unwilling to return again to earth. Opposed to this ᾅδης φωτεινὸς, or habitation of the good, after death, was the ᾅδης σκοτεινὸς or ζωφερὸς, the abode of the impious. Orpheus is said to have introduced this figment first, from Egypt into Greece. See infr. c. 13. sub. fin. *εἰσὶ γὰρ δή φ. οἱ π. τ. τ.*

Ἄνευ θείας μοίρας.] *Sine consilio et voluntate deorum qui ei consulerent.* Stall., because of ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖσε ἀφ. εὖ πράξειν seq. Cf. Plutarch. ii. p. 499. B. *ἀποθνήσκοντα δὲ αὐτὸν*

ἐλεεινὸν εἰσῄει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει· οὔτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων, ὥς περ εἰώθειμεν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν· ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἄτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καί τις ἀήθης κρᾶσις ἀπό τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμουμένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκεῖνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾷν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδόν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, ὁτὲ μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύοντες, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἀπολλόδωρος· οἶσθα γάρ που τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

ΕΧ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐκεῖνός τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχε, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

ΕΧ. Ἔτυχον δέ, ὦ Φαίδων τίνες, παραγενόμενοι;

[Σωκράτην] ἐμακαρίζον οἱ ζῶντες, ὡς οὐδ' ἐν ᾅδου θείας ἄνευ μοίρας ἰσόμενον.

Παρόντι πένθει.] *To one present at a sorrowful scene:* παρόντι depending on εἰκὸς and governing πένθει, in the dat. Heindorf. understands μοι to παρόντι, but this would require τῷ πένθει. The application of the passage is general; the composure of Socrates was such, that Phædo felt none of that commiseration which it was natural for any one to indulge who was witness to any similar affliction.

Ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων.] i. e. *As when we were engaged in our philosophical studies.*—ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εἶναι, *in philosophia versari, eadem occupari, quærere de locis philosophicis.* KORNER. Cf. Sophocl. Œd. Tyr. 570. τότ' οὖν ὁ μάντις ἦν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ; Xenoph. Cyrop. iv. 3. 23. οἱ μὲν δὴ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις ἦσαν. Maxim. Tyr. p. 396. i. ed. Lips. τοὺς δὲ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ πανυ ἀν τις μίμψαιτο.—STALL.

Τοιοῦτοι τινες.] i. e. Partaking of the character of their previous and customary discussions.

Ἄτοπον.] See in Crit. c. 2. extr.

Κρᾶσις ἀπό τε τῆς ἡδ.] See infr. c. 3. Ὡς ἄτοπον. Cf. Liban. Epist. lxiii. κρᾶσις ἔχει μί τις ἡδονῆς καὶ τοὐναντίου.

Ὁτὲ μὲν γελ. ἐνίοτε δὲ δακ.] These participles are added in explanation of οὕτω preced. otherwise the construction should be οὕτω διακείμεθα· οτὲ μὲν ἐγελῶμεν, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἐδακρύομεν. [as Lys. p. 779. ὑμεῖς δὲ οὕτω διετίθητε· τοὺς μὲν φεύγοντας κατεδέξασθε, &c.] Compare with the text as supr. Sophocl. Œd. Tyr. 10. τίνι τρόπῳ καθίστατε; Δείσαντες, ἢ στίρξαντες; Xenoph. Anab. iv. 1. 4. τὴν δὲ—ἐμβολὴν ὧδε ποιοῦνται, ἅμα μὲν λαθεῖν πειρώμενοι ἅμα δὲ φθάσαι, &c. HEIND.

Ἀπολλόδωρος.] A zealous and attached friend of Socrates; ἐπιθυμητὴς ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοῦ, Xen. Apolog. c. 28. He was morose in temper, and gloomy in disposition, whence in Sympos. c. 2. ΕΤΑΙ. Ἀεὶ ὅμοιος εἶ, ὦ Ἀπολλόδωρε· ἀεὶ γὰρ σαυτόν τε κακηγορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ δοκεῖς μοι ἀτεχνῶς πάντας ἀθλίους ἡγεῖσθαι πλὴν Σωκράτους, ἀπὸ σαυτοῦ ἀρξάμενος. καὶ ὁπόθεν ποτὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔλαβες τὸ μανικὸς [*nimius in laudando.* AST.] καλεῖσθαι, οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος εἶ· σαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγριαίνεις πλὴν Σωκράτους—and possessed of but little strength of mind: see infr. c. 66. a med. Ælian, V. H. i. 16. mentions, as an instance of his

ΦΑΙΔ. *Οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἔτι Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης. ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων· Πλάτων δέ, οἶμαι, ἠσθένει.*

simplicity, his having brought with him into the prison a tunic and splendid cloak, in which Socrates was to be dressed before his death.

Καὶ Κριτόβουλος.] Crito, who gave name to the preceding dialogue, had four sons, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Epigenes, and Ctesippus. Laert. ii. 121. But the Hermogenes mentioned supr. appears to have been the son of Hipponicus, and brother of Callias. Cratyl. c. 2. ΣΩ. Ὦ παῖ Ἱππονίκου, Ἑρμόγενες, &c. and Epigenes to have been the same as in Apolog. Socr. c. 22. a med. the son of Antiphon. Of Æschines, Diog. Laertius writes, iii. 37. Αὐτοῦ δὲ (Αἰσχίνου) Πλάτων οὐδαμόθι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ συγγραμμάτων μνήμην πεποίηται, ὅτι μὴ ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ Ἀπολογίᾳ. c. 22. He had lived in great poverty for many years at Athens, as an attached disciple and friend of Socrates, when he resolved to visit the court of Dionysius, who was, or affected to be, a patron of philosophers. He was introduced by Aristippus, and liberally rewarded for his Socratic dialogues.—He remained in Sicily until the expulsion of the tyrant, and then returned to Athens, where he gave instructions in philosophy, for payment, in private, as he could not publicly compete with Plato or Aristippus. He then, to enlarge his means, took up oratory, and appeared as the rival of Demosthenes. Antisthenes was born at Athens, about the ninetieth Olympiad, and served, in his youth, with considerable distinction, particularly at the battle of Tanagra. He first directed his attention to rhetoric, in which he was instructed by the sophist Gorgias; but abandoned a pursuit so unsatisfactory, for the more important study of moral and intellectual philosophy. He became a disciple of Socrates, and, in imitation of his master, sacrificed everything to the attainment of virtue. After the death of Socrates, while Plato and the rest of his disciples were forming schools, Antisthenes selected for his a place of public exercise without the city, near the Lyceum, called Κυνόσαργες, the temple of the white or swift dog; which, when Diomus was sacrificing to Hercules, seized upon part of the victim, whence the name of the place. Some writers derive from hence the name of the sect Κυνικοὶ, which Antisthenes founded here, others, and the more numerous, ascribe their title to the surname of their master, Κύων, which he obtained in consequence of the harshness and severity of his censures upon the manners of the age.—Ctesippus; Euthydem. c. 5. νεανίσκος τις Παιανιεύς, μάλα καλός τε κἀγαθὸς τὴν φύσιν ὅσον μέν, ὑβριστὴς δὲ διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι. Cf. Lysid. p. 206. 207. seq.—Menexenus, son of Demophon, was born of a noble family, and applied himself, early in life, to the study of philosophy. He was a follower of Ctesippus, whence they are mentioned together here, as in Lysid. locc. citt. One of the dialogues of Plato, on the subject of the Athenians who died for their country in battle, is inscribed with his name, Μενέξενος, ἢ Ἐπιτάφιος, ἠθικός.

Πλάτων — ἠσθένει.] Forster conjectures that Plato would have it inferred from hence, that his illness was occasioned by his grief for the impending death of his valued master. Athenæus, having recounted the several arguments in proof of the misunderstanding which was said to have existed between Plato and Xenophon, brings forward, in further confirmation, the passage in the text, where the name of the latter is omitted in the enumeration of those who had assembled to pay the last tribute of affection and respect to their venerable instructor and friend;

ΕΧ. *Ξένοι δέ τινες παρῆσαν;*

ΦΑΙΔ. *Ναί, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνδης, καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.*

ΕΧ. *Τί δαί; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος παρεγένοντο;*

l. xi. c. 15. p. 505. *Κἀν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ Πλάτων καταλεγόμενος ἕκαστον τῶν παρατυχόντων οὐδὲ κατὰ μικρὸν τοῦ Ξενοφῶντος μέμνηται.* Neither indeed could Plato have made any mention of Xenophon, who had departed into Asia a year before the death of Socrates; *ἐνὶ προτέρῳ ἔτει τῆς Σωκράτους τελευτῆς.* Laert. ii. 55.—Whence it is not likely that it ever occurred to Plato to explain the cause of his absence, and with regard to any jealousy which was reported to have existed between them, Xenophon was too far beneath his cotemporary to have ever been considered in the light of a rival. HEIND. So V. Cousin: "Je ne crois pas inutile de répéter que ce n'est aucunement par envie que Platon ne parle pas ici de Xénophon, ou qu'il ne remarque pas qu'il était absens pour une cause sérieuse. Il ne dit pas que Xénophon etait alors à la guerre, parceque c'etait une chose assez connue de son temps, et qu'il ne pouvait soupçonner qu'on lui ferait, cinq siècles plus tard (Athénée, liv. xi. 15), l'accusation de jalousie contre Xénophon. Heindorf est le premier qui se soit élevé contre la pretendue inimitié de ces deux grands hommes. Ils differaient sans doute; mais supposer qu'ils aient écrit pour se décrier, ou pour se distinguer l'un de l'autre, comme on l'a dit souvent, c'est une puérilité dont il n'existe aucune preuve."

Σιμμίας τέ—καὶ Κέβης.] Disciples of Philolaus, infr. c. 5. a med. a native of Crotona, who lived subsequently in Heraclea. He was a disciple of Archytas, a Pythagorean philosopher of Tarentum, and cotemporary with Plato, to whom he sold the written records of the Pythagorean system, contrary to the express oath of the society, that they would keep secret the mysteries of their sect. It is probable that among these books were the writings of Timæus, the Locrian, one of the Italic school, upon which Plato formed the dialogue which bears his name. Philolaus having interfered in civil affairs, fell a sacrifice subsequently to political jealousy. Enfield, Philosophy, B. ii. c. 12. s. 2. Phædondes, also a Theban v. Rhunk. ad Xenoph. Mem. i. 2. 48.—Euclides of Megara, founder of the Megaric sect, called the Eristic, from its contentious character, devoted himself to the study of philosophy in early life, and removed from Megara to Athens, for the purpose of joining the disciples of Socrates. He displeased Socrates by engaging in forensic disputes, to which he was led by an immoderate passion for controversy, and returned to Megara, where he became the head of a school, in which his chief occupation was to teach the art of disputation. He is not to be confounded with the mathematician, who flourished at a later period under Ptolemy Lagus, and died in the 123rd Olympiad. Enf. Phil. ii. c. 6. Of Terpsion nothing is known, further than that he is one of the speakers in Plato's dialogue, entitled Theætetus. Aristippus was the well-known founder of the Cyrenaic sect, which was so called from his native city, Cyrene, in Africa. It is not clear whether Cleombrotus, mentioned supr., was the native of Ambracia, of the same name, who furnished the subject for the celebrated epigram of Callimachus, to the effect that Cleombrotus of Ambracia, having paid his last respects to the sun, threw himself headlong from the top of a tower, not that he had done anything worthy of death, but had only read Plato's treatise on the immortality of the soul, and courted, by self-destruction, the death which he felt convinced to be the passage to a happier life. Callim. Epigr. xxiv. Tuscul. i. 34. Some suppose that he was not the one alluded

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

ΕΧ. Ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Σχηδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δή; τίνες, φῆς, ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

§. 3. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγώ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διηγήσασθαι. ἀεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθειμεν φοιτᾷν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἕωθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. Περιεμένομεν οὖν ἑκάστοτε ἕως ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμωτήριον, διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἀνεῴγνυτο γὰρ οὐ πρῴ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθείη, εἰσῄμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωϊαίτερον ξυνελέγημεν. τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἑσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφιγμένον εἴη· παρηγγειλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἥκειν ὡς πρωϊαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰωθός. καὶ ἥκο-

to in the text, but there is nothing clearly known of any other friend of Socrates of this name.

Ἐν Αἰγίνῃ.] It is conjectured, with great probability, that Plato intends covertly to rebuke Aristippus and Cleombrotus for their neglect of Socrates, in remaining to indulge their luxurious and effeminate pleasures at Ægina, from which they might have sailed with ease to Athens, a distance of but two or three and twenty miles: Diog. Laert. iii. 36. εἶχε δὲ φιλέχθρως ὁ Πλάτων καὶ πρὸς Ἀρίστιππον· ἐν γοῦν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς διαβάλλων αὐτὸν φησίν, ὅτι οὐ παρεγένετο Σωκράτει τελευτῶντι, αλλ' ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ἦν καὶ σύνεγγυς. Athenæus, xii. p. 544. D. διέτριβεν δ' ὁ Ἀριστιππος τὰ πολλὰ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ τρυφῶν. Aristippus annoyed Socrates by his passion for dress and extravagant habits, and offended his friends by the freedom of his manners, so much so, that he withdrew from Athens to the island of Ægina, and there met with the celebrated Lais, whom he brought on with him to Corinth. Cf. Horat. Sat. ii. 3. 99. Ep. i. 17. 23.

§. 3. Ἕωθεν.] Suid. and Phavor. i. q. Πρωΐθεν, h. e. *diluculo, prima aurora, sub aurora, ante lucem.* FISCH.

Ἕως ἀνοιχθείη.] If an action has been frequently repeated in times past, ἕως has the opt. without ἄν. Matthiæ Gr. s. 522. 1.

Διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων.] i. e. διαλεγόμενοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, as c. 65. infr. init.—Ἀνεῴγνυτο; the Attic form of the common impf. ἠνοίγετο.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 168. Obs. 1.

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθείη.] The optative is put with the particles ἐπεί, ἐπειδή, ὅτε, ὁπότε, when the discourse is concerning a past action, which, however, was not limited to a precise point of time, but was repeated by several persons, or in several places; so supr. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἑκάστοτε, ἕως ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμ .... ἐπειδη. δὲ ἀνοιχ. εἰσῄμεν παρὰ τὸν Σ. Matthiæ Gr. s. 521.

Διημερεύομεν.] Attic. Anon. ap. Villoison. Anec. Græc. p. 80. t. ii. διημερεύει, ἀντὶ τοῦ πᾶσαν τὴν ἡμέραν

μεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅς περ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, εἶπε περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι ἕως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ· Λύουσι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ ἕνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτήσῃ. οὐ πολὺν δ' οὖν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν ἦκε καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἡμᾶς εἰσιέναι. Εἰσελθόντες οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππην, γιγνώσκεις γάρ, ἔχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ξανθίππη, ἀνευφήμησέ τε καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα εἶπεν, οἷα δὴ

περί τι αναλίσκει. Hesych. Διημερεύοντες· πᾶσαν ποιοῦντες τὴν ἡμέραν.

Ὑπακούειν.] *Respondere et aperire.* WYTT. Cf. Crit c. 1.

Περιμένειν.] So the best editions read, instead of ἐπιμένειν, which signifies, *to be patient, to wait the consequence of anything;* but περιμένειν, generally, *to await, in one place, the arrival of some one,* or *to look for the appearance of something.* Whence the more frequent use of the latter in an absolute sense, whereas the former is more commonly joined with ἕως ἄν, and has certain derivatives which περιμένειν could not form. Wolf ad. h. l. Beck. Lectt. Phil. p. 89. supr. περιεμένομεν οὖν. Infr. c. 65. ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. Sympos. init. οὐ περιμενεῖς; κἀγὼ ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα.—STALL.

Λύουσι.] See Crit. c. 1.

Ὅπως ἂν—τελευτήσῃ.] Ὅπως ἂν is used with the conjunctive of the present, when referring to a continued action. Protag. c. 43. σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμελοῦνται καὶ ὅπως ἂν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακουργῶσι: and with the conjunctive of the aorist in reference to an action which is concluded at once, Plat. Gorg. 167. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ, ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτὸ αὐτῶν. HEIND. v. Matthiæ Gr. a. 518.

Οὐ πολὺν—χρόνον ἐπισχών.] i. e. *after no long delay.* For ἐκέλευσεν, many editions read ἐκέλευεν, in consequence of ἦκε imp. preced. but this connexion of the aorist with the imperfect is not unfrequent; Parmenid. p. 127. A. ἀνεγνώρισί τέ με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καὶ ἠσπάζετο, καὶ—τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὤκνει, — ἔπειτα μέντοι διηγεῖτο. Phædr. p. 228. B. ἰδὼν μὲν ἰόντα ἤσθη, ὅτι ἓξοι τὸν συγκορυβαντιῶντα, καὶ προάγειν ἐκέλευε. Different tenses may be connected, as supr. when two or more actions are to be considered as distinct in their character and intent. STALL.

Εἰσελθόντες.] Vulg. εἰσιόντες.—HEIND.

Τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππην.] It is highly probable that the failings of Xanthippe have been greatly exaggerated. Socrates, in a dialogue with his son, Lamprocles, Xen. Mem. l. ii., gives her credit for many domestic virtues; nor are these so completely inconsistent with the evidences which she, no doubt, occasionally afforded of an intractable temper. The child, παιδίον, alluded to in the text, must have been either Sophroniscus or Menexenus: infr. c. 65. σμικροί. Apol. Socr. 23. παιδία., for Lamprocles, the eldest son of Socrates, was now grown up; infr. c. 65. μέγας. Apol. Socr. 23. μειράκιον.—Xen. Memor. ii. 2. 1. νεανίσκος. Plato, Xenophon, and Seneca appear to have known of one only of the wives of Socrates, Xanthippe, and nothing of the other, Myrto.—αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες, infr. c. 65. referring to his female relations and kinswomen. FISCH.

Ἀνευφήμησε.] *Wept aloud.* Suidas: Ἀνευφήμησεν· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐθρήνησε· Πλάτων.—Hesychius explains it by ἀνώμωξε; κατ' ἀντίφρασιν, as

εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι Ὦ Σώκρατες, ὕστατον δὴ σὲ προσεροῦσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ σὺ τούτους. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, Ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, ἀπαγαγέτω τις ταύτην οἴκαδε. Καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπῆγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν τε καὶ κοπτομένην· ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψέ τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἔτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα Ὡς ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ· ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τῷ ἅμα μὲν αὐτὼ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δέ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἀεὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ὥς περ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένω δύ ὄντε. Καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι, ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἠδύνατο, ξυνῆψεν εἰς ταὐτὸν αὐτῶν τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ᾧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται, ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτε-

ἀνευφημεῖν and εὐφημεῖν are properly applied to words of auspicious and favorable import; approved by Stallbaum.

Τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος.] *Some of Crito's attendants.* The noble and wealthy at Athens never went abroad without a considerable retinue. Cf. Menon. c. 15. ἀλλά μοι προσκάλεσον τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολούθων τουτωνὶ τῶν σαυτοῦ ἕνα, ὁντινα βούλει.

Ἀνακαθιζόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν κλίνην.] *Sitting up in the bed.* Socrates having been unfettered early, did not rise until now, when he sat up in the bed; presently, c. 5. infr. καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, κ. τ. λ. Some editions read εἰς τὴν κλίνην, but ἵζεσθαι and καθίζειν εἴς τι, signify properly, *to go and sit down somewhere*, whence the text as supr. is the more correct. HEIND.

Ὡς ἄτοπον—τοῦτο—ἡδύ.] *How strange, my friends, said he, this thing appears to be which men call pleasure, and how wonderfully it is disposed towards that which seems to be its opposite, pain; in that they are not willing both to befal a man at once, but should any pursue and attain the one, he is almost invariably compelled to admit the other, as if, being two, they were connected by one head.* Xenophon, in his retreat of the ten thousand, mentions that the tumult of joy in which the Greeks indulged at the sight of the Euxine, was succeeded, almost immediately, by a passion of tears;—ὡς ἀναμεμικται τὰ πάθη! was the apposite remark to which the circumstance gave rise. Upon τῷ—μὴ ἐθέλειν supr., see Matthiæ Gr. s. 241. Compare with the passage in the text, Antiphon. apud Stob. Serm. vi. p. 78. ἔνθα τὸ ἡδύ ἐστι, πλησίον που καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν· αἱ γὰρ ἡδοναὶ οὐκ ἐκ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐκπορεύονται, ἀλλ' ἀκολουθοῦσιν αὐταις λύπαι καὶ πόνοι.

Πολεμοῦντα.] *Al variance.*

ρον. ὥς περ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει πρότερον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἥκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.

§. 4. Ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας, ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον, καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤροντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὐηνὸς πρώην, ὅ τί ποτε διανοηθείς, ἐπειδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας. Εἰ

§. 4. Ὑπολαβὼν.] Cf. Virg. Æn. vi. 723. "*Suscipit* Anchises atque ordine singula pandit." Gottl.

Εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με.] If the participle denotes an action coinciding in time with that of the finite verb, and completed along with it, the partic. is in the same tense, especially with λανθάνειν and φθάνειν. Matthiæ Gr. s. 559. c.

Ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους.] Ἐντείνας, sc. εἰς ἔπος, s. εἰς μέτρον. Heind. *In carminis modum ligans, in versus rediges, Æsopi fabulas.* Wytt. Augustin. de Consens. Evang. i. 12. Opp. t. iii. pt. ii. p. 5. D. "Socrates autem, quem rursus in activa (virtute) qua mores informantur omnes prætulerunt, ita ut testimonio quoque dei sui Apollinis omnium sapientissimam pronuntiatum esse non tacerent, Æsopi fabulas paucalis versibus persecutus est, verba et numeros suos adhibens rebus alterius. Usque adeo nihil scribere voluit; ut hoc se coactum imperio sui dæmonis fecisse dixerit; sicut nobilissimus discipulorum ejus Plato commemorat: in quo tamen opere maluit alienas quam suas exornare sententias." Bentley, in his dissertation on the fables of Æsop, appears to deny that they were extant in the time of Socrates, which, however, is affirmed, with greater probability, by Tyrwhitt, Dissert. de Babr. From which it is not to be concluded that Socrates had a copy in the prison, but merely that he retained some of the fables in his recollection. Diogenes Laertius, ii. 41. mentions the beginning of a fable by Socrates himself: ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ μῦθον Αἰσώπειον οὐ πάνυ ἐπιτετευγμένως, οὗ ἡ ἀρχή. Αἴσωπος ποτ' ἔλεξε Κορίνθιον ἄστυ νέμουσι, Μὴ κρίνειν ἀρετὴν λαοδίκῳ σοφίᾳ.—Wytt.

Τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον.] *A Pæan*, according to Diog. Laert. ii. 41. καὶ δεθεὶς—καὶ παιᾶνα κατά τινας ἐποίησεν, οὗ ἡ ἀρχή, Δήλι' Ἄπολλον χαῖρε καὶ Ἄρτεμι, παῖδε κλεεινώ.—Dio. Chrys. Or. xli. p. 507. C. Σωκράτης—καὶ παιᾶνα ἐποίησεν εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ τὴν Ἄρτεμιν. Epictet. Dissert. iv. 4. p. 590. καὶ πῶς ἂν ἔτι ἦν Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ὠδύρετο; πῶς ἂν ἐτι τῇ φυλακῇ παιᾶνας ἐγραφεν.—Προοίμιον seems to be peculiar to hymns in honor of Apollo, whence Thucydides iii. 104. δηλοῖ δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἦν, ἐν τοῖς ἕπεσι τοῖσδε, ἃ ἐστιν ἐκ προοιμίου Ἀπόλλωνος. Diog. Laert. viii. 57. mentions a προοίμιον εἰς Ἀπόλλωνα by Empedocles. Pausan. x. 8. p. 817. Ἀλκαῖος ἐν προοιμίῳ τῷ ἐς Ἀπόλλωνα. Plutarch, de Musica, p. 1132. D. 1133. *l.* commends the προοιμία, or preludes, of Terpander, where the term is used by itself, without reference to a deity. Wytt.

Ἀτὰρ καὶ.] Frequently answers to καὶ in a collateral proposition in the sense of καὶ-δέ. Matthiæ Gr. s. 621. Εὐηνὸς; See Apol. Socr. c. 4. ἀνὴρ Πάριος.—Ὅ τι ποτὲ διανοηθείς; see Apol. S. 26. ὅ τι μαθὼν.—Ἐποίησας αὐτά; ποιεῖν, *to compose*, is used simply in reference to poets. Apol. Socr. c. 7. Euthyphron. c. 13. λέγω τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ὁ ποιητὴς ἐποίησεν, ὁ ποιήσας, κ. τ. λ.

οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐηνῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅταν με αὖθις ἔρηται, εὖ οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐρήσεται, εἰπὲ τί χρή με λέγειν. Λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τἀληθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα· ᾔδειν γὰρ ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἴη· ἀλλ' ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγοι, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικήν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἄττα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, ὅ περ ἔπραττον, τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥς περ

Ἀντίτεχνος.] *A rival* or *competitor.* V. Cousin. *Son rival.* The term is emphatic in the text, as *ἀντίτεχνοι* is properly applied to poets who contend upon the stage, with their productions, for a prize. Casaub. ad Athen. vi. 7. p. 413. Ficinus gives two interpretations for the word, the former of which, besides being unnecessary, is incorrect.—Fisch.

Καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος.] *Acquitting my conscience;* Socrates having feared to provoke the anger of the deity by neglecting his will as conveyed through the medium of dreams.

Εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις.] *If so perchance.* Cf. Lach. p. 179. B. *εἰ δ' ἄρα πολλάκις μὴ προσεσχήκατε τὸν νοῦν τῷ τοιουτῳ.* p. 194. B. *εἰ δ' ἀρα πολλάκις αὐτὴ ἡ καρτέρησις ἐστιν ἀνδρία.*

Ἄττα τοιάδε.] Τις is often put with adjectives of quality, quantity, magnitude, especially when these stand alone, without a substantive, or in the predicate. Ἄττα and ἄσσα, particularly, are thus used, which are rarely found by themselves without an adjective.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 487. 4.

Ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει.] i. e. *At various times in a varied form, but its burden was the same, &c.*

Μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου.] *Musicam fac et tracta.* Wytt. *Cultive les Beaux-Arts;* V. Cousin, who subjoins the following just and explanatory note; "Si l' on traduit comme tout le monde, *fais de la musique,* il faut avouer qu'il est bien étrange que Socrate entende par là la philosophié, et, quand il se ravise, et veut prendre le mot dans le sens ordinaire, qu'il ne songe pas encore à la musique, mais à la poésie; au lieu que dans l' interprétation que nous avons préférée, il est natural que, lorsque le songe dit a Socrate : cultive ton esprit, exerce-toi dans les Beaux-Arts, livre-toi à des nobles occupations, Socrate songe d' abord à la philosophie, qu'il regard comme l'occupation la plus noble, et plus spécialement encore à la poésie. Voyez dans *le Criton,* dans *la République,* dans *les Rivaux,* et partout, le contraste de Μουσικὴ et de Γυμναστική, et consultez la note de Locella sur Xenophon d'Ephèse, p. 124. En général Μουσικὴ veut dire occupations distinguées, arts libéraux; dans le détail il se prend pour la philosophie ou pour la poésie à-peu-près également, ou pour la musique proprement dite, mais plus rarement." V. Alcibiad. Prim. cc. 10. 11.

Παρακελεύεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν.] i. e. *Adhortari et insuper hortari, prouti qui currentes ut currant [hortari pergunt.* Wytt. Παρακελεύεσθαι, *hor-*

οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελευόμενοι· καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὅ περ ἔπραττον, τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἥ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτὴ διεκώλυέ με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν· ἀσφα-

tari aliquem, ut aliquid faciat; ἐπικελεύειν, incitare facientem. FISCH. There is a peculiar force in the repetition of the same verb, differently compounded. Cf. Cic. Fin. v. 2. "Te autem hortamur omnes currentem quidem."

Τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν.] i. q. τοῦτο λέγειν ἐπικελεύον μουσικὴν ποιεῖν. HEIND. A conciseness of expression familiar to Plato.

Ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγ. μουσ.] i. e. *Since, indeed, philosophy is the highest exercise of the art.* Learning or discipline, in general, *παιδεία*, is frequently designated by the term *μουσική*, of which the origin and use, in its present sense, are developed, with great beauty and clearness, in the following passage in Lachet. p. 118. C. ὅταν—ἀκούω ἀνδρὸς περὶ ἀρετῆς διαλεγομένου ἢ περί τινος σοφίας, ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀξίου τῶν λόγων ὧν λέγει, χαίρω ὑπερφυῶς, θεώμενος ἅμα τόν τε λέγοντα καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὅτι πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἁρμόττοντα ἐστι· καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι ἁρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμοσμένος· οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ζῷν ἡρμοσμένος [οὗ] αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸν βίον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ἀτιχνῶς Δωριστὶ ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἰαστί, οἶομαι δὲ οὐδὲ Φρυγιστὶ οὐδὲ Λυδιστί, ἀλλ' ἥπερ μόνη Ἑλληνική ἐστιν ἁρμονία. Cf. Maxim. Tyr. Diss. xxxi. c. 2. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τῶν μελῶν ἁρμονίαις τὸ παραλειφθὲν, κἂν σμικρὸν ᾖ, διαλύει τὸν κόσμον τοῦ μέλους· οὕτω κἂν τῷ τοῦ βίου ἁρμονίᾳ, εἴ περ μὴ ἐκμελὴς ἡμῖν ἔσται, μηδὲ εἰκῇ διαπεραινόμενος, ὁμολογίαν εἶναι δεῖ ἔργου καὶ λόγου.—Gorg. c. 83. καὶ τοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀναρμοστεῖν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην, καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία λέγειν, μᾶλλον ἢ ἕνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν. The writings of Plato abound with similar allusions; virtue in general he compares *ἁρμονίᾳ τινὶ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ* de Rep. iv. p. 430. F. And wisdom he calls *τὴν καλλίστην καὶ μεγίστην τῶν συμφωνιῶν*. Legg. iii. p. 689, D. whence Sextus Empir. adv. Mus. p. 353. οἵ τε μέγα δυνηθέντες ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καθάπερ καὶ Πλάτων, τὸν σοφὸν ὅμοιόν φασιν εἶναι τῷ μουσικῷ, τὴν ψυχὴν ἡρμοσμένην ἔχοντα. For this, amongst other things, Plato was evidently indebted to the Italic school. The harmony which Pythagoras asserted to be the necessary result of the systematic movements of the celestial bodies, is in like manner affirmed, by Plato, to proceed from the attuning of the soul to wisdom and virtue, the due regulation and control of the feelings and affections, which are to be kept in unison with the voice of conscience; that no jarring passion may interfere to destroy that perfect concord in the character of the good, which depends upon the due adjustment and direction of their desires and hopes.

Ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτή.] Supr. c. 1. *νόμος ἐστὶν—μηδένα ἀποκτιννύναι.*

Δημώδη μουσικήν.] i. e. *Popular poetry*, as opp. to the *μουσική* of the philosophers, which had been always the study of Socrates, and towards which he now required no new impulse from the deity. V. Cousin explains the passage correctly; *Mais depuis ma condamnation et pendant l'intervalle que me laissait la fête de Dieu, je pensai que si par hasard s'etait*

λέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα, πειθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα, οὗ ἦν ἡ παροῦσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴ περ μέλλει ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦν μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δή, οὓς προχείρους εἶχον καὶ ἠπιστάμην μύθους τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτων ἐποίησα οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον.

§. 5. Ταῦτα οὖν ὦ Κέβης, Εὐηνῷ φράζε, καὶ ἐρρῶσθαι καὶ ἂν σωφρονῇ ἐμὲ διώκειν. ἄπειμι δέ, ὡς

aux beaux-arts dans le sens ordinaire que les songes m'ordonnaient de m'appliquer, il ne fallait pas leur désobéir et qu'il était plus sûr pour moi de ne quitter la vie qu'après avoir satisfait aux dieux, en composant des vers suivant l'avertissement du songe.

Ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους.] The fables of Æsop, which were called λόγοι supr. are here, and infr., entitled μύθοι. They are both used indifferently, like other synonyms, by the best writers, and their authors designated either as λογοποιοὶ or μυθοποιοί. But when they are intended to be opposed, as in the text, μύθος is to be understood as the fabulous department of composition in general, λόγος. Theon. et Aphthon. in Progymnasm. μῦθός ἐστι λόγος ψευδὴς, εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν, or fiction in writing, as opposed to fact. The moral of the fable, contained in the ἐπιμύθιον, is also frequently called λόγος. Wyttenbach explains the whole passage: "*cogitans, poetam debere, si poeta futurus esset,* [et huic muneri ac nomini satisfacere vellet] *fabulas componere ac non orationes* [id est non vera argumenta] *et me fabularum peritum et artificem non esse; propterea fabularum Æsopi, quæ mihi in promptu* [et memoria] *erant, quosque sciebam, harum eas, in quos primum inciderem, versibus conscripsi.* V. Cousin: *ensuite faisant réflexion qu'un poëte, pour être vraiment poëte, ne doit pas composer des discours en vers, mais inventer des fictions, &c.*—Αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦν, the indic. instead of the opt. which might seem to be required here, because Socrates passes from the *obliqua* to the *oratio recta*, by which the spirit and force of the passage are increased.

Μυθολογικός.] Plutarch, de Aud. Poet. αὐτὸς μὲν (Socrates) ἅτε δὴ γεγονὼς ἀληθείας ἀγωνιστὴς τὸν ἅπαντα βίον, οὐ πιθανὸς ἦν οὐδ' εὐφυὴς ψευδῶν ξημιουργός.

Τούτων ἐποίησα.] h. e. *versibus ligavi, in carminis modos redegi.* Cf. Herodot. ii. c. 53. οὗτοι [Homer and Hesiod] εἰσί οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἕλλησι. i. e. *hi vero sunt, qui deorum generationes Græcis carmine prodiderunt.* V. Wesseling in loc. cit. Pausan. iii. 25. p. 275. ἐποίησαν δὲ Ἑλλήνων τινὲς, ὡς Ἡρακλῆς ἀναγάγοι ταύτῃ τοῦ Ἅιδου τὸν κύνα——. *Græcorum nonnulli versibus prodiderunt, &c.*—WYTT.

§. 5. Εὐηνῷ φράζε.] Epist. Socr. xiv. p. 35. Εὐηνὸν τὸν ποιητὴν παρεκάλει δι' ἡμῶν, εἰ εὖ γινώσκοι, ἵέναι θᾶττον παρ' αὐτὸν, ἐπειδὴ φιλόσοφός ἐστι διὰ τὴν ποίησιν.

Ἐμὲ διώκειν.] Some editions read διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα; rejected by Heindorf, as Socrates is not speaking of a voluntary death, but the θανάτου μελέτη, which he subsequently explains as peculiar to philosophers. Stallbaum admits ὡς τάχιστα, on the grounds that Socrates might recommend Evenus to follow him as soon as possible, without inciting him to self-destruction, which it is evident he did not intend, but merely to advise him against a too strong attachment to the world. This reading would

ἔοικε, τήμερον· κελεύουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Οἷον παρακελεύει, ἔφη, τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, Εὐηνῷ; πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί· σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ᾔσθημαι, οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν σοι ἑκὼν εἶναι πείσεται. Τί δαι, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὐηνός; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἐθελήσει τοίνυν, ἔφη, καὶ Εὐηνὸς καὶ πᾶς ὅτῳ ἀξίως τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι γ' ἴσως βιάσεται αὑτόν· οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι. Καὶ ἅμα λέγων ταῦτα καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεζόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο.

appear to be further borne out by the Socratic epistle, as supr.—*εἶναι θᾶττον*, &c.

Οἷον *παρακελεύει*] h. e. *οἷόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὁ παρακ.* By means of the demonstrative pronoun, propositions, the first of which contains the verb *εἰμί*, and the second the relative pronoun, are contracted into one. Matthiæ Gr. s. 472. 4. From this passage, which is so constructed as to be expressive of surprise in the speaker, and the context, it may be concluded that Evenus was not notorious for the soundness of his philosophy in this particular.

Πολλὰ *γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα.*] Cf. Lachet. p. 197. D. *ὁ δὲ Δάμων τῷ Προδίκῳ πολλὰ πλησιάζει.* Cratyl. c. 30. *ἔωθεν πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνῆν, καὶ παρεῖχον τὰ ὦτα.*

Σχεδὸν *οὖν ἐξ ὧν.*] Sc. *ἐκ τούτων ὧν*; when the word to which the relative refers is a demonstrative pronoun, the pronoun is generally omitted, and the relative takes its case. Matthiæ Gr. s. 473. *b.* and s. 574.

Ὁπωστιοῦν *σοι.*] Al. *ὁπωστιοῦν ἂν σοι*, upon which see Apol. Socr. c. 17. *ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν—διαφθαρήσονται.*—Ἑκὼν *εἶναι.* The infinitive *εἶναι*, especially with *ἑκών*, is often redundant in Attic authors. See Apol. Socr. c. 27. init.

Τούτου *τοῦ πράγματος.*] Intell. *φιλοσοφίας.*

Οὐ *μέντοι.*] Ald. Bass. *οὐ μέν.*—Turneb. *οὐ μήν.* Stephens, as supr. *οὐ μέντοι*, correctly. Cf. Olympiod. Schol. Εἰπὼν ὁ Σωκράτης ὅτι εἰ φιλοσοφεῖ ὁ Εὐηνὸς, *ἐθελήσει ἀποθνήσκειν, ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ διὰ τούτων παρεγγυᾶν ἡμῖν τῷ ἑκουσίῳ θανάτῳ, φησὶν, ὅτι οὐ μέντοι ἴσως βιάσεται ἑαυτόν.* Καὶ *τοῦτο ἡ μὲν λέξις δείκνυσι διὰ δύο ἐπιχειρημάτων, ἑνὸς μὲν μυθικοῦ καὶ Ὀρφικοῦ, ἑτέρου δὲ διαλεκτικοῦ καὶ φιλοσόφου. Ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ τῆς λέξεως φέρε οἰκείοις ἐπιχειρήμασι τοῦτο αὐτὸ δείξομεν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἑαυτούς.*—Βιάσεται *αὐτόν*, i. e. *ἀποκτενεῖ ἑαυτόν.* infr. c. 6.

Οὐ *γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι.*] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. *e.* This was a dogma of the Platonic, and prior to this of the Pythagorean school; Cic. de Senec. c. xxi. "vetatque Pythagoras injussu imperatoris, id est, dei, de præsidio et statione vitæ decedere." On the other hand, the Stoics held that it was lawful for a wise man to withdraw from life whenever he judged it expedient; not only because life and death are to be classed with those things which are in their nature indifferent, but because life may be less consistent with virtue than death; and since all duty arises from a conformity to nature, it may happen that one may be so situated, that to remain in life may be more contrary to nature than to depart from it. Enfield's Philos. B. ii. c. 11. s. 1.

Καθῆκε *τὰ σκέλη.*] Schol. *συντονώτερον ἀνέλαβε σχῆμα καὶ σεμνότερον ὡς περὶ προβλήματος σεμνοτέρου μέλλων διαλέγεσθαι.*

Καθεζόμενος *οὕτως, κ.τ.λ.*] i. e. *καθέζετο καὶ οὕτως ἤδη—διελέγετο—and so proceeded with the rest of the discussion.*

Ἤρετο οὖν αὐτόν ὁ Κέβης, Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ' ἂν τῷ ἀποθνήσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἕπεσθαι; Τί δαί, ὦ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάῳ συγγεγονότες; Οὐδέν γε σαφές, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἃ μὴν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοώς, φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ἴσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκεῖσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν

Φιλολάῳ συγγεγονότες.] A. Boeckh, in lib. Philol. des Pythag. Lehren nebst den Bruchstücken seines werkes Berol. 1819. has settled the age of Philolaus to have been nearly from the seventieth to the ninety-fifth Olympiad. Plutarch mentions that he was one of those who escaped from the house which was burned by Gylon, at Crotona, during the life of Pythagoras, but this cannot be correct, as the latter died, according to the chronicon of Eusebius, in the third year of the sixty-eighth Olympiad. It is probable that Philolaus was a hearer of Lysis, who, with Archippus, escaped the conflagration of the Pythagorean school at Crotona, upon which the latter withdrew to his native city, Tarentum, and the former to Thebes, where it is to be supposed that Philolaus met Simmias and Cebes. Cf. Schol. in loc. ἦλθεν οὖν (Philolaus) καὶ εἰς Θήβας τεθνεῶτι τῷ διδασκάλῳ Λύσιδι χοὰς ποιήσασθαι ἐκεῖσε τεθαμμένῳ. This is the most likely account that can be collected from testimonies which are at variance, in some degree, with each other. V. Jamblich. Vit. Pythag. cc. 104. 199. 248. 250. Bentley, Dissert. de Ætate Pythag. p. 49. Plutarch. de Genio Socratis, p. 583. A. Porphyr. Vit. Pythag. s. 54.

Οὐδὲν—σαφές.] Schol. δι' αἰνιγμάτων ἐδίδασκε, καθάπερ ἦν ἔθος τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις. Philolaus treated the doctrine of nature with great subtlety, but at the same time with great obscurity; referring all things existing to mathematical principles. He taught, that reason, improved by mathematical learning, is alone capable of judging concerning the nature of things; that the whole world consists of infinite and finite; that number subsists by itself, and is the chain by which its power sustains the eternal frame of things; that the Monad is not the sole principle of all things, but that the Binary, or Duad, is necessary to furnish materials from which all subsequent numbers may be produced, &c. Hence it appears probable that Philolaus, following Timæus, whose writings he possessed, so far departed from the Pythagorean system as to conceive two independent principles in nature, God and Matter, the Monad and Duad, and that Plato derived from the same source his doctrine on the subject. Enfield, Philos. B. ii. c. 13.

Ἐξ ἀκοῆς.] i. q. Herod. iv. 16. ἀκοῇ τι λέγειν, *from hearsay*. Upon this assertion of Socrates', that he knew nothing of the doctrines of Philolaus, further than by repute, Boeckh, l. c. p. 23. sq. remarks, in discussing the subject; "daher mir denn jene Wendung mit dem Hörensagen bloss eine mit der Platonischen Ironie sehr wohl zusammenstimmende Manier scheint, durch welche die etwas geringschatzige Behandlung des gottlichen Mannes etwas verhüllt werden soll." [It seems, therefore, to me, that that allusion to the hearsay hardly agrees in manner with the usual style of Platonic irony, through which the half-contemptuous expression of the god-like man should be somewhat concealed.] Stall.

Φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν.] *There is no objection to tell.* Viger. c. iii. s. 12 r. 2.

Καὶ γὰρ ἴσως καὶ μάλιστα.] *Etenim vel maxime* [καὶ μάλιστα] *decet illuc profecturum disquirere et fabulari de re-*

τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ, ποίαν τιν' αὐτὴν οἰόμεθα εἶναι· τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;

§. 6. Κατὰ τί οὖν δή ποτε οὔ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἤδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅ περ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ' ἡμῖν διητᾶτο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν· σαφὲς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα. Ἀλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρη, ἔφη· τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσαις. ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται, εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων

regrinatione, quæ illic est. — WYTT.— *μέλλοντα*, is to be understood indefinitely, of any one. Ἐκεῖσε *ἀποδημεῖν*, i. q. *εἰς Ἅιδου ἀπιέναι.*—Διασκοπεῖν τε *καὶ μυθολογεῖν*: the former of these verbs is used in reference to a philosophical inquiry, the latter, to a speculative consideration of the subject in question.

Μέχρι *ἡλίου δυσμῶν.*] Schol. *ὡς ζήσεσθαι μέλλων μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν· ἐν γὰρ ἡμέρᾳ φονεύειν ἀπείρητο.*— Olympiod. ad. h. l. *νόμος δὲ ἦν παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναιοῖς τὸ μηδένα φονεύειν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ.* A similar law prevailed in Sparta, where the punishment of death was not inflicted in public, during the day, but in the night, in a certain part of the prison called δεκάς. Valer. M. iv. 6.

§. 6. Κατὰ *τί, κ. τ. λ.*] The principle laid down here for discussion is, that the period of death should be looked forward to, but not so as to be compassed by self destruction. For men, in this life, stand in the same relation to the gods, as servants to their masters, nor have they any right to leave it, unless the gods themselves discharge them.— Death is, therefore, to be endured with equanimity, because it is the limit which the gods assign to their protection of men here. Socrates then indulges a hope, that after death he might associate with those who, of mankind, had also lived uprightly, but asserts it as his positive belief, that he should enjoy the fellowship of the gods, the best of masters. This argument implies an unfitness in the body to assist the mind in the investigation of virtue and truth, and further, a divine providence exercised in behalf of those who have made this investigation the object of their lives, who are thus ensured its attendant blessings after their bodily decease.—Κατὰ *τί*,—Steph. in marg. *Quam igitur ob causam nefas esse aiunt, sibi mortem consciscere? Ego enim jam pridem illud non solum a Philolao, &c.*

Αὐτὸν *ἑαυτὸν.*] So in Latin, *se ipsum.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 468. 6.

Νῦν *δή.*] Tim. Plat. Lex. Πρὸ ὀλίγου χρόνου: *just now, a little while since.*

Ἴσως *μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι, κ. τ. λ.*] i. e. *Perhaps it shall, however, appear strange to you, if this alone, of all things, is unexceptionably true,* ἁπλοῦν, [sc. that death is better than life,] *and that never at any time, as is the case with the rest of human affairs, it should occur that at particular times,* ὅτε, *and to particular persons,* οἷς, *death is better than life. But* [seeing that at all times and with all persons, this principle holds good, or, according to V. Cousin, granting that there are particular individuals who prefer death to life,] *it appears strange to you, perhaps, if it is irreverent for those to whom death is preferable, to benefit themselves,* [by self-destruction,] *but that they must await another benefactor.* Cf. Simplic. in Epictet. p. 63. Ὁ δέ γε Πλάτων καὶ ὁ Πλάτωνος Σωκράτης, καὶ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸν [τὸν θάνατον] εἶναι καὶ κρεῖττονα τῆς μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ζωῆς ἀποφαίνε-

ἁπάντων ἁπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥς περ καὶ τἆλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν. οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστὸν ἴσως σοι φαίνεται εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιόν ἐστιν αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην. Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἠρέμα ἐπιγελάσας Ἴττω Ζεύς, ἔφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ

ται· οὐ τοῖς μὲν, τοῖς δ' οὔ· ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς πᾶσι. For all things else vary in their character and nature, and are good or evil, according to the agents by which they are employed, and the mode in which they are applied, Plat. in Sympos. p. 318. D. *πᾶσα γὰρ πρᾶξις ὧδ' ἔχει· αὐτὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς πραττομένη, οὔτε καλή, οὔτε αἰσχρά· οἷον ὁ νῦν ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν, ἢ πίνειν, ἢ ᾄδειν, ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καλὸν οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει ὡς ἂν πραχθῇ, τοιοῦτον ἀπέβη· καλῶς μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενον καὶ ὀρθῶς, καλὸν γίγνεται· μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ, αἰσχρόν.* But death is, on all occasions, as supr. represented by Plato as an unchangeable good. V. Cousin explains the passage; *Mais il pourra te sembler étonnant qu'il n'en soit pas de ceci comme de tout le reste, et qu'il faille admettre d'une manière absolue que la vie est toujours préférable à la mort, sans aucune distinction de circonstances et des personnes; ou si une telle rigueur parait excessive, et si l'on admet que la mort est quelquefois préférable à la vie, il pourra te sembler étonnant qu'alors même on ne puisse sans impiété se rendre heureux soi-même, et qu'il faille attendre un bienfaiteur étranger.* To which he subjoins the following note: "C'est-à-dire, en rétablissant tous les intermédiaires utiles, et supprimant tous ceux qui ne sont pas rigoureusement nécessaires: ou la vie est toujours préférable à la mort, quelles que soient les circonstances et les personnes, ce qui est bien singulier, les choses humaines n'étant point aussi absolues; ou si l'on admet la plus légère restriction à ce principe, si pour certaines personnes, dans certaines circonstances, la mort est préférable à la vie, alors il est bien étrange qu'à ces personnes, dans ces circonstances, il ne soit pas permis de se procurer elles-mêmes les avantages de la mort, et qu'il leur faille attendre un bienfaiteur étranger. Socrate avait avancé qu'il ne faut pas se tuer. Quoi! jamais! la vie est-elle donc toujours préférable à la mort? ce serait bien absolu et fort extraordinaire; tu n'oserais l'affirmer. Or, si la mort est quelquefois préférable a la vie, comment avancer qu'il n'est jamais permis de se tuer? L'objection devait se présenter à l'esprit de Cébès, et il est naturel que Socrate la lui prête, et aille au devant."

ἀπλοῦν.] *Plane verum et sine controversia.* Scap. Lex. in voc.—*Τυγχάνει,* is sometimes used as supr. without the participle *ὤν* or *ὄν*, Matthiæ Gr. s. 553. *δ.* Obs. 1.—*Καὶ τἆλλα,*—i. e. *καὶ κατὰ τἆλλα.* Schol. *οἷον πλοῦτος, ὄὀξα, ξίφος. ἐπαμφοτερίζει γὰρ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα. θάνατος δὲ μόνως ἀγαθόν ἐστι.*

Ἐπιγελάσας, Ἴττω Ζεύς.] Schol. *Ἐγέλασε, ὅιότι ἐκάλεσε τὸν φονεύοντα ἑαυτὸν εὐεργέτην. τὸ δὲ Ἴττω ἐπιχωριάζοντός ἐστιν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἴστω, τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ διαλέκτῳ· ὃ δείκνυται ὅτι φύσει τὸν Σωκράτην θαυμάζει.* Olympiod.—*καὶ εἰκότως ἐγχωρίᾳ γλώττῃ ἐχρήσατο, ἐνδεικνύμενος τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ ἐγχώριον θαῦμα, ὃ εἶχε πρὸς τὸν Σωκράτην.* Cf. Aristoph. Acharn. 910. *Τὼ δ' ἐμὰ Θείβαθεν, Ἴττω Ζεύς.*—Cebes so expresses his surprise at the nature of Socrates' remark.

Οὕτω γ' εἶναι.] *Sic primo aspectu, re nondum satis expensa.* HEIND. i. q. *ὡς οὕτωσὶ ἀκοῦσαι, if so it be heard,* or *understood.*—*Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ' ἴσως, sed fortassis: verum fortassis tamen.*—FISCH.

μέντοι ἀλλ' ἴσως ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διϊδεῖν· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελομένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους

Ἐν ἀπορρήτοις.] The secret or esoteric doctrine of the Pythagoreans, of which the former portion of what is stated in the text, *ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμὲν*, belongs to the Orphic school. Cf. Tim. Plat. p. 291. *ἃ γὰρ Ὀρφεὺς δὶ ἀπορρήτων λόγων μυστικῶς παραδέδωκε, πάντα Πυθαγόρας ἐξέμαθεν οργιασθεὶς ἐν Λειβήθροις τοῖς Θρακικοῖς.* Cratyl. c. 38. *Δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα [τὸ σῶμα] ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσι. τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σώζηται, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ὥσπερ αὐτὸ ὀνομάζεται, ἕως ἂν ἐκτισῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, τὸ σῶμα.* Forster, approved by Heindorf, understands by *ἀπορρήτα*, *mysteriorum arcana*, the Orphic mysteries; according to others, the Eleusinian or Bacchic. But Wyttenbach, in h. l., and Boeckh, l. c. p. 179. sqq. explain it correctly as supr. Most of the philosophical sects had their *ἀπορρήτα*, or secret doctrines, Clem. Alexandr. Strom. v. p. 575. A. *οὐ μόνον ἄρα οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων τὰ πολλὰ ἐπεκρύπτοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Ἐπικούρειοί φασί τινα καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀπορρήτα εἶναι καὶ μὴ πᾶσιν ἐπιτρέπειν ἐντυγχάνειν τούτοις τοῖς γράμμασιν· ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ λέγουσι Ζήνωνι τῷ πρώτῳ γεγράφθαί τινα, ἃ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἐπιτρέπουσι τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἀναγινώσκειν μὴ οὐκὶ πείραν δεδωκόσι πρότερον εἰ γνησίως φιλοσοφοῖεν· λέγουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ μὲν ἐσωτερικὰ εἶναι τῶν συγγραμμάτων αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐξωτερικά.*

Ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμὲν, κ. τ. λ.] *That we are in a certain prison, &c.* Cf. Cicer. Somn. Scip. 3. "Nisi Deus is, cujus hoc templum est omne quod conspicio, istis te corporis custodiis liberaverit, huc tibi aditus patere non potest. Quare et tibi—et piis omnibus retinendus est animus in custodia corporis, nec injussu ejus, a quo ille est vobis datus, ex hominum vita migrandum est, ne munus humanum assignatum a Deo defugisse videamini." Tusc. i. 30. "Vetat enim dominans ille in nobis Deus, injussu suo, nos hinc demigrare: cum vero justam causam Deus ipse dederit, ut tum Socrati, nunc Catoni, sæpe multis, næ ille, medius fidius, vir sapiens lætus ex his tenebris in lucem illam excesserit: nec tamen illa vincla carceris ruperit: leges enim vetant: sed tanquam a magistratu, aut ab aliqua potestate legitima, sic a Deo evocatus atque emissus exierit."

Οὐ ῥᾴδιος διϊδεῖν.] The infin. active for the infin. pass. Matthiæ Gr. s. 535. *b.* Obs.—*Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλά, it is no otherwise, but*, i. e. *however*. Id. s. 610. 4.— Ἐπιμελομένους. Mœris.— Ἐπιμέλου, παροξυτόνως, Ἀττικῶς. περισπωμένως, Ἑλληνικῶς. Thom. Mag. Ἐπιμέλομαι κάλλιον ἢ ἐπιμελοῦμαι.

Ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους — τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.] Cf. Legg. x. p. 902. B. *θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματά φαμὲν εἶναι πάντα ὑπόσα θνητὰ ζῶα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.* Ibid. p. 906. A. *ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ κτήματά θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων.* Critias. p. 109. B. *κατοικίσαντες οἷον νομῆς κτήματα καὶ ποίμνια καὶ θρέμματα ἑαυτῶν ἡμᾶς ἔτρεφον.* Upon the indifferent use of *θεὸς* and *θεοὶ*, Wyttenbach observes, that the latter is affirmed of the whole race of deities, under whose care, individually, mankind is placed, each mortal having a deity for his guardian. But the former is affirmed of the one supreme, who has the charge of those deities themselves, no less than of their dependents, as may be collected from the Phædrus, Timæus,

ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως: Ἔμοιγ', ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτιννύοι μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἂν ἀνάγκην τινὰ ὁ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥς περ καὶ τὴν νῦν παροῦσαν ἡμῖν.

§. 7. Ἀλλ' εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τουτό γε φαίνεται. ὃ μέντοι νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔοικε τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπῳ, εἴ περ ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπιόντας, ἐν ᾗ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἵ περ ἄριστοί εἰσι τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον. οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε ἑαυτοῦ οἴεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος· ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος

Leges. x., and other of Plato's writings.—Ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τ. θ. a dogma, as Heindorf conjectures, of the Pythagoreans.

Τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων.] *Of your slaves.* Cf. Eurip. Med. 49. Παλαιὸν οἴκων κτῆμα, *O vetus ancilla.*

Μὴ σημήναντός σου.] In like manner, Epictetus expresses it as a reasonable motive for departing from life; θεοῦ σημαίνοντος τὸ ἀνακλητικὸν, *when the deity sounds a retreat.*

Ὅτι βούλει.] Heindorf. would prefer βούλοι' because of the optt. ἀποκτιννύοι, χαλεπαίνοις, &c. but a similar construction occurs in Gorg. c. 45. ὥσπ' εἰ δίοι—διαγωνίζεσθαι—πότερος ἐπαΐει περὶ τῶν χρησιμῶν—λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἰατρόν.

Ταύτῃ.] *In this light,* V. Cousin. *Sous ce point de vue.*

Ἀνάγκην τινὰ.] Plato admits necessity as a plea for self-destruction, in two cases, in Legg. ix. p. 873. either when περιωδύνῳ ἀφύκτῳ προσπεσούσῃ τύχῃ ἀναγκασθείς, or αἰσχύνης τινὸς ἀπόρου καὶ ἀβίου μεταλαχὼν, Πρὶν ἂν—ἐπιπέμψῃ. Cf. de Legg. ix. p. 872. E. πρὶν ἂν φόνον φόνῳ—ἢ δράσασα ψυχὴ τίσῃ, Lachet. p. 187. E. πρὶν ἂν ἐμπέσῃ εἰς τὸ διδόναι λόγον. HEIND. Stallbaum would omit ἂν.

§. 7. Ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν.] h. e. *lubenter mori velle.* STALL. Ἔοικε τοῦτο—ἀτόπῳ. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 555. Obs. 2.

Οἵ περ—ἐπιστάται, θεοί.] Θεὸς and θεοὶ are frequently used for ὁ θεὸς, οἱ θεοὶ. Schæfer. in Meletem. Crit. p. 4.

Οὐκ ἔχει λόγον.] i. e. *Is quite unreasonable.*

Αὐτός γε ἑαυτοῦ.] This transition from the plural to the singular is very usual with Plato. Cf. Gorg. p. 478. B. C. ἆρ' οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστι καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι;—Μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, κ. τ. λ. Protagor. p. 319. D. &c.

τάχ' ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπό γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι· ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ που ἂν ἀεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ βελτίονι. καί τοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὐναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνήσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δ' ἄφρονας χαίρειν. Ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἡσθῆναί τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς Ἀεί τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅ τι ἄν τις εἴπῃ. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε δοκεῖ τί μοι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης· τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν; καί μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥᾳδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθούς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεούς. Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέ-

Οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον, κ. τ. λ.] *Putaret hoc, fugiendum esse a dominis: in hac opinione esset,* WYTT.—ταῦτα is emphatic and demonstrative, as infr. c. 14. σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, κ. τ. λ.

Ἀγανακτεῖν.] Etymol. M. Ἀγανακτεῖν. ἀντὶ τοῦ στένειν, παρὰ Πλάτωνι.

Πραγματείᾳ.] *The ingenuity.* h. l. *operosa et arguta dubitandi,* sc. *disputandi ratio, quæ solet esse subtilior quam verior.* KÖRNER. Olympiod. τὴν πραγματειώδη ἀπορίαν, πραγματείαν ἐκάλεσεν ὁ Πλάτων· ἀνωτέρω δὲ ἡνίκα ὁ Σιμμίας ἠρώτα, ἀπορίαν μόνην ἐκάλεσε τὴν ἐρώτησιν αὐτοῦ.

Ἀεί τοι—ὁ Κέβης.] Toi is emphatic here, as in Iliad. ε. 873. Ἀεί τοι ῥίγιστα θεοὶ τετληότες εἰμέν.

Ὅ τι ἂν τις εἴπῃ.] *Quodcunque illud sit quod quis dixerit.* STALL. Vulg. εἴποι, incorrectly, for the verb is used in referenee to what Socrates had said, not what he was going to say.

Τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι, κ. τ. λ.] *For with what intent, would men who are really wise fly from those masters who are better than themselves, and heedlessly,* or, *for a trivial cause, depart from them;* i. e. what could induce them to fly, what would they have by flying &c. as in Latin; "quid spectantes hoc fecerunt."—ὡς ἀληθῶς being joined to ἄνδρες σοφοί, as c. 9. ὁ ὄντως φιλόσοφος, c. 11. ὁ γνησίως φιλόσοφος, c. 12. ὁ φιλοσοφῶν ὀρθῶς. c. 29. a med. εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς. Cf. Cicer. pro Milon. 30. "Proposita invidia, morte, pœna, qui nihilo segnius rempublicam defendit, is vir vere putandus est."

Εἰς σὲ τείνειν.] h. e. *Te petere hac oratione, his verbis.* STALL. V. Cousin. *Et c'est contre toi, je pense, qu'est dirigé le raisonnement de Cébes.*—Ῥᾳδίως φέρεις — ἀπολείπων. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 555. i.

Ὡς αὐτ. ὁμολ.] *As you yourself admit.*

γετε. οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὡς περ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

§. 8. Φέρε δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, πειραθῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πιθανώτερον ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾤμην ἥξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθούς, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἠδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ· νῦν δὲ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς,—καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην· ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἥξειν, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι, εἴ πέρ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, διισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ' εὔελπίς εἰμι εἶναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καὶ ὡς πέρ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς.

§. 8. Οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν.] Olympiod. μὴ ἀγανακτῶν. But all the MSS. and best editions read as in the text, which is decidedly correct. Tr. *I should have erred in not being annoyed at death*, which, with μὴ ἀγαν., should be, *if I were not annoyed*. See Seag. Viger. c. vii. s. 12. r. 11. upon the distinction between μὴ and οὐ or οὐκ: the latter denying something directly, and as a matter of fact; the former, denying only in reference to a conception or view, which has either been before expressed, or which, according to the sense, is implied in what precedes. Cf. Matthiæ Gr. s. 608.

Ὅτι — ἥξειν.] Ὅτι is sometimes followed by an infinitive, as supr. Cf. Acts, xxvii. 10. θεωρῶ ὅτι—μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι τὸν πλοῦν. Plat. de Legg. x. p. 892. D. εἶπον ὅτι πρῶτον ἐμὲ χρῆναι πειραθῆναι κατ' ἐμαυτόν. Xenoph. Cyrop. v. 4. 1. ἐνόμισεν, ὅτι, εἴ τι οὗτος πάθοι, αὐτὸς ἂν λάβειν πάντα. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 539. 1.

Εἴ πέρ τι ἄλλο.] Εἴ πέρ τι καὶ ἄλλο. HEIND.

Οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ.] Socrates intends to say, that feeling such an assurance of his future communion with the gods, he was not, consequently, so annoyed as if death were unaccompanied by such a trust.

Εἶναί τι.] i. e. *Vivere*. GOTTL. as infr. c. 14. ὡς ἔστι ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος ἀνθρώπου. Cf. Cic. Epp. ad. Div. vi. 3. "nec enim, dum ero, angar ulla re—et, si non ero sensu omni carebo."

Πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον.] Cf. Gorg. p. 332. Bas. 2. ἦν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα, οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἐκτὸς κακῶν· τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμοτήριον, ὃ δὴ Τάρταρον καλοῦσι ἴέναι. v. Apol. Socr. c. 32. According to Herodotus, the Egyptians were the first who taught the doctrine of the soul's immortality; ii. 123. Πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοι εἰσὶ οἱ εἰπόντες ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι· τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος ἐς ἄλλο ζῶον

Τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες; πότερον αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοίης; κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο. καὶ ἅμα σοι ἡ ἀπολογία ἔσται, ἐὰν ἃ περ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσῃς. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαί γε, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψώμεθα, τί ἐστιν ὃ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦ-

ἀεὶ γινόμενον ἐσδύεται, &c.; but the transmigration of souls into beasts, birds, and fishes, as stated in loc. cit., which continued for three thousand years, when the soul assumed its human form again, was most probably held by some of the Egyptians, while others, it is equally probable, held that the souls of the good, having wandered for a time among the stars, were allowed to return to the society of the gods. Following the Thracians and Egyptians, from whom he derived his philosophy, Orpheus affirmed the soul to be immortal; and was the first, according to Diodorus Siculus, i. p. 86., who taught, among the Greeks, the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. v. Orph. Argon. 1105. 1136.

Αὐτὸς.] *Alone, by yourself?* Cf. Iliad. ἡ. 99. Τυδείδης δ' αὐτός περ ἐών.

Μεταδοίης.] Aug. μεταδώης: incorrectly. Moeris: Δοίημεν, δοίητε, Ἀττικῶς· δῴημεν, δῴητε, Ἑλληνικῶς. Mosquem. vol. i. p. 59. Ἀλοίη, δοίη, γνοίη, διὰ διφθόγγου δεῖ γράφειν κατὰ τοὺς Ἀττικούς, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀλῴη, δῴη, γνῴη.

Ἡ ἀπολογία.] i. e. *Ea quam dixisti defensio.* HEIND. in reference to οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή, κ. τ. λ. supr. c. 7. extr.

Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψώμεθα.] h. e. σκεψώμεθα, τί ἔστιν ὃ Κρίτων ὅδε βούλεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ π. ε. Upon τονδε, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 470. 2.

Τί δέ—ἄλλο γε.] Fully, τί δὲ ἄλλο γέ ἐστιν ἢ τοῦτο, ὅτι πάλαι μοι λέγει, &c.

Ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον.] The executioner, infr. c. 65. ὁ τῶν ἑνδεκα ὑπηρέτης. P. Petit, Misc. Obss. i. 17. argues from Plutarch in Phocion. p. 758. E. that the beadle did not make the suggestion, as in the text, from compassion, but because he was obliged to purchase the poison himself, at twelve drachms the dose; πεπωκότων δὲ ἤδη πάντων, τὸ φάρμακον ἐπέλιπε, καὶ ὁ δημόσιος [i. e. ὁ τῶν ἑνδεκ. ὑπηρετ.] οὐκ ἔφη τρίψειν ἕτερον, εἰ μὴ λάβοι δώδεκα δραχμάς, ὅσου τὴν ὀλκὴν ὠνεῖται. Χρόνου δε γενομένου καὶ διατριβῆς, ὁ Φωκίων καλέσας τινὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ εἰπὼν ὅτι μηδὲ ἀποθανεῖν Ἀθήνησι δωρεὰν ἐστι, ἐκέλευσε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δοῦναι τὸ κερμάτιον. However, the person who administered the poison to Socrates appears to have been of a very different character, as may be judged from the description given. c. 65. which cannot be understood otherwise than seriously.

Θερμαίνεσθαι.] Olympiod. ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως θερμανθῇς, καὶ πίψῃς τὸ κώνειον. The efficacy of hemlock, as a poison, lies in the extreme coldness it produces, which might be counteracted by increasing the bodily heat either by exercise or warm draughts, especially of wine, when taken in time to obviate the chill and consequent check of the vital action. V. Plin. H. N. xiv. 5. xxv. 13. Dresig. Dissert de Cicut.—Μᾶλλον, sc. τοῦ δέοντος. HEIND.

τον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς πίνειν τούς τι τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἔα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δὶς δώσων, ἐὰν δὲ δέῃ, καὶ τρίς. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μέν τι ᾔδη, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλά μοι πάλαι πράγματα παρέχει. Ἔα αὐτόν, ἔφη.

Ἀλλ' ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὡς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαῤῥεῖν μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθά, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ. πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης; ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

§. 9. Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς

Δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 3.—Εἰ δὲ μή. See in Criton. c. 15. sub. fin.

Ἀλλὰ — ᾔδη.] Olympiod. Φησὶ καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἰδέναι ὅτι τοῦτο μέλλει (λέγειν) ὁ Σωκράτης· διότι πεῖραν αὐτοῦ εἶχεν ἐν ὁμωνύμῳ διαλόγῳ, ὡς καταφρονητικῶς ἔχοντος περὶ τὸν θάνατον.

§. 9. Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates proceeds to argue that philosophy consists in meditation upon and preparation for death. For the duty of the philosoper is to lead away the mind from what is corporeal and transient, and to direct it to the study of its own capabilities for the discovery of pure and simple truth. But in this life, this object cannot be satisfactorily accomplished; for the mind is then chiefly most energetic in thought, when it withdraws itself from the influence of the body, and makes itself the scope of its own contemplation. Whence it appears that so far from requiring the assistance of the body towards the strength and efficiency of its reflective powers, it is only when emancipated from the thrall of the body that it attains to the perfection of its nature. The body seduces from the investigation of truth; the senses, and their subordinate feelings, distract the mind, and lead it into erroneous and false conclusions. The body is hostile, and the opposite to virtue; it is the source of all corruption, and while it depends upon the mind for its pleasure and support, the latter is allured into the commission of vice and crime. It is most likely, then, that after the decease of the body the mind shall attain to the fuller recognition of truth, and shall fix its abode among the gods, provided, that in this life, as far as it could, it cleansed itself from the impurity of the body by a diligent inquiry into truth, and the study of justice, wisdom, and fortitude. The further object of this argument is to show, from the analogy of all things in nature, that death is not annihilation, but a passage to another state of existence; the purport of which has been comprised by Mendelsohn in his Phædo, thus: Since every change in the nature of things takes place mediately, and by successive gradations, a change at once from life to death, from existence to annihilation, would not be gradual, nor, therefore, natural. Besides, nothing can be so diminished as to be utterly destroyed, whence the mind cannot naturally perish.

ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας, λελῆθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἄτοπον δή που ἂν εἴη προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἥκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν ὃ πάλαι προὐθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γέ με νῦν δὴ γελασείοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι. οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας καὶ ξυμφάναι ἄν, τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσι τοῦτο πάσχειν. Καὶ ἀληθῆ

Κινδυνεύουσι.] Olympiod. *ὅτι ἀδεῶς ἔξει περὶ τὸν θάνατον δὲ μελετήσει, νῦν δείκνυσι. δύο γὰρ ὄντων τοῦ τε ἐπιτηδεύειν ἀποθνήσκειν καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν, τὸν μὲν προαιρετικὸν θάνατον καὶ τὸν χωρισμὸν τῶν παθῶν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύει καὶ ἐθέλει· τὸν δὲ σωματικὸν ἐθέλει μέν, οὐ μὴν ἐπιτηδεύει.* Cic. Tuscul. 1. 30. "tota enim philosophorum ista, ut ait idem (Socrates,) commentatio mortis est."—31. "Secernere autem a corpore animum nec quidquam est, quam emori discere." Senec. Ep. xxv. "egregia res est mortem condiscere—hoc est ipsum quare meditari debeamus." Infr. c. 12. *τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστι τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος.*

Ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι.] i. e. *Mori et mortuum esse;* the former being the passage to the latter. WYTT. Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 8. "Emori nolo: sed me esse mortuum nihil æstumo."

Ἀγανακτεῖν ὀ.] Ὁ may be taken here as depending upon *ἐπετήδευον* or *ἀγανακτεῖν*: the latter construction is preferable. Cf. Demosth. de Chersones. p. 103. *καὶ τοι ἔγωγ' ἀγανακτῶ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ τὰ μὲν χρήματα λυπεῖ τινας ὑμῶν,* &c. Id. adv. Conon. p. 1261. *ἐγὼ δὲ— χαλεπῶς, ἐφ' οἷς πέπονθα, ἐνηνοχὼς οὐχ ἧττον τοῦτ' ἀγανακτήσαιμι ἄν,* &c. Lysias. p. 787. *ὃ δὴ ἀγωνιῶ καὶ ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ ταύτῃ τῇ ἐλπίδι εἰς ὑμᾶς ἥκει πιστεύων.* HEIND. Steph. in Thes. Ling. Græc. v. *ἀγανακτεῖν*; "rarior præcedentibus constructio est in eadem Phædonis Plat. p. 32. ubi accusativo rei jungitur." Abresch. Lect. Aristænet. p. 266. understands *αὐτῷ* before ὀ.

Γελασείοντα.] Schol. *γελαστικῶς ἔχοντα, γελάσαι θέλοντα.*

Τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν.] i. e. The Thebans and Bœotians, who were naturally averse to philosophy and its professors. Olympiod. Cod. i. p. 9. *εἰκότως· Θηβαῖος γὰρ ἦν ὁ Σιμμίας· παρ' οἷς καὶ ἡ Βοιωτία ὑς.* Dacier reads *παρ' υμιν, Athenienses vestri;* approved by Schleiermacher, who understands an evident allusion to the Athenians. V. Cousin reads and refers *παρ' ἡμῖν* to the Thebans, and notes the passage: "C'est comme si Simmias disait: Il y a des gens qui consentiraient volontiers....du moins nos Thébains; car pour les Athéniens, ils n'en sont pas capables assurément....Ici la restriction explicite aux Thébains est une extension indirecte aux Athéniens eux-mêmes dont un étranger devait s'abstenir de parler."

Καὶ πάνυ.] *In particular.—Θανατῶσι*; Schol. *θανάτου ἐπιθυμοῦσι.* Cf. Lobeck. ad Phrynich. p. 80. sqq. For *οὐ λελήθασι* the ordinary form should be *οὐ λέληθε*, but the verb is suited to

γ' ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλήν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθε γὰρ αὐτοὺς ᾗ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ᾗ ἄξιοί εἰσι θανάτου καὶ οἵου θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. εἴπωμεν γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις· ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν εἶναι; ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο; Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη. Σκέψαι δή, ὦ 'γαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ ἅ περ καὶ ἐμοί· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεταί σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν; Ἥκιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Τί δαί; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δαί;

its subject here as in Xenoph. Œcon. i. 19. ὅτι πονηρότατοι εἰσι, οὐδε σὲ λανθάνουσιν.

Πλήν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθ.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. *e.*

Ἡγούμεθα τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι.] i. e. *Estne mors aliquid an nihil? estne ejus notio aiens, an negans.* WYTT. v. Cicer. Tuscul. i. 9.—Ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι; See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. *a.* Obs. 3.

Τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι.] Olympiod. ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ εἶναι εἶπε (Σωκράτης), διότι ἀγγέννητος αὕτη· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ σώματος τὸ γεγονέναι, γεννητὸν γὰρ τοῦτο.

Ἐσπουδακέναι.] *To be solicitous.*

Σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν—ἀφροδισίων—καλλωπισμῶν.] Cf. Olympiod. p. 9. τριῶν οὐσῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἢ φυσικῶν καὶ ἀναγκαίων ὡς τὸ τρέφεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν· ἢ φυσικῶν μὲν οὐκ ἀναγκαίων δὲ, ὡς τὸ ἀφροδισιάζειν· ἢ οὔτε φυσικῶν οὔτε ἀναγκαίων, ὡς καλλωπισμὸς, καὶ ὅσα τὰ τῆς ποικίλης ἐσθῆτος· αὗται γὰρ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι, ὡς δηλοῦσι τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα, ταύταις μὴ χρώμενα· τριῶν οὖν οὐσῶν ἐνεργειῶν, ταῖς μὲν φυσικαῖς οὐκ ἀναγκαίαις, καὶ ταῖς οὔτε φυσικαῖς οὔτε ἀναγκαίαις οὐ χρήσεται ὅλως ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἄλλα ἀπώσεται αὐτάς.—So, temperance, according to Epicurus, is that discreet regulation of the passions and desires, by which pleasure may be enjoyed without consequent inconvenience. They who maintain such a constant self-command, as never to be enticed by the prospect of present indulgence, to do that which will be productive of evil, obtain the truest pleasures by declining pleasure. Since of desires, some are natural and necessary; others, natural but not necessary; and others neither natural nor necessary, but the offspring of false judgment, it must be the office of temperance to gratify the first class, as far as nature requires; to restrain the second within the bounds of moderation; and as to the third, resolutely to oppose, and if possible, entirely subdue them. Enfield's Philos. B. ii. c. 15.

τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἱματίων διαφερόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾷν σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἀτιμάζειν, καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν; Ἀτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος. Οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι; Ἔμοιγε. Ἆρ' οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας

Ἱματίων διαφερόντων.] *Distinguished robes*; in opposition to those ordinarily worn by philosophers, which were called, in contempt, τρίβωνες or τριβώνια. Xenophon, Memor. i. 6. 2. calls the apparel of Socrates, ἱμάτιον φαῦλον, and Apuleius, Metam. i. p. 104. Elment. *Scissile palliastrum.*—Ὑποδημάτων: for the various species of shoes in use among the Greeks, see Robinson's Grec. Antiq. B. V. c. 25. Socrates makes an express allusion to this part of their appointments here, because they were particularly fastidious, both men and women, about this article of dress, while the philosopher himself went barefoot. Epist. Socr. vi. p. 13. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ἀπαρκεῖ τροφῇ τε χρῆσθαι τῇ λιτοτάτῃ, καὶ ἐσθῆτι θέρους τε καὶ χειμῶνος τῇ αὐτῇ ὑποδήμασι δὲ πάμπαν οὐ χρῶμαι. Aristoph. Nub. 103.—τοὺς ἀλαζόνας. Τοὺς ὠχριῶντας, τοὺς ἀνυποδήτους λίγεις, Ὧν ὁ κακοδαίμων Σωκράτης καὶ Χαιρεφῶν.—Τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμούς.—*Cætera*, alia, *corporis lenocinia.* FISCH. Cf. Isocr. ad Demonic. p. 12. εἶναι βούλου τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα φιλόκαλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ καλλωπιστής·—καλλωπιστοῦ δὲ τὸ περίεργον.—Καλλωπισμός is generally used to designate a culpable affectation in superfluous ornament and dress.

Ἆρ' οὖν.] Ἆρα, frequently by itself denotes *nonne*, like the Latin *ne* enclitic. Matthiæ Gr. s. 614.

Ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχήν.] This ἀπόλυσις of the soul is explained, infr. c. 12. τὸ χωρίζειν ἀπο τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχήν, κ. τ. λ. Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 30. "Quid—tum agimus, nisi animum ad seipsum advocamus, secum esse cogimus, maximeque a corpore abducimus? Secernere autem a corpore animum, nec quidquam aliud est mori discere." Senec. de Sap. Ment. Ep. 57. "Animum cogi sibi intentum esse, nec avocari ad externa, omnia licet foris resonent, dum intus nil tumultus sit, dum inter se non rixentur cupiditas et timor." Ep. 65. "Corpus hoc animi pondus ac pœna est, premente illo urgetur, in vinculis est; nisi accessit philosophia." So Virgil, in allusion to the body being, as it were, the prison of the soul, and the faculties of the latter benumbed by its earthly bondage, and blinded towards the attainment of celestial truth, Æn. vi. 733. "Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque; dolent gaudentque: neque auras Despiciunt clausæ tenebris et carcere cæco." Horace is supposed to have alluded to this Platonic doctrine, speaking of Democritus, Ep. i. 12. v. 13. "dum peregre est animus sine corpore velox."—The remedy for this adulteration of the soul by its connexion with the body, is philosophy. The philosopher would withdraw the heart and affections from the perishable and deceptive objects of present and worldly hopes and fears; would struggle to break the chain which

διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; Φαίνεται. Καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ᾧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἳ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

§. 10. Τί δαὶ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν, πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὔ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἆρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὄψις τε καὶ

binds the etherial and immortal to the corporeal and decaying portion of his nature, and raising himself above the mists of prejudice and vice, would make the TRUTH his study here, and contemplate its sure fulfilment in the time to come. Hence the vulgar and illiterate, engrossed by selfish and immediate sensual pleasures, are unable to appreciate the purpose of philosophy, and reject, as an unwise and unaccountable desire for death, the doctrine that it is a passage only to a future and a better life.

Διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων.] *Præ reliquis omnibus.* STALL. Cf. Criton. c. 14. init.

Τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις.] Elsewhere, τοῖς πολλοῖς, simply.

Ὧ—μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν.] i. e. καὶ ὃς μὴ μετεχει αὐτῶν. In the second member of a sentence there must sometimes be understood a case of ὃς different from that expressed in the first Cf. Odyss. β'. 114. ἄνωχθι δέ μιν γαμέεσθαι Τῷ, ὅτεῳ τε πατὴρ κέλεται, καὶ ἀνδάνει αὐτῇ: i. e. καὶ ὅστις· ἀνδάνει αὐτῇ—V. Matthiæ Gr. s. 428. 2. Upon μηδεν and μηδε, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. c. Cf. Criton. c. 15. οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν.

Ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι.] *Prope mortuum esse, similem esse mortuo.* HEIND., τι being referred to ἐγγὺς, as in ὅμου τι, πάνυ τι, μετάξυ τι, &c. Cf. Soph. Antig. 1179. τὰς γὰρ ἡδονὰς Ὅταν προδῶσιν ἄνδρες, οὐ τίθημ' ἐγὼ Ζῆν τοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἔμψυχον ἡγοῦμαι νεκρόν.

§. 10. Τί δαὶ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 630.

Αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν.] "L'idee de la science, implique l'indépendance de l'ame et son immortalité. On ne parvient à la science qu'en se séparant des sens, en ramenant l'œil de l'ame sur elle-même, en l'accoutumant à se servir des puissances intérieures qui lui appartiennent, comme des seuls instrumens légitimes dans toutes ses recherches. En fait, ce n'est pas des sensations et des notions contingentes et purement collectives que produit leur généralisation la plus élevée, que nous viennent les idées universelles et necessaires du bien du beau du juste, de l'activite, de la force, et de l'essence des choses; et, sous le rapport de la méthode, si l'on veut acquérir d'exactes connaissances, ie meilleur moyen assurement n' est pas d'aborder ce qu'on veut connaitre par l'intermédiaire infidèle et mobile des organes corporels, mais par la raison et l'intelligence, élevées a leur plus haut degré d'abstraction et de pureté. Le procédé de l'ame, dans l'acquisition de la connaissance et la direction de l'esprit, temoigne donc aussi d'une energie qui lui est propre, et de son independance du corps." V. Cousin, Œuv. de Plat. tom. i. 162. 163.

Ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα.] Virgil, Æn. vi. 730. πλατωνίζων, "Igneus est ollis vigor et cœlestis origo Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundaque membra."—GOTTL.

Κοινωνὸν.] *A partner* or *ally.*

Οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω.] h. e. *Quod quidem ita intelligi volo.* STALL.

ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὔτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν; καί τοι εἰ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσὶ μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἵ γε ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι γάρ που τούτων φαυλότεραί εἰσιν. ἢ σοί οὐ δοκοῦσιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πότε οὖν, η δ' ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἅπτεται; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογιζεσθαι, εἴ πέρ που ἄλλοθι, κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεταί τι τῶν ὄντων; Ναί. Λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν μηδὲν τούτων αὐτὴν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγηδὼν μή τέ

Οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ.] Olympiod. Ποιητὰς λέγει Παρμενίδην, Ἐμπεδοκλέα, καὶ Ἐπίχαρμον· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς λέγουσιν εἰδέναι τὴν αἴσθησιν· καθάπερ Ἐπίχαρμος φησι,—Νοῦς ὁρᾷ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.

Parmenides was a disciple of Xenophanes, and an equally distinguished member of the Eleatic school, the doctrines of which he put into verse.—The remaining fragments of his composition are inadequate to explain his system of philosophy, which is not much more intelligible from the dialogue which Plato has written, entitled by his name, in which the tenets of Parmenides are mingled and confounded with his own. The dogma alluded to in the text was that, probably, by which he asserted that nothing in nature is produced or destroyed, but merely seems to be so to the senses. Empedocles, of Agrigentum, in Sicily, appears to have belonged to the Italic school. He possessed some poetical talent, and is supposed by Fabricius, Bib. Gr. i. p. 466, to have been the real author of the "Golden verses of Pythagoras." He asserted that it was impossible to judge of truth by the senses, without the assistance of reason, which is, however, led by their intervention to the contemplation of real nature, and the immutable essences of things. Epicharmus, of the island of Coos, whence he was removed by his father, at an early age, to Megara, and thence to Syracuse, was a disciple of the Pythagorean school. Having been prevented, by the tyranny of Hiero, from a public profession of philosophy, he devoted himself to dramatic poetry, and offended his sect by the introduction of the doctrines and precepts of Pythagoras on the stage. He is supposed by some to have been the inventor of comedy; an honor which is by others ascribed to Susarion. v. Horat. Ep. ii. 1. 58.—"Plautus ad exemplar Siculi properare Epicharmi." Among the poets alluded to in the text, Xenophanes is also to be reckoned, the founder of the Eleatic sect, and a native of Colophon. He left his country early in life, and supported himself, in the court of Hiero, by reciting elegiac and iambic verses, written in censure of the theogonies of Homer and Hesiod. Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathem. vii. 49. 110. Diog. Laert. iii. 12. ix. 27. Cic. Academ. ii. 5.

Θρυλοῦσιν.] Al. Θρυλλοῦσιν.

Ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι.] *In reasoning.* i. e. in the exercise of that reason, λόγος, which is a faculty of the mind, ὁ νοῦς.

Παραλυπῇ.] Steph. in marg. *Ipsi nullus corporis sensus molestus est: negotium facessit.* Infr.—τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν, κ. τ. λ.

τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν γίγνηται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μήδ' ἁπτομένη ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν γίγνεσθαι; Φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; Φαμὲν μέντοι νὴ Δία. Καὶ αὖ καλόν γέ τοι καὶ ἀγαθόν; Πῶς δ' οὔ; Ἦδη οὖν πώποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες; Οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἀλλ' ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτων; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑνὶ λόγῳ ἁπάντων τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν· ἆρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὧδ' ἔχει· ὃς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ

Ἐνταῦθα.] Sc. while occupied in active thought.

Φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον.] See c. 50. init. *εἶναι τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν.*— Olympiod. *αὐτὸ δίκαιον καλεῖ τὴν ἰδέαν*, h. e. *formam, speciem justi;* which is attainable by the mind alone. Cf. Tertullian. de Anima. c. 18. p. 247. t. iv. Semi. "Vult enim Plato esse quasdam substantias invisibiles, incorporales, supermundiales, divinas et æternas: quas appellet *ideas:* i. e. formas exemplares, et causas naturalium istorum manifestorum, et subjacentium corporalibus sensibus, et illas quidem esse veritates, hæc autem imagines earum." *Φαμὲν μέντοι νὴ Δία.* Olympiod.— Ὁ Σιμμίας ἑτοίμως συνκατατίθεται τῷ περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν λόγῳ, ὡς συνήθης Πυθαγορείοις.

Ἁπάντων τῆς οὐσίας.] Cf. Timæus, p. 27. 28. Ἔστιν οὖν δὴ κατ' ἐμὴν δοξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὂν μὲν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον· καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε. τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιλαπτὸν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταυτὰ ὄν· τόδ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, δοξαστὸν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν. Hence *οὐσία*, or *essence*, is the term employed to designate the *ἀεὶ κατὰ ταυτὰ ὄν*, so called in contradistinction to the objects of sense, which are continually fluctuating, so that none of them can ever continue uniform, constant, and the same. The divine reason, according to Plato, contains eternally within itself, ideas or intelligible forms, which, flowing from the fountain of the divine essence, have in themselves a real existence, and which, in the foundation of the visible world, were, by the energy of the efficient cause, united to matter, to produce sensible bodies. These ideas Plato defines to be the peculiar nature of things or essences as such; and asserts that they can remain the same, without beginning or end. Phædr. p. 278. de Rep. vii. p. 531. Timæus. c. 6. Enfield, Philos. B. ii. c. 8. s. 1.—Ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν; subjoined in explanation of *οὐσία* preced. HEIND. V. Cousin—*en un mot de l'essence de toutes choses, c'est a dire de ce qu'elles sont en elles memes?*

σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσειε καθαρώτατα, ὅς τις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ' ἕκαστον, μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μή τέ τιν' ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφελκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὑτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροίη θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγεὶς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὤτων καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ξύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, ὅταν κοινωνῇ; ἆρ' οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Σιμμία, εἴ πέρ τις καὶ ἄλλος, ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; Ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσηται.] h. e. *Qui maxime ac diligentissime instituerit; assuefecerit, &c.* STALL.

Αὐτὸ ἕκαστον.] *Unumquodque τῶν εἰδῶν νοητῶν* [intelligible forms] *si per se ipsum spectetur.* HEIND.

Καθαρώτατα.] *Most purely.* i. e. most independently of the organs of sense.

Παρατιθέμενος.] *Apponens sibi, adhibens ut comitem ac socium.* WYTT. Cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 580. A. Ὁ γὰρ μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι, μήτε τινὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἐφελκόμενος, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ καθαρῷ τῷ νῷ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐντυγχάνων, τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν μίτεισι. de Repub. vii. c. 12. sub. fin.—οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ, ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὁρμᾷ καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, &c.

Εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ.] Εἰλικρινεῖ is in a degree redundant, being implied in αὐτῇ καθ' αὑτὴν preced. It signifies *unmixed, unalloyed,* and is derived qu. τῇ εἴλῃ κρινόμενος, "quoniam ad splendorem solis, qui εἴλη dicitur, τὰ μεμιγμένα καὶ τὰ ἀμιγῆ facile διακρίνεται." Scap. Lex. V. Cousin.—*dégagée de tout élément étranger et sensible, d'appliquer immédiatement la pure essence de la pensée en elle-même à la recherche de la pure essence de chaque chose en soi, sans le ministere des yeux et des oreilles, sans aucune intervention du corps qui ne fait que troubler l'ame et l'empêcher de trouver la sagesse et la vérité; pour peu qu'elle ait avec lui le moindre commerce? Si l'on peut jamais parvenir à connaître l'essence des choses, n'est-ce pas par ce moyen?*

Θηρεύειν.] This term is in frequent use with Plato and his followers, in reference to the investigation of truth.—Olympiod. Οἰκεῖον τὸ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν, διότι ἀφανεῖ δυνάμει τῆς ψυχῆς γινώσκεται ταῦτα, καθάπερ καὶ οἱ θηραταὶ ἀφανεῖς σπεύδουσιν εἶναι τοῖς θηράμασιν.

Ἀπαλλαγείς.] Cic. Acadd. iv. 46. "Plato autem omne judicium veritatis, veritatemque ipsam, abductam ab opinionibus, et a sensibus, cogitationis ipsius et mentis, esse voluit."

Ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.] See Apol. Socr. c. 1. init.

Ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος.] *Qui rerum naturam,* i. e. *veritatem* (segregans animum a corpore) *intelliget.* GOTTL. Τὸ ὄν, i. q. ἀλήθεια, because truth is permanent and the same; besides, truth

§. 11. *Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτ' ἄττα λέγειν, ὅτι Κινδυνεύει τοι ὥς περ ἄτραπός τις ἡμᾶς ἐκφέρειν μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, ὅτι ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ ξυμπεφυρμένη ᾖ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοῦ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μή ποτε κτησόμεθα ἱκανῶς οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τό σῶμα διὰ*

is the knowledge of what a thing *actually is*. Whence Plato, Tim. c. 9. speaks of the Deity as *τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον*, and of the body as *τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε*, thus explained by Sextus Empiric.; *διὰ τὴν λεγομένην συνεχῆ ῥύσιν αὐτῶν*, (viz. *τῶν σωμάτων*) *ὡς μηδὲ τὴν τότε δεῖξιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι, μηδὲ εἶναι νομίζεσθαι. παρὸ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων γινόμενα μὲν, ὄντα δὲ οὐδέποτε καλεῖ τὰ σώματα.*

Ὑπερφυῶς—*ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις.*] *Mirifice quantum vera dicis.* WYTT.—*ὡς* having here the force of *ὅσον* in the forms *οὐράνιον ὅσον, μυρία ὅσα*, &c. It occurs frequently in this sense in the writings of Plato.

§. 11. Τοῖς *γνησίως φιλοσόφοις.*] *Veros, genuinosque philosophos,* GOTTL.—so called in opposition to the *πολιτικοί*, or those who aimed no higher than the practice of such virtues as affected the well-being of society, temperance, justice, &c. Olympiod. *Γνησίοις φιλοσόφοις εἶπε διὰ τοὺς πολιτικούς.*

Ὅτι.] See Matthiæ Gr. 624. 2. *b.*

Κινδυνεύει τοι ὥς περ ἀτραπός, κ. τ. λ.] Olympiod. Schol. *Φησὶν ὅτι ταύτην τὴν ἀτραπὸν ἰτέον, οὐ τὴν λεωφόρον· τοῦτ' ἔστι, καθαρτικῶς ζητέον· ἀτραπὸς γὰρ ἡ ὁδὸς, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἡ κάθαρσις ἡ ἐπὶ τὴν θεωρίαν ἄγουσα· οὐ τὴν λεωφόρον δὲ δεῖ ἰέναι, τοῦτ' ἔστι, τὴν τῶν πολλῶν. Καὶ Πυθαγόρειον γὰρ ἦν παράγγελμα, φεύγειν τας λεωφόρους.* Heindorf understands the passage to mean that a certain by-path, pursued by the true philosopher, who separates the soul from the things of sense, and not the high road, traversed by the many who make sense the medium of their judgment, appeared most likely to conduct the searchers after truth, who in their scrutiny took reason for their guide, and on this account, because while the soul is united to, and encumbered with the body, it is incapable of attaining the object of its otherwise unrestrained exertions. So V. Cousin. *Il n'y a qu'un sentier détourné qui puisse guider la raison dans ses recherches; car tant que nous aurons notre corps et que notre ame sera enchaînée dans cette corruption, jamais nous ne posséderons l'objet de nos désirs, c'est-à-dire la vérité;* to which he subjoins in a note; "Ce sentier détourné est évidemment le dégagement de l'ame; i. e. *λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος.* Heindorf further explains *μετὰ λόγου, præeunte et ducente ratione;* Cf. Matthiæ Gr. s. 587. 3. Demosth. Leptin. c. 90. *παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν λόγῳ μετὰ τῶν νόμων* [*ducentibus, præeuntibus legibus,* WOLF.] *τὰ δίκαια, λαμβάνοντες;* and in this sense proposes *ἐν τῇ μετὰ τοῦ λόγου σκέψει* as an equivalent arrangement to that in the text. Stallbaum understands by *ἡ μετὰ τοῦ λόγου σκέψις—veri investigatio mente et ratione instituta, segregata ac sejuncta corporis communione.* Schleierm. connects *ἡμᾶς* with *μετὰ τοῦ λόγου* in the sense of *ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸν λόγον.* But the spirit of the passage is best evinced and supported by the construction and explanation of Heindorf, as supr.

Μυρίας μὲν γὰρ, κ. τ. λ.] Olympiod *Τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ διὰ παραδειγμάτων ἐκτραγῴδουσιν ἀφηγούμενοι,* [i. e. *tragice exaggerant,* sc. *tragedias excitant in describendis impedimentis, quæ fiunt animo a corpore.* GOTTL.] *τὰ συμβαί-*

τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν· ἔτι δὲ ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν· ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι ἡμῖν γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ ταῦτα. τὸ

νοντα ἐμπόδια τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντος ἐν ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις τροφαῖς, καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἐν ταῖς νόσοις.

Καὶ φλυαρίας.] Olympiod. φλυαρίαν καλεῖ ὁ Πλάτων πᾶν τὸ περιττὸν, οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐν λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἔργοις.

Ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον.] *Ut, quod vero proverbio dicitur, omnino ne sapere quidem unquam quidquam propter corpus possimus*, WYTT., where it is to be observed that the adage is one to be confined altogether to the class of philosophers. Cf. Matthiæ Gr. s. 432. 5. Ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 636. Cf. de Repub. i. p. 347. D. Ὁ τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινὸς ἄρχων οὐ πίφυκε τὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖσθαι. Lachet. p. 183. D. Τοῦτον—ἐγὼ κάλλιον ἐθεασάμην ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιδεικνύμενον.

Καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις, κ. τ. λ.] Cic. Fin. i. 13. "Cupiditates enim sunt insatiabiles: quæ non modo singulos homines, sed universas familias evertunt: totam etiam labefactant sæpe rempublicam. Ex cupiditatibus odia, dissidia, discordia, seditiones, bella nascuntur: nec hæ sese foris solum jactant, nec tantum in allos cæco impetu incurrunt: sed intus etiam in animis inclusæ inter se dissident atque discordant; ex quo vitam amarissimam necesse est effici; ut sapiens solum, amputatis circumcisaque inanitate omni et errore, naturæ finibus contentus, sine ægritudine posset et sine metu vivere." James, Epist. iv. 1. Πόθεν πόλεμοι καὶ μάχαι ἐν ὑμῖν; Οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν, ἐκ τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑμῶν τῶν στρατευομένων ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ὑμῶν; Ἐπιθυμεῖτε, καὶ οὐκ ἔχετε· φονεύετε καὶ ζηλοῦτε, καὶ οὐ δύνασθε ἐπιτυχεῖν· μάχεσθε καὶ πολεμεῖτε, οὐκ ἔχετε, διὰ τὸ μὴ αἰτεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς· Αἰτεῖτε, καὶ οὐ λαμβάνετε, διότι κακῶς αἰτεῖσθε, ἵνα ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ὑμῶν δαπανήσητε. Μοιχοὶ καὶ μοιχαλίδες, οὐκ οἴδατε, ὅτι ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου ἔχθρα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστιν;

Διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων, κ. τ. λ.] Olympiod. Πῶς διὰ τὰ χρήματα πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίνονται; πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας ἐγίνοντο· Ῥητέον οὖν ὡς μὲν Ἀρποκρατίων, ἢ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον, ἢ ὅτι καὶ ἡ τῶν λαφύρων ἐλπὶς ἐπιτείνει τὸν πόλεμον· ὡς δὲ Λογγῖνος, τὰ ἐκτὸς πάντα χρήματα καλεῖ. V. Ruhnken in Dissert. de Longin. c. 6. p. 8. Fabric. Bib. Græc. ii. p. 61. Cf. Virg. Æneid. iii. 54. "Quid non mortalia pectora cogis, Auri sacra fames."

Καὶ ἐκ τούτου—διὰ ταῦτα πάντα.] i. e. *Et ex hac corporis causa, propter has cupiditates, et negotia, otium tractandæ philosophiæ nobis intercipitur.* WYTT.—Ἐκ τουτου, in consequence of the body, as a means;—*διὰ ταῦτα πάντα*, on account of its affections, as a result, &c.

Φιλοσοφίας πέρι.] *Quod ad philosophiam attinet.* HEIND.

δ' ἔσχατον πάντων, ὅτι ἐάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὖ πανταχοῦ παραπῖπτον θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθορᾷν τἀληθές. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καὶ φαμὲν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσι δὲ οὔ. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γνῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστι κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασι· τότε γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ' οὔ. καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅ τι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς. καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μετὰ τοιούτων τε

Τὸ δ' ἔσχατον πάντων, ὅτι, κ. τ. λ.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 432. 5.

Παραπῖπτον.] *Quod casu et fortuito adeoque tempore interveniat alieno.* — Fisch. Θόρυβον is used in reference to what affects the ears, ταραχὴν, the eyes, and ἐκπλήττει, of the senses generally. Körner.

Οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν—φρονήσεως.] See Matthiæ Gr. 474. *b.*

Ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει.] i. e. What has been hitherto said of the body and its passions, as infr. c. 12. ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται.

Δυοῖν θάτερον.] These words form an apposition, being introduced into a proposition with ἤ—ἤ, without having any other connexion with it. Matthiæ Gr. s. 433. Obs. 1.

Ὅ τι μή.] See in Criton. c. 14. sub. init.

Ἀναπιμπλώμεθα.] See Apol. Socr. c. 20. a med. ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν.

Ὡς τὸ εἰκός.] *In all likelihood.* Aristid. Orat. i. p. 253. fully, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς ἔχει.—Μετὰ τοιούτων, i. e. the gods and good men. c. 8. supr.—Ἴσως τἀληθές, *probably true*; ἴσως being used as indicative of a high degree of probability, ὄντως, of certainty itself. Legg. xii. p. 695. G. KA. Ἴσως. ΑΘΗΝ. Οὐκ ἴσως, ἀλλ' ὄντως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ταύτης οὐκ ἔστι σοφωτέρα μέθοδος ἀνθρώπων οὐδενί. Heindorf observes upon ἴσως, supr., that it is peculiarly expressive of the modesty of the Attic style, to speak hesitatingly of what was positively known and believed. The prudent reserve [εὐλάβεια, Olympiod.] which Plato generally used in treating of such subjects as were manifestly beyond the grasp of human comprehen-

ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἴσως τἀληθές, μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ. Τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως; Παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

§. 12. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτες, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴ πέρ που ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἥ γε ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν ἐμοὶ προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ ὃς ἡγεῖταί οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥς περ κεκαθαρμένην. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἆρα οὐ τοῦτο ξυμβαίνει ὅ περ πά-

sion, was a well-known and commendable characteristic of the Socratic school. Plutarch. de S. N. V. p. 549. B.

Μὴ καθαρῷ γάρ, κ. τ. λ.] Plutarch. de Is. et Osir. p. 352. D. καθαροῦ γὰρ, ᾗ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, οὐ θεμιτὸν ἅπτεσθαι μὴ καθαρῷ. Hierocl. in Aur. Carm. p. 6. μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 517. Obs. 4. and s. 608. c.

Λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν.] *Dicere et existimare omnes, qui doctrinæ recte studeant.* WYTT.

§. 12. Πολλὴ ἐλπὶς — κτήσασθαι.] The construction would probably require κτήσεσθαι or κτήσασθαι ἄν, but after verbs of a like signification to that in the text, the aorist is not unusual. Cf. infr. ἐλπὶς ἐστιν—τυχεῖν. Sympos. p. 193. D. ὃς—εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ἐλπίδας μεγίστας παρέχεται καταστήσας ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν καὶ ἰασάμενος μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι. Pindar, Pyth. iv. 432. Ἥλπετο δ' οὐκέτι οἱ κεῖνόν γε πράξασθαι πόνον.

Εἴ πέρ που ἄλλοθι.] *If any where at all.*

Ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι.] Stephens, and others, read, ἐν τῷ παρόντι, which, as Heindorf justly observes, should have been followed by γίγνεται, not γέγονεν.

Καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ.] Socrates had already asserted of himself, ὥστ' εὐελπίς εἰμι εἶναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι, καὶ — πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς—but now that he had shown it to be the province of all true philosophers, to aim at a perfect freedom of the mind and its attributes from the body and its influences, he concludes that any other, who had so achieved his moral independence, should welcome like himself, with willingness and hope, the prospect of a pure and perfect life to come.

Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι—τοῦτο ξυμβαίνει.] For ξυμβ. κάθαρσιν εἶναι τοῦτο, as infr. c. 19. init. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα ξυμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, &c. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 297. This doctrine of the purification of the soul was borrowed from the Orphic and Pythagorean schools, which inculcated an austere and constant course of discipline, as tending to emancipate the soul from the contagion of things terrestrial, and to restore it unspotted to its celestial source. — KÖRNER.

λαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα μόνην καθ' αὑτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὡς περ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; Παντάπασί γ', ἦ δ' ὅς. Λύειν δέ γε αὐτήν, ὡς φαμέν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστι τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος. ἢ οὔ; Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν ὅ περ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοῖον ἂν εἴη ἄνδρα παρασκευάζονθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν, κἄπειθ' ἥκοντος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν; οὐ γελοῖον; Πῶς δ' οὔ; Τῷ ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνήσκειν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἥκιστ' αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὑτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν

Συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι.] Cf. Hom Il. θ. 240. ἐσαγείρατο θυμὸν and Schol. in loc. νοῦν ἠθροίζετο.

Ὡς περ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος.] In such appositions the Greek writers seldom repeat the preposition, except for the sake of emphasis, as supr. and infr. c. 33. ὥσπερ δι' εἰργμοῦ διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι, &c. c. 64. ὥσπερ κατ' ἴχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα. — Phædr. p. 250. D. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθε. Whence the latter ἐκ has been in some editions incorrectly omitted.

Τοῦτο γε θάνατος.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 472. 2. *e.*

Τὸ μελέτημα.] *The study, practice, or pursuit.*

Ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι.] h. e. *qui se ita componit et hoc studet, ut vitam agat morti quam proximam.*— STALL.—οὕτω ζῆν, is elegantly redundant here; Cf. Herodot. i. 196. ἐγγυητὰς χρῆν καταστήσαντα, ἢ μὴν συνοικήσειν αὐτῇ, οὕτω ἀπάγεσθαι.— WYTT.

Τούτου.] Sc. τοῦ τεθνάναι.

Ἀποθνήσκειν — καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι] Supr. c. 9. init.

Διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι.] Schol. ἀντὶ τοῦ διαβεβλημένως ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ σῶμα. *Ab omni parte inimici sunt corpori, infensi; corpus ut inimicum suspicantur et oderunt.* WYTT. Upon εἰ γὰρ preced. see Matthiæ Gr. s. 630. 2. *f.*—upon αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὑτήν, seq. s. 616. and upon the indicatives, διαβέβληνται and ἐπιθυμοῦσι, with the optatives, φοβοῖντο and ἀγανακτοῖεν following εἰ, s. 524. Obs. 1.

ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοῖντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν οἳ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστιν, οὗ διὰ βίου ἤρων, τυχεῖν· ἤρων δὲ φρονήσεως· ᾧ τε διαβέβληντο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι ξυνόντος αὐτοῖς; ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ υἱέων ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἑκόντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς Ἅιδου ἐλθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαί τι ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ ξυνέσεσθαι· φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρῶν, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἀξίως λόγου ἢ ἐν Ἅιδου, ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀποθνήσκων καὶ οὐκ ἄσμενος εἶσιν αὐτόσε; οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γ' ᾖ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅ περ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος;

§. 13. Πολλὴ μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν ἱκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρὸς ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα μελλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ'

Εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν.] Here the original proposition repeated, is turned into a question. Math. Gr. s. 636.

Ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν.] *For the sake of human objects of affection*, to which are opposed, ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία, which may be considered as θεῖα παιδικά, *divine objects of regard*; παιδικά, admitting of being applied to whatever is dearly cherished or beloved, may be affirmed of philosophy, as the favorite of its genuine professors. Heindorf compares Gorg. p. 482. A. ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν. V. Markland ad Tyr. Max. Diss. XXXV. 1.— Ἑκόντες ἠθέλησαν, i. e. having sought the accomplishment of their desires, by self-destruction.

Τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα.] *This same hope*. sc. which was entertained by those who had descended into the lower regions, of renewing their interrupted love.

Μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 3.

Ἀξίως λόγου.] i. q. ἱκανῶς, supr. c. 11. and καθαρῶς, seq. Körn.

Οἴεσθαί γε χρή.] Sc. ὡς πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη. Wytt.

Ὅ περ ἄρτι ἔλεγον.] Stephens correctly refers this to οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, seq.

§. 13. Τοῦτο ἀνδρὸς.] Τοῦτο is explained by ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγαν. seqq. Heind. Cf. Xenoph. Œcon. iv. 19.— Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἡγοῦμαι μέγα τεκμήριον ἄρχοντος ἀρετῆς εἶναι, ᾧ ἂν ἑκόντες ὑπωνται καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς παραμένειν θέλωσι.

Ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν.] Thus explained by Heindorf; *non erat philosophus tum*

ἦν φιλόσοφος ἀλλά τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δέ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἤτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ καὶ ἀμφότερα. Πάνυ γ', ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὡς λέγεις. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει; Πάντως δή που, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἣν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι ἀλλ' ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἆρ' οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγωροῦσί τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι τὴν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρίαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι

quisnam esse videbatur; ἆρ' ἦν being a form in frequent use with the Greek writers, to indicate the deceitfulness and disappointment of a previous hope. Cf. Odyss. π. 418. sqq. *Ἀντίνο', ὕβριν ἔχων, κακομήχανε, καί δὶ σὲ φασιν Ἐν δήμῳ Ἰθάκης μεθ' ὁμήλικας ἔμμεν' ἄριστον Βουλῇ καὶ μύθοισι σὺ δ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῖος ἔησθα.* Eurip. Hipp. 360. *Κύπρις οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν θεός, Ἀλλ' εἴ τι μεῖζον ἄλλο γίγνεται θεοῦ, Ἥ τήνδε κἀμὲ καὶ δόμους ἀπώλεσεν.*

Τις φιλοσώματος.] See infr. c. 32. init.

Ἢ καὶ ἀμφότερα.] Apol. Socr. c. 8. extr. Cf. Homer. Il. γ'. 178. *Οὗτος γ'—Ἀμφότερον, βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθὸς, κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής.*

Τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις.] Videl. *iis, qui student animum sejungere a corpore atque sperant se sapientiam esse assecuturos, ubi venerint ad inferos.* STALL.

Οἱ πολλοί.] *Vulgus,* [inf. *τῶν ἄλλων,*] i. e. *ii,* qui non possunt in numero virorum philosophorum haberi. STALL. v. infr. c. 31. sub. fin. *Μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι.* Suid. *θαυμάζειν.* See Horat. Ep. i. 6. 1. "Nil admirari—" 9. sqq. "Qui timet his adversa, fere miratur eodem Quo cupiens, pacto; pavor est utrobique molestus, Improvisa simul species exterret utrumque:" and M'Caul, in loco citt. The verb *πτοεῖσθαι* is used here like the Latin *trepidare,* or *metuere,* as expressive of that tremulous apprehension attending the desires and affections of the body, which arises from the uncertainty of their future fulfilment. Cf. infr. c. 57. *πολὺν χρόνον ἐπτοημένῃ.* This temperance, or equanimity with regard to the affections, which even the vulgar, though they do not possess, are still competent to define, is limited in truth, as well as the preceding virtue, *ἀνδρία,* to philosophers alone. V. Cousin.—*et la tempérance, cette vertu qui consiste à maîtriser ses passions, ne convient-elle pas particulièrement à ceux qui méprisent leur corps et qui se sont consacrés à l'étude de la sagesse?*

Εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις—δόξει σοι.] Heindorf compares with this construction, Protag. c. 39. *εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν, ὃ Σώκρ. τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτό σε διδάξει.*—Menon. p. 71. A. *εἰ γοῦν τινα ἐθέλεις οὕτως ἐρέσθαι τῶν ἐνθάδε, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ;* whence he prefers the reading as supr. to Vulg. *ἐθελήσεις.*

Τὴν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρίαν τε καὶ σωφρ.] i. e. The semblances and counterfeit of these virtues amongst the vulgar many, the reality of which could be only felt and appreciated by the wiser few. See Cicero, de Fin. i. 10. 14. 18. ii. 14. 15. Socrates now proceeds to prove how it is that the philosopher

ἄτοπος. Πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἶσθα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἡγοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν εἶναι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι. καί τοι ἄτοπόν γε δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλίᾳ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι. Πάνυ μεν οὖν. Τί δαί, οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτων οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν; ἀκολασίᾳ τινὶ σώφρονές εἰσι; καί τοι φαμέν γέ που ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον. εἶναι τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην· φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἑτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. καί τοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅμως ξυμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατουμένοις ὑφ' ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν. τοῦτο δ'

alone is possessed of those virtues in all their perfection and efficacy. The dread of some greater evil emboldens the ignorant against the fear of death; but there is an inconsistency in courage arising thus from cowardice: equally so in the abstinence which is owing to intemperance, and yet amongst the vulgar, these incongruities do actually exist.—And for this reason; their's is not like the philosopher's, an utter independence of the passions, but a reciprocation of them, like the interchange of money. They call it intemperance, to be subject to their yoke, but still, if they forbear from the pursuit of one pleasure, it is but to secure the enjoyment of another and a more probable. So with their fortitude, which is the offspring of despair, and not like the philosopher's, the calmly anticipated result of hope. Hence it is evident that the latter is imbued with the essence of those virtues of which the former are but familiar with the name, and of which, in their attempt to practise, they only can succeed in the abuse.

Τῷ δεδιέναι—καὶ δέει.] i. e. *By the act and principle of fear.*

Δειλίᾳ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι.] Cf. Plutarch. Vit. Romul. p. 37. D. ὁ δὲ (sc. Romulus) δουλείας φυγῇ παρούσης καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιφερομένης, ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ἀτεχνῶς ὑπὸ δίους ἀνδρεῖος γενόμενος.

Οἱ κόσμιοι.] *Homines moribus compositis, temperantiæ et munditiei studiosi.* GOTTL. In the text it appears nearly synonymous with σώφρονες. "What," says Socrates, "of the temperate amongst them? Are they not so affected as to owe their abstinence to intemperance? Which, impossible as it may appear, still to such an affection as this they are assuredly liable, in consequence of their foolish and inadequate notions upon the subject of the virtue which they have not the sense to comprehend."—Ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐτοῖς, κ. τ. λ.—h. e. ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην, ὁ αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει, τούτῳ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν.—Εὐήθη, i. q. ἀτοπόν, supr. Cf. Alcibiad. ii. c. 5. οἱ δὲ ἐν εὐφημοτάτοις ὀνόμασι βουλόμενοι κατονομάζειν οἱ μὲν μεγαλοψύχους, οἱ δὲ εὐήθεις, ἕτεροι δὲ ἀκάκους καὶ ἀ-

ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ᾧ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο, τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δι' ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσωφρονίσθαι. Ἔοικε γάρ. Ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ᾖ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγή, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω, ὥς περ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ᾖ ἐκεῖνο μόνον το νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀνθ' οὗ δεῖ ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα

πείρους καὶ ἰνεούς. Terent. Phorm. iii. 2. 63. "homo suavis!" KÖRNER.

Ὦι νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο.] Fully, ᾧ ὅμοιον εἶναι ἐλέγετο. Matthiæ Gr. s. 473. Obs. 1.

Μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη.] Sc. ὁρᾶ or φοβοῦμαι μὴ γάρ, &c. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. Stallbaum explains the passage; *Noli hunc sentiendi agendique rationem probare; vide enim, ne hæc non sit recta ad virtutem adipiscendam permutatio, ut voluptates cum voluptatibus commutemus.* V. Cousin: *Songe que ce n'est pas un très-bon échange pour la vertu que de changer des voluptés pour des voluptés, des tristesses pour des tristesses, &c.* In the older editions ἀλλαγή was not found, and ὁδὸς was understood, by a common ellipse, to ἡ ὀρθή, to which, however, Wyttenbach supplied ἀρετή, as virtue itself, and not the way to it, was the subject of discussion, and so read ἡ ὀρθὴ ἀρετή, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονάς, κ. τ. λ.—Καταλλάττεσθαι—Cf. Aristot. Ethic. Nicomach. iii. 9. ἕτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται. Ælian. Nat. An. viii. 1. θάνατον δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀνδρείας ἠλλάξατο.

Καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω.] *Ominoque majora permutare minoribus velut nummismata.* HEIND. i. e. balancing the passions and affections, with a view to being guided by their relative degrees, a mode which is evidently inadmissible in estimating the virtues. V. Cousin—*Et de mettre, pour ainsi dire, ses passions en petite monnaie.*

Μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν.] *The only sterling coin.* V. Cousin. *la seule bonne monnaie.* Cf. Philo Jud. de Somn. p. 1120. C. τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς νόμισμα, παιδείαν, ἐξιστάντες καὶ κατακιρματίζοντες οἰκτρῶς ἀναλίσκουσιν.

Ἀνθ' οὗ.] The preposition ἀντί, with the genitive, sometimes accompanies the verbs signifying *to exchange.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 365. Obs. 1.

Καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα, κ. τ. λ.] *Vereorque ne quæ hoc numismate emuntur venduntur, ea omnia sint re vera, tum fortitudo, tum temperantia, tum justitia, omninoque vera virtus sit cum sapientia conjuncta, &c.* HEIND., who proposes, however, as ὠνεῖσθαι is seldom, if ever, used in a passive sense, to read the passage, καὶ ἃ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμεθα τε καὶ πιπρασκόμεθα. Wyttenbach objects to the text, on the grounds that ὠνούμενα cannot be referred to τούτου, i. e. φρονήσεως. For if anything be purchased for prudence, it would appear that prudence should then be parted with as the price, which is contrary to the injunction of Socrates, that prudence should be the thing to be acquired. Accordingly he arranges and interprets the passage as follows; καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα τε πιπρασκόμενα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενα· i. e. *et si hac omnia vendantur, et cum hac* (i. e. prudenter) *omnia emantur, tum revera constat et fortitudo et temperantia, et justitia, et summatim vera virtus, quæ sine prudentia esse nequit.* But the passage may be admitted as it stands, as a general explanation of καταλάττεσθαι supr., and, as Socrates had asserted that a reciprocation of pleasures, pains, or fears, with similar affections, even though unequal in degree, was not ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγή, so he proceeds to affirm what this exchange, properly so called, consisted in, which was nothing else than the interchange of prudence for its equivalent virtues. Prudence was the τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, (the metaphor being

καὶ μετὰ τούτου ἀνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ᾖ, καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀληθὴς ἀρετὴ ᾖ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ᾖ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ᾖ κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ

continued from *μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττ. ὥσπ. νομ.* supr.) which none who possessed would part with for less than its value, nor could any so part with except in name, prudence being only the aggregate of the virtues, as mentioned supr. in detail.

'Ανδρία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη.] Cf. Plat. de Repub. iv. cc. 6. 10. 16. where the four virtues, as supr., prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude, are mentioned, as also in Legg. iii. p. 688. p. 963. B., a division which Wyttenbach supposes to have been borrowed from the Pythagoreans. Cf. Cic. de Offic. i. 5. "Omne quod honestum est, id quatuor partium oritur ex aliqua: aut enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur, aut in hominum societate tuenda, tribuendoque suum cuique, et rerum contractarum fide: aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac robore: aut in omnium quæ fiunt, quæque dicuntur, ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia." The Stoics held these to be the primary virtues; prudence, as respected the choice and pursuit of good; temperance, the government of the appetites and desires; fortitude, the endurance of what is commonly esteemed evil, and justice, the offices of social life. Enf. Phil. ii. 11. 1.

Ξυλλήβδην] *In sum.*

'Αληθὴς ἀρετὴ ᾗ μετὰ φρονήσεως.] Socrates decides upon wisdom or prudence as the sum and basis of all the virtues; Cf. Meno, c. 24. Upon which Aristotle, Eth. Nicom. vi. 13. Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει, τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως ἔλεγε.

Καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγ.] h. e. *Sive adsint sive absint.* STALL.

Χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως—] *Disjuncta autem hæc a sapientia et invicem commutata vide ne nihil sint nisi adumbratio quædam virtutis.* STALL.— χωριζόμενα—καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα referring to ἡδονας—λυπας, &c. supr.

Σκιαγραφία.] *A semblance*, or *similitude*; — a metaphor taken from painters or sculptors who only imitate reality. So virtue does not actually, but in appearance merely, exist among those who reciprocate the passions apart from wisdom. Cf. Cic. pro M. Cœl. 5. "Habuit ille maximarum non expressa signa, sed adumbrata virtutum." Tusc. Quæst. iii. 2. "Consectatur nullam eminentem effigiem virtutis, sed adumbratam imaginem gloriæ." Offic. i. 15. "simulacrum virtutis;" which Cicero applies to the mere shadowing-forth of virtue, after Plato, Sympos. 190. εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς. Cf. Theætet. c. 7. p. 111. Fisch. ψευδῆ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. Plutarch. adv. Epicur. p. 1091. D. Πλάτων—ἀπηγόρευε τὰς λυπῶν καὶ πόνων ἀπαλλαγὰς ἡδονὰς μὴ νομίζειν ἀλλ' οἷον τινα σκιαγραφίαν ἢ μίξιν οἰκείου καὶ ἀλλοτρίου, καθάπερ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος.

Τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι.] Supr. c. 11. ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι. *Revera autem certo purgatio talium omnium, et temperantia, et justitia, et fortitudo: atque ipsa prudentia vide ne sit purgatio.*

ἀνδρία καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ᾖ. Καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσὶ γὰρ δή, φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς, ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι· οὗ-

WYTT. Virtue, in truth and reality, consists in the purification of the passions, which is effected by temperance, justice, fortitude, and prudence itself; through the medium of these qualities, and as their origin and source.—Τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, Intell. ἡδονῶν, φόβων, κ. τ. λ. This doctrine of the purifying of the mind by the study of virtue, i. e. by philosophy, was inculcated by many of the ancient philosophical writers, but eminently by Plato, through the whole range of his compositions, whence the frequent mention of the virtues and courses of discipline, entitled καθαρτικαι. V. Aristot. Poet. 16. Politic. viii. 7.

Καθαρμός τις.] This was the first part of the μυήσις, or initiation, which took place by the river Ilissus, where the person to be purified stood, having under his feet the Διὸς κώδιον, or skin of a victim offered to Jove. The second grade of initiation was the τῆς τελετῆς παράδοσις; the third, ἐποπτεία; the fourth, ἀνάδεσις καὶ στεμμάτων ἐπίθεσις, and the fifth, τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ θειοῖς συνδίαιτος εὐδαιμονία. See Robinson's Grec. Antiq. iii. c. 19.—ΕΛΕΥΣΙΝΙΑ.

Οὗτοι.] *Noti illi, celebrati illi;* Orpheus, Musæus, &c. STALL. Καταστήσαντες; Eurip. Bacch. 21. Κἀκεῖ χορεύσας καὶ καταστήσας ἐμὰς Τελετὰς—ἐς τήνδε—ἦλθον πόλιν.

Ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται.] This doctrine was taken, according to Olympiodorus, from one of the Orphic hymns. Fragm. Orph. p. 509. Herm. Hymn. in Cerer. 485. Ὄλβιος, ὃς τάδ' ὄπωπεν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων· Ὃς δ' ἀτελὴς, ἱερῶν ὃς τ' ἄμμορος, οὔποθ' ὁμοίων Αἶσαν ἔχει, φθίμενος περ, ὑπὸ ζόφῳ εὐρώεντι. Schol. Olymp. διόπερ καὶ παρῳδεῖ ἔπος Ὀρφικὸν τὸ λέγον ὅτι ὅστις δ' ἡμῶν ἀτέλεστος, ὥσπερ ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται ἐν ᾅδου. Cf. de Rep. ii. p. 363. D.—Μουσαῖος—καὶ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ—τοὺς ἀνοσίους καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλόν τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν ᾅδου,—and infr. E. Βίβλων ὅμαδον παρέχονται (οἱ μάντεις) Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως—καθ' ἃς θυηπολοῦσι πείθοντες—ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσι μὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἳ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς· μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει. Whence Diog. Cynic. apud Laert. vi. 39. γελοῖον εἰ Ἀγησίλαος μὲν καὶ Ἐπαμινώνδας ἐν τῷ βορβόρῳ διάξουσιν, εὐτελεῖς δέ τινες μεμυημένοι ἐν ταῖς μακάρων νήσοις ἔσονται.—Βορβόρος, properly ἡ ἐκ τῆς βορᾶς κόπρος. Scap. Lex.

Ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος—μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει.] The ancient writers have frequently made mention of the future felicity of the initiated. Soph. apud. Plutarch. de Aud. Poet. c. 4. ὡς τρισόλβιοι Κεῖνοι βροτῶν, οἳ ταῦτα διελθόντες τέλη Μολῶς' εἰς ᾅδου. v. Aristoph. Ran. 346. Æschin. in Axioch. c. 20. Upon this sense of τέλη, Cf. Cic. in Verr. v. 72.—"teque Ceres, et Libera, quarum sacra, sicut opiniones hominum et religiones ferunt, longe maximis atque occultissimis cæremoniis continentur: a quibus initia vitæ, atque victus, legum, morum, mansuetudinis, humanitatis exempla hominibus et civitatibus data ac dispertita esse dicuntur."

Ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοὶ βάκχ. ὅ. τ. π.] Taken also from an Orphic hymn. Schol. Aristoph. Equit. 406. βάκχον οὐ τὸν Διόνυσον ἐπάλουν μό-

πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καί τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή; Ἐγωγ' οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι ἥν τινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὔκουν γ' ἂν οἶμαι, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινὰ νῦν ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ' εἰ κωμῳδοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.

μυθία signifying, not merely consolation, but, as Wyttenbach justly observes, an assurance of the judgment, when it hesitates to admit an apparently improbable position.

Ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχή, κ. τ. λ.] This sentence contains the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul. — Τινὰ δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν; Olympiod. Τινὰ ζωὴν ἔχει καὶ γνωστικὴν ἐπιστήμην. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δύναμις τὴν ζωτικὴν ἐνέργειαν δηλοῖ, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὴν ἐπιστημονικήν. Stall.

Διαμυθολογῶμεν.] Olympiod. Τί οὖν μῦθος τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ Σωκράτους; ἢ τὴν ἐξ ἑπομένου πίστιν μυθολογίαν ἐκάλεσεν ὁ Σωκράτης, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ προκείμενος λόγος; κατασκευάζει γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἀθανασίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ὁρμώμενος, ἀλλ' ἐκ τινος ἑπομένου τοῦ μεταβάλλειν τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὴν ζωὴν εἰς ἄλληλα. ταύτην οὖν μυθολογίαν εἶπεν.

Ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης.] Infr. c. 18. a med. ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας. Cf. Æschyl. a. c. Th. 555. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τῷδ' ὃν λέγως τὸν Ἀρκάδα, ἀνὴρ ἄκομπος.

Οὐδ' εἰ κωμῳδοποιὸς εἴη.] In allusion to Aristophanes, Amipsias; Diog. Laert. ii. 28; and Eupolis. Olympiod. τί βούλεται ἐνταῦθα τῷ Πλάτωνι ἡ μνήμη τῶν κωμῳδοποιῶν; ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐ δώσω χώραν τοῖς κωμῳδοποιοῖς διαλοιδορεῖσθαί μοι· ὁ γὰο Εὔπολις φησι περὶ Σωκράτους, Τί δῆτ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀδολέσχην καὶ πτωχόν, Ὅς τ' ἄλλα μὲν πεφρόντικεν, Πόθεν δὲ κατάφαγεῖν ἔχοι, Τοῦτον κατημέληκεν. The common taunt, *τῆς ἀδολεσχίας περὶ τῶν μετεώρων*, which the vulgar threw out against Socrates and the philosophers in general, was taken up by the comic poets, and occurs in several instances throughout the writings of Plato, in many of which the expression is evidently repeated in sarcastic ridicule of the ignorance and folly by which its proper meaning was abused. Cratyl. c. 39. κινδυνεύουσι γοῦν—οἱ πρῶτοι τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενοι οὐ φαῦλοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μετεωρολόγοι τινὲς καὶ ἀδολέσχαι. Parmenid. c. 19. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμή, ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἕλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασον μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολέσχίας, ἕως νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. So in that celebrated passage, de Repub. xi. p. 488, where the true philosopher is compared to the pilot of a vessel, and the ignorant mob in a state, to its mutinous crew, Socrates says: τοιούτων δὴ [i. e. the mutiny on board,] περὶ τὰς ναῦς γιγνομένων, τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνητικὸν οὐκ ἠγῇ ἂν τῷ ὄντι μετεωροσκόπον τε καὶ ἀδολέσχην καὶ ἄχρηστόν σφισι καλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς οὕτω κατεσκευασμέναις ναυσὶ πλωτήρων;—Οὐ δὴ οἶμαι δεῖσθαί σε ἐξεταζομένην τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φιλοσόφους τὴν διάθεσιν ἔοικεν. Cf. Aristoph. Nub. 1482. ἀλλ', ὦ φίλ' Ἑρμῆ, μηδαμῶς θύμαινέ μοι, μηδέ μ' ἐπιτρίψῃς ἀλλὰ συγγνώμην ἔχε, ἐμοῦ παρανοήσαντος ἀδολεσχίᾳ, &c. The term ἀδολεσχῆς,

§. 15. Σκεψώμεθα δ' αὐτὸ τῇδέ πῃ, εἴτε ἄρα ἐν Ἅιδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὔ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος, οὗτος

whence ἀδολεσχῶ supr., had been originally applied to those who undertook to explain the difficulties and obscurities of natural phenomena, without an adequate knowledge of the subject of which they professed themselves competent to treat; it was subsequently used in a commendatory sense, but continued to be employed in the former by those who could only vituperate the virtues they did not care to possess.

§. 15. Σκεψώμεθα.] Olympiod. Ὁ σκοπὸς τῷ προκειμένῳ λόγῳ δεῖξαι, οὐκ ἀθάνατον τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλ' ἐπιδιαμένουσαν χρόνον τινὰ μετὰ τὸν χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὐ καθάπερ Ἰαμβλιχος οἴεται ἕκαστον λόγον δεικνῦναι τὴν ἀθανασίαν τῆς ψυχῆς.—οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ ἐρωτῶν τοῦτο ἠρώτησε τὸ πρόβλημα, οὔτε ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος ἔδειξε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κέβης ἠρώτησεν, εἰ δυνατὸν τὴν ψυχὴν χωρισθεῖσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιδιαμένειν, καὶ μὴ δίκην πνεύματος διασκορπίζεσθαι. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης δείκνυσιν ὅτι ἐπιδιαμένει χρόνον τινὰ μετὰ τὸν χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματος, οὐ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἀεί, ἔδειξε. Forst.

Αὐτὸ τῇδέ πῃ.] Αὐτὸ is explained by εἴτε ἄρα ἐν ᾅδ. and τῇδή πῃ refers to seqq. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν, &c.— Heind.

Παλαιὸς μὲν — τις λόγος.] See Herodot. ii. c. 123. where the historian evidently refers to the doctrines of the Pythagoreans. How closely the preexistence of the soul was united with the idea of its immortality amongst the ancient philosophers, appears from the following passage in Cudworth. Intell. Syst. B. i. c. 1. s. 31. "It is also further evident, that this same principle which thus led the ancients to hold the soul's immortality, or its future permanence after death, must needs determine them likewise to maintain its προϋπαρξις, or *preexistence*, and consequently its μετενσωμάτωσις, or transmigration. For that which did preexist before the generation of any animal, and was then somewhere else, must needs transmigrate into the body of that animal where now it is. But, as for that other transmigration of human souls into the bodies of brutes, though it cannot be denied but that many of the ancients admitted it also, yet, Timæus Locrus, and divers others of the Pythagoreans, rejected it, any otherwise than as it might be taken for an allegorical description of that beastly transformation that is made of men's souls by vice.— Aristotle tells us again, agreeably to what was declared before, ὅτι μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διετέλησαν οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνεσθαι τι προϋπάρχοντος. *That the ancient philosophers were afraid of nothing more than this one thing, that anything should be made out of nothing preexistent.* And, therefore, they must needs conclude, that the souls of all animals preexisted before their generations. And indeed it is a thing very well known, that, according to the sense of philosophers, these two things were always included together in that one opinion of the soul's immortality, namely, *its pre-existence* as well as its *post-existence*. Neither was there any of the ancients, before Christianity, that held the soul's future permanency after death, who did not likewise assert its preexistence; they clearly perceiving, that if it were once granted that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might also be corrupted. And, therefore, the assertors of the soul's immortality commonly began here; first to prove its pre-existence, proceeding thence, afterwards, to establish its permanency after death." Cf. Tertullian de Anima. xxiii. p. 275. "Illius (Platonis) est enim in Phædone, quod animæ hinc euntes sunt illuc, et inde huc." Olympiod in Fragm. Orph. p. 510. ed Herm. Ὀρφικός τε γὰρ καὶ Πυθαγόρειος ὁ πάλιν ἄγων τὰς ψυχὰς εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πάλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀνάγων, καὶ τοῦτο κύκλῳ πολλάκις. in Menon. p. 81. B. καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅσοι θεῖοί εἰσιν—φασὶ—τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνα-

οὖ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων. Καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἄλλο τι εἶεν ἂν ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὖσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερὸν γένοιτο ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων. εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἄν του δέοι λόγου. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Μὴ τοίνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἦ δ' ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾷον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ ξυλλήβδην ὅσα περ ἔχει γένεσιν, περὶ πάντων ἴδωμεν, ἆρ' οὐτωσὶ

τον καὶ τότε μὲν τελευτᾷν, ὃ δὴ ἀποθνήσκειν καλοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ οὐδέποτε, κ. τ. λ.] Plat. Epist. vii. 716. B. *πείθεσθαι δ' οὕτως ἀεὶ χρὴ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις, οἳ δὴ μηνύουσιν ἡμῖν ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν εἶναι.* Compare the following passages from Empedocles: Ἄλλο δέ σοι ἐρέω φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν ἑκαστῳ Θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένη θανάτοιο γενέθλη (al. lect. τελεύτη) Ἀλλα μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων Ἔστι, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν:—and again, Νήπιοι, οὐ γάρ σφιν ὀλιχόφρονες εἰσὶ μέριμναι, Οἳ δὴ γίνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐὸν ἐλπίζουσιν, Ἔτοι καταθνήσκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀπάντη:—Οὐκ ἂν ἀνηρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιτο, Ὡς ὄφρα μέν τε βιῶσι, τὸ δὴ βίοτον καλέουσι, Τόφρα μὲν οὖν εἰσι, καὶ σφι πάρα δεινὰ καὶ ἐσθλα Πρὶν δὲ παγῆναι βροτοὶ, λυθέντες τ' οὐδὲν ἄρ' εἰσί. So Euripides likewise gives the sense of the ancient philosophers on this head. Clem. Alex. Strom. vi. p. 750: Θνήσκει δ' οὐδὲν τῶν γινομένων, Διακρινόμενον δ' ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο Μόρφην ἑτέραν ἀπέδειξεν. "Agreeably whereunto," observes Cudworth, "Plato also tells us that it was παλαιὸς λόγος, *an ancient tradition*, or doctrine, before his time, τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων. *That as well the living were made out of the dead, as the dead out of the living;* and that this was the constant circle of nature. Moreover, the same philosopher acquaints us, that some of those ancients were not without suspicion, that what is now called death, was to men, more properly, a nativity or birth into life, and what was called generation into life, was, comparatively, rather to be accounted a sinking into death; the former being the soul's ascent out of these gross terrestrial bodies, to a body more thin and subtile, and the latter its descent from a purer body to that which is more gross and terrestrial: Τίς οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι καθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν." Intell. Syst. B. i. c. 1. 33.

Εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, κ. τ. λ.] *And if this is indeed the case, namely, that the living are reproduced out of the dead, &c.* Stall.—Ἄλλο τι; see Apol. Socr. c. 12. init.

Μὴ οὖσαι.] i. e. εἰ μὴ ἦσαν: see Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. *d.*

Τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι.] i. e. τοῦ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ εἶναι. Heind.

Κατ' ἀνθρώπων.] *With regard to mankind.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 581. *a.*

Κατὰ ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν.] Olympiod. Τινὲς ἐκ τούτου ῥησιδίου ἁπατηθέντες, ᾠήθησαν τὸν Πλάτωνα πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀθανατίζειν.... ἄμεινον δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος Ἀμμώνιος ἐξηγή-

γίγνεται ἅπαντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὂν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. Τοῦτ' οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα ἀναγκαῖον ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου. οἷον ὅταν μεῖζόν τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν κἂν ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται; Ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτως. Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου γε τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θᾶττον; Πάνυ γε. Τί δαί; ἄν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἐὰν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἱκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; Πάνυ γε. Τί δ' αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων

σατο τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο, λέγων ὅτι τοῦτο φησι πρὸς τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἐπιχείρημα, τὸ κατασκεύαζον ὅτι τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα.

Ἰδωμεν.] *Videamus.* HEIND. Vulg. εἰδῶμεν, *sciamus;* incorrectly. WYTT.

Ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία.] Added in explanation of οὑτωσὶ preced. Tr. *But—taking the whole in connexion, let us see, whether all things do not mutually originate in the following manner, that is, in no otherwise than the contrary out of the contrary.* STALL. Olympiod. Ὅτι γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα, δείκνυσιν ἡ λέξις τριχόθεν. πρῶτον μὲν, ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. παρατίθεται γὰρ πολλὰ ἐναντία, ἃ δείκνυσι μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἄλληλα. δεύτερον, ἐκ τῶν γενεσέων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ὁδῶν. εἰ γὰρ αἱ ὁδοὶ μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἄλληλας, οἷον ἡ λεύκανσις εἰς τὴν μέλανσιν, πολλῷ μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ τέλη μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἄλληλα, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ το μέλαν. τρίτον, ὅτι χωλεύοι ἡ φύσις, εἰ ἓν μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ ἄλλο, ἓν δὲ οὐ μεταβάλλει. καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐπιλείποι θάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐναντίον ἔσται, τὸ λοιπὸν μηδὲν ἔχον εἰς ὃ μεταβαλεῖ. This doctrine of the generation of contraries from contraries, according to Aristotle in Phys. i. c. 6. was held, in common, by nearly all the philosophers.

Τοῦτ' οὖν σκεψ. ἆρα ἀναγ.] *Let us consider this then, whether it be necessary, &c.*

Αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι.] More accurately, αὐτῶν ἕκαστον γίγν. HEIND. But for a similar change from a plural to a singular, see sup. c. 7. init. αὐτός γε ἑαυτοῦ. *n.*

Ἱκανῶς οὖν—ἔχομεν τοῦτο.] *Are we sufficiently assured of this?*

Τι δ' αὖ; ἔστι, τ. κ. λ.] Olympiod. Ἐντεῦθεν τὸ δεύτερον ἐπιχείρημα, τὸ ἐκ τῶν ὁδῶν, ὅτι αἱ ὁδοὶ ἐναντίαι εἰσὶ καὶ μεταβάλλουσι εἰς ἀλλήλας, πολλῷ μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ τέλη. Socrates now proceeds to describe the passage between the two extremes, that is the progress of the change, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, and vice versa; whence the δύο γενέσεις, or two generations by which the contraries are

τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντοιν δύο γενέσεις, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ' αὖ τοῦ ἑτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον; μείζονος μὲν γὰρ πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν; Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνεσθαί τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσίν τε εἶναι ἑκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα; Πάνυ γ', ἦ δ' ὅς.

§. 16. Τί οὖν; ἔφη, τῷ ζῆν ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, ὥς περ τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί; Τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴ περ ἐναντία ἐστί, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντοιν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἑτέραν συζυγίαν ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις· σὺ δέ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖν τὴν μὲν καταδαρ-

eventually produced, and which must, of necessity, be two-fold, for as of all contraries there must be two extremes, *πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντοιν*, so there must be two *γενέσεις*, or stages of generation, from one to the other and back again. The principle of which is fully developed in the text.

Κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμ. τοῖς ὀνόμ. ἐνιαχ.] There being, at times, no names by which these intermediate changes can be designated, does not interfere with the fact, that they do exist, and necessarily lead to the specified results.

Γίγνεσθαι—γένεσίν τε εἶναι.] Olympiod. Οὐκ ἀδολεσχεῖ ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν γίγνεσθαι αὐτὰς ἐξ ἀλλήλων περὶ τῶν ὁδῶν εἴρηται, τὸ δὲ γένεσιν εἶναι ἑκατέροις, περὶ τῶν τελῶν.

§. 16. Καὶ αἱ γενέσεις—δυοῖν ὄντοιν.] h. e. *et rationes quibus hæc gignuntur, duæ sunt duobus illis quasi interjectæ.* STALL. Upon the construction as supr., see Matthiæ Gr. s. 595. 3.

Ἑτέραν συζυγίαν.] Socrates proceeds to contrast two pair, or combinations of contraries, the one, *τὸ καθεύδειν*, and its opposite, *ἐγρηγορέναι*; the other, *τὸ ζῆν* and *τεθνάναι*, which are mutually analogous. GOTTL.—*Συζυγία, copulatio disjunctorum, par contrariorum.* WYTT. Cf. Columella de R. R. ii. 2. 2. "Recurrendum est igitur ad qualitatum inter se dissidentium quasi quasdam conjunctiones, quas Græci, *συζυγίας ἐναντιοτήτων*, nos *discordantium comparationes* tolerabiliter dixerimus."

Σὺ δέ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν.] Intell. *ἐρεῖς*.

θάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀνεγείρεσθαι. Ἱκανῶς σοι, ἔφη, ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Λέγε δή μοι καὶ σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῂς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι; Ἔγωγε. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων; Ναί. Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον; Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη. Τί δαί, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος; Ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν. Ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίγνονται; Φαίνεται, ἔφη. Εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν Ἅιδου. Ἔοικεν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσέοιν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἥ γ' ἑτέρα σαφὴς οὖσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνήσκειν σαφὲς δή που. ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν; Πάντως που, ἔφη. Τίνα ταύτην; Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἴ περ ἔστι το ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἔκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι; Πάνυ γε. Ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονεναι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων. τούτου δὲ ὄντος ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναί που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.

§. 17. Ἰδὲ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδί-

Τοῖν γενεσέοιν τοῖν.] With feminines in the dual, the article is often put in the masculine. Matthiæ Gr. s. 281. Cf. de Legg. x. p. 898. A. Τούτοιν δὴ τοῖν κινησέοιν τοῖν ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένοιν.

Χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις.] The term χωλὸς is elegantly applied to things which are imperfect or deficient in their proper proportions. Suid. in v. Χωλός. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀτελὴς· περὶ ψυχῆς Πλάτων. Ἀλλ' εἰ ταύτῃ ἔσται χ. ἡ φ.

Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς—ψυχὰς, κ. τ. λ.] The accusative, with the infinitive, is also used after particles which begin a protasis, and in construction with the relative; both in the *oratio obliqua*.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 538.

§. 17. Ἰδὲ τοίννν, κ. τ. λ.] Socrates proceeds to argue, that if the course of generation were direct instead of circu-

κως ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα, ὥσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντα, ἀλλ' εὐθεία τις εἴη ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο, οἶσθ' ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνόμενα; Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Οὐδὲν χαλεπόν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ἃ λέγω· ἀλλ' οἷον εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μεν εἴη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίη γιγνόμενον ἐκ

lar, that is, if all living were to proceed straight on to death, nor return again, by a winding in the route, to life—all nature gradually should sink in death, and remain buried in an equally profound repose as that of the fabled Endymion. But there is in nature a restorative principle, whereby life is reproduced from death, the living from the dead. Hence is inferred a future state of existence, of which the character depends upon the conduct of those to whom, according as they are good or evil, it must either prove a blessing or a curse. Cf. V. Cousin: " Les contraires naissent des contraires : la mort, de la vie ; et la vie de la mort. L'existence est un cercle actif et fécond dont les extrémités opposées reviennent sur elles-mêmes, rentrent sans cesse les unes dans les autres, par deux mouvemens contraires qui les séparent à la fois et qui les rapprochent, composent pour décomposer, décomposent pour composer encore..... Et il faut bien qu'il en soit ainsi, car si la vie engendrait la mort sans que la mort à son tour reproduisît la vie, la mort aurait bientôt aboli tout etre vivant, et les propositions harmonieuses de l'éternelle seraient altérées *Circulus æterni motus*.... La vie n'a donc rien à craindre de la mort, in l'ame de la dissolution de ses organes." Œuv. de Plat. tom. 1. 165.

Ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδίκως ὡμολογ.] *That we have not rashly or unadvisedly allowed, &c.*

Ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις.] i. e. *If matters did not mutually alternate with, or correspond to each other, as if revolving in a circle, &c.*— Upon the intransitive use of the verb in this passage, see Viger de Idiotism. cap. v. s. 1. v. 4. Κύκλῳ περιϊόντα— Cf. in Tim. τοῦτο ἅμα πᾶν οἷον τροχου περιαγομένου γίγνεται. Analogous to the above was the opinion of Heraclitus, and some other philosophers, that the rational principle which animated the eternal fire, or etherial exhalation, ἀναθυμίασις, from which all things in nature were produced, pervaded the universe, and formed, preserved, and destroyed, in perpetual succession, the visible world. Enfield. Philos. B. ii. c. 14.—Μὴ ἀνάκαμποι πάλιν, κ. τ. λ. A metaphor taken from the stadium, in which καμπὴ or καμπτὴρ was applied not only to the goal itself, but to the act of turning round it to return to the place of starting. It is elegantly used, as supr., by Plato, in explaining this doctrine of contraries, for which the Stoics, also, and Ænesidemus, the sceptic, of Gnossus in Crete, were indebted to Heraclitus. — Ἀνακάμπτειν signifies merely *to round the goal*, but καμπὴν ποιεῖσθαι, *to return again to the place of starting.* This was called the ἑρόμος ὁ ἐν καμπῇ, and included the race to the καμπτὴρ and back; but sometimes the race ended at the καμπτὴρ, and was then called ἑρόμος ἀκάμπιος, ἁπλοῦς or εὐθύς.

Οἶσθ' ὅτι.] Commonly inserted παρενθέτως by the Greek writers. Cf. de Rep. iii. p. 393. D. Εἰ γὰρ Ὅμηρος— μὴ ὡς Χρύσης γενόμενος ἔλεγεν, ἀλλ' ἔτι ὡς Ὅμηρος, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν μίμησις ἦν.—Τελευτῶντα, *in fine*, or *at*

τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ' ἂν λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο, διὰ τὸ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ταὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ πεπονθέναι, καθεύδειν· κἂν εἰ ξυγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μή, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα. Ὡσαύτως δέ, ὦ φιλε

length. Matthiæ Gr. s. 557. 4.

Τελευτῶντα πάντ' ἂν λῆρον, κ.τ.λ.] i. e. *All things coming to an end would render the fable of Endymion a mere jest, and he should no longer be considered of importance :* because all nature would then be circumstanced like himself, and he would be no longer remarkable for the singularity of his situation. Heindorf correctly understands ὁ Ἐνδυμίων as the subject of φαίνοιτο, and compares the construction, as supr., with Euthyd. s. 10. φοβούμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ—μή τις φθῇ ἡμᾶς επ' ἄλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα τρέψας αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ διαφθαρῇ (sc. αὐτός.) Wyttenbach explains the passage: *tandem omnia fabulam Endymionis nugas esse ostenderent et nusquam apparerent ;* making πάντα the subject of both verbs; but the former interpretation is the more effective, and equally admissible. The beauty of Endymion, whose slumbers were proverbial for their continuance and soundness, captivated Diana, and induced the enamoured deity to visit the object of her love upon Latmos, a mountain of Caria, the favorite place of his repose. Cf. Olympiod. Ἐλέγετο δὲ οὗτος ἀεὶ καθεύδειν, διότι ἀστρονομῶν ἐπ' ἐρημίας διέτριβε· διὸ καὶ φίλος τῇ Σελήνῃ· ὃ δὴ καὶ περὶ Πτολεμαίου φασίν· οὗτος γὰρ ἐπὶ μ' ἔτη ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις πτεροῖς τοῦ Κανώβου ὤκει ἀστρονομίᾳ σχολάζων· διὸ καὶ ἀνεγράψατο τὰς στήλας ἐκεῖ τῶν εὑρημένων αὐτῷ ἀστρονομικῶν δογμάτων.

Τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη.] See Apol. Socr. c. 14. Diog. Laert. ii. 6. records the opening dogma of the system of Anaxagoras; Πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ, εἶτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε. Adhering to the principle, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, he admitted the existence of a chaotic matter, the constituent elements of which, always united and identical, (τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ), are incapable of being decomposed; and by the arrangement of which, and dissemination, he undertook to account for the phenomena of the natural world : adding, that this chaos, which he conceived surrounded by air and ether, must have been put in movement and animated, at the first, by the Intelligent Principle. Νοῦς he defined to be the ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως. From this principle he deduces motion, at first circular; the result of which rotation (he maintained) was the separation of the discordant particles; the union and amalgamation of those which were homogeneous; and, in fine, the creation of symmetry and order. Anaxagoras was more inclined to the study of physics than of metaphysics, for which he is blamed by Plato; see infr. c. 46.; and by Aristotle, Metaph. 1. 4., who accuses him of using the Deity only as a machine in his philosophy. Accordingly he explained, on physical principles, the formation of plants and animals, and even of the heavenly bodies, as in Apol. Socr. loc. cit. supr. which drew on him the reproach of atheism. He admitted, to a certain extent, the validity of the evidence of the senses; but reserved for reason (λόγος) the discrimination of *objective* truth. Tennemann's Hist. of Philos. sect. 106. By some, Anaxagoras is asserted to have been the disciple of Hermotimus, of Clazomenæ, who is said to have recognized a superior Intelligence as the author of nature, and to whose mystical revelations the former is supposed to have been considerably indebted.

Ὡσαύτως δὲ.] Referring to οἷον preced. as οὕτως δὲ, (not δή) is generally used after ὥσπερ. Cf. Soph. Antig. 423. Ἡ παῖς ὁρᾶται κάνακωκύει πικρὰς Ὄρνιθος ὀξὺν φθόγγον, ὡς ὅταν κενῆς Εὐνῆς νεοσσῶν ὀρφανὸν

Κέβης, καὶ εἰ ἀποθνήσκοι μὲν πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μενοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἆρ' οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνήσκοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοι δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατώμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶς τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι, καὶ ταῖς μέν γ' ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον.

§. 18. *Καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ'*

βλέψῃ λέχος. Οὕτω δὲ χ' αὕτη—γόοισιν ἐξῴμωξεν. Electr. 25. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἵππος εὐγενὴς—Ἐν τοῖσι δεινοῖς θυμὸν οὐκ ἀπώλεσεν, Ἀλλ' ὀρθὸν οὖς ἴστησιν· ὡσαύτως δὲ σὺ Ἡμᾶς τ' ὀτρύνεις, &c. HEIND.

Ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων.] i. e. *From any thing else*; not from what once had lived for a time, and then died; but had what lived been once in any way produced, and subsequently died without revival, it would be impossible but that all things should have come to an end, as the source of life should be wasted and destroyed. So Heindorf explains the phrase, to obviate the necessity of Dacier's emendation, *εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα μὴ γίγνοιτο.*

Τίς μηχανή.] i. q. Οὐδεμία μηχανή; whence *μὴ οὐ* is correctly used as in ordinary after a negative. Cf. c. 37. sub. nn. *δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροίη, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν*, &c. and infr. *εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαῤῥοῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαῤῥεῖν*, &c.—Καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι, i. e. *what remedy is there against all things being destroyed by death?* So Epicurus, in Epist. ad Herodot. Diog. Laert. x. 39. *καὶ εἰ ἐφθείρετο δὴ τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, πάντα ἂν ἀπολώλει τὰ πράγματα, οὐκ ὄντων τῶν εἰς ἃ διελύετο.*—Οὐδὲ μία; more emphatic, as Stallbaum observes, than *οὐδεμία*, which signifies simply, *none*, but the former, *none at all, none whatsoever.*

Ἔστι τῷ ὄντι—τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι.] From what has preceded, Socrates draws his conclusion of a resurrection from the dead, which is to be followed by the judgment, and the distribution of rewards and punishments, according to the meed of the immortal souls. Compare with the text, as supr. St. Paul, Corinth. i. 15. 35. sqq.

§. 18. Καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates having established the point of the soul's surviving the body, proceeds now to argue in favour of its preexistence. *Knowledge* or *science* (*μάθησις*) he asserts to be, in reality, but *reminiscence* (*ἀνάμνησις*); because, in the first place, if one is fairly questioned upon a subject with which he is unacquainted, his answer will evince a knowledge of, and power of reasoning upon that, of the existence of which he was previously unaware. This is equally the case in things sensible or corporeal, and in

ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο

things abstract or intelligible. Of the latter there exist in the mind exemplars or types, by which qualities and degrees are recognized and decided. — What is beautiful, for instance, is acknowledged from its conformity to the idea of beauty preconceived in the mind. So of an action which is perceived by the senses, the merits are weighed by a standard or test which is innate and incorporeal, that is, by a preexisting, abstract idea of the qualities of actions and their degrees of good and evil, not derived from the senses; besides it is from these universal ideas that we arrive at the perception and knowledge of singulars. Consequently their preexistence, and independence of the body, infer that of the mind, which was also living and active before the body came to light. This doctrine, as Wyttenbach justly observes, however ingenious, is not unexceptionable, for it is possible for those abstract ideas to be attained in many ways during life. There are two opposite opinions of philosophers respecting their origin, the one maintained by Aristotle and Locke, that they are acquired through the medium of the senses, and introduced, like the notions of all things external, into the as yet unoccupied mind; the other maintained by Plato, who inculcates their innateness and preexistence, upon the grounds that the mind could not understand and acknowledge the appearance of what is presented to the senses, unless there was something within to which the external object might be referred, and with which it might be compared. This latter doctrine has been adopted by Leibnitz; but Plato uses it to prove that the mind existed, while the former would merely infer that it contained those ideas before its union with the body. According to Leibnitz, necessary truths are innate: not that we are from our birth actually conscious of them, but are born with a capacity for them..... *Sensible* perceptions are indistinct; *all precise knowledge being the property of the understanding*..... The ideas which relate to objects *without* the soul, must have a correspondency with such objects; otherwise they would be mere illusions. Tennemann's Manual of Philos. s. 347.

Μάθησις—ἀνάμνησις.] Cf. in Menon. c. 15. Ἅτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγοννῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν, ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷον τε εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι ἅ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο, &c. in Phædr. p. 249. C. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἅ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ.— ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι δ' ἐκ τῶνδε ἐκεῖνα, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἁπάσῃ, &c. Boeth. in Consol. "Quod si Platonis Musa personat verum, Quod quisque discit immemor recordatur." This doctrine, which is imputed, as supr. by Plato, to Socrates, appears to have been borrowed from the Pythagoreans. V. Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 24. and Davis in loc. Augustin. de Immortalitat. s. 6. t. i. p. 290. D. De Quantitate Anim. s. 34. p. 310. D. V. Cousin explains the argument, Œuvres de Plat. i. 165. "Toute science n'est que réminiscence: s'il en est ainsi, il faut que nous ayons su avant cette vie; il faut donc que l'ame ait existé avant de revêtir cette forme humaine; elle peut donc lui survivre.

"Par exemple, les sens nous decouvrent des choses que nous jugeons égales; savoir, des arbres, des pierres, &c.— Mais l'idée d'égalité renfermée dans le jugement que nous portons sur ces choses, d'où l'avons nous tirée? L'égalité ne doit pas etre confondue avec les choses égales qui ne sont telles que par leur rapport à l'égalité. L'idée de l'égalité ne vient donc point des sens; il suit qu'il faut qu'elle naisse avec nous, ou que nous l'ayons eue avant cette vie, et qu' à l'occasion des objets extérieurs elle nous revienne à la mémoire. Est-elle innée, et le seul fait de la naissance la developpe-t-il en nous? Loin de là: ce n'est pas en entrant dans ce sejour des ténèbres qu'on découvre la lumière; on la perdrait bien plutôt! Reste donc que nous ayons acquis l'idée de l'égalité avant notre naissance, et que nous ne

τι ἡ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι· ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατόν τι ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι. Αλλ', ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβών, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. Ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσι πάντα ἃ ἔχει· καί τοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔπειτα ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο

fassions que nous en ressouvenir. Ce que nous disons de l'idée de l'égalité, il faut le dire aussi de l'idée du beau, du bien, du juste. Encore une fois, nous ne puisons pas toutes ces idées dans les impressions extérieures, mais nous les trouvons d'abord dans notre ame qui les possédait avant cette vie; il faut alors que notre ame ait existé avant cette vie; elle peut donc lui survivre.

"On voit que nous avons gardé ici à dessein, et avec un respect scrupuleux, les formes et la phraséologie sons laquelle cette théorie célèbre a paru pour la premiere fois dans le monde philosophique. Mais il faut percer ces enveloppes, pour entrevoir les hautes vérités qui sont dessous. La théorie de la science considerée comme reminiscence, ne nous enseigne-t-elle pas que la puissance intellectuelle prise substantiellement, et avant de se manifester sous la forme de l'ame humaine, contient déja en elle, ou plutôt est elle-même le type primitif et absolu du beau, du bien, de l'égalité de l'unité, et que lorsqu'elle passe de l'état de substance a celui de personne, et acquiert ainsi la conscience et la pensée distincte en sortant des profondeurs ou elle se cachait à ses propres yeux, elle trouve dans le sentiment obscur et confus de la relation intime qui la rattache à son premier état comme à son centre et a son principe, les idées du beau, du bien, de l'égalité, de l'unité, de l'infini, qui alors ne lui paraissent pas tout-à-fait des découvertes, et ressemblent assez à des souvenirs ? C'est ainsi du moins que j'entends Platon."

Πρὶν ἐν τῷδε—εἴδει.] Explained by Cicero, Tusc. i. 24. "nisi animus ante quam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione viguisset."

Ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ—καλλίστῳ.] i. e. *To comprise all in one most admirable argument; ἐνὶ λόγῳ* is in frequent use for *in sum.*

Ἔπειτα ἐάν τις.] Heindorf and Stallbaum object to *ἔπειτα* supr., as it is a new argument which is introduced, not the preceding one illustrated by an example. The former would read *ἐπεί τοι*, which is not sanctioned, however, by any of the copies.—*Ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα*; *geometrical figures.* Cic. Tusc. i. 17. *Descriptiones*, (explained by Fischer,) *formæ, figuræ, geometricæ.* Allusion seems to be made here to the passage already quoted from the Meno; where Socrates asks one of the attendant boys in Meno's train, a series of questions upon the properties of a square, to which he makes such answers as might be expected from his age, and at the same time is led, by the easy progress of the interrogatives, to evince such an acquaintance with the subject as might have been supposed cousistent with a previous knowledge

τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ γε, ἔφη, πείθει, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι ἐὰν τῇδέ πῃ σοι σκοπουμένῳ συνδόξῃ, ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δὴ πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν; Ἀπιστῶ μὲν ἔγωγ', ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὔ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι· καὶ σχεδόν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι, οὐδὲν μέντ' ἂν ἧττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν σὺ πῇ ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν. Τῇδε ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δή που, εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι. Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω

of the principles of geometry; which is adduced by Socrates as a proof of his argument.

Κατηγορεῖ.] Sc. ὁ ἄγων ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα, or it may be taken impersonally in the sense of, *it appears*, like ἐδήλωσε, προσημαίνει, δείξει, &c. HEIND.

Ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ.] *For you hesitate to admit, &c.*

Δέομαι παθεῖν.] i. e. *But I require to be made sensible of this very thing, which is the subject of the argument, that is, to be reminded.* Simmias evidently refers here to the preceding ἀνάμνησις, with which Ficinus, who reads δέομαι μαθεῖν, understood ἀναμνησθῆναι, as synonymous, but incorrectly, as Serranus justly observes, as it should have been in this case preceded by the article τὸ, besides that the obvious bearing of the whole passage is against it. Simmias means to say, that he did not disbelieve the doctrine, but wished his memory to be refreshed upon it, whence he asks, as supr. ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με, &c. And he now addresses Socrates to a similar effect, and desires to be made recollect what had been previously argued upon the very subject of all our knowledge being nothing but recollection. All the copies read μαθεῖν, which is adhered to by Wyttenbach, who would insert ἢ before περὶ, and explains the passage: *hoc autem ipsum*, scil. πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μαθήσις ἀναμνησις ἐστιν, *desidero discere, aut reminisci, de quo nunc loquimur.* But Serranus first altered it to παθεῖν, which is in every respect suitable to the sense of the text as supr. and has been adopted by Heindorf, who supports the present reading by comparing what follows shortly after: Οὐκοῦν—τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησίς τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπιλέληστο; c. 19. init. ἆρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν, &c. c. 25. Οὔκουν τοιόνδε τι—δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἀνερέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι, &c.

Οὐδὲν μέντ' ἂν ἧττον ἀκου.] i. e. *Nevertheless, I would now hear how you essay to argue the subject;* ἂν being taken with ἀκουοιμι, as Stallbaum, after Schæfer, ad Gregor. Corinth. p. 1015. correctly observes, and not as Wyttenbach proposes, with μέντοι in the sense of *tamen*. Heindorf, from Ficinus, v. Lat. Int., would insert ἡδέως after ἧττον.

Ὅταν ἐπιστήμη, κ. τ. λ.] See infr. c. 34. τὸ ἀδοξαστον.

δέ τινα τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐάν τίς τι ἕτερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ, οὗ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ· ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' ἄλλη, ἆρ' οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη οὗ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔλαβεν; Πῶς λέγεις; Οἷον τὰ τοιάδε· ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσι λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἤ τι ἄλλο οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο· ἔγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος ποῦ παιδὸς οὗ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις· ὥς πέρ γε καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη. Μυρία μέντοι νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὐκοῦν ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησίς τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα

'Εάν τίς τι ἕτερον.] i. e. If one should, by sight or hearing, or any other perception, receive an idea of some one object distinct from any other, (as the idea of a lyre, which is distinct from that of its owner,) and along with this idea should receive another impression, (that of the owner of the lyre,) of which the knowledge is equally distinct as in the former instance, how is it not justly argued that he *remembered* that of which the latter impression was so received? V. Cousin renders the passage; *Par exemple, lorsqu'un homme en voyant ou en entendant quelque chose, ou en l'apercevant par quelque autre sens, n'acquiert pas seulement l'idée de la chose aperçue, mais en même temps pense à une autre chose dont la connaissance est pour lui d'un tout autre genre que la première, ne disons-nous pas avec raison que cet homme se ressourient de la chose à laquelle il a pensé occasionellement.*

Οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσι λύραν, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Maxim. Tyr. Diss. xvi. 7. p. 185. *ἤδη τις καὶ λύραν ἰδὼν ἐμνήσθη τῶν χρησαμένων τῇ λύρᾳ· κοῦφον γάρ τι χρῆμα ἀνάμνησις καὶ εὔκολον.* viii. 10. *αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο τὸ τῶν ἐρώντων πάθος, οἷς ἥδιστον μὲν θέαμα οἱ τῶν παιδικῶν τύποι, ἡδὺ δὲ εἰς ἀνάμνησιν καὶ λύρα—καὶ πᾶν ἁπλῶς τὸ ἐπεγεῖρον τὴν μνήμην τοῦ ἐρωμένου.* J. Chrysostom. Homil. ad Antioch. xxii. t. i. p. 249. D. *τῶν φιλουμένων καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια, καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα, καὶ τὰ ὑποδήματα, καὶ οἱ στενωποί, πτεροῦσιν ἡμᾶς εὐθέως ὀφθέντες.*—Τὰ παιδικά, *the object of their love.*

Πάσχ. τοῦτο.] i. e. *Are thus affected.* Ἔγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν, κ. τ. λ.] Whenever any *habitual* occurrence, or any customary event is mentioned, without its being an express narrative, the Greeks frequently have, instead of the *pres.*, by which it is stated in other languages, and even the Greek itself, the *aor.* (which then marks *an indefinite time* in the strictest sense.) Demosth. Olynth. 2. *Μικρὸν πταῖσμα ἀνεχαίτισε καὶ διέλυσε πάντα, a small mistake overthrows and destroys all again.* Buttmann's Lr. Gr. Gr. s. 137. Obs. 5. So infr. *πολλάκις—ἀνεμνήσθη*, where the adverb explains the full force of the aorist.—Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 440. 7.

Μέντοι νὴ Δί'.] Μέντοι is of frequent occurrence in answers, in the sense of *certainly, very true, indeed.* Matthiæ Gr. 622. 6.

μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπιλέλησται; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί δαί; ἦ δ' ὅς ἔστιν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καί λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκουν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι; Ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη.

§. 19. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα ξυμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπ' ἀνομοίων; Ξυμβαίνει. Ἀλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμιμνήσκηταί τίς τι, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴ τέ τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὗ ἀνεμνήσθη; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Σκόπει δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν; Φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυ-

Ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπ.] i. e. *Owing to length of time and want of observation.*

Αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου.] *Simmias himself;* as opposed to his picture, Σιμμίαν—γεγραμμένον, supr.

§. 19. Τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν. See Matthiæ Gr. 472. 2. *b.*

Εἴ τέ τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο—ἐκείνου.] i. e. *Whether this, as far as regards the likeness, comes short in any respect, or not, of that which he remembered.*

Φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον.] See supr. c. 10. a med. τι εἶναι δίκαιον. n. c. 50. init. Socrates alludes here to the τὸ ἴσον παχυμερές, the equality supposed by the vulgar to exist between one thing and another, which were in reality unequal, and the τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἴσον, or αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον infr., which is the idea of equality contained within the mind, and from which it is made apparent, that there is no actual equality or similitude between the things in nature; "Tantam enim," says Quinctilian, In. Or. x. 11., "difficultatem habet similitudo, ut ne ipsa quidem natura in hoc ita evaluerit, ut non res quæ simillimæ videantur discrimine aliquo discernantur." Whence it appears that the ancients were not unacquainted with those views of the subject which have occupied the attention of more recent philosophers. GOTTL.

Οὐ ξύλον ξύλῳ λέγω, κ.τ.λ.] Olymp. Τὸ ἐνταῦθα ἴσον οὐκ ἀκριβές ἐστι. πῶς γὰρ ἀκριβῶς ἴσον τὸ καὶ ψαμμίου μεγέθους ἀφαιρεθέντος ἢ προστιθέντος ἴσον μεῖναν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁρῶμεν οὐδὲν ἀκριβές, οὐδὲ ἀκούομεν κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον. ἀπὸ οὖν τοῦ παχυμεροῦς ἴσου ἐπὶ τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἴσον ἔρχεται.

Ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτ. τι.] i. e. *But something else distinct from all these.* Cf. Politic. p. 295. E. μὴ ἐξέστω δὴ παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερα προστάττειν. de Repub. i. p. 337. E. δείξω ἐτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας.

Φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δί'.] Olympiod.

μαστῶς γε. Ἦ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὅ ἔστιν; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἆρ' οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον ὂν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε. ἆρ οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τοτὲ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τοτὲ δ' οὔ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δαί; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης; Οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρ' ἐστίν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἑτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν

Ὁ δὲ Σιμμίας ἑτοίμως (ἔχει) τῷ εἶναι τὰ εἴδη. διὸ καὶ ὅρκον ἐπάγει καὶ φησιν ὅτι θαυμασίως πέπεισμαι, ὡς συνήθης τῶν Σωκρατικῶν δογμάτων.—Θαυμαστῶς γε; h. e. *σφόδρα*.

Πόθεν λαβόντες.] Sc. *ἐπιστάμεθα*.

Ἆρ οὐ λίθοι—τοτὲ δ' οὔ.] Socrates asks whether it does not sometimes occur, that stones which are equal, and logs which are so likewise, although they continue the same, yet at one time seem equal, and again seem not? that is, of the objects submitted to the senses, of which an equality, *τὸ ἴσον παχυμερὲς*, may be in the first instance affirmed, this property, though the objects remain unaltered, is not invariable, for it is liable to be affected by a change of the judgment, but the *αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον* remains unchangeably the same. Socrates evidently intends to draw this distinction between the objects of sense, and their intelligible forms, that the latter only admit of being certainly known, and are the only tests of truth. This is the view taken of the passage by Stallbaum; Heindorf explains it: *eosdem lapides eademque ligna alii lapidi lignove æqualia apparere alii inæqualia: contra æquale ipsum, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, semper esse æquale, nunquam inæquale;* and for *φαίνεται* would read *δοκεῖ*, but either is applicable to the objects of sense. He objects further to *τοτὲ μὲν*, and *τοτὲ δέ* after *ἐνίοτε*, and proposes *τῷ μὲν—τῷ δέ* instead. This is unnecessary, however, from the position which *ἐνίοτε* may be made to occupy in the interpretation of the sentence which is thus given by Stallbaum; *annon* interdum *accidit ut lapides et ligna sibi æqualia, quamquam eadem sunt tamen* modo *æqualia*, modo *inæqualia videantur*, h. e. *sensibus apparent*. This is decidedly preferable, the question being simply to decide upon the superiority of the ideal over the corporeal in the investigation and discernment of truth. Upon *τοτὲ δ' οὔ*, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. *e*.

Αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα.] i. q. *αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον*, but used in the plural, as the affection, not of one, but several minds. So Olympiod Cod. i. ex Plut. t. v. p. 741. Wytt. Ὅτι ποτὲ μὲν ἴσον, ποτὲ δέ αὐτὰ ἴσα λέγει· ἢ εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀποβλέπων νόας, ὧν ἐν ἑκάστῳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἴσον· ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ νῷ ἀποδοτέον, τὸ δὲ πεπληθυσμένον τῇ ψυχῇ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ ἓν πολλά, διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ὑπόβασιν. Cf. Parmenid. c. 7. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά τις ἀπέφαινεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν, &c. According to Heindorf, the plural may be used, because more than one object is involved in the notion of equality or similitude.

Ταῦτά—τὰ ἴσα.] Applied, demonstratively, to the individual objects submitted to the senses.

ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας; Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου; Πάνυ γε. Διαφέρει δέ γ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδέν. ὅταν οὖν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὄψεως, ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς, εἴτε ὅμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δαὶ τόδ'; ἦ δ' ὅς. ἦ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις; ἆρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὡς περ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν; Καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο, ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ, εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ἔστι φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησὶν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μέν, ἐνδεέστερως δὲ ἔχειν; Ἀνάγκη. Τί οὖν; τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἢ οὔ, περί τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον; Παντάπασί γε. Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτ' εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον,

Ὅταν οὖν.] Ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο, κ. τ. λ. Bekk.

Ἄλλο ἰδὼν—ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς.] The distinction must be observed here between the perception of the eye and of the mind, which are both caused by the same glance. Both together constitute the *ἀνάμνησις* of Socrates, as he proceeds to prove.—Αὐτὸ *ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι*—*αὐτό*, i. e. *τὸ ἄλλο ἰδόντα ἄλλο νοῆσαι.*

Ἆρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν.] Added in explanation of *ἢ πάσχομέν τι*—*τοῖς ἴσοις* preced.

Ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου.] Sc. *τοῦ ἴσου.*

Ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο.] Βούλομαι, and *ἐθέλειν*, signify *to intend, to aim* or *endeavour*, and are used in this sense of things as well as persons.

Ἀναγκαῖον—τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο, κ. τ. λ.] Olymp. Ὅτι γὰρ δευτέρα ἐστὶ γνῶσις, δηλοῖ αὐτὴ ἡ μετάβασις. εἰ γὰρ πρώτη ἦν, οὐδὲν προστιθέναι ὕλως ἠδυνάμεθα, οὐδὲ μετάβασις ἐγίγνετο. ὁ γαρ τὴν εἰκόνα Σωκράτους θεασάμενος, μὴ πρότερον δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην θεασάμενος, ἵσταται μέχρι τοῦ εἰκόνος.—Ἀναγκ. που, either εἶναι may be understood here, or the construction explained by an anacoluthon.

Τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν.] i. e. *Are we similarly affected*; as *ἢ πάσχομεν τι τ.* supr.

Ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα τ. εἶν.] h. e. *Hæc omnia, (τὰ ἴσα) appetere ipsi æqualitatis speciei fieri similia, nec tamen fieri posse.* Stall. According to

μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλόν τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὁσίου, καὶ ὅ περ λέγω, περὶ ἁπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο, ὃ ἔστι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν εἶναι τούτων ἁπάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ μέν γε λαβόντες μὴ ἑκάστοτε ἐπιλελήσμεθα, εἰδότας ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι

γεν] *Tum ante ortum nostrum, tum statim ut nati eramus.* STALL.

Περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ.] Beauty, Plato considered to be the sensible representation of moral and physical perfection; consequently it is one with truth and goodness, and inspires love (ἔρως) which leads to virtue. (Platonic love.) De Legg. p. 62. sqq. p. 89. sqq. Phædr. p. 301. Euthyphr. p. 20.

Ὅ περ λέγω.] See Apol. Socr. c. 5. sub. fin.

Οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο, ὃ ἔστι.] h. e. *Quibus τῆς οὐσίας signum imprimimus, quæ nomine essentiæ insignimus.* STALL. *Upon which we set the seal of substance,* οὐσία, or *real existence,* τὸ ὄν, as opposed to the φαινόμενον or *apparent truth.* The source of knowledge, Plato pronounces to be not the evidence of our senses, which are occupied with *contingent* matter, nor yet the *understanding,* but reason, whose object is that which is invariable and absolute (τὸ ὄντως ὄν.) He held the doctrine of the existence, in the soul, of certain *innate ideas,* (νοήματα), which form the basis of our conceptions, and the elements of our practical resolutions. To these ἰδέαι, as he termed them, (the eternal παραδείγματα, types or models of all things, and the ἀρχαί, or principles of our knowledge,) we refer the infinite variety of individual objects presented to us (τὸ ἄπειρον, and τὰ πολλά). Hence it follows that all these details of knowledge are not the result of experience, but only developed by it. The soul *recollects* the ideas in proportion as it becomes acquainted with their copies (ὁμοιώματα), with which the world is filled; the process being that of recalling to mind the circumstances of a state of pre-existence. Inasmuch, as the objects thus presented to the mind correspond in part with its *ideas,* they must have some principle in common: that principle is the Divinity, who has formed these external objects after the model of the ideas. Tennemann's Man. of Phil. s. 132.

Ἐρωτῶντες καὶ — ἀποκρινόμενοι.] So infr. c. 25. a med. ἡ οὐσία, ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, i. e. διαλεγόμενοι, *discussing* or *arguing in the form of question and answer.* Cf. Theæt. p. 146. C. ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ δεῖ ἐρωτῶντας τε καὶ ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις σπουδάσαι αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον.

Καὶ εἰ μὲν λαβόντες — εἰδέναι.] Socrates had already arrived at the conclusion, that those ideas which constituted knowledge had been received by the mind before birth. He now unfolds the subject more fully and expressly, and argues, that if this knowledge, having been once received, was not in every instance lost at the time of birth, we should be born with it, and possess it through life, for *to know* anything is to retain the knowledge of it when once acquired, as oblivion or forgetfulness is to lose it afterwards. If, then, we were possessed of this knowledge before being born, and are unconscious of it at the period of our birth, and that it is subsequently so called into operation as to convey a satisfactory proof of its pre-existence in the mind, it should be

καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι· τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ' ἐστί, λαβόντα του ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι. ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὦ Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν; Πάντως δή που, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰ δέ γε, οἶμαι, λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἃς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἴχομεν, ἆρ' οὐχ, ὃ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν, οἰκείαν ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν εἴη; τοῦτο δέ που ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; Πάνυ γε. Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γ' ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι ὃ ἐπελέληστο, ᾧ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὂν ἢ ᾧ ὅμοιον. ὥστε ὅ περ λέγω, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί τε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον οὕς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκονται οὗτοι καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

§. 21. Πότερον οὖν αἱρεῖ ὦ Σιμμία; ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ὕστερον ὧν

called *remembrance*, if we would designate it correctly. This view of the passage appears to be borne out by the succeeding portion of the chapter, which is devoted to a development of the same principle, and closes with a statement in sum of both sides of the question; either that we are born conscious of those ideas, and continue so through life, or, the knowledge is revived after a temporary loss; in other words, it is remembrance, which is the position to be proved.

Ἀπολωλεκέναι.] Cf. Horat. Epist. ii. 1. 84. "Vel quia turpe putant parere minoribus et quæ Imberbes didicere, senes *perdenda* fateri."

Ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν.] Cf. Sympos. c. 26. λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος. Nemes. de Nat. Homin. p. 202. ed. Matth. λήθη δ' ἔστι μνήμης ἀποβολή.

Περὶ ταῦτα.] i. e. Τὰ ἐνταῦθα, *ea quæ in hac vita sensibus nostris subjiciuntur.* HEIND. Ficinus appears to have read αὐτὰς, which is obviously incorrect. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 474. 4.

Οἰκείαν.] i. e. *Our own proper knowledge.*

Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γ' ἐφάνη.] h. e. *Nam fieri sane posse videbatur antea, ut quis vel oculis vel auribus vel alio quodam sensu aliquid perciperet, et simul mente sua conciperet notionem rei, ab illa quam sensibus percepit, diversæ, cujus oblitus erat, quæ huic conjuncta erat vel dissimilitudine vel similitudine sua.* STALL. where Socrates again alludes to the lyre, &c. as c. 18. supr.

Οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ.] Intell. ποιοῦσι. Cf. Xen. Cyrop. i. 4. 24. μόνος ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοὺς πεπτωκότας περιελαύνων ἐθεᾶτο. Memor. ii. 3. 17. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ κινδυνεύσεις. So the Latins, *nihil aliud quam.*

πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἦμεν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐλέσθαι. Τί δέ; τόδε ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχοι ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὔ; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σωκρατες. Ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; Βουλοίμην μέντ' ἄν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι μὴ αὔριον τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ᾖ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἷός τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀναμιμνήσκονται ἄρα ἃ ποτε ἔμαθον; Ἀνάγκη. Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ' οὗ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν. Οὐ δῆτα. Πρότερον ἄρα. Ναί. Ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἅμα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας· οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος. Εἶεν, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτὰς γιγνόμεθα, ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν· ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν ἐν ᾧ περ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλον

§. 21. Ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 473. *a.*

Πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι μή.] In many cases δεδιέναι μή (as in Latin *vereor ne, cave ne*) is only a softened expression of a categorical declaration, and then the other negations which follow μή, with the subjunctive, are expressed by οὐ. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. *a.* Obs. 2. — Αὔριον τηνικάδε, *this time to-morrow.*

Πάντες αὐτά.] Sc. περὶ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, as appears from what precedes, where, as here, reference is made to the ideas of the beautiful, the good, &c.

Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἅμα γιγνομ.] i. e. *Unless, perhaps, we receive this knowledge at our birth.*

Ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ.] *At what other time*, sc. than that of our being born: the argument then is, we cannot receive these ideas at our birth, for that is the time when they are admitted to be lost; nor can any other period be made out in which we may be said to lose them. Olympiod. Exerp. Cod. i. p. 62. Ὅτι ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει ἡ σφοδροτάτη μεταβολή ἐστιν· αὕτη δὲ ἐκπλήττει τὴν μνήμην καὶ ταράττουσα λήθην ποιεῖ· τότε ἄρα οὐκ ἂν ἐλάβομεν ἐπιστήμην· πρότερον ἄρα τοῦ σώματος· ἤτοι δὲ προσεχῶς, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν νεοτελῶν τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ἢ καὶ ἐκ προγενεστέρων ἔτι βίων.

Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτ.] In reference to Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσι — ἐπίστασθαι—πάντες αὐτά, supr.

τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον; Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἔλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών.

§. 22. Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν, ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὖσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνῃ ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὡς περ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένος εἴη; ἆρ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε; Ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλόν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος, εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τήν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὂν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἃ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες· καὶ ἔμοιγε ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται.

Ἔλαθον—οὐδὲν εἰπών.] Heindorf observes that the part. of the aorist is always joined to the aorist λαθεῖν, as in the form λάθε βιώσας, and quotes Protag. s. 31. ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν καταναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις. Demosth. Leptin. c. 104. ἵνα μὴ λάθητε ἐξαπατηθέντες. &c. Stallbaum had expressed himself as nearly of the same opinion, ad Phileb. p. 86. but found reason to change it from the following passages amongst others; in Criton. c. 10. ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες. Theætet. p. 169. C. μὴ που παιδικόν τι λάθωμεν εἶδος τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι. de Repub. vi. p. 486. A. μή σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας. Ibid. v. p. 457. E. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔλαθες — ἀποδιδράσκων, &c.

§. 22. Καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν.] Vulg. καλόν τέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν, which is neither sanctioned by the best copies, nor by the sense of the passage, the present question not being whether any thing deserved to be called beautiful and good, but whether there was the αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν and αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, which alone had a real existence; whence οὐσία, i. e. αὐτο ἕκαστον, ὅ ἐστι τὸ ὄν.— Cf. Parmenid. p. 152. καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἄρα εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι.

Καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσ.] h. e. *Et ad harum essentiarum notiones ea, quæ sensibus percipiuntur, omnia referimus.* HEIND.

Ἄλλως.] *In vain.*

Εἰς καλόν γε.] i. e *The argument has an excellent or apposite tendency, in establishing that our soul exists, in like manner, previous to our birth, as also the substance of which you are speaking now.*

Ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα.] *With all pos-*

Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν. Ἱκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι. καὶ τοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι αὐτόν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή.

§. 23. Εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔσται, οὐδ' αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποδεδεῖχθαι, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνέστηκεν, ὃ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἅμα ἀποθνήσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδάννυται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ᾖ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ ξυνίστασθαι ἀλλόθεν ποθὲν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτου, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτᾷν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι; Εὖ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης· φαίνεται γὰρ ὡς περ ἥμισυ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι οὗ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή· δεῖ δὲ προσαποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔσται ἡ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἕξειν. Ἀποδέδεικται μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθεῖναι

sible certainty.

Καρτερώτατος ἀνθρ.] Καρτεροί and μαλακοί are terms in frequent use with Plato, by whom they are applied, respectively, to those who are persevering and obstinate, or those who are easily convinced, and yielding in debate.

Οὐκ ἐνδεῶς.] *Sufficiently, satisfactorily.*

§. 23. Εἰ μέντοι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 617. 5.

Ἔτι ἐνίστηκεν.] *Is still in the way.* i. e. obstructs conviction. — Ὅπως μή, *lest*; see Viger, c. vii. s. 10. r. 4. Matthiæ Gr. 565. Obs. 2.—Διασκεδάννυται; a form of the subjunctive for διασκεδαννύηται, as c. 24. init. μὴ — διαφυσᾷ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν for διασκεδαννύῃ. V. Buttmann. Gram. Ampl. i. p. 540.

Αλλόθεν ποθὲν.] *From some place or other.* ἀμόθεν ποθ. Bekk.—Ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφίκηται, Intell. εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα.

Προσαποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπ.] The second part of the argument Cebes asserts to be still wanting, the proof that the soul survives the body, and is not lost when it leaves it. This, Socrates answers, is sufficiently apparent to himself, for it is a natural consequence of what had been demonstrated already; since, if it be true that nothing in nature is destroyed, but merely undergoes a change, and if it be equally true that the mind is possessed of a certain knowledge without the aid of the body, it is necessary that the soul should survive the death of the body. But to remove all

τοῦτόν τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταὐτὸν καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτου ὡμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ ζῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δ' αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἰούσῃ τε καὶ γιγνομένῃ μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπειδή γε δεῖ αὖθις αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν, ὅ περ λέγετε, καὶ νῦν.

§. 24. Ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾷ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμίᾳ ἀλλ' ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνήσκων. Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας Ὡς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν· μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ὅς τις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται. τοῦτον οὖν πειρώ-

doubt on the subject the philosopher proceeds from c. 24. to advance new arguments upon this branch of the subject.

Τεθνάναι.] *Status hominis mortui; θανάτος, transitus ex vita in illum statum.* WYTT.

§ 24. Διαπραγματεύσασθαι.] *To discuss,* or *examine into diligently,* as c. 45. supr. περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι.

Τὸ τῶν παίδων.] *Id quod pueri faciunt.* as τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, supr. STALL. *Id quod pueri dixerint,* as τὸ τοῦ λόγου, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου. HEIND.

Διαφυσᾷ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν.] *Should disperse and destroy.* The doctrine of the destruction of the soul by the dispersion and dissolution of its component atoms, upon the death of the body, was inculcated by Epicurus, and adopted by his followers. He compared the soul to the eye, which is incapable of sight when detached from the organization to which it properly belongs.

Μὴ ἐν νηνεμίᾳ.] h. e. *Non tum, quum fuit ventorum pax, sed tum, quum venti vehementer sævierunt.* FISCH.— Suidas, in v. Ταὐτόν, ex Alex. Aphrodis.—Νηνεμία, καὶ γαλήνη, ἡ αὐτή· ὃ γὰρ γαλήνη ἐν θαλάσσῃ, τοῦτο νηνεμία ἐν ἀέρι. Hesych. Νηνεμία· γαλήνη ἀνέμων.

Ὡς δεδιότων.] As genitives absolute are sometimes found where the partic. should conform to the case of the preceding noun, so the genitive or accusative absolute are used as supr. instead of the case of the preceding noun. Matthiæ Gr. s. 568. 3.

Ἀναπείθειν.] Some copies read μεταπείθειν: ἀνὰ and μετὰ, both, in composition, convey the idea of some change or alteration, whence either reading would answer as implying the persuasion to adopt a new opinion: *ἀναπείθειν, aliam cui sententiam persuadere.* V. Abresch. Dilucid. Thucyd. Auct. p. 258. WYTT.

Ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς.] It might be supposed, as Wyttenbach observes, at first, that allusion was made here to Apollodo-

μεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥς περ τὰ μορμολύκεια. Ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπᾴδειν αὐτῷ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐξεπᾴσητε. Πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθὸν ἐπῳδὸν ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις; Πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ἐν ᾗ ἔνεισί που ἀγαθοὶ

rus, but upon consideration it will appear that the sense and connexion of the passage require it to be explained of the mind; that part of it which, being left neglected and unenlightened, continues to be puerile and irrational. So the ancients interpreted the passage; *τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν παῖδα, puerum intus in animo nostro abditum.* Cf. Porphyr. de Abstin. i. 41. p. 69. *πανταχοῦ γὰρ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν παιδὸς ἦν ταῦτα τὰ πάθη.*— Themist. Or. i. p. 13. D. *ἐστι γὰρ τις ἐν ἡμῖν, οὐ παῖς, ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλ' οἷόν τις εὐγενης νεανίας, φιλόνεικος γε ὑπεροχῆς ἐραστής,* &c. V. Cousin renders it, *Prends que nous le craignons, ou plutôt que ce n'est pas nous qui le craignons, mais qu'il pourrait bien y avoir en nous un enfant qui le craignit; tâchons donc de lui apprendre à ne pas avoir peur de la mort, comme d'un masque difforme;* and adds upon the passage, "J'entends *παῖς τις ἐν ἡμῖν* comme les Alexandrins. La preuve de ce sens philosophique est l'opposition de *ἡμῶν* et de *ἐν ἡμῖν*. Ce n'est pas *nous*, dans notre essence propre, ce n'est pas *moi* qui craint la mort; mais *c'est quelque chose en nous*, un élément etranger au moi, quoi qu' accidentellement en rapport avec lui la partie puérile de l'ame. *ἐν ἡμῖν* opposé à *ἡμῶν* ne peut vouloir dire que *dans nous*, et non *parmi nous*, ce qui serait nécessaire au sens ordinaire: *il y a peut-être parmi nous un enfant.*"

Τὰ μορμολύκεια.] See in Criton. c. 6. *μορμολύττηται.*

Ἐπᾴδειν.] *To charm* or *enchant*; hence *to soothe* or *tranquillize*. This word appears to have been used on account of *μορμολύκεια* preced. The mind is diseased when it dreads the approach of death as it would the supernatural, and it must be relieved of its complaint by those remedies which are most likely to operate towards its eventual cure. Whence Plato has adopted the term, which seems to have been familiar with the medical practitioners in Greece, who not unfrequently had recourse to the *ἐπῳδαι* in the treatment of such disorders as arose from a morbid imagination. Cf. Charmid. p. 243. — *ἐπῳδὴ δέ τις ἐπὶ τῷ φαρμάκῳ εἴη. ἦν εἰ μέν τις ἐπᾴδοι ἅμα καὶ χρῷτο, παντάπασιν ὑγιᾶ ποιεῖ τὸ φάρμακον· ἄνευ δὲ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς, οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἴη τοῦ φύλλου.*—A little further on (p. 244.) condemning the system of those who in relieving the body did not extend their care to the mind, Plato explains the *ἐπῳδὴ*;—*Θεραπεύεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπῳδαῖς τισι· τὰς δὲ ἐπῳδὰς ταύτας, τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς καλούς· ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἧς ἐγγινομένης — ῥᾴδιον ἤδη εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν,* &c. Cf. Horat. Epist i. 1. 31. "Sunt verba et voces, quibus hunc lenire dolorem Possis, et magnam morbi deponere partem." Eurip. Hippolyt. v. 491. *εἰσὶν δ' ἐπῳδαὶ καὶ λόγοι θελκτήριοι· φανήσεταί τι τῆσδε φάρμακον νόσου.*

Ἐξεπᾴσητε.] Ἐξεπᾴδειν, properly, *to disenchant*, signifies here, *to alleviate* or *cure*. Some copies read *ἐξιάσηται*, others *ἐξάσεται*, *excantabitur*. Cf. Sophocl. Oed. Colon. 1193. *εἰσὶ χατέροις γοναὶ κακαὶ Καὶ θυμὸς ὀξύς, ἀλλὰ νουθετούμενοι Φίλων ἐπῳδαῖς ἐξεπᾴδονται φύσιν.*

Πόθεν οὖν ἔφη—ἐπειδ. σύ ἔφη.] Examples are frequent of a similar repetition of *ἔφη*. Xenoph. Œcon. viii. 15. Ὁ δ' εἶπεν, *ἐπισκοπῶ, ἔφη, ὦ ξένε, εἴ τι συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, πῶς κεῖται, ἔφη, τὰ ἐν τῇ νηΐ, εἴ τι ἀποστατεῖ,* &c. Sueton. Cæsar. 32. "Tunc Cæsar, Eatur, inquit, quo deorum ostenta et inimicorum iniquitas vocat. Jacta alea esto inquit."

Πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς.] Cf. Theo-

ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὓς πάντας χρὴ διερευνᾶσθαι ζητοῦντας τοιοῦτον ἐπῳδόν, μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε πόνων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὅ τι ἂν εὐκαιρότερον ἀναλίσκοιτε χρήματα. ζητεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίως εὕροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δή, ἔφη, ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης· ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν, ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἴ σοι ἡδομένῳ ἐστίν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε· πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

§. 25. Οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, δεῖ

crit. Idyll. xxii. 154. Οὐχ οὕτω, φίλοι ἄνδρες, ἀριστήεσσιν ἐοικὲ Μνασταύειν ἀλόχους, αἷς νυμφίοι ἤδη ἑτοῖμοι. Πολλά τοι Σπάρτα, πολλὰ δ' ἱππήλατος Ἄλις—Ἔνθα κόραι τοκέεσσιν ὑπὸ σφετέροισι τρέφονται Μυρίαι, &c.

Ζητεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ αὐτοὺς.] *But it it is necessary that you should yourselves examine into the matter, amongst each other, for you could not perhaps easily find any more competent to do so than you are.* Heindorf explains ζητεῖν, in the general sense of τὴν ζήτησιν τοῦ πράγματος ποιεῖσθαι, *operam dare rei indagandæ*, and Stallbaum, *rem investigare;* correctly, for the meaning of the passage is opposed to τοιοῦτον ἐπῳδόν being understood here from what precedes.

Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν—ὑπάρξει.] h. e. *Sed hæc quidem suppetent, non deerunt.* i. e. *but this shall be done, indeed,* or *shall certainly appear.* HEIND.

Ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν, ἐπανελθωμεν.] i. e. *To return from our digression.* Cf. Demosth. de Coron. p. 341. B. ἐπανελθεῖν οὖν, ὅθεν εἰς ταῦτα ἐξέβην βούλομαι. Cic. de Nat. Deor. iii. 23. "Sed eo jam, unde huc digressi sumus, revertamur."—Εἴ σοι ἡδομένῳ ἐστίν, *si hoc tibi lubenti accidit, si tibi placet.* WYTT. The verbs εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι are often accompanied by a participle of the verb "to wish," &c. in the dative; in which case the participle only, as the leading idea, is translated by the finite verb. Matthiæ Gr. s. 388. *e.* Cf. Cratyl. 1. εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν, h. e. εἰ βούλει. Hom. Iliad. ξ'. 108. ἐμοὶ δέ κεν ἀσμένῳ εἴη, h. e. ἀσμένως ἔχω, interp. Eustath. This form was adopted by the Latins from the Greeks. Macrob. Saturn. vi. 1. vi. 6. vii. 13. "Si volentibus vobis erit, &c. Sallust. Jugurth. 100. "Uti militibus exæquatus cum imperatore labos volentibus esset." Tacit. Agr. 18. "Quibus bellum volentibus erat."—Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει. The infinitive is often wanting to μέλλει, when it can be easily supplied from the context or otherwise. Matthiæ Gr. s. 498. *d.*

§. 25. Οὔκουν τοιόνδε τι, κ. τ. λ.] Socrates now proceeds to meet the objection against the immortality of the soul, that it perishes upon the decease of the body, in consequence of the disunion of the particles of which it is composed, by considering what the nature of the soul is, and proving from hence that as it does not consist of parts, but is in itself simple and uniform, it cannot be affected like what is compound, and consequently changeable, from the different affections of its component parts. Into these two classes all things are divided, simple and compound, between which there is this further distinction, that the latter are concerned with, and discerned by the senses, while the former is rendered intelligible by the mind alone. That the mind is itself simple, there is no reason to doubt; it is independent of the senses, and by the ex-

ἡμᾶς ἀνερέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι μὴ πάθῃ αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὔ; καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον ψυχή ἐστι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαῤῥεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς; Ἀληθῆ, εφη, λέγεις. Ἆρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν ξυντεθέντι τε καὶ ξυνθέτῳ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει

ercise of its own faculties comes to know that it exists. It is also independent of the changes of the body, and retains its power of thought, whatever injury the body may sustain by the loss of any of its customary media of sensation. The mind receives impressions of what is simple and immutable, while the body is incapable of any knowledge further than of what is transient and liable to change. Socrates presses, again, the perception of truth, to which the mind can best attain when collected within itself, apart from the body; when it is conversant with, and merges into a nature similar to its own, and abides in the contemplation of unmixed and unerring truth. The mind commands and the body obeys, the one fulfils the office of a master, and the other of a slave; hence it will appear which part of man is the more noble and divine. But as the attributes of contraries are also contrary, it follows that as the body, consisting of parts, is destroyed by their disunion in death, so the mind, which is one and simple, continues to exist, and departs into some sacred and unseen spot, to hold communion with its God; the destiny, sooner or later, of those who never lived in subjection to the body and its appetites. Those who have done so and are polluted in consequence, seek, after death, for other bodies which they are again obliged to animate.

Τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσ.] h. e. ποῖόν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο, ᾧ προσ. v. Hermann. ad Viger. p. 705. STALL. The question Socrates proposes to consider is, first, what it is that is liable to this affection of being dissolved and destroyed; for what reason, (*ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς,*) it should apprehend this result, and what it was that was not thus liable either to the affection or the dread of it, (*καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὔ*); then to consider which of the two the soul is, and to found our hopes or fears on the result. Hence will appear the correctness of Heindorf's emendation, *τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὔ* for *τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ*, which without the negative is but a useless repetition. Wyttenbach and Cornarius would reject this member of the sentence, but without sufficient reason, as is evident from the sense of the passage as supr.

Τῷ μὲν ξυντεθ.—καὶ ξυνθέτῳ.] i. e. *Ei quod componendo factum est, et quod natura sua compositum est.* WYTT. — *ξυντεθὲν*, signifying a compound which was not always so, but the result of art, and *ξύνθετον ὂν φύσει*, a compound which was always, and naturally so; a distinction to which Plotinus seems to refer, Ennead. v. ix. 3. p. 557. A. *ὁρῶμεν δὴ τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι πάντα σύνθετα, καὶ ἁπλοῦν οὐδὲ ἕν, ἅτε τέχνη ἐργάζεται ἕκαστα ἅτε φύσει.* By some *ξυνθέτον* is taken in the sense of the verbals *ὁρατὸν, id quod potest videri, visibile; ἀκουστὸν, quod audiri potest; αἰσθητὸν, sensibile, &c.* whence they interpret the passage of *that which is actually compounded* (*ξυντέθεν, compositum*) *and that which is liable to be so,* (*ξυνθέτον quod componi potest.*) But the former interpretation is in every way preferable. — Ταύτῃ ᾗ περ ξυνετέθη, that is, that the whole should be divided into its component parts, preserving these parts distinct, as in the case of the division of body into the four elements of which it consists, from a separation of the links by which they are combined. Plotinus refers to this; Ennead. iv. 7. 12. p. 466. B. *πᾶν τε τὸ λυόμενον σύνθεσιν εἰληφὸς, ταύτῃ διαλύεσθαι πέφυκεν, ᾗ συνετέθη· ψυχὴ δὲ μία καὶ ἁπλῆ ἐνέργεια οὖσα ἐν τῷ ζῆν φύσις* (f. *φύσει ἐστί*)· *οὐ τοίνυν ταύτῃ φθα-*

τοῦτο πάσχειν διαιρεθῆναι ταύτῃ ᾗ περ ξυνετέθη· εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ὂν ἀξύνθετον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴ πέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν ἅ περ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀξύνθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά, ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι τὰ ξύνθετα; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ἴωμεν δή, ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ἐφ' ἅ περ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχει καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, τὸ ὄν, μή ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἠντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται; ἢ ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι μονοειδὲς ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ

ρήσεται. To the body, according to Plotinus, belongs multiplicity, divisible with reference to space. The soul is an essence devoid of extent, immaterial and simple in its nature; without body, or with a body which has two natures, the superior one indivisible; the inferior one divisible. The metaphysical arguments for the immateriality and immortality of the soul, have been ably stated by Plotinus, (born A. D. 205, at Lycopolis, in Egypt,) in his Six Enneades, a collection of his various scattered treatises by Porphyry. Porphyr. Vit. Plot. c. 6. 24. Tennem. Man. Phil. s. 203. sqq.

Ἃ περ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ—ἔχει.] So in Parmenid. p. 152. Οἷόν τε, τὸ ἔχον πως, μὴ ἔχειν οὕτω, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως; οὐκ οἷόντε. πᾶν ἄρα τὸ τοιοῦτον, μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν οὕτω τε καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχῃ. Cf. Apul. de Dogm. Plat. p. 252. "Τὰς οὐσίας, quas essentias dicimus, duas esse ait: per quas cuncta gignantur. Sed illa, quæ mentis oculis comprehenditur, semper et eodem modo et sui par, et sui similis invenitur, ut quæ vere sit." (ὅ ἐστι τὸ ὄν) It is to be observed, that the tenor of this passage is consistent rather with the Pythagorean than the Socratic school. Bruck. Hist. Phil. i. p. 696. GOTTL. For κατὰ ταὐτὰ Wyttenbuch proposes κ. τὰ αὐτὰ, and adduces numerous passages in support of its constant application to ideas which are constant and uniform, as also to immutable natures and essences. de Legg. vii. p. 631. A.—ταχθὲν μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ μετασχὸν τοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς παίζειν, etc.

Τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως.] Sc. ἔχοντα. Heindorf proposes ἃ δ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως.—Ταῦτα δὲ,—When a proposition beginning with the relative precedes, and another with the demonstrative follows, δὲ is sometimes repeated; (Matthiæ Gr. s. 622. 5.) in order, as Buttmann observes, to increase the force of the opposition between the two members of the sentence when divided into the protasis and apodosis. Excurs. xii. ad Demosthen. Or. Midian. p. 147. sqq.

Ἡ οὐσία, ἧς λόγ. δίδ. τοῦ εἶναι] *The essence, with respect to which we give the definition that* IT IS.—See Matthiæ Gr. s. 540. *Obs.* 2.—λόγον, i. q. ὁρισμόν, as frequently elsewhere. Cf. c. 20. supr. οἷς ἐπισφαγιζόμεθα τοῦτο, ὃ ἔστι.

Τὸ ὄν] Added merely in explanation of ὃ ἔστι preced.

Μονοειδὲς.] *Simple, uniform*; i. e. that which contains nothing foreign to or unlike itself. V. c. 28. infr. a med. Cic. Acad. i. 8. "Earum qualitatum sunt

ταὐτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται; Ὡσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν, οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ ἱματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἴσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων; ἆρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταὐτά ἐστιν; Οὔτως αὖ, ἔφη, ταῦτα, ὁ Κέβης· οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει. Οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἅψαιο κἂν ἴδοις κἂν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἴσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ποτ' ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀειδῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται.

§. 26. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν,

aliæ principes, aliæ ex iis ortæ: principes sunt uniusmodi et implices. Itaque aer et ignis et aqua et terra prima sunt." V. Ernest. Clav. Cic. V. *Simplex.* Whence Virgil, vi. 747. calls the mind, "Ætherium sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem." h. e. *ἀξύνθετον*, having been cleansed of its pollution. The term is applied to different subjects: in Tim. p. 59. B. gold is called *μονοειδὲς γένος*: to a rock or stone. Porphyr. Ant. Nymph. p. 310. *τὰ ἄντρα ὑπὸ πέτρας περιεχόμενα μονοειδοῦς*, etc.—*Αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό*,—this is to be understood of identity, as *ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ* of permanence.

Οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς.] Plato not unfrequently uses this strengthening of the negative by a repetition of its compounds. Cf. de Legg. xii. p. 951. C. *οὐ πρέπον ἐν εὐνόμῳ πόλει γίγνεσθαι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς.* Timæ. p. 50. C. *ὁμοίαν εἴληφεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς.* Sophist. p. 162. F. — p. 251. E. *μηδενὶ μηδὲν μηδεμίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν κοινωνίας εἰς μηδέν.* It was not unusual also with the tragic and other writers amongst the Greeks. Eurip. Cycl. 120. *Νομάδες· ἀκούει δ' οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν οὐδενός.* It is remarked that in such cases the letter *δ* is constantly repeated, and the letter *π* in affirmatives. FAEHSE.

Τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν.] The genitive absolute, serving to point out the object of the following proposition. Matthiæ Gr. s. 342.

Πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐκείνοις.] *Completely an opposite case to the former; τοὐναντίον* being put absolutely.

Οὕτως αὖ, ἔφη, ταῦτα.] *Sic contra, inquit, hæc.* WYTT.—*αὖ* in opposition having usually the sense of *contra.*

Ὅτῳ — ἐπιλάβοιο.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 330.

Τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ.] i. e. *reflection;* according to Plato, *διάνοια* is a mean between *νοῦς*, which is engaged in what is abstract and intelligible, and *δόξα* which regards the sensible and concrete, whence it is concerned with both, as the progressive state from the sensible to the intelligible by which the latter becomes certainly known.

§. 26. *Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει κ. τ. λ.*] Olymp. *Διαρεῖ καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν σύστασιν εἰς ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καὶ ζητεῖ τί μᾶλλον ἔοικε τοῖς ἀδιαλύτοις, πότερον ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ κατασκευάζει ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ μᾶλλον ἔοικε τοῖς*

τὸ δὲ ἀειδές; Θῶμεν, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀειδὲς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν. Φέρε δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοιότερον τῷ εἴδει φαῖμεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; Παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε δῆλον ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ. Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀειδές; Οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἐλέγομεν. ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ οἴει; Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὁρατὸν εἶναι ἢ οὐχ ὁρατόν; Οὐχ ὁρατόν. Ἀειδὲς ἄρα; Ναί. Ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ σώματός ἐστι τῷ ἀειδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ; Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

§. 27. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι λέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως—τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι' αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι—, τότε μὲν ἕλκεται ὑπὸ

ἀδιαλύτοις διὰ τριῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων, ἐκ τοῦ ἀοράτου αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ δεσπόζειν τοῦ σώματος. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 516. 3.

Ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *Is any other the case than that one part of ourselves consists of body and the other of soul?* V. Viger. de Idiotism. c. iii. s. q. r. 8. Matthiæ Gr. s. 487. 9.—ἡμῶν αὐτῶν depending upon τὸ seq.

Οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε.] *Not by mankind at least.* Intell. ὁρᾶται (ὁρατόν ἐστιν.)

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς κ. τ. λ.] *But we indeed were speaking of what was visible and what invisible according to the nature* (i. e. the capabilities) *of man.*—ὁρατὰ—ἐλέγομεν, i. q. περὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν ἐλέγ. Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 9. Καὶ φαίνεται τουτ' οὐ λέγειν. — τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει, an elegant periphrasis for τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Οὐχ ὁρατόν.] *Quod cerni nequit—ἀειδὲς ἄρα, quod speciem formamve non habet.* HEIND.

§. 27. Καὶ τόδε πάλαι λέγομεν.] Cf. c. 10. supr. et seq. Πάλαι, according to Fischer, is used here, as occasionally elsewhere, like the *dudum* of the Latins, to signify *just now, a short time since.* Phot. Lex. v. Πάλαι· τὸ ἤδη λέγειν εἰώθασι Πάλαι: Eustath. ad Il. θ'. p. 702. Phavor. in. voc.—"Οταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται; Cf. Laert. iii. 12. φησὶν ὁ Ἄλκιμος καὶ ταυτί· φασὶν οἱ σοφοὶ, τὴν ψυχὴν, τὰ μὲν διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθάνεσθαι, οἷον ἀκούσαν, βλέπουσαν· τὰ δ' αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, μηδὲν τῷ σώματι χρωμένην.

Τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι, κ. τ. λ.] In this passage τὸ διὰ τοῦ σ. σκοπεῖν is the subject, and τὸ δι' αἰσθ. σκ. the predi-

τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη; Πάνυ γε. Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅταν περ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη; καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται; Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ποτέρῳ οὖν αὖ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχὴ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενέστερον; Πᾶς ἂν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ξυγχωρῆσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι ψυχὴ τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μή. Τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα; Τῷ ἑτέρῳ.

§. 28. Ὅρα δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι

cate introduced by τοῦτο. Matthiæ Gr. s. 540.

Τότε μὲν ἔλκεται.] Ἕλκεσθαι is used here of the soul, to signify the unwillingness with which it is forced into the consideration of the corporeal and sensible.

Ἰλιγγιᾷ.] *Is affected with dizziness. becomes dizzy* or *perplexed. Vertigine correptus rotatur et circumagitur.* STALL. v. Pierson. ad Moer. p. 196. sq. Lennep. ad Phalar. p. 35—38. Cf. Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 12. "hoc est quod Plato notavit in Phædone: animam in corpus trahi nova ebrietate trepidantem: volens novum potum materialis alluvionis intelligi, quo delibuta et gravata deducitur."

Τοιούτων.] Sc. Πλανωμένων καὶ ἐν ταραχῇ ὄντων.

Τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται.] Olympiodorus objects to the application of πάθημα to φρόνησις. (As in Xenoph. Cyrop. iii. 1. 10. πάθημα ἄρα σὺ λέγεις τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι τὴν σωφροσύνην, ὥσπερ λύπην οὐμάθημα) upon which Wyttenbach observes: "Ratio aute oculos in modo dictis: πέπαυταί τοῦ πλάνου, κ. τ. λ. indeque et sensu quietis et perceptione veritatis suaviter afficitur et bene patitur, εὐπαθείᾳ fruitur, εὐπαθεῖ." So in Phædr. p. 345. B.—ἰδοῦσα διὰ χρόνου τὸ ὄν, ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ θεωροῦσα τἀληθῆ τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ.

Καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ.] Cf. Terent. Adelph. iv. 3. 18. "Et recte et verum dicis."

Ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου.] *From this investigation.*—Ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ, a proverbial form; *in all and every*, i. e. *completely, altogether.* Upon the addition of μᾶλλον to the comparative, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 458. So with the Latins, *magis certius, magis dulcius, magis mollior, &c.* STALL.

ἡ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὖ πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ ὅμοιον τῷ θείῳ εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἷον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ δουλεύειν; Ἔμοιγε. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔοικεν; Δῆλα δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ. Σκόπει δή, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχήν, τῷ δ' ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον αὖ εἶναι σῶμα. ἔχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, ὡς οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

§. 29. Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἆρ' οὐχὶ σώματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὖ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου; Πῶς

§. 28. Τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν.] Albinus Doctrin. Plat. c. 25. p. 370. καὶ μὴν ἡγεμονεύει ἡ ψυχὴ φύσει· τὸ δὲ δὴ φύσει ἡγεμονικὸν τῷ θείῳ ἔοικεν.

Θεῖον οἷον ἄρχειν.] Cf. Somn. Scip. c. 8. "Deum te igitur scito esse; siquidem Deus est, qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur et movet id corpus cui præpositus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps Deus: et ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipse Deus æternus, sic fragile corpus animus sempiternus movet." Apul. de Dogm. Plat. p. 255. "animam—imperare et regere ea, quorum curam fuerit diligentiamque secuta."

Ξυμβαίνει.] h. e. *An ex iis, quæ disputata sunt, hoc consequatur.*—Stall. The verb συμβαίνειν is frequently used in a logical sense, to express a deduction from established premises. Cf. c. 41. a med. Αἰσθάνει οὖν—ὅτι ταῦτά σοι ξυμβαίνει λέγειν, &c. Aristot. Topic. viii. 22. θέντες γὰρ τὰ πλεῖστα, ἐπὶ τέλους τερθρεύονται, ὡς οὐ συμβαίνοντος ἐκ τῶν κειμένων· i. e. *quum plurima posuerunt, in fine argutantur, quasi non consequatur ex positis.* — Wytt.

Νοητῷ.] *Intelligible, intellectual*, i. e. not material, or falling under the senses. Donn. Gr. Lex. Proclus in Tim. i. p. 90. τὸ νοητόν ποτε μὲν φέρουσι κατὰ πάσης τῆς ἀειδοῦς καὶ ἀοράτου φύσεως, ὥσπερ ὅταν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν νοητὴν εἶναι λέγωσιν· ὡς ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης.

Πολυειδεῖ.] *Multiform.*

§. 29. Ἀδιαλύτῳ.] Olympiod. Ἀδιαλυτόν ἐστιν, ὡς μὴ ἐκ μερῶν συγκείμενον, τὸ γὰρ διαλυόμενον εἰς οἰκεῖα μέρη διαλύεται. Cic. de Senect. c. 21. "Cum simplex—animi natura esset, neque haberet in se quidquam admistum dispar sui atque dissimile, non posse eum dividi: quod si non possit, non posse interire."

γὰρ οὔ; Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὁρατῷ κείμενον, ὃ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ᾧ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, ἐὰν μέν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάνυ μάλα. συμπεσὸν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ὥς περ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγου ὅλον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον. ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἐὰν σαπῇ, ὀστᾶ τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅμως ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστιν. ἢ οὔ; Ναί. Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον, γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀειδῆ, εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἷ, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἰτέον, αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη

Ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν—χρόνον.] h. e. *Satis diu; a moderately long time.* — Stall. Cf. in Criton. c. 1. init. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

Ἐὰν μέν τις καὶ χαριέντως, κ. τ. λ.] The point of the present argument is to evince that if the body, whose inferiority, in all respects, to the soul is already conceded, does not disappear, is not dissolved and dispersed, at once, when death takes place, but continues to last, according as circumstances may admit or effect, it is then only reasonable to allow that the soul does not perish instantaneously at the moment of decease.— Stallbaum explains the passage as supr. (referring ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ to χαριέντως, as if the reading were ἐν χαριέσσῃ ὥρᾳ,) *St quidem quis et corpore florente mortuus fuerit et florente ætate;* and understands καὶ πάνυ μάλα as a confirmatory assertion of its truth. Χαριέντως and ὥρα, he further observes justly, are not applied merely to what is graceful and beautiful, but to the strong and healthy disposition of the frame, by which, in the prime of life, the qualities of grace and beauty are best developed. Dacier and Wyttenbach, both incorrectly, refer ὥρᾳ to the time of the year.

Συμπεσὸν.] *Having collapsed.* — Ταριχευθέν, *embalmed.* See Herodot. ii. 86. Cic. Tusc. i. 45. Cf. Lactant. vi. 12. 6. "Non enim simul interit, sed, anima discedente, integrum, per multos dies manet, et plerumque medicatum diutissime durat."

Καὶ ἐὰν σαπῇ.] Intell. τὸ ἄλλα σῶμα.

Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ—τὸ ἀειδές.] Compare with this, Paul, Corinth. ii. 4. 18.—"for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal." 5. 1. and Whitby in loc.

Εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον.] *Even into such another place as itself.* Cf. c. 2. supr. Τοιούτους ἑτέρους ἔχεις.

Εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς.] *In eum, qui vere est ἀΐδης;* ὡς ἀληθῶς being used in reference to the fictions of the poets and the vulgar on the subject; for doubtless the place where the τὰ ἀειδῆ, and τὰ ὄντως ὄντα were, properly deserved a name synonymous with that of its occupant.

τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὥς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὧδε ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος ξυνεφέλκουσα, ἅτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἑκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροισμένη αὐτὴ εἰς αὐτήν, ἅτε μελετῶσα ἀεὶ τοῦτο,—τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥᾳδίως. ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μελέτη θανάτου; Παντάπασί γε. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀειδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἷ ἀφικομένῃ ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένῃ, ὥς περ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ θεῶν διάγουσα; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὦ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως.

§. 30. Οὕτω νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Ἐὰν δέ γε, οἶμαι, μεμιασμένη καί ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ ξυνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θε-

Διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν.] i. e. *Is wont to be dissipated and destroyed;* the perfect being used in this sense, with reference to the complete fulfilment, succeeded by a state analogous to it.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 502. 2.

Οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι.] Elsewhere οἱ πολλοί, simply; ἄνθρωποι is probably added in contempt.

Ἑκοῦσα εἶναι.] *Quantum quidem ab ipsius voluntate penderet.* STALL. Cf. c. 5. supr. a med. ἑκὼν εἶναι. Apol. Socr. c. 27. init. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 545.

Μελέτη θανάτου.] Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 30. "Tota enim philosophorum vita, ut ait idem (Plato) commentatio mortis est." Hermias Comment. MS. n. Phædr. p. 45. καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία οὐδὲν ἄλλό ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μελέτη θανάτου.

Ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι.] h. e. *Ei contingit esse beatæ.* STALL. Cf. Xenoph. Cyrop. ii. 1. 23. ὑπῆρχε δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τοῖς ἄρχουσι πρῶτον μὲν θεραπεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων.

Ἀγρίων ἐρώτων.] *Wild* or *unbridled desires,* which, together with the fears, produce those disturbances of the mind which are comprehended in ἀνοία preceding.

Διάγουσα.] Heindorf would read διαγούσῃ, because of ἀπηλλαγμένῃ preced. but there is no sanction in any of the copies for the change, which certainly seems requisite. Stallbaum attributes the reading, as supr., to the not unusual negligence of prose writers, who attend, in many instances, to the sense rather than the grammatical construction. He compares Thucyd. vii. 42. καὶ τοῖς μὲν Συρακουσίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις κατάπληξις ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα οὐκ ὀλίγη ἐγένετο, εἰ πέρας μηδὲν ἔσται σφίσι

ραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρῶσα καὶ γεγοητευμένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδὲς οὗ τις ἂν ἅψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πίοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκοτῶδες καὶ ἀειδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσαν οἴει ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν εἰλικρινῆ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι; Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ διειλημμένην γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ αὐτῇ ἡ ὁμιλία τε καὶ ξυνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε ξύμφυτον. Πάνυ γε. Ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἴεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεταί τε καὶ ἕλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς τε καὶ

τοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ κινδύνου, ὁρῶντες οὔτε διὰ τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχιζομένην οὐδὲν ἧσσον στρατὸν ἴσον — ἐπεληλυθότα, κ. τ. λ., where *ὁρῶντες* does not appear to have required emendation. V. Ducker. in loc. Poppo Prolegomen. ad Thucyd. i. P. 1. p. 111. Whence he conjectures the nom. *διάγουσα* to have been used as if the preceding construction had been *οἱ ἀφικομένη εὐδαίμων ἔσται, κ. τ. λ.*

§. 30. *Ἐρῶσα.*] Sc. *αὐτοῦ.*—*Ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν,*—added in explanation of *ὑπ' αὐτοῦ* preced.

Ἀλλ' ἢ.] See Apol. Socr. c. 22. fin. *Ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν.* This form, which is frequently adopted by the Greek writers, arises from the union of two constructions, of which the one denotes opposition, and the other comparison, whence the passage, as supr. combines the effect of the separate propositions *ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς, ἄλλα τὸ σωματοειδὲς*—and *ὥστε μ. ἄ. δ. εἶναι ἀληθὲς, ἢ τὸ σωματ.* So with *πλὴν ἢ.* STALL. Cf. Schaefer, Apparat. ad Demosthen. i. p. 752.

Οὗ τις ἂν ἅψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι.] If there are two verbs of different regimen in the proposition which begins with the relative, with each of which, therefore, the relative should be in a different case, it is commonly found only once, and in the case required by the nearest verb.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 474. *d.* Upon the sense "to be able," implied in the optatives as supr. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 514. *b.*

Νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ αἱρετόν.] i. q. In Tim. p. 29. A. *λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτόν.*

Διειλημμένην.] *Involved, engrossed,* or *enmeshed.* According to Heindorf; *ita occupatam a corpore, ut id per eam dispersum quasi et dissipatum sit.* Wyttenbach gives it the force of *ligatam, interceptam, interligatam,* in which he is followed by V. Cousin; *toute chargée des liens de l'enveloppe materielle.*

Ἐμβριθὲς.] Nearly synonymous with *βαρύ* seq. Hesych. *Ἐμβριθὲς· βαρύ.* Sap. Sal. ix. 15. *Φθαρτὸν γαρ σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχὴν, καὶ βρίθει το γεῶδες σκῆνος νοῦν πολυφροντίδα.* Philo de Gigant. 288. *Πλατωνίζων*: *ὅσαι* (*sc.* *ψυχαὶ*) *τῶν σαρκῶν φόρτον ἀχθοφοροῦσι, βαρυνόμεναι καὶ πιεζόμεναι, ἄνω μὲν βλέπειν εἰς τὰς οὐρανίους περιόδους ἀδυνατοῦσι, κάτω δὲ ἑλκυσθεῖσθαι τὸν αὐχένα βιαίως, δίκην τετραπόδων, γῇ προσερρίζωνται.*

Αιδου, ὥς περ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματα τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὤφθη ἄττα ψυχῶν σκοτοειδῆ φάσματα, οἷα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ

Περὶ τὰ μνήματα—καὶ τοὺς τάφους.] This doctrine was held by many of the ancients. v. Hieron. Mag. in Miscell. iv. c. 12. Elsner, in Observ. Sacr. p. 47. It was adopted by the Jews also, who believed that the soul was not admitted to the celestial joys immediately after death, but that it wandered in this world, chiefly about the place where its body had been deposited, and after a species of purgatory, by which it was cleansed from its stains, it passed again into other bodies of men or inferior animals. V. Lightfoot on John, c. 11. v. 39. Vitringa in Synagog. Vet. i. p. 222. Mosheim, on Cudworth, cap. 5. Sect. 3. note 21. in fin. "Hæc nempe spectra nonnulli animos esse hominum decernebant mortuorum, aut potius eorum simulacra; quibus oppositi alii duplicis ea generis esse, constituebant: alia dæmonum ex ordine seu animorum nondum corporibus sociatorum, alia ex animis corpore solutis. Et erant aliqui tam audaces, ut datum sibi esse prædicarent, hæc duplicis naturæ spectra certis notis inter se discernere et distinguere. Scilicet nil intentatum relinquit superstitio." Κυλινδουμένη, — *κυλινδεῖσθαι, volutari, versari.* — Fisch. Cf. Cic. Somn. Scip. ix. "eorum animi qui se corporis voluptatibus dederunt—corporibus elapsi circa terram ipsam volutantur." Lactant. Instit. ii. 2. 6. "Vulgus existimat animas circa tumulos et corporum suorum reliquias oberrare."

Σκοτοειδῆ φάσματα.] Appul. Apol. p. 315. Elm. "At tibi duat deus ista semper obvias species mortuorum; quicquid umbrarum est usquam, quicquid Lemurum, quicquid Manium, quicquid Larvarum, oculis tuis aggerat: omnia noctium occursacula, omnia bustorum formidamina, omnia sepulchrorum terriculamenta." Sallust. de Diis et Mundo. c. 19. p. 106. Πάντως δὲ μετὰ τῆς ἀλόγου ὑπομένουσι, μεθ' ἣσπερ καὶ ἥμαρτον· δι' ἣν καὶ τὸ σκιοειδὲς σῶμα ὑφίσταται, ὃ περὶ τοὺς τάφους, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν κακῶς ζησάντων ὁρᾶται.

Εἴδωλα.] Mosheim on Cudworth, cap. 5. sec. 3. note 23. "Constans est veterum et concors sententia, animos corporis terreni vinculis solutos ad inferos seu *εἰς ᾅδην* abire: sapientum quidem et heroum mentes ipsum una cum corpore mortali simulacrum (*εἴδωλον*) amittere, statimque cum Diis post excessum conjungi, tametsi simulacrum seu animus sentiens ad civitatem *Plutonis* descendat; vulgares autem animos una cum simulacro in subterraneum huncce locum commigrare: in eo animos sanabiles varii generis cruciatibus, quo puri fiant et liquidi, subjici: nimis vero sceleratos et inveterata malitia infectos æternis suppliciis torqueri." Ibid. note 19—"Modo—monuero non iisdem apud omnes nominibus secundarium hoc animæ corpus appellari. Plerique eorum *εἴδωλον* illud nominant—alii vero, in quibus Porphyrius et Hierocles sunt, *φύσιν* illud dicunt, alii *πνεῦμα* nominant alii *ψυχὴν πνευματικὴν*, ut Synesius Libro de Insomniis, p. 137. Ex his nominibus varii nascuntur qui familiares sunt Platonicis, loquendi modi, in quibus exponendis facile aliquis erraverit, nisi nomina quæ diximus calleat." The subject of the *εἴδωλα* is discussed at considerable length by Mosheim in locc. citt. and with a distinctness which throws all possible light upon this portion of the Platonic philosophy. Cf. Hom. Il. ψ'. 103. Ὦ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τις ἐστὶ καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι Ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν. and Kennedy in loc. Odyss. λ'. 600. Τὸν ὁ μετ' εἰσενόησα βίην Ἡρακληείην, Εἴδωλον.—which is mentioned as distinct from Hercules himself, who was dwelling amongst the gods. Lucret. i. 121.—"Esse Acherusia templa Ennius æternis exponit versibus edens; quo neque permanent animæ, neque corpora nostra; sed quædam simulacra modis pallentia miris." Æneid. iv. 654. "Et nunc magna mei sub terras ibit imago." vi. 292. "Et ni docta comes tenues sine corpore vitas Admoneat volitare cava sub imagine formæ, Irruat

ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται. Εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὦ Κέβης· καὶ οὔ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταύτας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἳ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς, κακῆς οὔσης. καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται ἕως ἂν τῇ τοῦ ξυνεπακολουθοῦντος τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς ἐπιθυμίᾳ πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα.

§. 31. Ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥς περ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη ὁποῖ' ἄττ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἷον τοὺς

et frustra ferro diverberet umbras," and Heyne in loc.

Τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς.] Etymol. M. and Suid. Τροφή· — λαμβάνεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγωγῆς καὶ παιδείας. where τροφή, *a mode* or *plan of life*, implies the instruction or discipline by which it was originally framed.

§. 31. Ἐνδοῦνται.] Olympiod.— Ὅτι παλαιὸς λόγος, Ὀρφικός τε γὰρ καὶ Πυθαγόρειος, ὁ πάλιν ἄγων τὰς ψυχὰς εἰς τὸ σῶμα, καὶ πάλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀνάγων, καὶ τοῦτο κύκλῳ πολλάκις. This doctrine, which, as Olympiodorus justly observes, should rather be called μετενσωμάτωσις, as being the transmigration of the same soul into different bodies, than μετεμψύχωσις, which strictly signifies the transmigration of different souls into the same body, was borrowed from Pythagoras and the Egyptians. Plato, says Enfield, disdaining the sober method of reasoning introduced by Socrates, left his first master in search of other preceptors. This natural propensity towards excessive refinement in speculation, and the celebrity of the Italic school, which abounded in subtleties, induced him to attach himself to the Pythagorean philosophy. He afterwards studied under the Egyptian priests, who, doubtless, seduced him still farther from the plain path of common sense which had hitherto been followed in the Socratic school. Whence it was not without reason that Xenophon, or whoever else was the author of the epistle of Æschines, preserved in his works, censures Plato for neglecting the sober philosophy of Socrates, and through a vain affectation of extraordinary refinement, and a fond partiality for the mysteries of Egypt, and for the prodigies of Pythagoras, devoting himself to subtle speculations, and becoming a haughty professor of wisdom. Hist. of Philos. ii. c. 8. s. 1.

Τοιαῦτα ἤθη.] h. l. Ζῶα τοιούτοις ἤθεσι χρώμενα. HEIND.

Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις.] Mosheim, in Cudworth. c. 5. sect. 3. note 21. " Antiquiores humanam tantum formam huic animæ vestimento attribuerunt, nec ullo putem veterem scriptorum dicto demonstrari posse, visum fuisse cuiquam remotiori ævo, canis, lupi, leonis, aut aliorum animalium figuram mentem adsciscere posse. At Platonicum genus nullos respuebat credulæ plebis rumores et fabulas: quare quum sermones passim circumferri non ignoraret de spectris, luporum aut aliorum animantium forma vagantibus et vim hominibus inferentibus, et hos sibi minime repudiandos, verum ita temperandos esse, ut suis non adversarentur præceptis existimavit. Hinc talem esse docebat animæ formam exteriorem, qualis interior ejus status esset: Humanam plerosque animos formam referre: at aliquos tamen, ceteris scilicet corruptiores et ad improbas libidines propensiores, talibus similes apparere bestiis, qualium vitia et naturam consectati essent in hac vita: crudelem tyrannum leonis, intemperantem prorsus et voracem lupi, libidinosum hirci simulacrum gerere. —

μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διευλαβημένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι. ἢ οὐκ οἴει; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις. Τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἁρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη. ἢ ποῖ ἂν ἄλλοσε φαῖμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι; Ἀμελει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τἆλλα, οἳ ἂν ἑκάστη ἴοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης; δῆλον δή, ἔφη· πῶς δ' οὔ; Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικήν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σω-

Omnes tamen an huic dediti fuerint sententiæ sectæ hujus philosophi, haud equidem dixerim. Consentiunt etiam inter se de causis et initiis hujus formæ. Animam enim ipsam universi statuunt; formam istam corpori, quod adjunctum habet, imaginandi qua pollet, facultate imprimere. Accendi nimirum animum amore corporum: hunc amorem efficere, ut humidum is spiritum copiose attrahat: per spiritum hunc crassiorem aspectabilem fieri animum: accedere denique imaginationem animæ et forma corpus, quod gerit, donare tali, qualem interior ejus poscat affectio. Quot hic recito sententias, tot scio, me portenta narrare videri illis, qui nihil probant prætor id, quod rationibus et argumentis vident munitum esse: verum nihil me sectæ huic tribuere, quod ab ejus alienum disciplina sit, innumeris confirmare mihi locis eorum licet." Cf. in Tim. p. 42. 91. de Repub. x. sub. fin. in Phædr. p. 249. Tim. Socr. de Anim. Mundi in fin.

Ὑβρεις.] *Stupra, flagitia;* whence ὕβ. μεμελετηκότες, *lascivi, libidinosi, flagitiosi.* FISCH. Φιλοποσίας, *inebriety.* Edd. φιλοτησίας, which does not accord with the tenor of the passage.

Μὴ διευλαβημένους.] h. e. *Qui sibi non prorsus ab illis vitiis caverunt, qui illa non omni modo fugerunt.* STALL.— Ficinus appears to have read καὶ μηδὲν διευλαβημ. which is approved by Heindorf. V. Cousin; *qui n'ont eu aucune retenue.*

Οἳ ἂν ἑκάστη ἴοι, κ. τ. λ.] *Quocumque quæque iverit, iverit secundum similitudinem consuetudinis.* WYTT. Some copies read ᾗ ἂν ἑκάσ. upon which see Matthiæ Gr. s. 486. 2. *a.*

Καὶ τούτων.] *Even of these;* i. e. who have not studied to withdraw their attention altogether from things terestrial. The happiest amongst them were those who forbore the excesses which a merely moral discipline enabled them to withstand.

Τὴν δημοτικήν τε καὶ πολιτικ. ἀρετ.] Cf. c. 13. supr. The virtues unconnected with philosophy, and which were attainable by study and practice, without any exercise of those higher intellectual faculties which were necessary to, and frequently made synonymous with philosophy itself, were called πολιτικαὶ. They were social or moral virtues only, and received their name from the sense in which Plato understood politics, which he defined to be the application, on a great scale, of the laws of morality; a society being composed of individuals, and therefore restricted by similar obligations. According to Plotinus, the human soul cannot attain perfection or felicity but by the contemplation of the Supreme Unity, by means of an absolute abstraction (ἁπλώσις, simplification), from all compounded

φροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ; Πῇ δὴ οὗτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι; Ὅτι τούτους εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικόν τε καὶ ἥμερον γένος, ἢ που μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων, ἢ καὶ εἰς ταὐτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας μετρίους. Εἰκός.

§. 32. Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἕνεκα, ὦ ἑταῖρε Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἁπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὑταῖς αὐτούς, οὔ τι

things, and by ascending to the heights of pure existence. In this consists virtue, which is two-fold; inferior virtue, (or πολιτική) belonging to such souls as are in the progress of purification; and superior virtue, which consists in an intimate union, by contemplation, with the Divine Being (ἕνωσις). Tennemann, Philos. s. 214. Cf. Macrob. in Somn. Scip. i. 8. "Plotinus inter philosophiæ professores cum Platone princeps, libro de Virtutibus, gradus earum vera et naturali divisionis ratione compositos per ordinem digerit. Quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum genera virtutum: ex his primæ politicæ vocantur, secundæ purgatoriæ, tertiæ animi jam purgati, quartæ exemplares," &c.

Πολιτικόν — γένος, ἢ που μελιττῶν.] The familiar economy of the bee-hive renders the application of πολιτικόν γένος easily obvious. Cf. Aristot. Hist. Anim. i. 1. p. 471. Virgil. Georg. iv. 3. "Admiranda tibi levium spectacula rerum, Magnanimosque duces, totiusque ordine gentis Mores, et studia, et populos, et prælia dicam."

§. 32. Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος.] It would appear, Wyttenbach remarks, from this passage as it stands, that although one were not a philosopher, nor perfectly clear, at his departure from life, of corporeal taint, still he might be classed among the gods, if only he were φιλομαθής: an interpretation which the commentator observes to be at variance with the reasoning and sense of Plato, whence he proposes to read; Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἄλλῳ ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῶς ἀπιόντι, i. e. *In deorum autem genus nefas est alii pervenire quam doctrinæ studioso philosophato et plane puro abeunti.* Heindorf conjectures; ἀλλὰ μόνῳ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. τούτων ἕνεκα, κ. τ. λ. Φιλοσοφήσας and φιλομαθής are nearly synonymous, so much so as to prevent any distinction that could be drawn between them affecting the passage to such a degree as might obviate the difficulty. It is suggested as a probable explanation, that ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ is added to increase the force and emphasis of the sentence, as if he said, that it was unlawful for one who was not a philosopher, and who had not departed from life unstained by moral guilt, to rank among the gods; unlawful that this should occur in any case, except to the genuine philosopher.

Some suppose the words οὐδ' ἄλλῳ ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ, to have been inserted by a copyist in explanation of μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι, preced. and ἄλλῳ changed afterwards to ἀλλά as supr. According to Wyttenbach, φιλομαθής is the genus of which φιλόσοφος is the species, whence every φιλόσοφος was also φιλομαθής but not v. v. Hence Cicero

οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι ὥς περ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι· οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὥς περ οἱ φιλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', ἦ δ' ὅς. τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν ἅπασιν, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ἐκεῖνοι οἷς τι μέλει τῆς αὐτῶν ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματα πλάττοντες ζῶσι, χαίρειν εἰπόντες οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὰ πορεύονται αὐτοῖς, ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ὅπῃ ἔρχονται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ ταύτῃ τρέπονται, ἐκείνῃ ἑπόμενοι ᾗ ἐκείνη ὑφηγεῖται.

§. 33. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ, ἔφη. γιγνώσκουσι γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὥς περ δι' εἱργμοῦ διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δι' αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλινδουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἱργμοῦ τὴν δεινότητα

uses *docti* and *doctissimi* for *philosophi*.

Οἰκοφθορίαν.] *Rei familiaris jacturam.* Wytt. *The ruin* or *dilapidation of a family property.* Donn. Gr. Lex.

Ἔπειτα.] *So, therefore, things being so.*

Μὴ σώματα πλάττοντες.] *Qui quidem animum suum curant, neque corpus unice colunt et fovent.* Stall.—Ζῶσι, sc. *αὐτοί*, Matthiæ Gr. s. 472. 3.

Τῇ ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρ. ταύτ.] Explained c. 33. sq.

§. 33. Παραλαβοῦσα—*τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία.*] Παραλαμβάνειν is affirmed of those who take up, or take charge of any for the purposes of education and discipline. Hence it is justly applied to philosophy as above, under whose tutelage the soul is delivered from the thraldom of the body and its organs, and restored to the purity and freedom to which it is entitled as an immortal and independent essence.

Ὡς περ δι' εἱργμοῦ.] *As if through a dungeon.* Cod. Aug. *δι' εἵργμοῦ*, after Hesych. Εἱργμός· κώλυσις, δεσμός, συνέχεσις., but εἱργμοῦ is correct, as appears from Eustathius, ad Odyss. *ά.* p. 14. ed. Bas. τὸ εἵργω ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ κωλύω ἐψιλουν οἱ Ἀττικοί, καὶ δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ ἀπειρξαν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλείω ἐδάσυνον, ὡς δηλοῖ τὸ καθεῖρξαν, ὅθεν καὶ δασύνεται καὶ ἡ εἰρκτή. The soul, imprisoned within the body, is obliged to receive impressions through the senses, which are usually as false as the medium is fallacious. It cannot, while thus confined, become properly the object of its own contemplation, nor can it devote itself, while trammelled by the body and its appetites, to those purely intellectual exertions and researches, by which alone it is enabled to arrive at truth. But it is assisted, and in fine successfully, in attaining to a knowledge of the intelligible and invisible, by philosophy, which is at once its ransomer and guide.

Κυλινδουμένην.] *Grovelling.*

κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος ξυλλήπτωρ εἴη τῷ δεδέσθαι,—ὅ περ οὖν λέγω, γιγνώσκουσιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἠρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δε ἡ διὰ τῶν ὤτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν ξυλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἢ αὐτὴν αὐτῇ, ὅ τι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν ὄντων· ὅ τι δ' ἂν δι' ἄλλων σκοπῇ ἐν ἄλλοις ὂν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀληθές· εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ὁρατόν, ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὁρᾷ, νοητόν τε καὶ ἀειδές. ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἡ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ

Ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν.] i. q. Ὅτι ἐπιθυμεῖ, sc. ὁ εἱργμός. Whence Stallbaum; *et quum philosophia claustri istius vim et diritatem perspexit, quippe quod cupide quasi circumspiciat, quomodo ille ipse, qui devinctus est, maxime ad id conferat, ut captus teneatur.*—Heindorf objects to the affirming δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν in an active sense of τοῦ εἱργμοῦ as supr., but as it has already received the attribute, τὴν δεινότητα, it may be easily said ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὡς ἂν μάλ. κ. τ. λ. Upon the construction δι' ἐπιθυμίας εἶναι, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 580. 2. c. For τῷ δεδέσθαι infr. Heindorf proposes τοῦ δεδέσθαι and compares Phædr. c. 29. ξύμ. μοι λαβέσθε τοῦ μύθου. Aristoph. Vesp. 733. νῦν δ' αὖ παρών τις—τῶν θεῶν ξυλλαμβάνει τοῦ πράγματος. Xenoph. Mem. ii. 2. 12. ἵνα—ἀγαθοῦ σοι γίγνηται συλλήπτωρ. ii. 2. 32. ἀγαθὴ συλλήπτρια τῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόνων, &c.

Ἠρέμα παραμυθεῖται.] See c. 14. supr. a med. Παραμυθίας.

Ὅ τι δ' ἂν δι' ἄλλων—ἐν ἄλλοις ὂν ἄλλο.] Δι' ἄλλων is opposed to αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν preced. in the sense of δι' αἰσθήσεων or διὰ τοῦ σώματος. So τὸ ἐν ἄλλοις ὂν ἄλλο is opposed to αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, the former being understood of those things which, as submitted to the senses, are subject to continual uncertainty and change, whence they are said to be ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα. Wyttenbach explains the passage; *Quidquid vero per alia considebet* (i. e. *corporeum per sensus corporis*), *quum in aliis sensibus aliud appareat, nihil horum verum putare*; and compares Phædr. p. 345. C.—καθορᾷ δὲ ἐπιστήμη, οὐχ ᾗ γίνεσις πρόσεστιν· οὐδ' ἡ ἐστί που ἑτέρα ἐν ἑτέρῳ οὖσα, ὧν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν· ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ ὄ ἐστιν ὂν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν.—V. Cousin: "*Et de tenir pour faux tout ce qu'elle apprend par un autre qu'elle même, tout ce qui varie selon la difference des intermédiaires.*

Ἐναντιοῦσθαι.] *Counteract by opposition.*

Οὕτως.] i. q. Ἔπειτα. supr. c. 32. sub. fin.

φόβων καθ' ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι ἐπειδάν τις σφόδρα ἡσθῇ ἢ φοβηθῇ ἢ λυπηθῇ ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὅσον ἄν τις οἰηθείη, οἷον ἢ νοσήσας ἤ τι ἀναλώσας διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' ὃ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακὸν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό. Τί τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπί τῳ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι, περὶ ὃ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχῃ, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ὁρατά. ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδεῖται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος; Πῶς δή; Ὅτι ἑκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥς περ ἧλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρός τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅ περ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται, οἶμαι, ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίγνεσθαι καὶ οἷα μηδέποτε καθαρῶς εἰς Αἰδου ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξιέναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς ἄλλο σώ-

Τοσοῦτον.] i. e. *Merely such an evil as one would suppose to result from sickness, &c.—but that which is the greatest and extreme evil of all, &c.*—τοσοῦτον being taken in the opposite of its more usual sense, which is sometimes the case with *tantum* of the Latins. See Cic. Epist. i. 7. and Manut. in loc. c.—Ἀπ' αὐτῶν, sc. τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν.

Ἐπί τῳ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι.] h. e. *animum cogi simul et gaudere vel dolere magnopere de re quapiam et putare, &c.*—HEIND.—Οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον, *though it is not so.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. *d.*—Ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ὁρατά. — *Hæc autem potissimum ea sunt, quæ cerni possunt.* HEIND.

Ὑπὸ σώματος.] i. e. By the bodily appetites and passions, with which the soul being infected, is called infr. τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα. Cf. in Tim. p. 43. 86. Steph. where Plato shows the diseases of the mind to derive their origin from this material contagion, uncorrected by proper discipline.

Ἧλον ἔχουσα.] Cf. Iamblich. Vit. Pythag. s. 228. μήτε προσηλούντων τῷ σώματι τὴν ψυχὴν παθημάτων καὶ προσπερονώντων ἐπιστρέφεσθαι. de Myster. Ægypt. ii. 6. p. 48.—Παθῶν πληροῖ προσηλούντων τοὺς θεωροῦντας τοῖς σώμασι. Horat. Sat. ii. 2. 79.—"Atque adfigit humo divinæ particulam auræ."

Οἷα μηδέποτε — ἀφικέσθαι.] h. e. καὶ τοιαύτη, ὥστε μηδέποτε ἀφ.—STALL.

Τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα.] *Corpore polluta et inquinata.*—STALL. Ruhnken ad Tim. Gloss. Ἀνάπλεως. ἀναπεπλησμένος. χρῆται δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ

μα καὶ ὥς περ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σωκρατες.

§. 34. Τούτων τοίνυν ἕνεκα, ὦ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κοσμιοί τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἕνεκά φασιν. ἢ σὺ οἴει; Οὐ δῆτα ἔγωγε. Οὐ γὰρ· ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι ἑαυτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἑαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν, Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἱστὸν μεταχειριζομένην· ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἑπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον

μεμολυσμένον. See Apol. Socr. c. 20. a med. Ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν.

§. 34. Οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς.] i. q. Οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλόσοφοι. c. 33. init. *Vere philosophantes, doctrinæ recte studentes.* Wytt.

Οὐ γὰρ· ἀλλ' οὕτω.] *Non profecto: sed sic.*—Wytt. Cf. Luke, Acts, xvi. 37. Οὐ γὰρ· ἀλλὰ ἐλθόντες αὐτοὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξαγαγέτωσαν, *nay, verily; but let them come themselves and fetch us out.*

Ἀνήνυτον ἔργον.] *Irritum opus facere, quod nunquam ad exitum perduci queat.* Heind. The soul, when disenthralled by the aid of philosophy it has shaken off its corporeal chains, should continue to abide in the purity and freedom secured by its deliverer. It should never again be subjected to the bondage of those passions by which it had been once degraded and debased: if it were so, the offices of philosophy were then rendered nugatory and vain. And as Penelope unwove by night what she had wove by day, so incomplete and unavailing was the task of philosophy in the purification of a soul, which *reversed*, however, the plan of Penelope, inasmuch as when loosed at first it submitted to be bound again;—hence ἐναντίως. Some copies read μεταχειριζομένης, and take ἐναντίως in the sense of ἀντικρυς, i. e. *instar Penelopæ tractantis telam;* but the text as supr. is preferable.

Γαλήνην τούτων.] Heindorf refers τούτων, as put for τούτου, to ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν, κ. τ. λ. preced. — Fischer, more correctly, to τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν underst.

Ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα.] *Always engaged in this, sc. the contemplation of truth, &c.;* τούτῳ referring to τὸ ἀληθὲς, κ. τ. λ. seq.—Τὸ ἀδόξαστον, *certain:* V. Cousin; *hors du domaine de l'opinion.* Truth is discerned not by the senses, but by the understanding. The human intellect is employed, either upon things which it comprehends by itself, and which are in their nature simple and invariable, or upon things which are subject to the senses, and are perpetually liable to fluctuation and change. (De Repub. vii. p. 531. 4. Phileb. t. ii. p. 63.) The contemplation of the former creates science, ἐπιστήμη; attention to the latter produces opinion, δόξα. (Cic. Acad. Quest. i. c. 5. Plat. Theæt. i. p. 186.) Sense is the passive perception of the soul through the medium of the body. When the forms of things are, by means of the corporeal organs, so deeply

θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζῇν τε οὕτως οἴεται δεῖν, ἕως ἂν ζῇ, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, ταῦτά γ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσηθεῖσα καὶ διαπτομένη οἴχηται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ.

§. 35. Σιγὴ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτός τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλω διελεγέσθην. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτὼ ἤρετο, Τί, ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα; μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ

impressed upon the mind, as not to be easily effaced by time, this permanent impression is called memory. From the union of sense and memory, or from the comparison of a present with a recollected perception, arises opinion. Where these agree, the opinion is true; where they differ, it is false. Enf. Phil. ii. c. 8. s. 1. Opinion, then, as being uncertain, from the nature of its origin, and variable in its result, cannot enter into the contemplation of the truth, which can only be regarded in conjunction with what is unerring and divine. It is to be observed, that memory and reminiscence differ in time and in degree: the latter is conversant with the ideas which the soul contemplated before its union with the body, the former with the perceptions to which it became subject after; consequently memory is employed upon sensible things, reminiscence upon the purely intelligible.

Ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς.] Sc. Ἀδόξαστης τροφῆς, to which is opposed the δοξαστὴ τροφή, of those souls which were incapable of attaining to philosophy and its results. Cf. in Phædr. p. 345. E. Πᾶσαι δὲ πολὺν ἔχουσαι πόνον, ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θίας ἀπέρχονται· καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρῶνται. Wyttenbach arranges and explains the passage as supr. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς, ταῦτα γ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ — ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα, κ. τ. λ. i. e. *Ex tali profecto nutritione, et quum hæc tractaverit, non est verendum ne timeat—ne distracta in discessu a quibusdam ventis dispersa ac difflata evadat, nec quidquam amplius usquam sit.*—Οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ. Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 16. init. οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ.

Διαφυσηθεῖσα.] See supr. c. 24. init.

§. 35. Αὐτός τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημ. λόγ. ἦν.] *Socrates, himself, was engaged in meditation upon*, or, *was occupied in thought with the subject that had been argued.* Cf. Philostr. de Vit. Apollon. v. 31. πρὸς τουτῷ ὅλος εἰμὶ, *I am wholly occupied in this*—such being an ordinary signification of πρὸς with a dative.

Ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο.] *As he appeared to view.* See Matthiæ Gr. s. 535. A similar pleonasm occurs in Tim. p. 535. F. Παντοδαπὴν ἰδεῖν φαίνεσθαι. — Alcib. i. p. 30. E. Φαίνομαι, ὡς ἔοικα.

Τί — ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα.] Intell. δοκεῖ. Cf. Soph. Electr. 766. Ὦ Ζεῦ, τί ταῦτα, πότερον, εὐτυχῆ λέγω; i. e.

ἐνδεῶς λελέχθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς, εἴ γε δή τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξιέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο σκοπεῖσθον, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκνήσητε καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ διεξελθεῖν, εἴ πῃ ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον λεχθῆναι, καὶ αὖ καὶ ἐμὲ ξυμπαραλαβεῖν, εἴ τι μαλλον οἴεσθε μετ' ἐμοῦ εὐπορήσειν. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη, Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τἀληθῆ σοι ἐρῶ. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἕτερον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ το ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκούσαι, ὀκνεῖν δὲ ὄχλον παρέχειν, μή σοι ἀηδὲς ᾖ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ξυμφοράν. Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέ τε ἠρέμα καὶ φησι, Βαβαί, ὦ Σιμμία· ἦ που χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους πείσαιμι ἀνθρώπους ὡς οὐ ξυμφορὰν ἡγοῦμαι τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μηδ' ὑμας δύναμαι πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε μὴ δυσκολώτερόν τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ. καὶ ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαυλότερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικήν, οἳ

τί ταῦτα λέγω, πότερον εὐτ.—Μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ,—μῶν, an Attic particle of interrogation, in Latin *an forte*, is occasionally joined with each of its component parts, with μὴ pleonastically, and commonly the question asked with it as well as with μὴ, involve a negation. Seag. Vig. de Id. c. vii. s. 9. r. 3.

Εἴ πῃ ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτ. λεχ. *If it appears to you in any degree that it could be better expressed;* where ἂν would seem to be required before λεχθῆναι, but it is not unusually omitted in the case of other moods to which it gives the force of the optative or conjunctive.

Τὸν ἕτερον προωθεῖ.] Cf. Aristænet. Ep. i. 24. init. Ἄρτι παρ' ἐμοὶ συναθροισθέντες οἱ κορυφαῖοι τῶν ἐμῶν ἐραστῶν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐσίγων· καὶ ἄλλος τὸν ἄλλον προώθει, κελεύων διεξελθεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ τὰ μελετηθέντα πᾶσι κοινῇ.

Ὄχλον παρέχειν.] *To give trouble.* Lex. Coislin. p. 483. Ὄχλος ἐπὶ τῆς ὀχλήσεως φασι θετέον εἶναι, οὐκ ἐπὶ πλήθους. Phavor. Ὄχλος· ἡ ὀχλήσις, παρὰ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς· παρὰ δὲ τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι, τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ λαοῦ· Piers. ad. Mœrin. p. 290.

Ἐγέλασε τε—καί φησι.] Heindorf compares with this construction of the present with the aorist, Eurip. Iph. T. 16. Εἰς ἔμπυρ' ἦλθε καὶ λέγει Κάλχας τάδε. Soph. Electr. 897. Ἰδοῦσα δ' ἔσχον θαῦμα καὶ περισκοπῶ. Trach. 767. Ἰδρὼς ἀνῆει χρωτὶ καὶ προσπτύσσεται. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 504.

Ἦ που]—Serves, sometimes, the purpose of assuring, but so that που somewhat moderates the assurance contained in ἦ; *certainly, if I mistake not.* — Matthiæ Gr. s. 604.

Ὅτε γε.] *Since indeed.*

Μὴ δυσκ.—διάκειμαι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 240. κειμαι. s. 520. Obs. 2.

Τῶν κύκνων.] Cf. Horat. Od. ii. 20. Ovid. Heroid. Ep. vii. 1. "Sic ubi fata vocant, udis abjectus in herbis Ad vada Mæandri concinit albus olor." Cic. Tusc. i. 30. "Itaque commemorat (So-

ἐπειδὰν αἴσθωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ᾄδοντες καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ τότε δὴ πλεῖστα καὶ μάλιστα ᾄδουσι, γεγηθότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιέναι, οὗ πέρ εἰσι θεράποντες. οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καὶ φασὶν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξᾄδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄρνεον ᾄδει ὅταν πεινῇ ἢ ῥιγοῖ ἤ τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπῆται, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἥ τε ἀηδὼν καὶ ἡ χελιδὼν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ, ἃ δή φασι διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ᾄδειν· ἀλλ' οὔτε ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα ᾄδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ' ἅτε, οἶμαι, τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες μαντικοί τ' εἰσὶ καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου ἀγαθὰ ᾄδουσί τε καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλός τε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χεῖρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ

crates,) ut cygni, qui non sine causa Apollini dicati sint, sed quod ab eo divinationem habere videantur, qua providentes quid in morte boni sit, cum cantu et voluptate moriantur; sic omnibus bonis et doctis (i. e. philosophis) esse faciendum." Ælian. Nat. Hist. v. 34.—Ὁ κύκνος μελῳδεῖ τινα ἐπικήδειον αὐτῷ μοῦσαν, ἐφόδια διδοὺς τῆς ἀποδημίας ἢ θεῶν ὕμνους, ἢ ἔπαινον οἰκεῖον τινα, μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅτι ᾄδει οὐ λυπούμενος, ἀλλ' εὐθυμούμενος μᾶλλον. Vid. I. H. Voss. Epistol. Mythol. Br. t. ii. p. 98. Martial. Epigr. xiii. 77. and infr. οἱ κύκνοι—μαντικοι.

Οὗ πέρ εἰσι θεράποντες.] Infr. τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες.

Τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται.] *Belie the swans.* Cf. Legg. vii. p. 821. B. καταψευδόμεθα—μεγάλων θεῶν. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 378.

Ἐξᾴδειν.] Explained by Stephens, *to sing for the last time, to take leave of their art of song;* by Heindorf, *to sing out life,* i. e. *to die by singing,* or *die singing.* Serranus attributes to the ἐξ an intensive force, as in ἐκδιδάσκειν, ἐξευρεῖν, ἐκσώζειν, ἐκπίνειν; and like that of the Latin *de,* in *decanto, desævio, detono,* and renders the term *vehementius canere,* comparing ᾄδουσί—διαφερόντως, infr.

Ἅ δή φασι.] In reference to the fabled metamorphoses of Tereus, Procne, and Philomela.

Μαντικοί.] Oppian Cyneg. ii. 547. s. Οὐκ ἄρα τοι μούνοισιν ἐν ὀρνίθεσσιν ἔασι Κύκνοι μαντιπόλοι γόον ὕστατον ἀείδοντες. Æschyl. Agam. 1453. ἡ δέ τοι κύκνου δίκην, Τὸν ὕστατον μέλψασα θανάσιμον γόον. — whence the language of one at the near approach of death was called κύκνειον ᾆσμα. Cic. Orat. iii. 2. *Cycnea.*

Διαφερόντως ἢ.] *Rather than.* See Matthiæ Gr. s. 366. Obs. 2.

Ὁμόδουλός — τῶν κύκνων.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 405. Obs. 1.—Ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ. Matthiæ Gr. s. 315. 1.

Οὐ χεῖρον—τὴν μαντικὴν.] See Apol. Socr. c. 30. Ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἂν-

βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τούτου γε ἕνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾷν ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε, ἕως ἂν οἱ Ἀθηναίων ἐῶσιν ἄνδρες ἔνδεκα. Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας· καὶ ἐγώ τέ σοι ἐρῶ ὃ ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὖ ὅδε, ἢ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὡς περ καὶ σοί, τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός· δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἕν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὑρεῖν, ἢ εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον, ὥς περ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα, διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μή τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον

θρωποι χρησμῳδ.—Παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, sc. Apollo.

Ὃ ἀπορῶ.] h. e. Περὶ οὗ ἀπορῶ.

Τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ, κ. τ. λ.] Cf. St. Paul. Corinth. i. c. 13. 12.

Καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι.] Added in explanation of παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν preced. whence the passage might have been arranged so—παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν μὴ προαφισταμένους πρὶν ἂν π. &c. Stephens and Forster would omit μή, which, however, is more correctly retained and explained by Fischer and Heindorf, as supr.—Ἀπειπεῖν, ἀπαυδᾶν, and ἀπαγορεύειν, as Stallbaum observes, are used in reference to those who are wearied and exhausted in pursuit of an object, which it is either difficult or impossible to attain.

Ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὑρεῖν.] i. e. *Either to learn from others, or to find out, upon investigation, by one's self.* Μανθάνειν occurs frequently also in the sense attributed to εὑρειν here, but it is properly used with reference to διδάσκειν, *to teach.* Hence the three methods of acquiring knowledge, by learning, invention, and inspiration, as Soph. apud. Plutarch. de Fortuna. p. 98. A. τὰ μὲν διδακτὰ μανθάνω, τὰ δ' εὑρετὰ Ζητῶ· Τὰ δ' εὐκτὰ παρὰ θεῶν ᾐτησάμην.

Τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων.] h. e. *Inter rationes et argumenta, quæ humano ingenio excogitata et inventa sunt.*—Stall. — to which is opposed λόγον θείου τινὸς infr.

Ὡς περ ἐπὶ σχεδίας.] Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 30. "Itaque dubitans, circumspectans, hæsitans multa adversa reverens, tanquam ratis in mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio." This metaphor is taken from the Greek adage, ἐπ' ἐλπίδος ὀχεῖσθαι. v. Plat. Legg. iii. p. 59. C. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐλπίδος ὀχούμενοι ταύτης εὕρισκον καταφυγὴν αὐτοῖς εἰς αὐτοὺς μόνους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς θεούς. Some idea of risk or hazard is implied in κινδυνεύοντα, as if the very best of human reasonings were still an uncertain vessel to embark in and traverse the sea of life. Hence ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον, &c. as applied to the more steady and unerring vehicle, the reason inspired from above. On the phrase διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, see Wesseling ad. Herodot. v. 6. p. 422. Toup. ad Suid. i. p. 20.

καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος ἢ λόγου θείου τινὸς διαπορευθῆναι. Καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδὲ ἐμαυτὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἃ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι.

§. 36. *Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε ὅπῃ δὴ οὐχ ἱκανᾶς.*

Ἢ λόγου θείου τινὸς.] Heindorf woul omit ἢ ; but it may be retained in a similar sense to that in which it is used in Criton. c. 3. init. *ταύτης δόξα, ἣ δοκεῖν*. Seag. Viger. c. vii. s. 7. r. 2.— *Θείου* is to be understood here in the sense of *θεσπέσιου*, or *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ προσγενόμενον*. It is scarcely necessary to say that there is no foundation for the conjectures of those who have understood the above passage as containing an implied reference to Holy Writ.— The idea, to say no more, involves, in the first instance, a misapprehension of the sense in which λόγος is used in the text.

Ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις.] i. e. *Especially since you yourself advise me to it.*

Πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ.] h. e. *Quando et mecum hæc animo reputo, et cum hoc una considero.*— STALL.

§. 36. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, κ. τ. λ.] Socrates now proceeds to meet the objections which he had encouraged Simmias and Cebes to advance against the conclusion at which he had arrived from the preceding part of the discussion. Simmias asserts that the faculty of thought might be a quality of body, arising from the due disposition of its several affections, heat, cold, moisture, and dryness, in the same way that concord results from a well-tuned lyre ; in other words, that *the mind is a harmony*, which ceases to exist upon the decease of the body and the dispersion of its particles, as the music of the lyre is destroyed when the chords are broken and the instrument past use, a doctrine held by Parmenides Zeno, and others. — Cebes, using a different image, argues to a similar effect against the soul's surviving the body. V. Cousin sums up the argument and its answer, Œuv. Plat. i. p. 160. " Mais si l'ame n'etait qu'un être collectif, un résultat, une relation, l'harmonie d'une lyre ! l'harmonie aussi ne semble-t-elle pas quelque chose de simple, d'invisible, de fixe, et pourtant elle se dissipe quand la lyre et les cordes sont brisées ! Non, l'ame qui préexiste substantiellement a son apparition sous cette forme corporelle, l'ame ne peut être la collection, le resultat, la relation, l'harmonie de parties qu'elle précède. D'ailleurs une collection, un resultat, un rapport n'ont pas d'essence propre, et n'existent recellement que dans les élémens qui les constituent, tandis que l'ame sait et sent qu'elle a une existence à soi. Enfin la force de toute composition est dans l'accord le plus intime de ses composans ; la force de l'ame au contraire est de se separer violemment de plusieurs de ses pretendues elemens, et de leur faire la guerre. L'ame n'est donc ni une collection, ni un résultat, ni une relation ; c'est une unité individuelle, subsistante par ellemême." Hence the conclusion to which those who subsequently adopted this doctrine of Plato have justly arrived, that the faculty of thought cannot be inherent in the body, as being that whose every action and passion depend upon the change and motion of its component parts.

Οὐκ ἱκανῶς.] *Inadequately.*

Ταύτῃ ἔμοιγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἦ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία ἀόρατόν τι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν [τι] καὶ θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένῃ λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ' ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ ξύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ ξυγγενῆ. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἢ κατάξῃ τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμῃ ἢ καὶ διαῤῥήξῃ τὰς χορδάς, εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥς περ σύ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι· οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἔτι εἶναι διεῤῥωγυιῶν

Ἦι δὴ καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας.] i. e. *So far as any one could advance the same argument, in respect to a lyre, &c.*

Ἡρμοσμένῃ λύρᾳ.] *A well-tuned lyre.*

Ἐπειδὰν οὖν κατάξῃ.] From this to πρίν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν contains the protasis to which is subjoined a parenthesis, καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρ.—ἢ κατασαπῇ; then the apodosis is introduced ὅρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγ. where οὖν, as usually, renews the interrupted sense. HEIND.

Ὡς περ σύ.] Fischer, following Forster, reads ᾧπερ, incorrectly. Cf. Priscian. xviii. p. 1195. "Demosthenes ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Φιλιππικῷ, μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ οἱ δικαζόμενοι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ὅνπερ." Plat. Legg. p. 671. C. Τοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν πλάστην τὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τότε. Sophoc. Electr. 532. οὐκ ἴσον καμὼν ἐμοὶ Αὔπης, ὅτ' ἐσπειρ', ὥσπερ ἡ τίκτουσ' ἐγώ. Lys. pro. Aristoph. bon. p. 637. ἡγοῦντο καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ ὅμως σφίσιν εἶναι ἴσα ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 629.

Οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη.] The sense of this passage and the context is somewhat involved, and it may be well to develope it more largely and clearly. Simmias objects to the proofs deduced by Socrates, from the nature and connexion of the soul and body, of the immortality of the former, by shewing that in the supposed analogous case of a lyre, and the harmony which results from its being sound and in tune, a similar train of reasoning cannot hold good. The harmony, which is analogous to the soul is invisible, incorporeal, perfectly beautiful and divine, when the instrument is in order; the lyre itself, and its chords, are typical of the body, being actual bodies, consequently partaking of their nature, compound, terrestrial, and allied to mortality. Should one break the lyre, cut or rend its strings, according to the mode of argument adopted by Socrates, one would say that the harmony still existed and had not been destroyed. For it could not be possible that the lyre in its broken and imperfect state should continue to exist, and that the strings, after they had been cut or rent, should still obviously though uselessly exist, while the harmony, of the same nature with, and congenial to the immortal and divine, should disappear, having perished previous to that which was mortal, and naturally subject to decay. But one should assert that the harmony, of necessity, existed somewhere, and that the frame and chords of the instrument ought to be utterly decayed before any such affection could befal the harmony itself. Here, then, was the difficulty arising from the argument of Socrates. If the soul was a harmony, resulting from the due adjustment of the bodily affections, it is plain that like the harmonies of music, or of the other works of art, it could not exist when the body had been too much relaxed or overstrained; but the bodily relics still continued to exist for a long

τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θνητοειδεῖς οὔσας, τὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυᾶ τε καὶ ξυγγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην· ἀλλὰ φαίη ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι που εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπήσεσθαι πρίν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν, καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὥς περ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ ξυνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἁρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα. εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὖσα ἁρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῇ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καί περ οὖσαν θειοτάτην, ὥς περ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι αἱ τ' ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἑκάστου πολὺν χρόνον παραμένειν,

time, until consumed by fire, or wasted by decay, in other words, the corporeal evidently survived the spiritual, which could not be the case if the previous conclusions of Socrates were adequate and just.

Τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι.] h. e. *Tecum reputasse, ita ut in animo tuo quasi resideat hujus rei cogitatio.* STALL.

Ὡς περ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος.] Cf. Aristot. de Anim. i. 4. Καὶ ἄλλη δέ τις δόξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχῆς, πιθανὴ μὲν πολλοῖς, καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἧττων τῶν λεγομένων· λόγους δὲ ὥσπερ εὐθύνας δεδωκυῖα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐν κοινῷ γινομένοις λόγοις· ἁρμονίαν γάρ τινα αὐτήν τινες λέγουσι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσίν τινα ἐναντίων εἶναι· καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων. Lucret. iii. 98. 105. "Multa quidem sapientum turba putarunt Sensum animi certa non esse parte locatum; Verum Habitum quendam vitalem corporis esse, Harmoniam Græci quam dicunt; quod faciat nos vivere cum sensu, nulla cum in parte siet Mens: Ut bona sæpe Valetudo cum dicitur esse Corporis, et non est tamen hæc pars ulla valentis." This doctrine, though somewhat diversified in its aspect, was held nearly in common by all the schools of Greek philosophy, whence Simmias, h. l. μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν, &c. not ὑπολαμβάνουσί τινες, and Aristotle in loc. cit. supr. ἐν κοινῷ γινομένοις λόγοις. It does not appear to which of the philosophers prior to Plato this opinion is to be attributed. It was subsequently appropriated by Aristotle and his followers, Dicæarchus of Messene, and Aristoxenus of Tarentum, the musician.

Κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἁρμονίαν.] Nemes. de Nat. Hom. ii. p. 41. Δικαίαρχος δὲ

ἕως ἂν ἢ κατακαυθῇ ἢ κατασαπῇ. ὅρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί φήσομεν, ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ κρᾶσιν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρώτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.

§. 37. Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥς περ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας Δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας. εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἁπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι πρότερον Κέβητος ἀκοῦσαι, τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνου ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθά τί ἐροῦμεν, ἔπειτα ἀκούσαντας ἢ ξυγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς, ἐάν τι δοκῶσι προσᾴδειν· ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης, λέγε τί ἦν ὃ σὲ αὖ θρᾶττον ἀπιστίαν παρέχει. Λέγω δή, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καὶ ὅ περ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ταὐτὸν ἔγκλημα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τόδε τὸ εἶδος ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθε-

ἁρμονίαν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἐκ φθόγγων συνισταμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι θερμῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν ἐναρμόνιον κρᾶσιν καὶ συμφωνίαν βούλεται λέγειν. So Zeno, apud. Diog. Laert. ix. 29. γεγενῆσθαι δὲ τὴν τῶν πάντων φύσιν ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ, καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ, λαμβανόντων αὐτῶν εἰς ἄλληλα τὴν μεταβολήν· γενεσίν τε ἀνθρώπων ἐκ γῆς εἶναι· καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κρᾶμα ὑπάρχειν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων κατὰ μηδενὸς τούτων ἰσπεράτησιν.

§. 37. Μέντοι.] Used emphatically, h. l. in affirmation, as the Latin *vero, indeed, in truth.* c. 13. supr. init. c. 18. sub. fin.

Ἁπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου.] i. e. *Seems to have impugned the justice of the argument with no mean success*—this sense being attributed to ἁπτομένῳ, supr. in consequence of τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ seq. as applied to the objection of Cebes.

Ἔπειτα ἀκούσαντας.] Vulg. ἔπειτα δὲ—but both εἶτα and ἔπειτα occur in numerous instances without the particle, the latter almost always, even when πρῶτον μέν precedes. HEIND.

Προσᾴδειν.] i. e. *If they seem to speak reasonably*; προσᾴδειν being used here in the sense of λέγειν τι, *aliquid veri firmique dicere.* WYTT.—the term being applied as supr. in reference to the nature of the subject in dispute. Cf. infr. c. 41. Οὗτος οὖν σοὶ ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς συνᾴσεται· καὶ μήν—πρέπει γε, εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ, ξυνῳδῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἁρμονίας.

Ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου.] *To defend* or *support the argument.*

Θρᾶττον.] Att. for θρᾶσσον i. q. ταράσσον: th. ταράσσω.

Ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ—εἶναι.] i. q. Οὐ προκεχωρηκέναι, i. e. *to have made no advances towards being established as a truth; to remain in the same place, or be liable to the same objections as before.*

Εἰς τόδε τὸ εἶδος.] Sc. ἀνθρώπινον.

μαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ χαριέντως, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι· ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν ἔτι που ἔστιν, οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε. ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον ψυχὴ σώματος, οὐ ξυγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν. Τί οὖν, ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδή γε ὁρᾷς ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό γε ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ὄν; τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔτι σώζεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο τόδε ἐπίσκεψαι εἴ τι λέγω· εἰκόνος γάρ τινος, ὡς ἔοικε, κἀγὼ ὥς περ Σιμμίας δέομαι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα, ὥς περ ἄν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου ὑφαντου

Cf. c. 21. supr. ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει.

Οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι.] *I do not retract*, or, *change my opinion*. The term is frequently used by Plato in this sense, in Menon. p. 89. D. Protagor. p. 211. E. Charmid. p. 240. It is properly applied to players at draughts; Suid. Ἀναθέσθαι· τὸ μεταθέσθαι· ἀπὸ τῶν πεττευόντων καὶ τὰς κεκινημένας ἤδη ψήφους διορθούντων· — σημαίνει ἡ λέξις — τὸ μεταβουλεύεσθαι καὶ μεταγνῶναι. πολύ ἐστι παρὰ Πλάτωνι φιλοσόφῳ.

Εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθὲς ἐστιν εἰπεῖν.] *If it is not too fulsome*, &c. — ἐπαχθὴς being affirmed of any praise or commendation which is so intemperately and injudiciously bestowed as to disgust not only the auditors, but the object of it. Cf. Plutarch. de Sui Laude, p. 54. F.— τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἐπαίνους—τινὰς ἐλλείψεις ἢ ἀποτεύξεις ἢ ἁμαρτίας ἐλαφρὰς ἐκβάλλοντες, ἀφαιροῦσι τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῶν καὶ νεμεσητόν.

Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε.] Intell. ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι.

Ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον, κ. τ. λ.] Cebes does not agree with Simmias as to the relative strength and durability of the soul and body, but upholds, in either respect, the superiority of the former.

Ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος.] Sc. the argument personified.

Ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, κ. τ. λ.] The objection of Cebes to the argument of Socrates was, that it did not prove the immortality of the soul, although it might have established its pre-existence and other advantages over the body, but was still liable to the exception, that after it had survived several bodies, the soul might eventually perish itself. Cebes uses, as an illustration, the case of an aged deceased weaver, of whom, according to Socrates, it might be affirmed that he was yet alive somewhere, because the garment which he wove and wore had continued to exist after he had died. And this objection might be fairly advanced, even by those who admitted the superiority of the nature of man above that of the garment, because the weaver, it is to be supposed, had, during a long life, wrought and worn out several habits, although he had been survived by the last. So that one would be easily justified in still asserting the garment to be, in its nature and quality, inferior to and frailer than the man. Thus with the soul and body, the former of which one might reasonably admit to excel the latter, inasmuch as it survived several bodies, more or less, according to the longer or shorter term of its own existence, and yet this would not interfere with its being destroyed at last, and consequently perishing before the relics of the last body it inhabited had mouldered in decay. Hence one could not encounter death with a courage and a

πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ' ἔστι που ἴσως, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θοιμάτιον ὃ ἠμπείχετο αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος, ὅτι ἔστι σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλε, καὶ εἴ τις ἀπιστοῖ αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτῴη πότερον πολυχρονιώτερόν ἐστι τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἱματίου ἐν χρείᾳ τε ὄντος καὶ φορουμένου, ἀποκριναμένου δέ τινος ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἴοιτο ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὅ γε ἄνθρωπος σῶς ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τό γε ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλε. Τὸ δ' οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἃ λέγω. πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὖηθες λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων. ὁ γὰρ ὑφάντης οὗτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος ἐκείνων μὲν ὕστερος ἀπόλωλε πολλῶν ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου, οἶμαι, πρότερος, καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἕνεκα ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἱματίου φαυλότερον οὐδ' ἀσθενέστερον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην, οἶμαι, εἰκόνα δέξαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα, καί τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι' ἄν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιόν ἔστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ἑκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ἔτη βιώῃ· εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἔτι ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' ἡ ψυ-

confidence arising from a secure belief in the immortality of the soul, for he could not tell but that the body, which was then itself on the eve of dissolution, was also that which was to be accompanied by the death of the soul.

Περὶ αὐτῶν.] Sc. ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος.—μέτρι' ἂν μοι, i. e. *rightly, correctly, suitably to reason.* Cf. in Criton. c. 6. a med. μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη.] Intell. ὁ λέγων ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν.

Εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. If, while a man is still living, the body is liable to change and waste, and the soul weaves, as it were, anew what had completely decayed, or, in other words, if it uses one body after another, it should follow of course that when the soul perished, it should do so prior to its last tenement only, which would still evince its inferiority, for on the destruction of the soul, it would give evidence of its weakness by a speedy dissolution. — Hence, according to Cebes, it would appear that the greater strength and durability of the soul, and its being necessary to the continued existence of the body, cannot be trusted to as an argument against its own final dissolution, which may take place previous to the

χὴ ἀεὶ τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνοι, ἀναγκαῖον μέντ' ἂν εἴη, ὁπότε ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχή, τὸ τελευταῖον ὕφασμα τυχεῖν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτου μόνου προτέραν ἀπόλλυσθαι· ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότ' ἤδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπὲν διοίχοιτο. Ὥστε τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὔπω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαῤῥεῖν, ὡς ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν, ἔτι που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔστιν. εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πλέον ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι ἢ ἃ σὺ λέγεις ξυγχωρήσειε, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν, ἐνίων ἔτι εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γεγήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι αὖθις· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὥστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν· δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροίη, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσι καὶ

corruption of one, and that the last body it may dwell in.

Τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας.] i. q. Τὴν ἀσθένειαν,—φύσις being in frequent use in similar periphrases. Cf. Plat. in Epinom. p. 702. C. θεοὺς γὰρ δὴ ὁρατοὺς—τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φύσιν λεκτέον, i. q. τὰ ἄστρα. Legg. xii. 697. ἐπιτήδειοι πρὸς τὴν φυλακῆς φύσιν, i. e. πρὸς τὴν φυλακήν.—Plotin. Enn. ii. 1. 3. p. 98. A.—καὶ ἀὴρ μήποτ' ἐπιλείπει, οὐδ' ἡ ὕδατος φύσις. Cic. de Fin. v. 11.—"hoc intelligant, si quando naturam hominis dicam, hominem dicere me; nil enim hoc differt."

Εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πλέον ἔτι.] This, as well as what immediately preceded, Cebes addressed to Simmias, who while he admitted the pre-existence of the soul, yet by contrasting it with a harmony, denied its superior strength and durability, as compared with that of the body. Cebes now asserts, that if one were to concede to another, who insisted upon still more than Simmias did, namely, not merely the soul's pre-existence, but that the souls of some existed after their decease, and were subject to the successive changes of birth and death, the nature of the soul being such that it could survive these repeated births; if one were to concede this, he could not still by any means allow that the soul suffered no injury from these many changes, and that it did not eventually sink in some of them, but which, it would be impossible to say. Hence, according to Cebes, one should entertain but a foolish and unfounded confidence who would fearlessly encounter death without the ability to prove that the soul was, in every respect, immortal and imperishable, in which case it would be impossible but that the person about to die should fear with regard to his soul, that its doom was involved in the approaching dissolution of the body.

Οὕτω γὰρ αὐτό.] Αὐτο h. l. referring to ψυχήν, is used for αὐτὴν. Demonstrative pronouns are often not in the gender of the substantive to which they refer, but in the neuter, provided the idea of the substantive in the abstract be considered generally as a thing or matter. Matthiæ Gr. s. 439.—Ἀντέχειν, i. q. διαμένειν, σώζεσθαι, *to endure, to continue.*

Μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτήν.] Μὴ οὐ is used after negative propositions or verbs,

τελευτῶσάν γε ἔν τινι τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι· τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος, ἣ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὄλεθρον, μηδένα φαίη εἰδέναι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὁτῳοῦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡμῶν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαῤῥοῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαῤῥεῖν, ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἀεὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς, μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει παντάπασιν ἀπόληται.

§. 38. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἀηδῶς διετέθημεν, ὡς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν, πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαι καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλα καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα εἴη.

ΕΧ. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἐπέρχεται, Τίνι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὢν, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπ-

with infinitives which are themselves negatived, where it is equivalent to the Latin *quin*, or *quominus*. Matthiæ Gr. s. 609. e. Cf. supr. c. 17. sub. fin. *τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχί*, κ. τ. λ.—Πονεῖν, i. e. *frangi viribus, confici, fatiscere.* STALL. *ἐν παῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσι, quum migrat sæpius et proficiscitur in alia atque alia corpora.* ID.

Οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον.] Explained by Heindorf; *In neminem fidenter obfirmatoque animo mortem expectantem cadit, ut non stolide hanc habeat fiduciam, qui non possit, &c.* Upon θάνατον θαῤῥοῦντι see Matthiæ Gr. s. 414. 12.

Δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς.] *To fear concerning his soul;* the more usual form being, according to Heindorf, δεδιέναι περί τινος, or περί τινι.

§. 38. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες, κ. τ. λ.] This interruption of the dialogue, and the transition from the subject to the narrator himself, is admirably adapted, as Wyttenbach observes, to interest and affect the reader.

Εἰς ἀπιστίαν — τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 390.

Τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *A like reflection strikes myself.* Upon αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκ.—ἐπέρχεται, See Matthiæ Gr. s. 402. *a.* Obs. 1.

τωκε. θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεί, τὸ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ὥς περ ὑπέμνησέ με ῥηθεὶς ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προὐδέδοκτο. καὶ πάνυ δέομαι πάλιν, ὥς περ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἄλλου τινὸς λόγου, ὅς με πείσει ὡς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθνήσκει ἡ ψυχή. λέγε οὖν πρὸς Διός, πῇ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κἀκεῖνος, ὥς περ ὑμᾶς φῄς, ἔνδηλός τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πράως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἢ ἐνδεῶς; πάντα ἡμῖν δίελθε ὡς δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἠγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· ἀλλ᾽ ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ᾔσθετο ὃ πεπόνθειμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥς περ πεφευγότας καὶ ἡττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προὔτρεψε πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε καὶ ξυσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

Θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου—ἀντιλαμβάνεται.] i. e. *Makes a wonderful impression upon, takes a wonderful hold of me:* see Matthiæ Gr. s. 330. Stallbaum explains it; *mirifice me capit, ita ut ab altera illa sententia quasi abstrahar et abducar.*— Καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεί, *nunc, ut jam semper antea.* STALL. Cf. Schæfer, ad Sophocl. Antig. v. 181.

Καὶ ὥς περ ὑπέμνησέ με.] *And has reminded me, as it were, that I have myself held the same opinion.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 629. v. ὥσπερ.

Μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον.] *Followed up the argument;* for the purpose of explaining away the objected difficulties.

Πράως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ.] *Temperately bore out, supported, the argument;* i. e. defended and sustained it against the doubts and censures of his opponents, with good temper and discretion.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν.] This construction arises from the attraction of the subject; otherwise the passage would run, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἐκεῖνον ὃ λέγοι. Tr. *That he was able to make a reply is not, perhaps, so much to be wondered at.*

Πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο—ἔπειτα—ἔπειτα.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 603.—Ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς. Cf. in Criton. c. 1. ὡς ἡδέως καθεύδεις.—Ἀγαμένως—ἀπεδέξατο. i. e. *With what respect and admiration he attended to the argument of the young men.* Ruhnken, ad Tim. Gloss. p. 9. explains it; *orationem mirifice probavit,* and Hesychius understands ἀγαμένως in the sense of θαυμασίως, but it is obvious that the spirit and sense of the passage are best evinced by the interpretation of Stallbaum as supr.

Ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ᾔσθετο.] See Mat-

ΕΧ. Πῶς δή;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγώ. καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ξυμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας— εἰώθει γάρ, ὁπότε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τας τρίχας— Ἄὔριον δή, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας ἀποκερεῖ. Ἔοικεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὔκ, ἄν γε ἐμοὶ πείθῃ. Ἀλλὰ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Τήμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάν πέρ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἔγωγ' ἂν εἰ σὺ εἴην καί με διαφύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην ὥς περ Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ

thiæ Gr. s. 317.

Ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός.] Intell. δίφρου, or θρανίου. Tim. Plat. Lex. v. χαμαίζηλος· διφρίον μικρὸν ἢ ταπεινὸν σκιμπόδιον.

Καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλήν.] Cf. Terent. Heaut. iv. 5. 14. "Non possum pati, Quin tibi caput demulceam; accede huc Syre."

Τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας ἀποκερεῖ.] One of the modes by which the Grecians expressed their regret for the decease of their friends was, by cutting off or shaving the hair, of which they did not think it sufficient to deprive themselves of a small part only; Eurip. Orest. v. 128. They disposed of the hair in several ways. Sometimes it was thrown upon the corpse. Hom. Il. ψ'. v. 135. Θριξὶ δὲ πάντα νέκυν καταείννυον, ἃς ἐπέβαλλον Κειρόμενοι—sometimes it was thrown upon the funeral pile, or placed in the hands of the deceased, to be consumed with the body, Il. ψ'. 152—ἐν χερσὶ κόμην ἑτάροιο φίλοιο Θῆκεν.—and at other times it was laid on the grave. Æschyl. Choeph. Ὁρῶ τομαῖον τόνδε βόστρυχον τάφῳ. It has been objected, v. Meurs. ad Lycophr. 976. de Funer. c. xlvi. that shaving the hair was rather, as appears from several ancient authorities, a sign of rejoicing; see the discussion of this subject in Potter's Grec. Antiq. ii. c. 5.

Ἀλλὰ τί.] Suppl. βούλει ποιῶ. Cf. Aristoph. Ran. 489. Οὐκ ἂν ἕτερος ταῦτ' εἰργάσατ' ἀνήρ. Ξ. Ἀλλὰ τί; [sc. ἂν εἰργάσατο]. Δ. Κατέκειτ' ἂν ὀσφραινόμενος, εἴπερ δειλὸς ἦν.

Ἐάν περ—ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ.] The forms ὁ λόγος οἴχεται,—ἐκφεύγει,—σώζεται, are familiar with Plato, instead of which he now uses one less frequent, but more suitable to the immediate nature of the subject.—Ἀναβιώσασθαι, *to recall to life.* Cf. in Criton. c. 9. init. Καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων.

Εἰ—με διαφύγοι ὁ λόγος.] i. e. If he should lose hold of his argument, and be consequently unable to prove his point, the immortality of the soul.—Ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην, *I would bind myself by oath.*

Ὡς περ Ἀργεῖοι.] The Argives having lost Thyrea to the Spartans, bound themselves, by a decree and imprecation, to cut their hair and never permit it to grow again to its accustomed length until the place had been recovered. The Spartans, on the contrary, who used to wear their hair short, decreed that from thenceforward they would nourish their hair, as a reproach to their enemies. Herodot. i. 82. Ἀργεῖοι μέν νῦν ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου (the time of the loss of Thyrea) κατακειράμενοι τὰς κεφαλάς, πρότερον ἐπάναγκες κομῶντες, ἐποιήσαντο νόμον τε καὶ κατάρην, μὴ πρότερον θρέψειν κόμην Ἀργείων μηδένα μηδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας

πρότερον κομήσειν πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς λέγεται οἷός τε εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστίν. Παρακαλῶ τοίνυν, ἔφην, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ. Οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἔφη.

§. 39. Ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν. Τὸ ποῖον; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ' ὅς, μισολόγοι, ὥς περ οἱ μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι,

σφι χρυσοφορήσειν, πρὶν ἂν Θὺρέας ἀνασώσωνται. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία τούτων ἔθεντο νόμον, σὺ γὰρ κομῶντες πρὸ τούτου ἀπὸ τούτου κομᾷν.

Πρὸς δύο οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς.] The application of this proverb is plain, but its origin is uncertain. It arose, according to some, from Hercules having called Iolaus, son of Iphiclus, king of Thessaly, to assist him in destroying the hydra, which he did by applying a burning iron to the wound, as soon as one head was cut off, to prevent the growth of another; the attention of Hercules having been drawn away for a time by a sea-crab, which Juno, jealous of his glory, had sent during the combat to bite his foot. Cf. Schol. in loc. Ταύτης τὴν αἰτίαν ὁ Δοῦρις οὕτως ἀφηγεῖται. Ἡρακλέα φησὶ βωμὸν δειμάμενον ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀλφειῷ, πυγμῆς ἀγῶνα καταθεῖναι, καὶ νικήσαντα τὴν ἐξῆς Ὀλυμπιάδα, πάλιν ἀγωνιζόμενον, ὑπὸ Ἐλάτου καὶ Φεράνδρου πάλῃ ληφθῆναι, καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου τὸ, Πρὸς δύο οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς, παροιμιασθῆναι ..... Ἡρόθωρος δὲ καὶ Ἑλλάνικός φασιν, ὡς ὅτε τὴν ὕδραν Ἡρακλῆς ἀνῄρει, τὴν Ἥραν αὐτῷ καρκῖνον ἐφορμῆσαι· πρὸς δύο δὲ οὐ δυνάμενον μάχεσθαι, σύμμαχον ἐπικαλέσασθαι τὸν Ἰόλεων καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ῥηθῆναι τὴν παροιμίαν. V. Gecl. in Bibliothec. Crit. Nov. ii. p. 15. sqq.

Ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἔστι.] i. e. Before sunset, after which time, those who had been condemned to die were obliged to drink the poison. Cf. infr. c. 66.

§. 39. Πρῶτον.] *First of all.*—Τὸ ποῖον, h. e. ποῖόν ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ λέγεις. The article is prefixed to interrogative pronouns, when it always refers to something previously said by the person interrogated; the article appearing to be the commencement of an anticipation of what the person questioned is expected to say, and the interrogative pronoun to be resorted to after a short aposiopesis, from inability to proceed. Tr. εὐδαιμονεῖ· πάσχει δὲ θαυμαστόν. Merc. τὸ—τί. Aristoph. Pac. 696.—Merc. ὦ, ὦ. οἷα μ' ἐκέλευσεν ἀναπυθέσθαι σου; Tr. τὰ—τί; Aristoph. Pac. 693.—Π. πράγμα πορσύνων μέγα. Κ. τὸ — ποῖον, ὦ ξέν'; Soph. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις; when there is nothing in the preceding words to which the article thus employed can be *grammatically* referred, some noun with which it may agree is expressed in the interrogation itself: Prom. θνητοὺς ἔπαυσα μὴ προδέρκεσθαι μόρον. Chor. τὸ ποῖον εὑρὼν τῇδε φάρμακον νόσου. Æschyl. Prom. 248. *the remedy which you discovered for this malady was what?* Seag. Viger, c. 1. r. 19.

Μὴ γενώμεθα—μισολόγοι ὡς περ οἱ μισάνθρωποι.] Cf. Minucius Felix in Octavio xiv. 4. "Id accidere pernotum est auditorum facilitate, qui, dum verborum lenocinio a rerum intentionibus avocantur, sine delectu adsentiuntur dictis omnibus, nec a rectis falsa secernunt, nescientes inesse et in incredibili verum, et in verisimili mendacium. Itaque quo sæpius adseverationibus credunt, eo frequentius a peritioribus arguuntur: sic assidue temeritate decepti, culpam judicii (sic leg. pro judicis) transferunt ad

ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅ τι ἄν τις μεῖζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισήσας. Γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἥ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἡγήσασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὑρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον. καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθῃ τις, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὓς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἑταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαί οὕτω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, αἰσχρόν; καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τἀνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρῆτο, ὥς περ ἔχει, οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφό-

incerti querelam; ut, damnatis omnibus, malint universa suspendere, quam de fallacibus judicare. Igitur nobis providendum est, ne odio identidem sermonum omnium laboremus; ita ut in exsecrationem et odium hominum plerique simpliciores efferantur. Nam incaute creduli circumveniuntur ab his, quos bonos putarunt: mox errore consimili jam suspectis omnibus, ut improbos metuunt etiam quos optimos sentire potuerunt."

Τούτου κακὸν π. ἢ λόγ. μισ.] Compare Gorg. p. 500. C. οὔ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις—ἢ τοῦτο, ὄντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν. and Heindorf in loc. Cic. de Nat. Deor. i. 15. "Quo quid absurdius, quam aut res sordidas atque deformes deorum honore afficere."

Ἐνδύεται.] *Arises in the mind.* Cf. Æschin. Socr. iii. 8. φροντίδες ὑπεδυσαν—where the verb is also used absolutely and in a similar sense.

Αὖθις ἕτερον.] i. e. Upon a different occasion from that in which the favorable opinion was formed of him in the first instance, he will be found quite a different character. V. Cousin; *et tout autre encore dans une autre occasion.*

Ἑταιροτάτους.] Comparatives and superlatives of substantives, which are taken in an adjective sense, and which, for the most part, are adjectives, are not unusual. Cf. Herodot. vii. 7. δουλότερος. Aristoph. Equ. 45. διαβολώτατος.

Οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι.] Cf. Aristoph. Plut. 362. Ὡς οὐδὲν ἀτεχνῶς ὑγιές ἐστιν· οὐδενός. Schol. in loc. Ὅτι οὐδεὶς ὃς δοκεῖ ἔχειν πλεονέκτημα ἀρετῆς ὑγιῶς ἔχει.

Οὔκουν—αἰσχρόν.] Suppl. τοῦτό ἐστι.—Ἄνευ τέχνης; Cf. Lucian, in Timon. where Jupiter inquiring from Mercury the cause of the misery and complaints of Timon, is answered; χρηστότης ἐπέτριψεν αὐτὸν καὶ φιλανθρωπία—ὡς δὲ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ, ἄνοια καὶ εὐήθεια καὶ ἀκρισία περι τοὺς φίλους, ὃς οὐ συνίει, κόραξι καὶ λύκοις χαριζόμενος.

Ὡς περ ἔχει, κ. τ. λ.] *Such as it really is he would have judged the case to be, that the excessively good and evil are but few on either side, but that the middle class is the more numerous.*—σφό-

δρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἑκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους. Πῶς λέγεις; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ὡς περ, ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων· οἴει τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν; ἢ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ βραδύν, ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν, ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα; ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἄφθονα καὶ πολλά; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν οἴει, ἔφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἀγὼν προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν ὀλίγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρώτους φανῆναι; Εἰκός γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν δὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεσπόμην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ ᾗ, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κἄπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδὴς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὤν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ὤν, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος· καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες

δρα being taken with χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς. Cf. Apul. de Doctr. Plat. ii. p. 22. ed. Elm. "Sed apprime bonos et sine mediocritate deterrimos paucos admodum rarioresque, et, ut ipse ait, innumerabiles esse: eos autem, qui nec plane optimi nec omnino deterrimi sint, sed quasi medie morati, plures esse."

Τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων.] *The extremes.*

Ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι.] Socrates does not assert his analogy to hold good so far as that reasonings may be considered liable to the extremes of good and evil which he had just declared to be few as in the case of mankind, nor to the more widely extended mediocrity which prevailed amongst them. These observations applied to men alone, and he was led out of his way to express them, in explanation of a foregoing remark, by the question of Phædon, Πῶς λέγεις; supr. whence ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν δὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεσπόμην. After which Socrates proceeds to show where the points of similitude, to which he had in the first instance alluded, lay, and which appeared to arise from a hasty and inconsiderate mode of judgment, by which, inferring as it did a constant and perplexing change of opinion with regard to truth and falsehood in philosophy, as with regard to good and evil in man, the former was also condemned as deficient in those qualities of certainty and stability which alone enhanced its pursuit.

Ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ.] Sc. ὅμοιοι εἰσι. Upon ἐκείνῃ ᾗ, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 480. c. and 474. *d.* Schleirmacher observes upon this, that the consequence loses itself here, but in such a manner that it is possible to be drawn out in the parenthesis.

Οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικ. λόγ. διατρ.] *Those who are conversant in sophistical reasonings.* Wyttenbach explains ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους, *sophismata, argumenta in utramque partem composita, ratio contra omnia disputandi.* Cf. infr.

οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, ἀτεχνῶς ὥς περ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ, ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δή τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις τισὶ λόγοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτόν τις αἰτιῷτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἄσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.

§. 40. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ παριῶμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τῶν λόγων

c. 49. sub. fin. *ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο, ὥς περ οἱ ἀντιλογικοί*

Ὡς περ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ.] A narrow strait dividing Euboea from the main land of Greece. The currents were so strong that, according to some of the ancient writers, the sea was said to ebb and flow seven times a day, and as often during the night, whence it became proverbial for inconstancy and unsteadiness. Livy, xxviii. 6. whose account appears the more rational, denies that it ebbs and flows as stated supr. but says that it is subject to the influence of furious winds from the high mountains on either side, and that the current itself, changing irregularly, like the wind, from one point to another, is hurried along like a torrent from a mountain, so that ships cannot lie quiet in it day or night.

Ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται.] In allusion to the uncertainty which such reasoners attach to every thing, and the insecurity of the knowledge which results from such fluctuating principles. Upon *ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφ.* vid Wesseling, ad Herodot. p. 195. iii. 195.

Δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 535. *b.* Obs.

Ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι, κ. τ. λ.] Would it not, says Socrates, be a deplorable grievance, if, while there is a mode of reasoning which is true, solid, and intelligible, yet from having encountered such a description of reasons as at one time appeared to be true, and at another false, one should in fine, through discontent and vexation, be glad to transfer the blame from himself and his inertness in not endeavouring to dispel his doubts, and arrive by investigation at certainty, to the reasons, and should dislike and condemn them through life, while he remained a stranger to the truth and knowledge of the realities which those reasons evinced ?—Ἔπειτα, *yet, nevertheless.*

Οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.] *Grievous indeed.*

§. 40. Μὴ παριῶμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχήν.] *Let us not admit into our minds, let us not be persuaded, &c.*

κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὔπω ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἄλλ᾽ ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ θανάτου, ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥς περ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονείκως. Καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περί του ἀμφισβητήσωσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσι, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε· καὶ θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς· εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι,

Ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον.] Intell. *ἐννοῶμεν.*

Ἀνδριστέον.] i. e. *We must exert ourselves with manly resolution and energy.*

Περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου.] Sc. the immortality of the soul.

Οὐ γὰρ ὅπως.] Γὰρ, like the Latin *nempe*, serves for the explanation of a preceding proposition, in which was contained a demonstrative pronoun, preparing the way for that which follows. Matthiæ Gr. s. 615.

Εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον.] *Unless it should occur incidentally,—should occur as a matter of but secondary importance;* V. Cousin; *Au moins n'est-ce pas là mon but principal;* for Socrates was anxious in the first instance, from the nature of his situation at the time, to be himself convinced of the soul's immortality, that his arguments might not fail either of their due effect upon those to whom they appeared not to be primarily addressed.

Λογίζομαι γάρ—] i. e. *For I am considering, and observe how favorably to myself, if what I say happens to be true, it is well to be persuaded of it, &c.* Ficinus appears to have read λογίζομαι γὰρ ὧδε.—Εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει. The most learned among the ancients generally hesitated to admit the immortality of the soul as an absolute and incontrovertible truth, and accordingly they often appeared, at one time, to yield to that, as an established certainty, which they nullified at another by their many and perplexing doubts. So Cyr. Socrat. ap. Xenoph. viii. 7. on this subject; εἰ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει ταῦτα—εἰ δὲ μή. Cf. Cic. de Senec. 22. Epist. ad Div. v. 16. Senec Epist. 102. "Juvabat de æternitate animorum quærere, immo hercle quærere. Credebam enim facile opinionibus magnorum virorum, rem gratissimam promittentium, quam probantium." The ancients mostly were inclined to receive this opinion upon the grounds of what was asserted respecting the immortality of the soul, rather than upon a conviction resulting from close and suitable arguments, by which they seldom laboured to prove its truth. GOTTL.

Εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτ.] i. e. If all sensation is destroyed by death, and the soul itself ceases to exist.

ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἧττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος. ἡ δὲ ἄγνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ ξυνδιατελεῖ κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀπολεῖται. παρεσκευασμένος μὲν δή, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὑτωσὶ ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον. ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μέν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, ξυνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὥς περ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι.

§. 41. Ἀλλ' ἰτέον, ἔφη. πρῶτον μέν με ὑπομνήσατε ἃ ἐλέγετε, ἐὰν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνήμενος. Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχή, ὅμως καὶ θειότερον καὶ κάλλιον ὂν τοῦ σώματος, προαπολλύηται ἐν ἁρμονίας εἴδει οὖσα· Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ ξυγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλιποῦ-

Ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτόν γε—] *Yet* (ἀλλά) *I will for this reason* (οὖν) *now at least* (γε), &c. Matthiæ Gr. s. 615.

Ἅμα ἐμαύτον τε.] Vulg. ἅμα ἐαυτόν τε; the reflective pronoun ἑαυτοῦ being frequently used by the Attic writers for the other personal pronouns compounded with αὐτος.

Ὡς περ μέλιττα.] This very beautiful metaphor Plato seems to have borrowed from Eupolis, de Pericl. orat. Οὕτως ἐκήλει καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων Τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις. Diod. Sic. xii. 40. Lucian Nigrin. p. 24. καὶ γάρ τοι, κατὰ τὸν κωμικόν, ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐγκατέλιπε τι κέντρον τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. Cic. de. Orat. iii. 24. "Tantamque in eo (Pericle) vim fuisse (dixerunt), ut in eorum mentibus, qui audissent, quasi aculeos quosdam relinqueret."

§. 41. Ἀλλ' ἰτέον.] A usual form of expression, in proceeding to enter upon an argument. Vid. Wyttenbach, Biblioth. Crit. part. i. p. 59. xii. p. 12.

Ὅμως καὶ θειότερον—ὄν.] Ὅμως is sometimes put before its participle as supr. Cf. Plat. Lysid. c. 22. Theaet. c. 9. So ἔμπας. Pind. Pyth. v. 74. Soph. Aj. 1338. and more frequently εἶτα.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 566. 3. Cf. Terent. Eun. i. 2. 90. "Tamen contemptus abs te hæc habui in memoria."

Ἐν ἁρμονίας εἴδει οὖσα.] i. e. Ἁρμονία οὖσα. Cf. Menex. p. 249. A. ἐν πατρὸς σχήματι κατασταθσα ἡ πόλις. Vid. Heusd. Spec. Crit. p. 44.

Ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί.] Suppl. φάναι, which is implied in ξυγχωρεῖν preced.

Κατατρίψασα.] *Having worn out.*

σα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται, καὶ ᾗ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμα γ' ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἆρα ἄλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι; Ξυνωμολογείτην δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἄμφω. Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μέν, τοὺς δ' οὔ; Τοὺς μέν, ἐφάτην τοὺς δ' οὔ. Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε, ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλοθί που πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι; Ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ. Καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἴ μοι περί γε τούτου ἄλλα ποτὲ ἔτι δόξειεν. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης Ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὦ ξένε Θηβαῖε, ἄλλα δόξαι, ἐάν περ μείνῃ ἥδε ἡ οἴησις, τὸ ἁρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι ξύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων ξυγκεῖσθαι. οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξει γε σαυτοῦ λέγοντος ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἁρμονία ξυγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν ξυντεθῆναι. ἢ ἀποδέξει; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Αἰσθάνει οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ταὐτά σοι ξυμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν φῇς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἰδός τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι

Οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε.] *Do you not admit,* or *allow.*

Θαυμαστῶς ὡς.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 628. 3.

Ἀποδέξει γε σαυτοῦ λέγοντος.] *You will not assent to,* or *approve of yourself assenting,* &c. Matthiæ Gr. s. 373. *Obs.*

Ταὐτά σοι ξυμβαίνει λεγ.] *It follows that you assert this,* &c. Simmias admitted the pre-existence of the soul, but by comparing it to a harmony, which he could not assert to exist prior to the instrument by which it was produced, he was obliged to deny what he had already, and, as he allows, satisfactorily conceded. For if the soul bore the same relation to the body as the harmony to the lyre, the body should not only exist before it, but its qualities and affections should be so duly disposed and regulated as that they should combine to produce faculty of thought, in like manner as the harmony could only result from the proper tension of the strings. After ξυμβαίνει λέγειν, intell. ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἁρμονία ξυγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι, ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν ξυντεθῆναι.

Εἰς ἀνθρώπ. εἰδ.] *The human form.*

δ' αὐτὴν ξυγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ᾧ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίγνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων ξυνίσταται ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς ξυνάσεται; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Καὶ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πρέπει γε, εἴ πέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ, ξυνῳδῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἁρμονίας. Πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοὶ οὐ ξυνῳδός, ἀλλ' ὅρα· πότερον αἱρεῖ των λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν; Πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκεῖνον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ὅδε μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις ξύνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσι, καὶ ἄν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα ἐξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται. ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως

Ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων.] i. e. Ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος, ἃ οὔπω ἦν.

Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία.] *For neither is harmony any such thing as that to which you compare it.*—τοιοῦτον ἐστιν, ᾧ ἀπ. i. e. τοιοῦτον ἐστιν οἷον ᾧ ἀπ.

Οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος.] Sc. the argument of Simmias, that the soul was a harmony; how, Socrates asks, will he reconcile this with his former admission, that science was nothing but reminiscence, and that the soul existed before its union with the body?—Ἐκείνῳ, sc. τῷ τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι.—HEIND.

Ὅδε μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *For this argument* (that the soul was a harmony,) *occurred to me, independent of any demonstration, but in consequence of a certain verisimilitude and speciousness, whence many men entertain this same opinion. But I am convinced that, the arguments which derive their proofs from verisimilitudes, both in geometry and all other instances, are futile, and if one be not on his guard against them, especially deceptive.* Upon the εἰκότα of the rhetoricians, see in Phædr. p. 353. B. 355. E. Cf. Aristot. Rhet. ii. 26. ad Alexandr. 7.—Εὐπρεπείας, and εὐπρεπὴς are frequently used in reference to the plausibility of a speaker and his arguments. Cf. Thucyd. iii. 11. εὐπρέπεια λόγου. 38. τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου ἐκπονήσας παράγειν πειράσεται.

Ξύνοιδα.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 548. Ἀλαζόσι, Tim. Plat. Lex. Ἀλαζὼν· ψευδής. — ἐξαπατῶσι, *decipientibus.*—WYTT.

Δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι.] *Upon a principle deserving of admission* or *assent.*

Ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *For thus, indeed, our soul was said to exist before the body, since to it be-*

ἡμῶν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥς περ αὐτῆς ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαι. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος ὡς ψυχή ἐστιν ἁρμονία.

§. 42. Τί δαί, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σιμμία, τῇδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἁρμονία ἡ ἄλλῃ τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἔχῃ ἐξ ὧν ἂν ξυγκέηται; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ' ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἢ ποιῇ ἢ πάσχῃ. Ξυνέφη. Οὐκ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθαί γε προσήκει ἁρμονίαν τούτων ἐξ ὧν ἂν ξυντεθῇ, ἀλλ' ἕπεσθαι. Ξυνεδόκει. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἁρμονίαν κινηθῆναι ἢ φθέγξασθαι ἤ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν. Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἔφη. Τί δαι; οὐχ οὕτως ἁρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἑκάστη ἁρμονία, ὡς ἂν ἁρμοσθῇ; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη. Ἡ οὐχί, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν μὲν

longs (ὥς περ αὐτῆς ἔστιν,) *the essence* (ἡ οὐσία), *which bears the name of "that which is."* (τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν, i. q. τοῦ ὄντος). In other words, the soul as certainly existed before it was united to the body as did those essences, or intelligible forms, inseparable from and innate in the soul itself, and of whose pre-existence, it was likewise allowed, there was no doubt. Cf. cc. 22. 25. supr. in the former of which ἡμετέραν οὖσαν, as applied by Socrates to οὐσία, is equivalent to what is expressed as supr. by Simmias, ὥς περ αὐτῆς (τῆς ψυχῆς) ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία. V. Cousin, in h. l. "Ce passage se rapporte directement à celui qui précède, c. 24. ou Socrate dit: *si le beau, le bon,* καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, *et cet ordre d'idées auxquelles nous rapportons, comme à des principes supérieurs toutes les impressions des sens et que nous trouvons d'abord en nous-mêmes, oui, si toutes ces idées existent réellment avant de se développer en cette vie, il faut, nécessairement que l'ame qui les possède en propre, lui préexiste également.* Platon appelle les idées des essences, οὐσίαι, ou même collectivement ἡ οὐσία, parce qu' elles constituent la vraie existence, toutes les choses visibles n'en étant que des formes passageres. Il les appelle souvent τὰ ὄντα ὄντως; et c'est dans ce sens qu'il dit ici: ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἐστίν."

§. 42. Οὐδὲ μὴν.] *Nor yet.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 605.—Ἄλλο παρ' ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα, *anything else except,* or *otherwise than, that which it does and suffers itself.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 588. c. Socrates proceeds to show, by a further argument, that the soul is not a harmony; for harmonies vary in their degrees, and one may be more a harmony than another, but one soul cannot be more a soul than another, whence it easily appears that the similitude fails here also.

Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία.] *It is then far from being the case that harmony is contrariwise* (ἐναντία) *produced, or utters sounds, or in any other respect is opposed to its component parts.*

Οὐχ οὕτως ἁρμονία.] The harmony naturally depends upon the arrangement which is best adapted to produce

μᾶλλον ἁρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, εἴ περ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλόν τε ἂν ἁρμονία εἴη καὶ πλειων, εἰ δ' ἧττόν τε καὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, ἧττόν τε καὶ ἐλάττων; Πάνυ γε. Ἦ οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχήν, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον [μᾶλλον] ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ψυχὴν ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον καὶ ἧττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχήν; Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη. Φέρε δή, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός· λέγεται ψυχὴ ἡ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθή, ἡ δὲ ἄνοιάν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακή; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται; Ἀληθῶς μέντοι. Τῶν οὖν τιθεμένων ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τήν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἁρμονίαν αὖ τιν' ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθήν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῇ ἁρμονίᾳ οὖσῃ ἄλλην ἁρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτήν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῇ ἄλλην; Οὐκ

it; consequently, according to the degree of perfection in the arrangement of the instrument, strings, &c. the harmony itself, if it can admit of degrees at all (*εἴ περ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι* infr.) will be more or less complete.

Ἦ *οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο, κ. τ. λ.*] Is this then the case, Socrates asks, with regard to the soul, that even in the least degree possible, one soul should be more or less a soul than another? Assuredly not; therefore in this respect the soul is not a harmony.—Heusde would reject *μᾶλλον*, justly, as having no connexion with the sense of the passage; so, likewise, Stallbaum and Heindorf, but as it is found in all the editions it is preserved, and enclosed in brackets.—*Αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, Matthiæ Gr. s. 439. Obs. 1. b.

Φέρε δή, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός.] Socrates advances another argument against the position of Simmias. If souls are variously imbued with virtues and vices, so that some appear to be better attempered, and, as it were, attuned than others, it follows that one who insists on the soul being a harmony, should also admit that in this harmony, that is, in the soul, the forms and degrees of harmony should be manifold, which is obviously against the nature of the thing itself. Besides, if what was lately conceded be true, that one soul is not more or less so than another, one may be easily compelled to allow that no soul can excel or come short of another, which is the same as to assert that different minds are not capable of being endowed with different degrees of justice, temperance, and wisdom. But the experience of every one is against such an assertion as this. Further, if the nature and notion of harmony be more deeply and accurately investigated, it will be easily allowed that *true harmony* can, as such, at no time, and on no principle, admit of or participate in discord. Hence, whoever argues the soul to be a harmony, must also contend for its perfect freedom from all impurity and vice, and for the souls of all animals as partaking of the perfections of the soul of man; a conclusion which is obviously unwarrantable and absurd.

Τήν *τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν—ἁρμονίαν—καὶ ἀναρμ.*] Cf. c. 4. supr. Ὡς *φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγ. μοι*

ἔχω ἔγωγε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τοιαυτ' ἄττ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενος. Ἀλλὰ προωμολόγηται, ἔφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἧττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ψυχὴν ψυχῆς εἶναι. τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἐπὶ πλέον μηδὲ ἧττον μηδ' ἐπ' ἔλαττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἁρμονίαν ἁρμονίας εἶναι. ἦ γάρ; Πάνυ γε. Τὴν δέ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧττον ἁρμονίαν οὖσαν μηδὲ μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧττον ἡρμόσθαι. ἔστιν οὕτως; Ἔστιν. Ἡ δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον μήθ' ἧττον ἡρμοσμένη ἔστιν ὅ τι πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον ἁρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἴσον; Τὸ ἴσον. Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἧττον ἄλλη ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψυχή ἐστιν, οὐδὲν δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἧττον ἥρμοσται; Οὕτως. Τοῦτο δέ γε πεπονθυῖα οὐδὲν πλέον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ ἁρμονίας μετέχοι ἄν; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Τοῦτο δ' αὖ πεπονθυῖα ἆρ' ἄν τι πλέον κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς μετέχοι ἑτέρα ἑτέρας, εἴ περ ἡ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἁρμονία εἴη; Οὐδὲν πλέον. Μᾶλλον δέ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μεθέξει, εἴ περ ἁρμονία ἐστίν. ἁρμονία γὰρ δή που παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὖσα, ἁρμονία, ἀναρμοστίας οὔ ποτ' ἂν μετάσχοι. Οὐ μέντοι. Οὐδέ γε δή που ψυχή, οὖσα παντελῶς ψυχή, κακίας. Πῶς γὰρ ἔκ γε τῶν προειρημένων; Ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζώων ὁμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἴ περ ὁμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψυχαί, εἶναι; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἦ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πασχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος,

Virtue, according to Pythagoras also, is the harmony and unison of the soul, (Aristot. Eth. Nicom. ii. 5. cf. i. 4. Diog. Laert. viii. 33. Clem. Alex. Strom. iv. c. 23); or in other words, *similitude to God*, ὁμολογία προς τὸ θεῖον.

Μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἧττον.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 3.

Εἴ περ ὁμοίως ψυχαὶ.] h. e. *Si quidem animæ pariter a natura hoc ipsum habeant, ut sint animæ.* WYTT.

Καὶ πάσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. Whether do you suppose that such an assertion could be made with any shew of justice, or that our reasoning should be subjected to the censure

εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι; Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

§. 43. Τί δαί; ἦ δ' ὅς· τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἔσθ' ὅ τι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχήν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον; Οὐκ ἔγωγε. Πότερον ξυγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιουμένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἷον καύματος ἐνόντος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἕλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν· καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία ὁρῶμεν ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατα τὸ σῶμα. ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μή ποτ' ἂν αὐτήν ἁρμονίαν γε οὖσαν, ἐναντία ᾄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ χαλῷτο καὶ πάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάθος πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνοι οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἕπεσθαι ἐκείνοις καὶ οὔ ποτ' ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν; Ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φήσει τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ

of such senseless inferences if the position be correct, that the soul is a harmony?—Οὐδ' ὁπωστιουν, is to be referred to ἢ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ — οὔτ. λέγ. preced. making the sense of the passage; οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν καλῶς· δοκεῖ σοι οὕτω λέγεσθαι.

§. 43. Τί δαί, ἦ δ' ὅς·] — The last argument against the soul's being a harmony. The soul of the wise and prudent is always opposed to the passions and affections of the body, which, by various expedients it endeavours to curb and control. But if the soul were a harmony arising from and depending on the tension, relaxation, or vibration of the corporeal qualities, it could no more be independent of or opposed to them than the harmony of the lyre could be, which is evidently under the influence of the instrument itself. Whence the soul cannot be a harmony in this sense, or it would agree with the body, from which it is manifestly distinct in the case of all who choose to keep the body in subjection to the higher and more noble principle.

Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὡμ. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν.] Cf. supr. c. 42. init. Τί δέ—τῇδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἁρμονίᾳ ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἔχῃ, ἐξ ὧν ἂν ξυγκίηται.— Heindorf gives Spalding's explication of the passage as supr.—ἐναντία ᾄδειν τούτοις ἃ (καθ' ἃ) ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ χαλῷτο—ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχ. οὖσα, i. e. ἐναντία ᾄδειν ταῖς ἐπιτάσεσι καὶ χαλάσεσι καὶ παλμοῖς καὶ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν πάθει ἐκείνων ἐξ ὧν τυγχ. οὖσα. Stallbaum compares a similarly remarkable species of attraction, Demosth. adv. Mid. p. 515. καὶ δίκην ἅμα βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν ὧν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐτεθέαντο θρασὺν ὄντα καὶ βδελυρον, where ὧν is put for ἃ, depending on θρασὺν εἶναι. Buttm. in loc.

Ἐναντιουμένη — καὶ δεσπόζουσα.] Cf. Rep. iv. p. 440. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλοθι — πολλαχοῦ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅταν βιάζωνταί τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν

βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀλγηδόνων, τά τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικήν, τὰ δὲ πραότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις, ὡς ἄλλη οὖσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἷόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα,

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·
τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.

ἆρ' οἴει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἁρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ οἵας ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἵας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ

ἐπιθυμίαι, λοιδοροῦντα τε αὐτὸν καὶ θυμούμενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὥς περ δυοῖν στασιαζόντοιν ξύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιούτου.

Τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις.] Νουθετεῖν properly governs an accusative, but the case is sometimes determined by the remoter verb, as by ἀπειλοῦσα supr. Cf. Odyss. κ'. 531. ἐτάροισιν ἐποτρῦναι καὶ ἀνῶξαι. Soph. Antig. 537. καὶ ξυμμετίσχω καὶ φέρω τῆς αἰτίας. Lobeck. ad. Soph. Aj. 475. p. 295.

Οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα.] Odyss. υ. 17.—Στῆθος δὲ πλήξας. Plato makes a similar use of this argument, Rep. iii. p. 434. A. iv. p. 454. A. Cf. Heraclid. Allegor. Hom. p. 63. ed. Schow.—Ταῦτα τοίνυν ὥσπερ ἐκ πηγῆς τῶν Ὁμηρικῶν ἐπῶν εἰς τοὺς ἰδίους διαλόγους ὁ Πλάτων μετήρδευσεν· καὶ πρῶτόν γε περὶ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς σκεπτέον· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς εἵληχε τὸν ὑποκάρδιον χῶρον, ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ποιήσει τοῦτο σαφὲς ἐν τῇ κατα μνηστήρων ὀργῇ, καθάπερ οἰκόν τινα τῆς μισοπονηρίας θυμοκρουστῶν τὴν καρδίαν. ‘Στῆθος δὲ πλήξας, κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ, Τέτλαθι δὴ κραδίη, καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο πότ' ἔτλης.’ Ἀφ' ἧς γὰρ αἱ θυμικαὶ ῥέουσι πηγαί, πρὸς ταύτην ὁ λόγος ἀποκλίνει. Proclus. in Rep. p. 392. ἐν Φαίδωνι μὲν γὰρ ὅπου διαφερόντως ὁ Σωκράτης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ζωὴν ἀναπλοῖ, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης πλῆθος ἀνοίγει τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ζηλωταῖς, πολλοῖς δή τισι καὶ παντοδαποῖς λόγοις καταδησάμενος ὡς ἄρα ἄλλη μέν ἐστιν ἡ ἁρμονία τῶν σωμάτων, ἄλλη δὲ ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις, καὶ διέζευκται ταῦτα κατ' οὐσίαν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τελευτῶν ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν ποιητὴν καταφεύγει, καὶ τοῖς ἐκείνου ῥήμασιν ἐνεργεστάτοις τεκμηρίοις χρώμενος ἐξῃρημένην ἐπιδείκνυσι τὴν ψυχὴν τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα τῶν κράσεων ἁρμονίας· τὸ γὰρ διαμαχόμενόν φησι πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῷ στήθει τεταγμένην ζωὴν κινουμένην, καὶ λέγον ‘τέτλαθι δὴ κραδίη’ πάντως που κατὰ φύσιν ἐξήλλακται τούτου πρὸς ὃ διαμάχεται· καὶ τὸ κατεξανιστάμενον τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῷ σώματι τὴν ὑποστασιν ἔχοι· καὶ οὕτω δὴ προϊὼν ὁ Σωκράτης καὶ συμπεραινόμενος ὅτι τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν ψυχῆς ἐρᾷν (f. ἐναντίαν) χρὴ φάναι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἁρμονίας, ὥσπερ εἰς ἄφυκτον ἀνάγκην κατακλείων (sic. leg. pro ἀνακλείαν) τὸν σύμπαντα λόγον· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν φησιν Ὁμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ταύτῃ λέγοντες ὁμολογοῖμεν, οὔτε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.

Διανοούμενον ὡς ἁρμονίας — οὔσης.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 569. 5.—Καὶ οἵας ἄγεσθαι, i. e. καὶ τοιαύτης ὥστε ἄγεσθαι. Matthiæ Gr. s. 476. a.

καθ' ἁρμονίαν; Νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὁμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ὁμολογοῖμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. Ἔχειν οὕτως ἔφη.

§. 44. Εἶεν δή, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἀρ-

Ἢ καθ' ἁρμονίαν.] i. e. *Than that it could be compared to a harmony.*— When it is not a substantive, that is compared with another, but the quality of a thing expressed by an adjective that is considered in its proportion to another quality, and compared in degree with it (where in Latin *quam pro* is used), then ἢ κατα or ἢ πρός is put after the comparative. Matthiæ Gr. s. 449. c.

Νὴ Δία—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.] Sc. ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενος ὡς αὐτῆς οὔσης οἵας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσποζειν, &c. Simmias allows that, according to his view, the intention of Homer, in the passage as cited above, was to evince the superiority and sway of the mind over the body.

Οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν.] It is to be observed that the harmony against which Socrates has argued as being in any respect analogous to the soul, is totally distinct from the harmony alluded to c. 4. supr. a med. n. Ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς. The one being a physical harmony, arising from without, and necessarily dependent upon what is external and perishable in its origin and result; the other a moral, intellectual, or as Jamblichus calls it, a mathematical harmony, apud Stob. Eclog. Phys. p. 864., arising from the accordant affections of the soul, inseparable from and co-existent with the soul itself.

§. 44. Εἶεν δή, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης.] From this to c. 56. infr. Socrates argues against the position of Cebes, that although the soul was more excellent than the body, and lived before it, still by changing into one body after another it impaired and wasted its influence and strength, and at last was utterly destroyed. The answer is, that the nature of the soul is the same as that of things intelligible, that is, ideas and essences. For that anything should be beautiful, the immediate presence of beauty is required in the object, as that of heat, that anything should be warm, or life, that anything should exist. Now what is warm may be made cold, but heat itself cannot become cold; what is beautiful may be unsightly, but not so with beauty itself. For on the appearance of cold, heat is not changed into cold, but disappears, so beauty is not changed into, but gives place to deformity. Thus on the approach of death, the soul departs, and is not changed into death. For by the presence of the soul the body is animated and alive, and the nature of the soul is the same as that of those imperishable and undecaying ideas and essences which are innate in the mind; therefore the soul is immortal. Wyttenbach sums up the argument thus; the essences of things are constant and immutable, the essence of the soul consists in thought, therefore the soul can never lose the faculty of thought, consequently it is immortal.— This argument is objectionable upon other grounds, but principally owing to a defect in Plato's system of ideas, in not sufficiently distinguishing between those which originate in the mind itself and those which are acquired by experience, or by confounding, as Wyttenbach observes, things actual with things possible. For as anything set in motion cannot be otherwise understood than as changing its place, yet there is no necessity that it should be always in motion, or always exist. So with the soul, although it cannot be otherwise understood than as living, yet it cannot for this reason be conceded that it always lives or is eternal. But Plato arrived at this conclusion as one conformable to his design. For by deciding on the immutability of those ideas, and classing souls with them as identical in their nature, it followed that he should decide upon the soul's being no more possible to be deprived of life than a triangle could continue to be

μονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἴλεά πως, ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονε· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, πῶς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ; Σύ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης,

one when deprived of its three sides.

The nature of this argument, and its application, is clearly and ably developed by V. Cousin. Œuvr. de Plat. i. p. 171.

"Ici se rencontre épisodiquement la théorie des *Idées*.

"Toute philosophie qui se renferme dans les phénomènes apparens du monde extérieur, se condamne à n'atteindre jamais ni les causes ni les principes. La physique croit faire merveille par exemple d'expliquer la situation dans laquelle je suis assis, par la disposition des os, la tension des muscles, n'oubliant rien dans le détail minutieux de ses laborieuses et superficielles explications, si ce n'est le principe réel, la cause première du phénomène, la détermination de ma volonté. L'erreur commune, celle du peuple et du physicien qui n'est pas philosophe, est de confondre l'apparence avec la réalité, ce sans quoi la cause ne pourrait pas se développer, avec la cause elle-même. 'La physique se perd dans une multitude de petites causes qui ne sont pas des causes, et prend pour une chimère la grande cause qui fait, lie et vivifie tout .... En parlant de la cause et du principe, il ne faut pas s'arrêter aux effets, si l'on veut pénétrer dans la réalité des choses.'

"La cause, le principe suprême, c'est l'intelligence.

"Les vrais principes, les vraies causes, ce sont donc les *idées*.

"L'*idée* est, dans chaque chose, l'élément intérieur et essentiel qui, s'ajoutant à la matière, l'organise et lui donne sa forme. L'idee est le type interne de toute chose.

"L'idee, ne venant pas du dehors, ne peut être saisie par les sens.

"Elle ne tombe pas davantage sous le raisonnement ; le caractère de la perception que nous en pouvons avoir, est d'être immédiate, simple et indécomposable. Par exemple, c'est l'idee seule du beau qui fait que toute chose belle, est belle. Qu'on y pense : ce n'est pas tel ou tel arrangement de parties, tel ou tel accord de formes, qui rend beau ce qui l'est ; car indépendamment de tout arrangement, de toute composition, chaque partie, chaque forme pouvait être déja belle, et serait belle encore, la disposition générale étant changée. La beauté se déclare par l'impossibilité immédiate où nous sommes de ne pas la trouver belle, c'est-à-dire, de ne pas être frappé par l'idée du beau qui s'y rencontre. On ne peut donner d'autre explication de la perception de l'idée du beau. Il en est de même du bien, du juste, de l'étendue et de la grandeur, de la quantité et du nombre, et des forces élémentaires de la nature.

"Sans doute ce n'est point ici le lieu de rechercher si la critique moderne, tout en reconnaissant la solidité et la profondeur des bases de cette théorie fameuse, pourrait en admettre toutes les applications, surtout celles qui se rapportent au détail des nombres ; mais on ne peut s'empêcher de remarquer, en passant, que la théorie de Platon a cela de propre et d'excellent parmi les théories idéalistes, qu'elle ne s'arrête pas à la qualité logique des idées et qu'elle va jusqu'à leur essence réelle. Les idées de Platon ne sont pas seulement des directions pour la pensée, comme les catégories d'Aristote et de Kant, ce sont des élémens intégrans de la réalité. Principes et causes tout ensemble, elles planent à la fois sur l'humanité et sur la nature, et réunissent en elles le *principium essendi* et le *principium cognoscendi*, si mal à propos divisés par la scholastique, comme si l'essence de l'être pouvait être destituée d'intelligence, ou que l'intelligence ne fût pas aussi de l'existence, et l'existence à la fois la plus puissante et la plus pure!

"Les idées, les principes et les causes, bien que, par leur rapport aux choses qu'elles animent et qu'elles constituent, elles tombent accidentellement dans le temps et dans l'espace, sont essentiellement étrangères aux revolutions de l'espace et du temps ; elles ne connaissent ni commencement ni fin pour elles-mêmes : elles sont éternelles, incorruptibles.

"Le caractère propre d'un vrai prin-

ἐξευρήσειν· τουτονὶ γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὅτε ἠπόρει, πάνυ ἐθαύμαζον εἴ τι ἔξει τις χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ· πάνυ οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθὺς τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον οὐ δέξασθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. ταὐτὰ δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι. Ὦ γαθέ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μή τις ἡμῖν βασκανία πε-

cipe, d'une vraie cause, c'est d'exclure son contraire, et même le contraire de ce qui émane directement d'elle. Or, suivant Platon, et toute l'école platonicienne, dont Stalh n'a fait que recueillir la tradition, l'ame est le principe, la cause de la vie: 'Si vous demandiez ce qui fait que tel corps est chaud, je ne répondrais pas, ce qui est bien vrai, mais n'explique rien, que c'est la chaleur; mais, allant d'abord au principe, je répondrais avec précision, que c'est le feu. Si l'on demandait ce qui fait que telle personne est malade, je ne répondrais pas, c'est la maladie, mais la fièvre; si, quelle est la raison de l'impair, je ne dirais pas l'imparité, mais l'unité. De même ici, m'élevant à l'idee primitive, au principe, à la cause de la vie, je dis que c'est l'ame.' Ainsi l'ame, constituant la vie, et excluant, en sà qualite de principe, le contraire de ce qu'elle constitue, et ce contraire étant ici la mort, elle n'a rien à craindre de la mort, et l'exclut éternellement. Elle est donc éternelle et incorruptible."

Τὰ μὲν Ἁρμονίας.] i. q. Ἁρμονία; whence ἵλεά, which in its proper sense is applied to the propitiation of a deity. Tr. *The Theban Harmonia has been tolerably well reconciled*, or *appeased*. Harmonia was the daughter of Venus and Mars, and wife of Cadmus, whence Socrates makes mention of her, as supr., in allusion to the native country of Simmias as well as to the nature of his argument, that the soul was a harmony, which as represented by the deity Harmonia, the philosopher professes to have now in some degree propitiated, by his success in convincing Simmias. Hence he passes to the doubts proposed by Cebes, also a Theban, which by a natural transition he designates as τὰ Κάδμου A more recondite sense has been attributed to the above passage by different commentators, less felicitous than ingenious: the explanation given by Dacier affords a satisfactory specimen of the rest; i. e. that as Amphion by the harmony of his lyre built the walls of Thebes, so Simmias formed, by his harmony, the human soul: and as Cadmus, having sowed the dragon's teeth, produced the men who almost immediately perished, so Cebes by his argument would destroy the soul!

Εἴ τι ἔξει τις χρήσασθαι.] *If one could be able to do anything with his argument*, i. e. if one could extricate himself by any means from the difficulty which, as Cebes had supposed, lay in the way of any attempt to answer Simmias. Cf. Hipp. Maj. p. 299. B. ἀλλ' ἔχεις τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λογῷ ἢ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐροῦμεν.

Ταὐτὰ δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι.] *I should not be surprised if the same thing should befal the argument of Cadmus*, (Cebes' own,) i. e. that it should at once prove unable to withstand the first encounter of Socrates' reply.

Μή τις ἡμῖν βασκανία.] Socrates asks of Cebes not to commend or eulogise him too highly, lest the efficacy of his future reasoning should be defeated by that fascination, βασκανία, by which those who had been too much commended by others, were in danger of losing the advantages in which they were said to excel. Upon the βασκανία, or *evil eye*, so called, παρὰ τὸ φάεσι καίνειν, *from destroying with the eyes*, see Potter, Grec. Antiq. i. c. 18. sub. fin. This power of fascination was called by the Latins *fascinus*; and the usual remedy

ριτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα λέγεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὁμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες πειρώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ζητεῖς· ἀξιοῖς ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὖσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαῤῥῶν τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανὼν ἐκεῖ εὖ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ ἠλίθιον θάῤῥος θαῤῥήσει. Τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ὅτι ἰσχυρόν τί

for its injurious effects was the herb *baccar*. Cf. Virgil, Eclog. vii. 27. "Aut si ultra placitum laudarit baccare frontem Cingite, ne vati noceat mala lingua futuro." and Serv. in loc. "quicquid ultra meritum laudatur, dicitur fascinari." Hence the Greeks, when expressing their approval of any person or thing, used the terms *μετὰ προβασκανίου*, or *ἀβασκάντως*, and the Latins used to add to their praises *præfiscine*, or *præfiscine dixerim*, to avert the mischief of the evil eye. The goddess Nemesis was supposed to have been the cause of this infliction, which was intended as a judgment on the arrogant and proud; whence de Legg. iv. p. 601. D. *κούφων καὶ πτηνῶν λόγων βαρυτάτη ζημία· πᾶσι γὰρ ἐπίσκοπος τοῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα Δίκης Νέμεσις ἄγγελος.* For *περιτρίψῃ* Ruhnken proposes *περιστρίψῃ*. It will be observed that in this word the metaphor is kept up from *ἔφοδον δίχεσθαι* supr.

Ὁμηρικῶς.] Explained by Stephens, *ut Homeri verbis utar, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου*; in which sense, however, it should rather have been written *ὡς Ὁμ. εἰπεῖν*. The term is better explained by Heindorf, to mean *after the manner of Homer's heroes*, i. e. boldly, undauntedly. Cf. Iliad. *δ'*. 496. *ι'*. 611.

Ἀξιοῖς ἐπιδειχθῆναι.] i. e. *You require that the soul should be proved to be imperishable and immortal, if a philosopher on the eve of death, full of confidence and expectation that after his decease he will be far happier than if he had died, having passed through a different life* (i. e. from that of a philosopher), *is to entertain this confidence on wise and prudent grounds.* Socrates adds *ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βιῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα*, as if summing up anew the former part of the argument, in which he had shown that philosophers, only, were admitted after death to the society of the gods, and consequently to a happier life. Heindorf observes that there is no occasion to supply *δεῖν* to the verbs *ἡγεῖσθαι, λογίζεσθαι, οἴεσθαι δοκεῖν νομίζειν*, when used in the same signification as *ἀξιοῦν, æquum, s. opus judicare.* Whence it need not be understood either to *ἀξιοῖς* supr. For *ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτ.* Wyttenbach proposes *ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ ἐν ᾧ βιοὺς ἐτ.*

Τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *But the demonstration that the soul is something potent and divine, and that it was yet in existence before we were born ourselves—you say there is nothing to prevent all this from signifying, not that the soul is immortal* (an immortality,) *but only that it is of a long duration, and pre-existed for an immeasurable time, and was both conversant with and engaged in the execution of many things.* The difficulty of this passage, which all the editions read as supr., arises from the construction *ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον, κ. τ. λ.* which Heindorf proposes to obviate by reading; *οὐδὲν κωλύειν φὴς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν οὐ τὴν ἀθανασίαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι πολυχρόνιόν τέ ἐστι, κ. τ. λ.*; the meaning of the passage being certainly this, that all the arguments advanced by Socrates had only gone the length of establishing satisfactorily the soul's pre-existence and durability, but assuredly not its immortality. But, as Stallbaum observes, there is no change requisite in the text to elucidate its sense, for what

ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδές, καὶ ἦν ἔτι πρότερον πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φὴς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιόν τ' ἐστὶ ψυχὴ καὶ ἦν που πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ἤδει τε καὶ ἔπραττε πόλλ' ἄττα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὥς περ νόσος, καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῴη καὶ τελευτῶσά γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο. διαφέρει δὲ δή, φῄς, οὐδὲν εἴτε ἅπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἴτε πολλάκις, πρός γε τὸ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσήκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότι μηδ' ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι ὡς ἀθάνατόν ἐστι. τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐστίν, οἶμαι, ὦ Κέβης, ἃ λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ τι βούλει, προσθῇς ἢ ἀφελῇς. Καὶ ὁ Κέβης, Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἔφη, οὔτ' ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἃ λεγω.

might have been expressed simply thus; *πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν μόνον, ὅτι πολυχρόνιόν τέ ἐστι*, κ. τ. λ. might, when the contrary argument respecting the soul's immortality was mentioned, have been more fully expressed; *ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι δέ*, &c. in which *ἀθαν. μὲν μή* is a kind of equivalent for the omission of *μόνον*. The reason is obvious also for the use of *μή* instead of *οὔ*, as Socrates was speaking the opinion of Cebes. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. e.—Hence *ἄλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέν τι μ.*, κ. τ. λ. seq. which are also spoken as the opinion of Cebes, must be referred to, and closely connected in sense with *ὅτι πολυχρόν. ἐστ.—ἔπραττ. πολλ ἄττ.* preced. Tr. *But nothing the more was the soul immortal* (i. e. *in its pre-existence, before it was united to the body,*) *but its very entrance into the human body, like a disease, was the very principle and cause of its decay. Wherefore it passed through this life in misery and perished finally in that which is called death.* Upon the legitimate use of the optatives *ζῴη* and *ἀπολλύοιτο* without the cunjunction which as well as *ἄν* is sometimes omitted, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 529. 1. 3.

Πρὶν ἡμας ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι.] i. e. *Πρὶν ἡμᾶς (τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν) εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν.*

Οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον.] Sc. Previous to its junction with the body.—*ἀθάνατον*, h. l. signifies *endued with an immortal nature.*

Διαφέρει δὲ δή, φῄς, οὐδὲν, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *But you assert that it makes no difference whether the soul is united to a body once, or often times, as far as regards our several apprehensions; for it is right that he should feel afraid, unless he is a fool, who is not fully aware, and cannot advance a satisfactory argument in favour of the immortality of the soul;* that is, he must feel afraid, and justly, lest the soul being eventually exhausted, should perish in the same death as the last body which it had ceased to animate.

§. 45. Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτόν τι σκεψάμενος, Οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ζητεῖς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενεσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι περί αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη· ἔπειτα ἄν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ περὶ ὧν λέγεις χρήσει. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε. Ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν. ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδοκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι· καὶ πολλάκις ἐμαν-

Εἴ τι βούλει, προσθῇς ἢ ἀφέλῃς.] h. e. Καὶ ἵνα, εἴ τι βούλει, προσθῇς ἢ ἀφέλῃς. Cf. Matthiæ Gr. s. 516. 3.

Προσθεῖναι δέομαι.] i. e. βούλομαι. *I desire to add nothing more.*

§. 45. Οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα.] *No trivial matter,* — Περὶ γενέσεως, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 380. 4.

Τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη.] h. e. Ἃ ἐγὼ ἔπαθον.— Socrates proceeds to show how he was, himself, affected in the course of this investigation.

Ἐγὼ γάρ ἔφη—νέος ὢν θ.] By some, what is stated by Socrates here is supposed to be applicable to himself, by others, it is understood to refer more distinctly to Plato, upon other grounds besides the doctrine of ideas infr. c. 49.— Τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν, *of the wisdom which they call a knowledge of nature,* i. e. natural philosophy. The starting point of philosophy was the question concerning the origin and the elementary principles of the world; the resolution of which was attempted, after the experimental method, by the Ionic school, and the formal by the Pythagoreans. The Eleatic school opposed to each other the experimental and intellectual systems, which were combined by the Atomistic philosophers. Last of all came a sophistical school, which threatened to destroy all belief, religious and moral. But this progress of investigation was a sort of prelude to a more scientific philosophy, which by-and-by turned from the external *object* to the internal *subject*; from the world without to the mind within. Tennemann, Hist. Phil. 83. 84. The study of human nature, self-knowledge, observes V. Cousin, was, according to Socrates, the true beginning of philosophy; who, while the Pythagoreans, before him, placed all philosophy in theology, and the Ionians in physics, was the first to show that the relation in which man stands to the world and to God, is by virtue of his own nature, and that nature's laws. Wherefore this nature ought to be primarily and preferably examined into and investigated, to the end, that when once the nature of human beings is known, we may understand their true relations to what is not known—to the world and to God. In a word, Socrates added psycology to theology and cosmology, or substituted it for them. Introduction generale à L' Histoire de la Philos. 3me. Leçon. The name ἱστορία φύσεως was anciently applied generally to that knowledge of nature and acquaintance with its principles, which resulted, in practice and theory, from observation and reason.

Ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι.] Sc. αὕτη ἡ σοφία. *For this appeared to me to be a consummate wisdom, to be ac-*

τὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιάδε, ἆρ' ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα ξυντρέφεται, καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ

quainted with the causes of every thing, &c.—εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας being added in explanation of ὑπερήφ. γάρ μοι preced. Heindorf compares Gorg. p. 462. C. οὐκουν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις.

Ἄνω κάτω μετίβαλλον.] There is no doubt but that this expression frequently has the meaning assigned to it by Heindorf, who understands it of the variableness and continual changing of the different opinions which Socrates had successively embraced. But it should rather be interpreted here of the perplexity in which Socrates was involved, not from the variety of opinions or systems which he had recourse to himself, but from the doubts and difficulties which he met with in the pursuit of his physical researches and the many different opinions which he found severally advocated there. So V. Cousin; "— L' expression Grecque ne marque proprement que l'agitation en sens contraires, et cette signification suffit ici. Si Socrate eût embrassé tour à tour des opinions diverses, la chose était assez grave pour la developper davantage, et Platon n'eût pas manqué cette occasion de donner plus de mouvement et d'intérêt à son drame. Mais il n'est question de ces changemens de Socrate, ni dans toute l'antiquité, ni dans ce dialogue. Cela d' ailleurs répugne au caractère de Socrate, qui ne faisait pas assez vite ses opinions pour être sujet à en changer." Notes sur le Phedon p. 363.

Σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ.] Σηπίδων, properly *putrefaction*, is used here to signify the *digestion of food in the stomach*; in which sense σήπειν, σῆψις, and ἄσηπτος are also used; whence Galen, in Hippocrat. Aphorism. vi. 1. Παλαιά τις ἦν συνήθεια τούτοις τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἄσηπτα καλεῖν ἅπερ ἡμεῖς ἄπεπτα λέγομεν. Hence, too, κατὰ σῆψιν and ἡ πέψις are synonymous, the food being corrupted in the process of digestion. V. Hippocrat. de Diæta, i. 11.—Ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, the Ionic philosophers, Anaxagoras, who said, according to Laertius ii. 9.—τὰ ζῶα γενέσθαι ἐξ ὑγροῦ τε καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ γεώδους, ὕστερον δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων.; and Archelaus, who maintained that all things were disengaged from the original chaos by the operation of two discordant principles of heat and cold, (or of fire and water); Diog. Laert. ii. 16. ἔλεγε δύο αἰτίας εἶναι γενέσεως, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, καὶ τὰ ζῶα ἀπὸ τῆς ἰλύος γεννηθῆναι—. γεννᾶσθαι δὲ—τὰ ζῶα ἐκ θερμῆς τῆς γῆς καὶ λὶν παραπλήσιαν γάλακτι οἷον τροφὴν ἀνιείσης. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ποιῆσαι. — ξυντρέφεται, i. e. συνίσταται, πήγνυται Suid. *Coagulantur.* HEIND. *Are made of a due and proper consistency.*

Τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν.] This was the opinion of Empedocles, who defined the soul as consisting in a combination of the four elements (to account for the knowledge it possesses of external objects, which he conceived to be owing to an analogy subsisting between the subject and the object); and pronounced the seat of the soul to be principally the blood. Tennemann's Hist. Phil. 108.—Ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ,—the opinion of Anaximenes, who was led by certain observations on the origin of things, and the nature of the soul, to regard the air (ἀὴρ) as the primitive element.—Auct. de Placit. Phil. i. 3. Ἀναξιμένης ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀέρα ἀπεφήνατο· ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν πάλιν ἀναλύεσθαι, οἷον ἡ ψυχή, φησὶν, ἡ ἡμετέρα ἀὴρ οὖσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀὴρ περιέχει. Diogenes, of Apollonia, held this opinion also. Aristot. de Anim. i. 2.—Ἢ τὸ πῦρ,—Fire was the elemental principle, according to Heraclitus, the foundation of all things, and the universal agent. He maintained the excellence of the soul to consist in its *aridity*, or freedom from aqueous particles—αὐτὴ

τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν κατὰ ταὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην. Καὶ αὐ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τον οὐρανόν τε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυὴς εἶναι, ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα. τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἱκανόν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ᾤμην εἰδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται. τοῦτο γὰρ ᾤμην πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ

ψυχὴ ἀρίστη or σοφωτάτη; according to Stob. Serm. 17. and Ast, on the Phædrus of Plato, c. 111. ed. Lips. 1810. Αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη. On this expression compare Pet. Wesseling, Obs. de Heracl. αὖη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη, in ej. Obs. Misc. Amst. v. c. 111. p. 42. Leucippus and Democritus also held the opinion that the soul consisted of globular atoms of fire, which imparted motion to the body.

Ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλός.] Cic. Tusc. i. 9.—"Aliis pars quædam cerebri visa est animi principatum obtinere." So Laertius, viii. 30, in explanation of the doctrine of Pythagoros; εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ καρδίας μέχρι ἐγκεφάλου, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μέρος αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν θυμόν· φρένας δὲ καὶ νοῦν τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ. Hippocrat. de Morb. Sacr. c. 17. Κατὰ ταῦτα νομίζω τὸν ἐγκέφαλον δύναμιν πλείστην ἔχειν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. Οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστι τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἠέρος γενομένων ἑρμηνεύς, ἢν ὑγιαίνων τυγχάνῃ. Τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν αὐτῷ ὁ ἀὴρ παρέχεται. Οἱ δὲ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα καὶ αἱ χεῖρες καὶ οἱ πόδες, οἷα ἂν ὁ ἐγκέφαλος γινώσκῃ, τοιαῦτα ὑπηρετοῦσι. Γίνεται δὲ παντὶ τῷ σώματι τῆς φρονήσιος, ὡς ἂν μετίχῃ τοῦ ἠέρος. Ἐς δὲ τὴν σύνεσιν ὁ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ διαγγέλλων.

Ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο.] The optative is used here, not as if according to Heindorf, it had been preceded by a past tense, thus; ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἔλεγόν τινες, ὅτι ὁ ἐγκέφαλος εἴη—but because Socrates passes from the *oratio recta* to the *oratio obliqua* as if he had used ὅτι or ὡς. Hence, too, the infin. γίγνεσθαι seq. Stall. Ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης. See supr. c. 34. Τὸ ἀδοξαστον.—Λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, i. e. *being steadied, settled*, or *at rest*; for, according to Plato, ἐπιστήμη or science alone, is durable, firm, and unchanging; while δόξα or opinion, is variable, shifting, and insecure. Κατὰ ταὐτά, *in the same manner* as memory and opinion were said supr. to arise from the sense of hearing, seeing, &c.

Ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα.] i. e. *I looked upon myself at last as completely* (that nothing could be more so) *unsuited* (from want of natural capacity) *for this investigation*. Ὡς οὐδ. χρῆμ., *ut nihil quidquam*, i. e. that I was more unsuited than any one else. Heind. So in Latin; *nihil videbatur me ineptius esse ad hæc investiganda*.

Ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφ. ἠπιστ.—οὕτω σφόδρ. ἐτυφ.] *For the things which I formerly with certainty knew—in these* (ταῦτα being supplied to ἐτυφλώθην

δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρξὶ σάρκες προσγένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστοῖς ὀστᾶ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἑκάστοις προσγένηται τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ὕστερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν. οὕτω τότε ᾤμην· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως; Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. ᾤμην γὰρ ἔγωγε ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὁπότε τις φαίνοιτο ἀνθρωπος παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῷ μείζων εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἵππου· καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτὼ πλείονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου μεῖζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν. Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν; Πόῤῥω που, ἔφη, νὴ Δί' ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἴεσθαι περὶ τούτων του τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπειδὰν ἑνί τις

from ἄ preced.) *I was so utterly blinded, &c.*

Ταῖς μὲν σαρξὶ σάρκες προσγίνωνται.] In allusion to the Homœomeria of Anaxagoras, the doctrine that bodies of every kind were generated from homogeneous particles; a bone, for instance, from a great number of bony particles, a piece of gold from golden particles, &c., the character of which particles was assumed by the body itself. Lucret. in Anaxag, doctr. i. 835. "Ossa videlicit e pauxillis atque minutis Visceribus Viscus gigni; Sanguenque creari, Sanguinis inter se multis cæuntibu' guttis."

Μετρίως.] *Justly, with sufficient reason.* i. q. ἱκανῶς. infr.

Αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ.] Wyttenbach proposes αὐτοῦ τῇ κεφ. i. e. *taller than him by the head;* but all the editions retain αὐτῇ, and the correction does not appear to be required. Vers. Sic. *homo magnus parvo major esse ipso capite, et equus equo.*

Ἔτι γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 432. 5.

Διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν.] Cf. infr. c. 49. a med. καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μεῖζον εἶναι.

Πόῤῥω που—ἐμὲ εἶναι.] *I am far from thinking that I am, in any degree, conversant with the cause of these things.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 380. Obs. 4. s. 354. ε.

Ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ—] i. e. *I, who cannot convince myself even of this, whether, when to one a person should add one, that one to which it was added has become two, or that one added, and that to which it was added, have become two on account of the addition of the one to the other.* [There are in this hypothesis, according to Wyttenbach, three ways in which e. gr. A and B may be made two: either A becomes two by the addition of B, or B becomes two by being added to A, or A and B become two by a common addition. — Hence he reads the passage; οὐδὲ ὡς, ἐπειδὰν ἑνί τίς προσθῇ ἕν, ἢ τὸ ἓν ᾧ ἓν προσετέθη δύο γίγονεν· ἢ τὸ προστεθὲν· ἢ τὸ προστεθὲν, καὶ ᾧ προσετέθη, διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου τῷ ἑτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο.] *For I wonder if*

προσθῇ ἕν, ἢ τὸ ἓν ᾧ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστεθὲν καὶ ᾧ προσετέθη διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου τῷ ἑτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο· θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἓν ἄρ' ἑκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦστην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αὐτοῖς αἰτία ἐγένετο δυοῖν γενέσθαι ἡ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. Οὐδέ γε [ὡς] ἐάν τις ἓν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὡς αὕτη αὖ αἰτία γέγονεν ἡ σχίσις τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι· ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι· τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ξυνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ' ἑτέρου. οὐδέ γε διότι ἓν γίγνεται, ὡς ἐπίσταμαι ἔτι πείθω ἐμαυτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἑνὶ λόγῳ, διότι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλά τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσίεμαι.

when each of them was separate, each separately was one, and they were not then two. But when they are joined together, this is the cause of their becoming two, namely, the conjunction by which they are approximated to each other. Neither, indeed, if any should divide one (from the other of two) *can I yet be persuaded that this, on the other hand, is the cause, namely their division, of their becoming two. For this is quite an opposite cause to the former, of their becoming two; for then it was because they were mutually conjoined, and added, the one to the other; but now it is because the one is divided and separated from the other. Neither, yet, according to this system of investigation, am I persuaded that I know how one becomes two, nor in a word, anything else, how it is produced, or perishes, or exists, but I proceed to compound without due consideration some other system, and by no means approve of this.*

Ἓν ἄρ' ἑκάτερον.] Theopomp. Comic. ap. Diog. Laert. iii. 26. ἓν γάρ ἐστιν οὐδὲ ἓν, Τὰ δὲ δύο μόλις ἓν ἐστιν, ὥς φησιν Πλάτων.

Αἰτία—δυοῖν γενέσθαι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 542. *b.* β.—Τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι, *inasmuch as they are near each other;* added in explanation of ἡ ξύνοδος preced. Matthiæ Gr. s. 540. Obs. 2.

Οὐδέ γε [ὡς] ἐάν τις.] Ὡς, as Fischer observes, is incorrectly placed before ἐάν τις, but such negligence, he adds, is not unpleasing in the easy style of familiar dialogue. It is omitted in Vat. et Flor. d., and justly. STALL.

Ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται.] Olympiod. Εἰ τἀναντία εἶδη αἰτία τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, πῶς ἡ τε σύνοδος καὶ ἡ σχίσις ἐναντίαι οὖσαι τὸ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσι.—Ἡ τότε αἰτία,—Vett. editt. Bas. 2. ἡ τότε αἰτία, incorrectly, for τότε must then be referred to ἡ σχίσις, whereas it is plain from τότε μὲν γὰρ infr. that it refers to ἡ ξύνοδος. Tr. *For this* (sc. ἡ σχίσις) *is an opposite cause to the former, &c.* Cf. Plat. Gorg. p. 481. C. καὶ πάντα τἀναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἀδεῖ. Upon ἢ after ἐναντία, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 619.

Τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.] i. e. Physics; περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν supr.

Αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω.] *Aliam quandam*

§. 46. Ἀλλ' ἀκούσας μέν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἥσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ· εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἑκάστου, ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπῃ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος εὑρηκέναι ᾠμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καί μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἡ γῆ πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν,

rationem quasi commisceo temere et comminiscor. STALL.—a metaphor taken, as Fischer correctly observes, from those who mix up clay or flour with water to make mud or dough. Aristoph. Av. 462. προπεφύραται λόγος εἰς μοι, ὃν διαμάττειν οὐ κωλύει. By τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον, Socrates alludes to the system of Anaxagoras, c. 46. infr., to which he had recourse in the hope of being extricated from the difficulties which physics had left unexplained. He certainly does not intend by it any reference to the subsequent theory of ideas, which he adhered to with a firmness and constancy quite inconsistent with the form of expression as supr. αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω.

§. 46. Ἀλλ' ἀκούσας μέν ποτε.] i. e. Ἀλλ' ἀκούσας μέν ποτε ἀναγιγνώσκοντος τινος ἐκ βιβλίου, ὡς ἔφη, (sc. ὁ ἀναγιγνώσκων) Ἀναξαγ. See supr. c. 17. Τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη.

Ὁ διακοσμῶν.] Διακοσμεῖν, and κοσμεῖν, which Cicero renders *in ordinem adducere* are peculiar to the system of Anaxagoras. Cf. Cratyl. c. 37. καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων φύσιν οὐ πιστεύεις Ἀναξαγόρᾳ νοῦν τε καὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν διακοσμοῦσαν καὶ ἔχουσαν. Plutarch. de Plac. Phil. i. 7. t. ii. p. 881. A. ὁ δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας φησὶν ὡς εἰστήκει κατ' ἀρχὰς τὰ σώματα, νοῦς δὲ αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε θεοῦ.

Κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ.] i. e. *An instructor to my mind, one who answered my wishes;* Socrates plays upon the word which sustained a province of such importance in the system of Anaxagoras. Cf. Aristoph. Eqq. 499. Ἀλλ' ἴθι χαίρων καὶ πράξειας κατὰ νοῦν τὸν ἐμόν.

Πότερον ἡ γῆ πλατεῖα ἐστιν ἢ στρογ.] On this point Anaximander and Anaximenes, who preceded Anaxagoras in the Ionic school, disagreed;

ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτήν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἴ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοιτο, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος. Καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτω παρεσκευάσμην ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῇ ποτὲ ταὐτ' ἄμεινον ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν ᾠμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμῆσθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὡς περ ἔχει· ἑκάστῳ οὖν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἑκάστῳ βέλτιστον ᾠμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ἀγαθόν. καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἷός τ' ἦ ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἵν' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.

§. 47. Ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἐλπίδος ᾠ-

the latter taught that the form of the sun and moon, both fiery bodies, was that of a circular plate, that the stars, also fiery bodies, were fixed in the heavens like nails in a crystalline plane, and that the earth itself was a plane tablet [πλατεῖα or τραπεζοειδὴς] resting upon the air. The former taught that the stars, planets, &c. were globular, and that the earth was a globe, whence στρογγύλη supr. or, as some say, cylindrical, to which the same term will apply. By πλατεῖα, Heindorf, h. l. understands Plato as alluding to the Ionic, and by στρογγύλη, to the Pythagorean school. Voss. ad Virg. Georg. iv. 357. Laert. ii. 1. 2. iii. 4.

Ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος.] *So as no more to require any other species of cause.* Vulg. ὡς οὐκετ' ὑποθησομενος, which appears to have been adopted by Ficinus, but is neither sanctioned by the best editions, nor is it at all consistent with the obvious and necessary sense of the passage.

Τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα.] i. e. *Concerning their mutual velocity, revolutions, and other affections* or *accidents.*

Καὶ ποιεῖν.] Sc. ἃ ποιεῖ.

Ἑκάστῳ οὖν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδόντα, κ. τ. λ.] *I thought therefore, that he ascribing a cause to each thing in particular, and all things in common, would enlarge more clearly upon what was best for each, and the general good of all.*— Οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, *I would not for a great consideration have parted with my hopes;* i. e. I had the fullest assurance that I should obtain the knowledge I required.—Πανυ σπουδῇ, *with the greatest earnestness.* Upon this Attic formula, especially familiar with Thucydides, see Valcken. ad Phalarid. Epp. p. xvii.—Τὰς βίβλους, i. e. the physics of Anaxagoras.

χόμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προϊὼν καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα. καί μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὡς περ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῷ πράττει, κἄπειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι ξύγκειταί μου τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὀστῶν καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ ἐστὶ στερρὰ καὶ διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὀστᾶ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος, ὃ ξυνέχει αὐτά· αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστῶν ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν ξυμβολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ ξυντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαί που ποιεῖ οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ξυγκαμφθεὶς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι· καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἑτέρας τινὰς τοιαύ-

§. 47. Ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς—ἐλπίδος ψχ φερ.] *I was baffled then in this wonderful hope.* Upon the form ψχόμην φερόμενος, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 559. c. Stephens explains the passage; *Mirifica illa spe ducebar*, or, *Hanc in spem erectus eram, quum ecce ulterius in illorum lectione progressus, &c.* incorrectly, for φέρεσθαι ὑπὸ ἐλπίδος means, *to be led*, or *induced, by a hope*, as ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα infr. But φέρεσθαι ἀπὸ ἐλπίδος signifies, *to be baffled, disappointed in*, or *be deprived of a hope*. So Euthyphr. p. 15. E. καταβάλλεσθαι ἀπ' ἐλπίδος. Ficinus has adopted the sense of Stephens as supr.

Τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον.] i. e. *Making no use of* (that divine) *intelligence, nor alleging any causes for the arrangement of all things, otherwise than assigning the air, atmosphere, and water, as causes, besides many other things equally absurd.* Cf. Aristot. Metaphys. i. 4. Ἀναξαγόρας μηχανῇ χρῆται τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιΐαν· καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τότε ἕλκει αὐτόν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιᾶται τῶν γενομένων ἢ νοῦν. Simplic. in Aristot. Phys. i. p. 2. A. Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἐπέστησε μὲν ποιητικὸν αἴτιον τὸν νοῦν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς αἰτιολογίαις ὀλίγα αὐτῷ προσεχρήσατο· ὡς ὁ ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης ἐπέσκηψε.

Διαφυὰς.] *And have their diaphyses* (or bodies) *separately, one from the other.* Cloquet's System of Human Anat. c. 1. 29. "The *long bones* (*ossa longa* sive *cylindrica*) occur in the limbs. Those nearest the trunk are longest and less numerous. Their extremities are enlarged, and their middle part, which is named their *body* or *diaphysis*, is contracted, and most commonly triangular and twisted."—διαφυὴ signifies also the intervals between the knots on the stalk of a plant.

Οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι.] i. e. Τοιαῦτα ὥστε ἐπιτείνεσθαι.

Αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστῶν, κ.τ.λ.] *The bones being suspended from, swinging,* or *playing in their joints.*—Ξυμβολαῖς,

τας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν, ὅτι ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσιν, ἐπεὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρά τε καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτιστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾤμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἥντιν' ἂν τάττῃ. ἀλλ' αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' ἦ ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι· ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ, καὶ ταύτῃ νῷ πράττω, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἱρεσει, πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ῥᾳθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου. Τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν

Cic. de Nat. D. ii. 55. "Quid dicam de ossibus? quæ subjecta corpori, mirabiles commissuras habeat, et ad stabilitatem aptas, et ad artus finiendos accommodatas, et ad motum et ad omnem corporis actionem. Huc adde nervos, a quibus artus continentur, eorumque implicationem corpore toto pertinentem."

Φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας.] Another instance of the absurdity of those who stopped at secondary causes, through incompetence or unwillingness to carry their inquiries beyond the unsatisfactory limit of physical science. V. Plutarch. de Placit. Philos. p. 902.

Νὴ τὸν κύνα.] See Apol. Socr. c. 7. init.

Περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν.] As the nearest cities to which Socrates could have fled for the purpose of escape. Cf. in Crit. c. 4. c. 15.

Καὶ ταύτῃ νῷ πράττω.] *And so far act under the influence of mind* (as far as I have bones and nerves) *and not from the choice of what is best;* ταύτῃ being equivalent to ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ, and so opposed to τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἱρέσει. Hence there seems no necessity for the emendation of Heindorf, ταῦτα, which is to be found in some editions, and would appear to have been adopted by Ficinus.

Τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι.] *That one should not be capable of distinguishing that the real cause is one thing, and that without which the cause would not ever be a cause is another!* suppl. εὖηθες s. φαῦλόν ἐστιν.—the infinitive being often used in exclamations and questions of indignation. Cf. Cic. Fin. 2. 10. init. "Hoc vero non videre maximo argumento esse," &c. Matthiæ Gr. s. 544. Seag. Viger, c. 5. s. iii. r. 8. Socrates exclaims against the folly of those who cannot distinguish between the real or primary cause, and the concause, without which the former could not exist. For instance, the real or primary cause of the change of posture in the human frame is the will, and the secondary cause, the muscles, nerves, &c., upon which it is obvious that the former of necessity depends, in order to be effectually fulfilled.

τ' εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δ' ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον· ὃ δή μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πόλλοὶ ὥς περ ἐν σκότῳ, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι, ὡς αἴτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μέν τις δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ ὥς περ καρδόπῳ πλατείᾳ βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα

Ὃ δή μοι φαίνονται.] The accus. ὃ depends both on ψηλαφῶντες and προσαγορεύειν. HEIND. — Ψηλαφῶντες, — Phavor. ψηλαφῶ· λέξις αὕτη μουσική· ἐπεὶ κυρίως ἐπὶ χορδῶν τὸ ψηλαφᾶν λέγεται παρὰ τὸ ψαλτήριον ἁφᾶν. Hence it signifies, *to seek anything by feeling for it, to search in the dark.* Cf. Acts. xvii. 27. Ζητεῖν τὸν θεὸν, εἰ ἄρα γε ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτὸν καὶ εὕροιεν, καὶ τοί γε οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ἡμῶν ὑπάρχοντα: *That they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us.*— Aristoph. Pac. 690. Προτοῦ μεν οὖν Ἐψηλαφῶμεν ἐν σκότῳ τὰ πράγματα· Νυνὶ δ' ἅπαντα πρὸς λύχνον βούλεύσομεν. According to Valckenaer, this verb is composed in a manner rare in Greek, of *two* verbs, ψάω or ψάλλω and ἀφάω.

Ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι.] i. e. *Which the majority feeling for, as it were, in the dark, appear, while they call it by a name quite foreign from the true, to designate as the very cause itself.* Vulg. ἀλλοτρίῳ ὄμματι; incorrectly, which, however, is curiously defended by Reisig, Enarrat. Œdip. Colon. 142. "Alieno oculo, inquit, significantur ea membra, quibus in tenebris rem obscuram tentant. Hæc autem non sunt intellecta ab editoribus Platonis."

Δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ.] *Whence one indeed encompassing the earth with a vortex of the heavens, causes the earth to remain fixed;* in the centre of the universe. Heindorf correctly joins δίνην to ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, which he explains *vorticem qui a cælo fit;* and compares with this construction, Politic. p. 291. D. καὶ μετὰ μοναρχίαν εἶποι τις ἂν, οἶμαι, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλίγων δυναστείαν. de Rep. iii. p. 390. C. Ἄρεώς τε καὶ Ἀφροδίτης ὑπὸ Ἡφαίστου δεσμός. Cf. for a similar construction in Latin, Terent. Andr. 1. i. 129. "Ea primum *ab illo* (i. e. ejus,) animadvertenda injuria est;" and Westerhov. in loc. Sallust, Jugurth. 31, "Multa me dehortantur *a vobis.*" and Cort. in loc. It would appear that Empedocles was especially alluded to in the text as supr. from Aristotle, de Cœlo, ii. 13. Οἱ δὲ, ὥς περ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰν κύκλῳ περιθέουσαν καὶ θᾶττον φερομένην τὴν τῆς γῆς φορὰν κωλύειν, καθάπερ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κυάθοις ὕδωρ. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο, κυκλῳ τοῦ κυαθοῦ φερομένου, πολλάκις κατω τοῦ χαλκοῦ γιγνόμενον ὅμως οὐ φέρεται, κάτω πεφυκὸς φέρεσθαι, διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. According to Diog. Laert. ix. 45. this theory was also maintained by Leucippus and Democritus; πάντα τε κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι, τῆς δίνης αἰτίας οὔσης τῆς γενέσεως πάντων, ἣν ἀναγκην λέγει., and by Anaxagoras also, as appears from Aristoph. Nub. 379. Δῖνος; τουτί μ' ἐλελήθει, Ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ὢν, ἀλλ' ἀντ' αὐτοῦ Δῖνος νυνὶ βασιλεύων· and Schol. in l. καὶ τοῦτο ἐθρυλλεῖτο παρὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς, τοῦτ' ἔστι, δίνησις ἡ αἰσερία· ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν Ἀναξαγορείων λαμβάνει.

Ὡς περ καρδόπῳ.] Schol. τῇ μάκτρᾳ τοῦ ἀλεύρου. i. e. *But another supports the earth like a broad kneading-trough, upon the air, as a foundation,* or base. Socrates alludes here to the opinions of Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Democritas, whose notions upon the form of the earth are aptly expressed by καρδόπῳ πλατείᾳ; Anaxagoras, from whom it does not appear that the others disagreed, having determined that the earth, εἶναι αὐτὴν κοιλὴν, καὶ ἔχειν ὕδωρ ἐν τοῖς κοιλώμασι. Aristot. de Cœlo, ii. 13. Ἀναξιμένης δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Δημόκριτος τὸ πλάτος

ὑπερείδει· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔ τέ τινα οἴονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου ἄν ποτε Ἄτλαντα ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα ξυνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ ξυνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητὴς ὀτουοῦν ἥδιστ' ἂν γενοίμην· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὔτ' αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ᾗ πεπραγμάτευμαι, βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβης; Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὡς βούλομαι.

§. 48. Ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, μετὰ ταυτα,

αἴτιον εἶναί φασι τοῦ μένειν αὐτήν. οὐ γὰρ τίμνειν ἀλλ' ἐπιπωματίζειν τὸν ἀέρα τὸν κάτωθεν· ὥσπερ φαινεται τὰ πλάτος ἔχοντα τῶν σωμάτων ποιεῖν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνέμους ἔχει δυσκινήτως διὰ τὴν ἀντέρεισιν. ταυτὸ δὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖν τῷ πλάτει φασὶ τὴν γῆν πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον ἀέρα· τὸν δ' οὐκ ἔχοντα μεταστῆναι τόπον ἱκανὸν, ἀθρόον τῷ κάτωθεν ἠρεμεῖν, &c.

Τὴν τὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε.] h. e. Τὴν δέ δύναμιν τοῦ οὕτω νῦν αὐτὰ κεῖσθαι, ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα τεθῆναι. It is manifest that the philosophers who advocated the theories as supr., never thought of ascribing to a supreme disposing cause, a more than human power, the arrangement of the system, which in their efforts to explain upon the strength of physical science alone, they had involved in the most puerile absurdities and perplexing doubts.

Ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου.] *But they think that they would find a more powerful, a more enduring, and a more comprehensive Atlas than this;* i. e. they imagine that they can discover a sustaining cause, (Ἄτλαντα,) better established and more lasting, one that more efficiently combines everything within itself than this cause, (τούτου supr.,) according to which the system of the universe has been most wisely modelled, in which it has been most consistently and effectively preserved, and in which, from ignorance or arrogance, they decline to acquiesce.—Καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τἀγαθον, κ. τ. λ. i. e. *And what is excellent* (in design) *and suitable* (in its result) *they believe to be incapable of uniting and combining anything.*— δέον may be also understood as the part. pres. of δέω, δεῖν, *ligare, to bind,* in which sense it is used of the Stoics, περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, apud Diog. Laert. vii. 98. 99. πᾶν δὲ ἀγαθὸν, συμφέρον εἶναι, καὶ δέον, καὶ λυσιτελὲς, καὶ χρήσιμον, καὶ εὔχρηστον, καὶ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ αἱρετὸν, καὶ δίκαιον· συμφέρον μὲν ὅτι φέρει τοιαῦτα, ὧν συμβαινόντων ὠφελούμεθα· δέον δὲ, ὅτι συνέχει ἐν οἷς χρή· κ. τ. λ.

Τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν.] Schol. Παροιμία, Δεύτερος πλοῦς, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσφαλῶς τι πραττόντων, καθόσον οἱ διαμαρτόντες κατὰ τὸν πρότερον πλοῦν ἀσφαλῶς παρασκευάζονται τὸν δεύτερον. The expression is proverbial, and asserted generally of those who, having failed in the first, make trial of a second attempt. Eustath. in Odyss. B. p. 106. Bas. δεύτερος πλοῦς λέγεται ὅτε ἀποτυχών τις οὐρίου κώπαις πλέῃ κατὰ Παυσανίαν.

Ἣι πεπραγμάτευμαι.] Vulg. ἣν

ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι μὴ πάθοιμι ὅ περ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι· διαφθείρονται γάρ που ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἤ τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενοήθην, καὶ ἔδεισα μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν, ᾧ εἰκάζω, τροπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ ξυγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις· ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἑκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, α μὲν ἄν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ ξυμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων, ἃ δ' ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ.

πεπραγμ. Upon which see Matthiæ Gr. s. 421. Obs. 4. But the reading as supr. is preferable, besides being sanctioned by the best editions, as obviating the necessity of any circumlocution which ἦν would infer; δεύτερον πλοῦν being governed, as above, of πεπραγμ. whence the passage may be explained; *would you, Cebes, that I should show you in what manner* (ᾗ) *I set about a second voyage for the discovery of this cause.*

§. 48. Τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν.] h. e. *Rerum vim et naturam.* STALL.

Ἴσως μὲν οὖν, ᾧ εἰκαζω—] i. e. *Perhaps, however, this similitude does not hold good so far as I judge from the comparison.*—Οὐκ ἔοικεν, *non videtur verum;* impersonal as Protagor. p. 312. A.—STALL. Some understand τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα.

Οὐ γὰρ πάνυ ξυγχωρῶ.] i. e. *For I do not altogether admit that he who considers things in their reasons* (or as Gottleber explains ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, *in their natural principles,*) *is contemplating them more by means of images* (i. e. indirectly) *than he who contemplates them in their operations* or *effects,* sc. by the aid and with the co-operation of the senses. Socrates had already expressed himself to the effect that had he, with the aid of the senses alone, endeavoured to arrive at the true cause and nature of things, he feared he should resemble those who injured their sight by attempting to look at the sun itself in an eclipse, rather than its image or reflection in water, or through some other medium, by which the brightness of the luminary might be tempered and accommodated to the human eye. He therefore thought that in like manner he should contemplate and consider the truth of things in their reasons, as media or images; but still this similitude did not hold good throughout, for these reasons were not properly images of the truth, they were the truth itself, and consequently they were *realities,* and were contemplated and considered as such, equally as the operations and effects were looked upon as realities by those who judged them to be so by the help of the senses. Hence, says Socrates, he who considers things in their reasons cannot be said to contemplate

Βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω οἶμαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.

§. 49. Ἀλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, ὧδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινὸν ἀλλ' ἅ περ ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα· ἃ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ ξυγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τήν τε αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἐνευρήσειν ὡς ἀθανατον ἡ ψυχή. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὡς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων. Σκόπει δή, ἔφη, τὰ ἑξῆς ἐκείνοις. ἐάν σοι ξυνδοκῇ ὥς περ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτω λέγω. τῇ τοιᾷδε αἰτίᾳ ξυγχωρεῖς;

them in images any more than he who considers them in their visible effects, for, in both cases, there is reality presenting itself, in the latter case, however, to the eye of the body, in the former, to that of the mind.

§. 49. Ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε, κ. τ. λ.] *On every other occasion as well as in the preceding discussion.*

Ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν.] i. q. Ἐπιχειρήσων; the present participle being equally admissible, as the verb ἐπιχειρεῖν has of itself a future sense. Otherwise the future is constantly used in this form, v. c. ἔρχομαι λέξων. Cf. Portus, in Lex. Ionic. voc. Ἔρχομαι.—Heindorf gives as an equivalent to the phrase as supr. ἔρχομαι ἐπιδειξόμενος.

Πολυθρύλητα.] i. e. Διαβεβοημένα. Hesych. interpr.

Τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό.] Cf. supr. c. 19. 20. 22. infr. c. 50. Upon the εἴδη to which Socrates here alludes, see in Tim. p. 28. Steph. and Parmenid. p. 141. sqq. Bas. 2. He now proceeds to show that the immaterial and eternal qualities have a necessary relation to the immortality of the soul, such as a cause has to its effect.

Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων.] *Come to your conclusion then at once; περαίνειν,* in dialectics, having the sense of *concluding* or *deducing* from admitted premises. Upon the optative used imperatively see Matthiæ Gr. s. 514. c. 515. γ.—Τὰ ἑξῆς ἐκείνοις, i. e. *what follows the preceding,* as in Cratyl. p. 399. A. p. 420. D. Legg. vii. p. 796. E.

Οὐδὲ δι' ἓν ἄλλο.] *On account of no one thing else;* i. e. that which is beautiful is only so by its partaking of the *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν.*—Ἢ διότι μετέχει,—Plato makes frequent mention throughout his writings of this *μετοχὴ* or *μίθεξις,* the true nature of which will be easily understood from the following passage in Parmenid. c. 13. sub. fin. ἀλλὰ—μάλιστα ἔμοιγε (says Socrates) καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν. τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα

Ξυγχωρῶ, ἔφε. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γιγνώσκειν· ἀλλ' ἐάν τίς μοι λέγῃ διότι καλόν ἐστιν ὁτιοῦν, ἢ ὅτι χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶ, ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι, τοῦτο δὲ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία, εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά. τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ

ὥς περ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα· καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς. Cf. supr. c. 20. a med. Οἷς ἐσφραγιζόμεθα, κ. τ. λ. and see infr. μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου.

Τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας.] *These subtle causes.*

Ἢ ὅτι χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον.] Intell. ἐστίν; this form ἔχον ἐστὶ for ἔχει, being not unusual. Cf. Sophist. c. 32. εἰ ἄτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ πᾶν ἢ ἄρα τινὰ ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας,—Aristoph. Ran. 1160. Οὐ δῆτα τοῦτό γ', ὦ κατεστωμυλμένε Ἄνθρωπέ, ταὖτ' ἔστ', ἀλλ' ἄριστ', ἐπῶν ἔχον; and Brunck, in loc.

Ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι.] h. e. For I am troubled and perplexed at all the other arguments which any might adduce, so much so as to be incapable of discerning the truth. Ἀτέχνως, *artlessly*; so Wyttenbach and Heindorf in preference to ἀτεχνῶς. Harpocrat. Ἀτέχνως, περισπωμένος μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ σαφῶς ἢ βεβαίως ἢ ἀσφαλῶς ἢ φανερῶς· παροξυτόνως δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀμελῶς καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης.—Εὐήθως, Hesych. interpr. ἀνοήτως.

Εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία.] *Either the presence or participation.* For Plato was yet in doubt in what manner the εἴδη, or eternal and immutable forms, were joined to and connected with things themselves; he had not certainly, as yet, as appears from Parmenid. p. 130. E.—132., discovered a word by which he might designate their communion; hence εἴτε παρ. εἴτε κοιν. supr.—Εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη, *or by whatever means and in whatever manner it is communicated*, sc. as a presence or participation. Heindorf objects strongly to προσγενομένη being referred to παρουσία or κοινωνία, and throws out as a first-sight conjecture, that some word may have been lost after προσγενομένη, upon which also may have depended the gen. ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ supr. Ald. παρουσίᾳ—κοινωνίᾳ—προσγενομένῃ, which does not lessen the difficulty unless it might be further amended thus: ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἐκεῖνο τὸ καλὸν εἴτε παρουσίᾳ, εἴτε κοινωνίᾳ εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενόμενον. Wyttenbach, followed by Stallbaum, would read προσαγορευομένη, of which he supports the admission and propriety by many quotations, and so explains the passage; *nihil aliud reddere illud pulchrum, nisi ipsius pulchritudinis sive præsentia sive communio sive quocunque alio nomine appellatur.* But nearly all the editions agree in προσγενομένη, which Ficinus refers to παρουσία and κοινωνία supr.

Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι.] Socrates says that he does not yet insist upon establishing the manner or degree in which things are connected with their intelligible forms. Aristot. Met. i. 6. p. 272. τὴν μέντοί γε μίθεξιν,—ἥτις ἂν

τούτου ἐχόμενος ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἄν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά. ἦ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ; Δοκεῖ. Καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω μείζω, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω; Ναί. Οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρ' ἂν ἀποδέχοιο, εἴ τίς τινα φαίη ἕτερον ἑτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο ἂν ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μὲν μεῖζον πᾶν ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μεῖζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἔλαττον ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτό ἔλαττον, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβούμενος, οἶμαι, μή τις σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζονά τινα φῇς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἔλαττον, ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρᾷ οὔσῃ τὸν μείζω μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τινὶ μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι. ἢ οὐκ

εἴη, τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφεῖσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν. It may be deduced, as Stallbaum observes, from hence, that Plato had not as yet brought his Parmenides to light, in which this subject is argued at large.

Καὶ τούτου ἐχόμενος—οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν.] *And holding firmly by this, I think that I shall never fall.*

Μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα.] Cf. in Parmenid. c. 10. a med. δοκεῖ σοι—εἶναι εἶδη ἄττα ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, οἷον ὁμοιότητος μὲν μεταλαβόντα ὅμοια, μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, κάλλους δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι.

Οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρα ἂν ἀποδέχοιο.] *Neither indeed would you approve,* or *admit of it.*—Τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζω, *a head taller;* the dative expressing usually the relation of the measure, degree, &c. with the comparative. Matthiæ Gr. s. 400. 8.

Ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο.] Socrates objects to the generally received expression as supr. *taller* or *greater by the head,* upon the grounds of its reducing to matter and figure that essence, by the presence or participation of which, that to which the quality was attributed might really be considered what it was. For instance, to say of one man that he was greater than one, and smaller than another, by the head, would seem as well to imply that the head was the cause at the same time of a thing being greater and smaller, as also that by reason of the head, which is but a small part of the body, that which is greater becomes what it is. But one should rather assert that everything which was greater than another was so by means and on account of nothing else than magnitude itself, and likewise that which was smaller was so by means and on account of parvitude itself. So with two numbers ten and eight, and the cubit and two cubits infr.

Μή τις σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ.] *Lest any arguments of a contrary tendency should oppose you,* i. e. should be objected by any against you.

Τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι.] Τέρας, in

ἂν φοβοῖο ταῦτα; Καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας, Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυεῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος; καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μεῖζον εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ που φόβος. Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. Τί δαί; ἑνὶ ἑνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν προσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῴης ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου, οὗ ἂν μετάσχῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἓν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέ-

dialectics, is equivalent to τὸ παράδοξον, ἄτοπον, ἀδύνατον. Cf. in Menon. p. 21. B. καὶ τοὶ τέρας λέγεις. Parmenid. p. 55. E. εἰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια τὶς ἀπέφαινεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα, ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν.

Τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δ. γ.] See supr. c. 45. sqq.

Καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῴης.] So of the authoritative tone of the philosophers, Plutarch de Stoicis, t. ii. p. 1058. D. ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς βοῶν μέγα καὶ κεκραγὼς, ἐγὼ μόνος εἰμὶ βασιλεὺς—1169. D. μέγα βοῶντες, ὡς ἔν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν.

Μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου.] h. e. Τῆς ἰδίας ἑκάστου; referring to the μίθεξις or communion, by which individuals are made to participate in the one, indivisible and immutable εἶδος. That such should be its characteristics, however numerous the individuals with which it is communicated, and that it is not separated from itself while it is observable in each individual of its peculiar class, at the same time that it is known to exist prior to and independently of any, appears obvious from a happy illustration with which Socrates is made to answer the doubts of Parmenides on the point; Parmenid. c. 10.; Πότερον οὖν (says Parmenides) δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν, ἓν ὄν; ἢ πῶς; Τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτην, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ἓν εἶναι; Ἓν ἄρα ὂν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη. Οὐκ ἂν, εἰ γε, φάναι, οἷον ἡ ἡμέρα μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὐτῆς χωρίς ἐστιν,—εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταὐτὸν εἴη.—No truly, Socrates replies, the εἶδος is not capable of division or change; for, since a day being one and the same, is in many places at the same time, and is not on this account the more divided and distinct from itself, so every εἶδος exists in individuals, one and the same whole. Everything, therefore, that is beautiful, excellent, and just, is stamped with and known by its peculiar character; and that character is the idea or intelligible form of beauty, goodness, and justice, identical, impartible, and eternal. Upon the construction as supr. see Matthiæ Gr. s. 565. 2.

Τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν.] i. e. *Numeri binarii per se spectati* μετάσχεσιν. STALL.—the participation in the

σεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐφ᾽ ἧς ἂν χαίρειν παρεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν; εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐφ᾽ ἧς ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο, εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ; ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥ τις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο ὥς περ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς δια-

elementary principle of equals (ἀρτίοι), duality, whence things are made and said to be *two*, as infr., καὶ μονάδος, &c. the participation in the elementary principle of unequals (περιττοί), unity, by which anything is made and said to be *one*.

Τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας] i. e. Ποικίλας λαλιὰς καὶ πανουργίας. — Hesych. interpr.

Δεδιὼς ἂν τὸ λεγομένον τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιάν.] *In dread, as the proverb says, of your own shadow.* Schol. in loc. p. 12. Τὴν αὐτοῦ σκιὰν δέδοικεν· Ἐπὶ τῶν σφόδρα δειλοτάτων· μέμνηται ταύτης Ἀριστοφάνης Βαβυλωνίοις. Upon τὸ λεγομένον, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 571.

Ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς.] i. e. *Clinging firmly to that security which the principle affords.* But it is to be observed that the expression ἔχεσθαί τινος is capable of two distinct acceptations, the one, as supr., *to cling to*, or *depend upon*, and the other, *to assail* or *bear down upon any one* or *thing*; whence infr.; εἴ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, *if any one should attack this self-same principle*, &c. It is not often, however, that a verb is to be met with in two different senses in the same period.—Ὑποθέσεως, the ὑπόθεσις was this, εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα supr., of which the τὸ ἀσφαλὲς, *security* or *certainty* was, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλὰ καὶ μεγέθει τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα, &c. supr. Upon the construction ἐφ᾽ ἧς ἂν .... ἕως ἂν τὰ—σκέψαιο, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 522. s.

Ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο.] This whole passage, it is to be remarked, is in accordance with the usual system of dialectics. He who opposes the original thesis or principle (αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο,) can do so in two ways. First, he may show that its deductions involve a contradiction, i. e. ὅτι τὰ ὁρμηθέντα ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης διαφωνεῖ: in which case χαίρειν ἐφ᾽ ἧς ἄν, you would take leave of him, as it were, and make him no answer until you had considered whether the consequences attributed to your principle mutually coincided or disagreed: secondly, he might contend for the truth of a principle opposite to your own, upon which αὐτῆς ἐκείνης δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, i. e. it would be necessary to advance the reasons upon which your principle was founded, which you should do by so enlarging upon it, and sustaining it by one principle after another, whichever appears to be the best of the more universal, τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη, until you shall have arrived at a result which may justify the original proposition. Thus in pursuing this method you will avoid the errors of those contentious disputants, who, by confounding the principle and its consequences, are unable to arrive at the distinct knowledge of the truth. V. Wytt. in Præcept. Log. iii. 10. 1. By ἄνωθεν

λεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων, εἴ περ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν; ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ εἷς περὶ τούτου λόγος οὐδὲ φροντίς· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκῶντες ὅμως δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν· σὺ δ' εἴ περ εἶ τῶν φιλοσόφων, οἶμαι, ἂν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὅ τε Σιμμίας ἅμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.

ΕΧ. Νὴ Δία, ὦ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε· θαυμαστῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνος ταῦτα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἐδοξεν.

ΕΧ. Καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν.

§. 50. Ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα ξυνεχωρήθη, καὶ ὡμολογεῖτο εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν

supr. is to be understood *the more abstract* or *universal principle*; Cf. Aristot. Topic. i. 20. λέγω δὲ ἄνω μὲν, τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλον μᾶλλον (κατηγορίαν)· κάτω δὲ, τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος·—i. e. *but I call the category which is higher up, that which rises to the more universal, and that which is lower down, that which descends to the more particular.* Plutarch. Defect. Orac. p. 248. E. τῶν ἀνωτάτω ἀρχῶν, λέγω δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος.—Εἴ σοι—ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ,—*an, te judice, invicem consentiant an dissentiant.* WYTT. Cf. Theætet. p. 119. E. πότερον ἡμῖν (*in our judgment*) αὐτὰ ἀλλήλοις ξυμφωνεῖ.

§. 50. Εἶναι τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν.] i. e. *That every idea* (or intelligible form,) *was something, self-existent, and that other things,* τἄλλα, (i. e. distinct from these ideas, submitted to the senses), *participated in the former so as to receive their name*; as, for instance, *true* includes the idea of *truth, good* of *goodness, beautiful* of *beauty, greatness* of *great*, from which they are severally so called. Cf. Parmenid. p. 140. C. δοκεῖ σοι εἴδη εἶναι ἄττα, ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν. οἷον ὁμοιότητος μὲν μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια, &c. — Parmenid. c. 13. τὰ εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει· τά τε ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι, καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα.—where as supr. τὰ ἄλλα, elsewhere called also τὰ ἕτερα is to be understood of the things submitted to the senses. Cf. supr. c. 10. a med. τι εἶναι δίκαιον sqq. c. 20. init. οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο, ὃ ἔστι. It is to be observed that εἶδος and ἰδέα are used indifferently in this dialogue, as in the Parmenides which contains the whole substance of the system. Parmenid. p. 56. F. Οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιῶνδε ἓν ἕκαστον εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι· ὅταν πολλ' ἄττα μεγάλα δοξῇ σοι εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα αὕτη εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἓν τὸ μέγα ἡγῇ εἶναι· p. 57. D. F. Οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γιγνώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν·—Ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐστι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ

καὶ τούτων τἆλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἠρῶτα, Εἰ δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα οὕτω λέγεις, ἆρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῇς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότ εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφότερα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα; Ἔγωγε. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν; οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων· οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος. Ἀληθῆ. Οὐδέ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίου σμικρότητα; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπω-

καλὸν ὅ ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν· καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὔσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν. H. τοιαῦτα—καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἴδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων. p. 58. A.—εἰ δή γε τις. ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐ μὴ ἐάσῃ εἴδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ δὴ νῦν καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδὲ ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξει, μὴ ἓν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι. Aristot. Metaph. xii. 4. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδεῶν πρῶτον αὐτὴν τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν δόξαν ἐπισκεπτέον—ὡς ὑπέλαβον ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἱ πρῶτοι τὰς ἰδέας φήσαντες εἶναι· συνέβη δὲ ἡ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν δόξα τοῖς εἰποῦσι διὰ τὸ πεισθῆναι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας τοῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις λόγοις, ὡς ἁπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ῥεόντων. Plotin. Enn. i. vi. 8. p. 58. A. ἥξει γὰρ πρῶτον ἀναβαίνων ἐπὶ τὸν νοῦν· κἀκεῖ πάντα εἴσεται καλὰ τὰ εἴδη, καὶ φήσει τὸ κάλλος τοῦτο εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας. Enn. iii. ix. 1. p. 356. A. Νοῦς φησὶν ὁρᾷ ἐνούσας ἰδέας ἐν τῷ ὃ ἐστι ζῶον· —οὐκοῦν φησὶν ἤδη εἶναι τὰ εἴδη πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ. They are sometimes, however, mentioned as distinct, and ἰδέα is understood as the immaterial essence or exemplar, εἶδος the form of the external object which is modelled after the preceding. Cf. Senec. Epist. 58. p. 150. Olympiod. in Phæd. Cod. iii. p. 35. ὅτι ἐστὶ τὰ εἴδη· οὔτε φημὶ αἱ ἰδέαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴδη—where ἰδέαι has the same sense as supr., and εἴδη is applied to mental perceptions.

Ἴσχειν.] Mœris: Ἴσχειν, Ἀττικῶς· ἔχειν, Ἑλληνικῶς.

Οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν.] i. e. That Simmias did not in reality exceed Socrates, as he was said to do, for Simmias was not so adapted by nature as because of his being Simmias to exceed Socrates, but by reason of the magnitude which he had as compared with the parvitude of Socrates. The object of this is to show, that it is only relatively speaking that the same thing can be said to be small and great. Simmias was small, compared to Phædo, but his parvitude could not admit its contrary, the magnitude of the latter; neither could his magnitude admit of the relative parvitude of Socrates; therefore, in reality, the contraries, magnitude and parvitude, did not and could not meet together in Simmias.—The application of this will appear subsequently.

Πρὸς.] *In comparison with.*

νυμίαν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὢν ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπερέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον. Καὶ ἅμα μειδιάσας, Ἔοικα, ἔφη, καὶ ξυγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχει γέ που ὡς λέγω. Ξυνέφη. Λέγω δὲ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαί σοι ὅ περ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον

Ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει.] i. e. Ὀνομάζεται εἶναι. Cf. Herodot. ii. 44. ἱρὸν Ἡρακλέος, ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχοντος Θασίου εἶναι.

Τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν.] i. e. *Surpassing the parvitude of the one by his magnitude, but yielding to the other a magnitude which surpasses his own parvitude;* V. Cousin arranges and explains the passage correctly; Ὑπερέχων τοῦ μὲν (κατὰ) τὴν σμικρότητα τῷ ὑπερέχειν μεγέθει, *surpassant l'un dans sa petitesse, par la superiorite de sa grandeur,* καὶ παρέχων τῷ δὲ, *et laissant à l'autre, reconnaissant en lui, lui accordant parce qu'il ne peut pas ne pas lui accorder* τὸ μεγέθος ὑπερέχον τῆς σμικρότητος, *une grandeur qui surpasse sa petitesse.* Heindorf and Wyttenbach propose emendations of this passage as corrupt, which, however, from the interpretation as supr. appear unnecessary; the one would read τοῦ μὲν τὴν σμικρότητα τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχων, τοῦ δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπεροχήν, *alterius parvitatem magnitudine* (sua) *superans, alterius vero magnitudini parvitatem* (suam) *superandam præbens:* the other remodels the whole; τῷ μὲν, τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν, τὴν σμικρότητα παρέχων. τῷ δὲ τὸ μεγέθος, τῆς σμικρότητος ὑπερέχον· i. e. *illi quidem, quod magnitudine eum superat, parvitatem præbens huic autem magnitudinem, quæ parvitatem superat.*

Ξυγγραφικῶς.] i. e. *To speak with the accuracy of a written contract;* owing to the minute attention with which he discussed the subject in its several details. Fischer interprets the term *historicorum more,* and Wyttenbach, *scriptorum ratione,* both incorrectly.

Λέγω δὲ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα, βουλόμενος.] i. e. Ὅτι βουλομαι. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 505. 2.

Ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον, κ.τ.λ.] *For it appears to me not only that magnitude itself* (the abstract idea) *is never disposed to be at the same time great and small, but that the magnitude also in ourselves* (the concrete, in a sensible object) *never admits the small nor is disposed to be surpassed, but one of the two cases occurs, either that it retires and withdraws upon the approach of its contrary, the small, or ceases to exist when it has actually come, but it is not disposed, abiding and admitting parvitude, to be anything else than what it was before;* Socrates means now to say that in reality neither absolute nor relative magnitude and parvitude could exist together at the same time, for magnitude either withdrew as parvitude advanced, or completely disappeared when it had arrived, but it never was disposed by awaiting and admitting parvitude to become different from what it was before, which in such a case it should be, as it might then be as well affirmed to be parvitude as magnitude, which never could occur, for the one being great, never endured (τετόλμηκε) to be the other, small.—Ὡς περ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος, κ. τ. λ.—Magnitude, Socrates had observed, is not disposed by the admission of an opposite quality to be different from what it was, but was actually and in truth determined to remain the same, in like manner as Socrates who had received and sustained parvitude, and still continuing the same, was the same small individual, and had not admitted magnitude with which its contrary could not evidently coexist. This passage, ὥς περ ἐγὼ—ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρός εἰμι. is introduced parenthetically as an illustration of the truth and justice of what precedes. Stallbaum explains ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμ. κ. τ. λ.; *Quum autem* τὸ μέγεθος τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν *sustinuit et in se recepit parvita-*

αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτ' ἐθέλειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τό σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυεῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν ὅταν αὐτῷ προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρόν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ ὅ περ ἦν, ὥς περ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὢν ὅς περ εἰμί, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρός εἰμι· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκε μέγα ὂν σμικρὸν εἶναι. ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔτι ὂν ὅ περ ἦν ἅμα τοὐναντίον γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεταί μοι.

§. 51. Καί τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὅς τις δ' ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι—Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνὶ λεγομένων ὡμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἔλαττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν τὴν κε-

tem, videtur tamen non aliud esse velle, quam quod erat antea ; which as well as the accompanying note is neither correct nor intelligible. Wyttenbach's interpretation is equally infelicitous; *alterum de duobus accidit: aut fugit et decedit veniente contrario, scilicet parvitate : aut quum venerit contrarium, perit expectans et suscipiens parvitatem, nec tamen aliud vult esse quam quod fuerat.* The conclusion to which Socrates intended to come was simply this; one might be said, when spoken of relatively, to possess at the same time the opposite qualities, i. e. the contraries, magnitude and parvitude, but they could not in reality coexist or be reciprocated in the concrete, any more than their ideas themselves could coexist, or be reciprocated in the abstract, so as to be indifferently affirmed of each other, that magnitude was parvitude or *vice versa.* The application of this argument, which is continued through the four preceding chapters, will be found at the close of c. 54. and in c. 55.

Οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα—] *Is neither disposed to become, nor to be great.*

§. 51. Ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις.] Cf. supr. c. 15. sqq.

Παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλήν.] *Having moved his head forward;* to hear more

φαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, Ἀνδρικῶς, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνόντων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα· αὐτὰ δ' ἐκεῖνα οὐκ ἄν ποτέ φαμεν ἐθελῆσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. Καὶ ἅμα βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν, Ἆρα μή που, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, καὶ σέ τι τούτων ἐτάραξεν ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν; Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτως ἔχω· καί τοι οὔ τι λέγω ὡς οὐ πολλά με ταράττει. Ξυνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἁπλῶς τοῦτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη.

distinctly, as the objection was probably made in a low voice and hesitatingly, as in the case of Simmias and Cebes supr. c. 35.—Οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς, *you do not, however, observe the distinction between what is advanced now and at that time, &c.*

Ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος.] Socrates, supr. c. 15., spoke of things which are capable of producing, receiving, and reciprocating their contraries, as for instance, in the case of anything becoming greater, it must have been formerly less, and *vice versa*. Or when anything was stronger or swifter, it must have been generated from weaker and slower, &c. But Socrates is now speaking, not of the πράγματα ἐναντία, which are so produced, but the αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον, the contrary itself, the contrary as an essence or intelligible form, which cannot become its own contrary, (e. gr. the ideas of the just, beautiful, and good, which, with their opposites, being severally immutable and eternal cannot be changed so as to reciprocate with each other, nor are they so dependent on each other as to be mutually produced,) neither in the concrete, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν, nor in the abstract, οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. Socrates was then speaking of those things which contain the contraries, (τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία), and which are called by the name of their several inherent contrary essences; but now he is speaking of those essences, by reason of the presence of which, (i. e. which being inherent or contained, ὧν ἐνόντων,) those things which were so called received their name; and these he asserts to be such as are incapable of being mutually produced.—Οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. It is to be observed that Plato did not consider these ideas as mere notions of things impressed upon the human mind; he held them, on the contrary, to be self-existent and perfectly distinct from those things which bore their name.

Οὐδ' αὖ—οὕτως ἔχω.] i. e. Οὐδ' αὖ τεταραγμένος εἰμί, in which allusion is made to c. 22. supr. sub. fin. καί τοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. Heindorf pro-

§. 52. Ἔτι δή μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα ξυνομολογήσεις. θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν; Ἔγωγε. Ἆρ' ὅ περ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἕτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν; Ναί. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ' οἶμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα γ' οὖσαν, δεξαμενην τὸ θερμόν, ὥς περ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἔτι ἔσεσθαι ὅ περ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ ὑπεξιέναι ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὅ περ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἔστιν ἄρ', ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ

poses οὐκ αὖ.—Καί τοι οὔ τι λέγω,—*although I by no means deny that there are many things which perplex me.* Ficinus appears to have read καὶ τοιοῦτο τι λέγω, ὡς οὐ πολλά με ταράττει.

§. 52. Ἔτι δή μοι καὶ τόδε.] Socrates proceeds to show that not only the actual contraries themselves, *αὐτὰ τὰ ἐναντια*, could not be reciprocated but that even those things, which though not of themselves, nor strictly contraries, yet inferred some contrariety, did not admit of a form contrary to what they had, but rather on the approach of such, retired and disappeared. Thus the number three, which does not seem to have any contrary, or anything opposed to itself, yet because it always contains the idea of inequality, i. e. is always odd, it never admits of equality, i. e. never can become even. And so with fire and heat; for though the fire itself is one thing, and heat, the contrary of cold, another, yet both are so closely connected that fire cannot receive cold so as to coexist with it, but must disappear on the approach of the latter. In like manner snow, which is always connected with cold, disappears on the approach of heat, with which it obviously cannot mix. This argument with its conclusions, as applied to the soul, is made available thus: the soul, into whatever body it enters, brings with it the principle of life; but since death is contrary to life, it follows that the soul cannot receive and admit a form contrary to that with which it is of necessity joined, (as the idea of inequality is inseparaby connected with the odd number three,) and which is called life. But whatever does not admit of death, is immortal, whence it follows that the soul is imperishable and immortal.

Ἀλλ' ἕτερον τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν.] The latter being the result or consequence of the former; fire being the essential principle of heat, as snow of cold.

Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ' οἶμαι δοκεῖ σοι—] i. e. *But this I think is evident to you, that snow, while it is snow, can never, having admitted heat, as we said before,* (supr. c. 50. a med.) *continue to be what it was, snow, and* (at the same time) *hot, but on the approach of heat it will either give way to it or utterly disappear.*

Ὑπεξιέναι.] Matthiæ Gr. s. 404. 1. 3. Εἶμι and its components have always a future signification in the Attic writers. Dawes, M. Crit. 82.

Ἔστιν ἄρ'—ὥστε.] *It happens, therefore, that,* &c.—Αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος.—Here Plato appears to make the inequality, τὸ περιττὸν, the genus or εἶδος, and the number three, which contains the

τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἀεὶ ὅταν περ ᾖ. ἔτι δ' ἐν τοῖσδε ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω. τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν ἀεί που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν, ὅ περ νῦν λέγομεν· ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ γε. Ἆρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐχ ὅ περ τὸ περιττόν, ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν ἀεί, διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι ὥστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ τριὰς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος· ἆρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς ὀνόματι ἀεὶ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὄντος οὐχ ὅ περ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτω πως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριὰς καὶ ἡ πεμπτὰς καὶ ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας, ὥστε οὐκ ὢν ὅ περ τὸ περιττὸν ἀεὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστὶ περιττός. καὶ αὖ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τέτταρα καὶ ἅπας ὁ ἕτερος αὖ στίχος τοῦ

inequality, the species or *μορφὴ*; from which he varies infr. c. 53., calling three, *ἰδέα*, and the inequality, *μορφήν*.

Τοῦ *αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος*.] i. e. That not only the genus itself at all times, but that something else which is not the genus, but retains its form (is its species) as long as it lasts, is always designated by the same name. For example, inequality must always be so called, but the numbers three, five, &c. which are not the same with inequality, yet, (besides their own proper and peculiar names,) as participating in and admitting inequality, are called also by the same name, unequal. That is, not only the *τὸ περιττὸν* has the name *τοῦ περιττοῦ*, but the *τριὰς, πεμπτὰς καὶ ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας*.

Μετὰ *τοῦ ἑαυτου ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο*.] *Along with its own name* (as *τριὰς, πεμπτὰς*, &c.) *to designate it by this*, sc. *τὸ περιττὸν*: because its nature is such as that it cannot become distinct from or independent of the idea of inequality.

Οὐχ *ὅπερ τῆς τριάδος*.] Οὐχ *οὗ περ τ. τ.* Bekk. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 473. b. Fischer considers *ὄντος οὐχ ὅπερ* as equivalent to *ἑτέρου*, as supr. *ἑτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν, καὶ ἑτερὸν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν*: and *τὸ περιττὸν*, he observes, to be applied to inequality, or odd numbers, because they appear to have something superfluous, over and above what is necessary. Theo. Smyrnæus M. II. c. 5. Καὶ *ἄρτιοι μὲν εἰσιν οἱ ἐπιδεχόμενοι τὴν εἰς ἴσα διαίρεσιν, ὡς ἡ δυὰς, ἡ τετράς· περισσοὶ δὲ οἱ εἰς ἄνισα διαιρούμενοι, οἷον ὁ ε, ὁ ζ*.

Ὁ *ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας*.] *The entire half of number*: number being divided, as it were, into two equal parts, the one consisting of odd, and the other of even numbers, consequently the former formed one-half. Upon the adj. *ἥμισυς* with a substantive in the gen. see Matthiæ Gr. s. 442. 2.

Στίχος.] *Series*; the odd numbers being placed in one line, and the even in a parallel one. Cf. Plutarch, de Anim. Creat. in Tim. p. 1022. D. *ὁ γὰρ Θεό-*

ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὢν ὅ περ τὸ ἄρτιον, ὅμως ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἄρτιός ἐστιν ἀεί. ξυγχωρεῖς ἢ οὔ; Πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη. Ὁ τοίνυν, ἔφη, βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, ἄθρει. ἔστι δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἄλληλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντα ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει ἀεὶ τἀναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ἰδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσῃ ἐναντία ᾖ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἤτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολεῖσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομεῖναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Οὐδὲ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐναντίον γ' ἐστὶ δυὰς τριάδι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἴδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

§. 53. Βούλει οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν οἷοί τε ὦμεν, ὁρισώμεθα ὁποῖα ταῦτ' ἐστίν; Πάνυ γε. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, τάδη εἴη ἄν, ἃ ὅ τι ἂν κατάσχῃ, μὴ

δωρος, οὐχ ὡς ἐκεῖνοι, δύο στίχους ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μιᾶς εὐθείας ἐφεξῆς τούς τε διπλασίους ἐκτάττων καὶ τοὺς τριπλασίους.

Ὅσα οὐκ ὄντα—ἔχει ἀεὶ τἀναντία.] Socrates says that this was what he was concerned to show; not only that contraries themselves did not receive their contraries, but that also as many things, as without being mutually contrary, yet contain contraries, (three, for instance, not being the contrary of two, yet containing as an odd number the inequality τὸ περιττόν, which is the contrary of the equality τὸ ἄρτιον, contained in the even number two,) neither did these appear to receive the idea which is the contrary of that which they already contain, but on its approaching, either disappear or recede.

Ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα.] Sc. φαίνεται. Cf. supr. c. 29. οἱ ἀφικομένῃ ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ, κ. τ. λ.

Οὐδὲ μήν—ἐναντίον γ' ἐστὶ δυὰς τριάδι.] Hence it appears that the τριὰς is not to be reckoned amongst the εἴδη τὰ ἐναντία, for if it were a contrary itself, the contrary to it should be the δυάς, which is not and could not be the case.—Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα τὰ ἐναντία,—*but some other things also do not await the approach of those which are really contraries.* Cf. supr. c. 52. Ἔστιν ἄρ' — περὶ ἕνια τῶν τοιούτων, κ. τ. λ.

§. 53. Ἆρ' οὖν—τάδε εἴη—] *Would they then be such as to compel whatever they occupied, not only itself to retain the idea* (or form) *of itself, but always of something which is itself a contrary:* for example the τριὰς, whatever it may have occupied or become inherent in, it not only forces that to be three, but also to contain within it the notion of that which is of itself a contrary, the περιττόν. That this is the sense of the passage is evident from its subsequent explanation by Socrates; οἶσθα γὰρ δή που ὅτι ἃ ἂν ἡ τῶν τριῶν, κ. τ. λ. whence the reading of Heindorf has

μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ἰδέαν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου ἀεὶ αὐτοῦ τινός; Πῶς λέγεις; Ὡς περ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἶσθα γὰρ δή που ὅτι ἃ ἂν ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα κατάσχῃ, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς; Πάνυ γε. Ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δή, φαμέν, ἡ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνῃ τῇ μορφῇ ἥ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζηται, οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἔλθοι. Οὐ γάρ. Εἰργάζετό δέ γε ἡ περιττή; Ναί. Ἐναντία δὲ ταύτῃ ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου; Ναί. Ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἥξει; Οὐ δῆτα. Ἄμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία; Ἄμοιρα. Ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἡ τριάς; Ναί. Ὃ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὁρίσασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὅμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ [τὸ ἐναντίον], οἷον νῦν ἡ τριὰς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὖσα ἐναντία οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον αὐτῷ ἀεὶ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυὰς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα, ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ εἰ οὕτως ὁρίζει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ ἐφ' ὅ τι ἂν αὐτὸ ἴῃ,

been selected as supr. Bekker reads *ἐναντίου ἀεὶ αὐτῶ τινός*, so likewise Stallbaum, who encloses *αὐτῶ* in brackets as dubious. Ficinus appears to have read *ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου δεῖ αὐτῷ τινος*, but none of the proposed emendations, which are not a few, afford the easy and obvious interpretation supplied by the text as it stands.

Ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον.] *To such, we say now, the idea contrary to the form which effected this, can never at all arrive:* i. e. as infr. *Ἐπὶ τὰ τρία—ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἥξει.*—Τῇ *μορφῇ*; see supr. c. 52. *ἐκείνου μορφὴν*—Τοῦτο, sc. *τὸ περιττὸν εἶναι.*

Ἡ περιττή.] Sc. *μορφή*, i. q. *ἡ τοῦ περιττοῦ ἰδέα* s. *μορφή*. HEIND.

Ὃ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὁρίσασθαι.] *That therefore which I proposed to determine—see now if you determine thus;* ἀλλ' *ὅρα, δὴ, εἰ οὕτως ὁρίζει, κ. τ. λ.*, the apodosis commencing with ἀλλ' *ὅρα*, which takes up the sentence interrupted by the parenthesis *οἷον νῦν ἡ τριὰς—ἄλλα πάμπολλα.*

Τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον αὐτῷ.] Αὐτῷ sc. *τῷ ἀρτίῳ*, i. e. the *τριὰς* or ternary always brings against the even, *ἀρτίον*, its contrary, the odd, *περιττὸν*. The verb *ἐπιφέρει* supr., also *φεύγειν, ὑπεκχωρεῖν, προσιέναι, προσελθεῖν, δέξασθαι* and *ὑπομεῖναι*, which are in frequent use through the course of this argument, are obviously peculiar to military tactics.

Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο.] i. e. *But that also which brings any contrary against whatever it approaches, can never at any time receive the contrary of that which is so brought;* as the *τριὰς* which brings to whatever it approaches, the *περιττὸν*, (which is of itself *ἐναντίον τι*) does not receive the *ἄρτιον* which is the contrary *τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου* sc. *τοῦ περιττοῦ*. Olympiod.—*τοῦ ἐπιφερόμενου, τοῦτ' ἔστι, του συμπεφυκότος αὐτῷ εἴδους.* Gottleber calls *τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον* the *attribute* of anything, *τὸ συμβαῖνον τῷ πράγματι.* V. Mor. ad

αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι. Πάλιν δὲ ἀναμιμνήσκου· οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ ἐναντίον, ὅμως δὲ τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέξεται· οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἥμισυ, τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴ περ ἔπει τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως. Πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἕπομαι.

§. 54. Πάλιν δή μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μή μοι ᾧ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλ' ἄλλῳ, μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὲ παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην

Longin. p. 62.

Αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον.] This is merely a repetition of the nominative ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι preced.; a familiar usage with Greek and Latin writers.

Οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον.] *It would be profitable.* Cf. in Crit. c. 16. ἄμεινον εἶναι. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 457. p. 757.

Τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου.] Sc. ἰδέαν.—Οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα—τὸ διπλάσιον, *nor ten, the double of five, &c.*—Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ ἐναντίον; *this double, which is itself contrary to something else,* (than the περιττόν,) *will not nevertheless receive,* &c. i. e. the number ten not being the contrary of the genus περιττόν, but of its species, the number five, (the contrary of a double being its half, and everything having but one direct contrary,) still does not receive the περιττόν, that is, never can become an odd number, because it contains the idea of equality, which is inseparable from the doubling of numbers, as supr. So with the sesquialter or three halves, the half, and the third, which do not receive the idea of the whole, which is still not the contrary of any of them, (the contrary of half being the double, of a third the triple, &c., and the direct contrary of *whole* being *part,*) but because they include the general idea of *fraction,* which is contrary to the idea of *integer*—Οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον [the passage being so arranged by Stallbaum, with a view to unfolding its sense,] οὐδὲ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἥμισυ καὶ τριτημόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα (δέχεται) τὴν τοῦ ὅλου.

§. 54. Μὴ μοι ᾧ ἂν ἐρωτῶ—] Socrates says, do not answer me by a repetition of the word which I use in the question, but with a different one, imitating me, or following my practice. As when I ask of you whence a body becomes hot? do not say from heat, but from fire; or why a body is diseased? do not say from sickness, but from fever, &c.—Socrates wishes to be answered so as that the species of the genus, to which the subject of this inquiry belonged, should be named, not the genus itself.—STALL.

Λέγω δὲ παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον.] The reason why Socrates required to be so answered was, because he saw and understood (ὁρῶν) from what was immediately then under discussion (ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων, c. 53.) that besides that answer which, as he had formerly shown, (παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, V. c. 49. supr. διισχυρίζομαι—ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά, κ. τ. λ.) could be justly and safely given, (τὴν ἀσφάλειαν,) there could be another given of equal

ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται, θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρῃ, ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται, νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ᾧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ' ᾧ ἂν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένηται, περιττὸς ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οἶσθ' ὅ τι βούλομαι. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἱκανῶς, ἔφη. Ἀποκρίνου δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι, ζῶν ἔσται; Ὧι ἂν ψυχή, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅ τι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχῃ, ἀεὶ ἥκει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωήν; Ἥκει μέντοι, ἔφη. Πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωῇ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν; Ἔστιν, ἔφη. Τί; Θάνατος. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεί, οὐ μή ποτε δέξηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὡμολόγηται; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα, ὁ Κέβης.

§. 55. Τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν τί νῦν δὴ ὠνομάζομεν; Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχηται; Ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. Εἶεν· ὃ δ' ἂν θάνατον

certainty and truth (ἄλλην ἀσφάλειαν). Fischer.

Ὧι ἂν τι ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγίνηται.] Stephens proposes, ᾧ ἂν τί σώματι, or ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί, as infr. So Koehler and Gottleber. Zeunius,—τί ἂν σώματι ἐγγένηται, ᾧ θερμὸν ἔσται. Wyttenbach follows Stephens as supr. Tub. Ald. and Bass. ὃ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι, and seq. ὅτι ὃ ἂν θερμότης, and ὅτι ὃ ἂν πῦρ. Almost all the editions are at variance on this passage, from which however Heindorf, approved by Stallbaum, has made the happiest effort at an intelligible reading and obvious sense: ὅταν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι,—ὅταν θερμότης, and ὅτι ὅταν πῦρ. The remaining portion of the passage requires no emendation.

Ὅ τι βούλομαι.] *What I mean.*

Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει.] h. e. Τὸ ἐναντίον τούτου ὃ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει.

§. 55. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον — μουσικὸν.] *The just—and the graceful.* Cf. Apol. de Doctrin. Plat. i. p. 10. Elmenh. "fieretque (homo) totus ipse modulatus ac musicus." Fischer explains μουσικὸν, *modulatum, concinnum*, and consequently ἄμουσον, *immodulatum, inconcinnum.*

Ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον.] More fully, τὸ μὲν ἄμουσον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον: but μὲν is sometimes understood when δὲ, not preceded by it, is expressed in the latter clause or member of a sentence. So *quidem* appears to be omitted in "Libertas, quæ sera tamen respexit inertem," Virg. Eclog. i. 28; and "matura res erat, tergiversantur tamen," Liv. ii. 45. Seag. Bos', Gr. Ell. p. 234. Viger, p. 191.

μὴ δέχηται, τί καλοῦμεν; Ἀθάνατον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; Οὔ. Ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἡ ψυχή; Ἀθάνατον. Εἶεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν; ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνωλέθρῳ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἀνώλεθρα ἂν ἦν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπαγάγοι, ὑπεξῄει ἂν ἡ χιὼν οὖσα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε, οὐδ' αὖ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατ' ἂν τὴν θερμότητα. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ὡς δ' αὕτως, οἶμαι, κἂν εἰ τὸ ἄψυκτον ἀνώλεθρον ἦν, ὁπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπίοι, οὔ ποτ' ἂν ἀπεσβέννυτο οὐδ' ἀπώλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἂν ἀπελθὸν ᾤχετο. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὧδε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου εἰπεῖν; εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ, ὅταν θάνα-

Τί καλοῦμεν.] *By what name do we call;* as supr. τί νῦν δὴ ὠνομάζομεν.

Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχή, κ. τ. λ.] Olympiod. Ἡ ἀπόδειξις πρόεισιν ἐκ τῶν ὑποθέσεων τοιᾶδε συλλογισμῷ. ἡ ψυχὴ ᾧ ἂν παρῇ ζωὴν τούτῳ ἐπιφέρει. πᾶν δὲ ὃ ἐπιφέρει τι, ἄδεκτόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐναντίου αὐτῷ. ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἄδεκτός ἐστι τοῦ ἐναντίου ᾧ ἐπιφέρει. τὸ ἐναντίον ἐστὶν οὗ ἐπιφέρει, θάνατος. ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἄδεκτος θανάτου.

Ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία.] See Apol. Socr. c. 12. init. in Criton. c. 14.

Ἄθερμον.] Aug. Tub. and Stob. τὸ θερμόν, which is obviously incorrect. Stephens omits ἄθερμον, in Thes. Gr. L., which Wyttenbach observes should rather be ἀθέρμαντον supr. Heindorf remarks, that in all probability the word has only been used by Plato, and in this passage alone: ἀνάρτιον as used for περιττόν supr. he considers almost equally rare.

Ὁπότε τις—ἐπαγάγοι—ὑπεξῄει ἄν.] Even of actions still present, the aorist is sometimes used, if, rapidly passing, they are limited to a single point of time; (Plat. Phæd. p. 106. A. Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὁπότε τις, κ. τ. λ., as supr.) where ὑπεξῄει must be used in the sense of the aorists ἀπώλετο and ἐδέξατο seq. because the yielding of the unmelted snow can only be momentary, like the being destroyed and the reception of warmth. So in Gorg. p. 447. E. and the passages there produced by Heindorf, c. 3. p. 6. the aorist is used, not of a continued or repeated, but single act. Soph. Ant. 755. εἰ μὴ πατὴρ ἦσθ,' εἶπον ἄν (as an act) σ' οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν. Matthiæ Gr. s. 508. c.

Εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον, κ. τ. λ.] Ἀθάνατον is here applied to that, ὃ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται: ἀνώλεθρον to that which on the approach of its contrary οὐκ ἀπόλλυται. But they are generally used as synonyms, the one signifying *immortal*, and the other *imperishable*, so, however, as that the latter is rather more general in its acceptation than the former, death being one of the modes of corruption or decay. So Aristotle distinguishes between ἀθάνατον and ἄφθαρτον, the latter of which is

τος ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν ἴῃ, ἀπόλλυσθαι· θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὐδ᾽ ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα, ὥς περ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται, ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδέ γ᾽ αὖ τὸ περιττόν, οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὐδέ γε ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης. Ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει, φαίη ἄν τις, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου, ὥς περ ὡμολόγηται, ἀπολλυμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι; τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὰ τρία οἴχεται ἀπιόντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα. ἦ οὔ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἂν δέοι λόγου. Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἕνεκα· σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν τι

equivalent to *ἀνώλεθρον* supr. Topic. vi. p. 694. edit. Pac. t. i. p. 376. ed. Sylb. The argument as supr., is thus summed up by Albinus, Doctr. Plat. c. xxv. p. 370. *Τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ἀποφαίνει τοῦτον ἐπιὼν τὸν τρόπον· ἡ ψυχὴ ὅτῳ ἂν προσγένηται ἐπιφέρει τούτῳ τὸ ζῆν, ὡς σύμφυτον ὑπάρχον ἑαυτῇ· τὸ δὲ ἐπιφέρον τινὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀνεπίδεκτόν ἐστι θανάτου· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον, ἀθάνατον· εἰ δὲ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἂν εἴη· ἀσώματος γάρ ἐστιν οὐσία, ἀμετάβλητος κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ νοητή, καὶ ἀειδὴς καὶ μονοειδής· οὐκοῦν ἀσύνθετος, ἀδιάλυτος, ἀσκέδαστος.*

Ἀλλά τί κωλύει.] But, says an objector, what is there to prevent this,—granting that the odd cannot become the even on the accession of the even, as had been already conceded—that on the annihilation of the odd (*ἀπολλυμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ*) the even should succeed in its stead (*ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνου*)? That is, that the soul, while it is a soul, cannot receive death, but on the approach of death it ceases to be what it is. To this Socrates says, that he cannot make any answer on the grounds of the odd being imperishable, since its not being so did not interfere with the main of the argument which regarded the *ἀθάνατον*. If, however, it were conceded to be so, he might easily contend for the disappearance merely (that being one of the alternatives mentioned supr. c. 50. sub. fin., *ἢ φεύγειν—ἢ ἀπολωλέναι.*) of the odd and its species, three; and so with fire, heat, &c. Therefore with regard to the immortal, if it was agreed that it was also imperishable, the soul then, in addition to its being immortal, (*πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι,*) should be incorruptible likewise. But if this was not agreed to, some other argument would be required in proof, for which, however, there was no necessity, since nothing could be imperishable if that which was immortal and eternal in its nature should yet be subject to decay.

Διαμάχεσθαι.] *To contend with, to argue against.*

Τούτου γε ἕνεκα.] *As far as regards this.*

ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ τό γε ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀίδιον φθορὰν δέξεται.

§. 56. Ὁ δέ γε θεός, οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστι, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθείη μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νὴ Δί', ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, παρὰ θεῶν. Ὁπότε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι ψυχή, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἴη; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ μὲν θνητόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει, τὸ δ' ἀθάνατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἴχεται ἀπιόν, ὑπεκχωρῆσαν τῷ θανάτῳ. Φαίνεται. Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν Ἅιδου. Οὔκουν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πῃ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' εἰ δή τι Σιμμίας ὅδε ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγῆσαι, ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὅν τιν' ἄν τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἤ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ἔτι ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσί, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. Οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη,

§. 56. Τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος.] Sc. ἡ ζωὴ αὐτή.

Παντὸς μᾶλλον.] *Unquestionably, beyond all doubt.*

Ἀλλὰ μήν ἦ δ' ὃς, κ. τ. λ.] Simmias acknowledges that the importance and greatness of the subject, being such as almost to overpower the natural weakness of man, occasion the uncertainty and distrust with which the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is received. Consequently, he advises his friends to return again and again to the principles at first laid down, from the minute, patient, and unprejudiced investigation of which, if they appear at all worthy of credit, the admission of the doctrine will naturally follow as an obvious and undeniable truth.

Τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων.] *Disparaging human infirmity;—humanam imbecillitatem tantæ rationum magnitudini perspiciendæ imparem existimans.* WYTT.

Οὐ μόνον γ' ἔφη—ἀλλὰ ταῦτα τε.] After *οὐ μόνον* supply *ἀπιστίαν σε δεῖ*

ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις, καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσίν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστα ἀνθρώπῳ ἑπακολουθῆσαι· κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

§. 57. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ', ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθῆναι, ὅτι εἴ περ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγή, ἕρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμα ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὖσα, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ

ἔχειν περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. Cf. in Menon. p. 71. B. ταῦτα περὶ σοῦ καὶ οἵκαδε ἀπαγγέλωμεν. ΣΩΚΡ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι οὐδ' ἄλλῳ πω ἐνέτυχον εἰδότι. de Legg. vi. p. 752. A. ΚΛ. Ἄριστ' εἰρηκας ὦ ξένε. ΑΘ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ δράσω κατὰ δύναμιν οὕτω.

Καὶ εἰ πισταὶ—ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 447. 3. *b.*

§. 57. Οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *Not for the sake of this period only, during which that is which we call life;* ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν being equivalent to ἐν ᾧ τὸ καλούμενον ζῆν ἐστι. Cf. Hom. Iliad. λ'. 757. καὶ Ἀλεισίον ἔνθα κολώνη Κίκληται. Soph. Trach. 648. Ἔνθ' Ἑλλάνων ἀγοραὶ Πυλάτιδες καλέονται. Matthiæ Gr. s. 472. 4. *Obs.*

Εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει.] Εἰ is not unfrequently accompanied by the future indic., when the opt. with ἄν follows in the apodosis. Matthiæ Gr. s. 524. Obs 2. 1.

Ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγή.] *If death were a deliverance from every thing;* the soul perishing along with the body. The theme of ἀπαλλαγή is ἀπαλλάττεσθαι pass. or mid. not ἀπαλλάττειν.—Ἕρμαιον, Tim. Plat. Lex. εὕρεμα· ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν ἕθει λέγομένου, Κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς. Schol. interpr. τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον κέρδος· ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς τιθεμένων ἀπαρχῶν, ἃς οἱ ὁδοιπόροι κατεσθίουσι. ταύτας δὲ τῷ Ἑρμῇ ἀφιεροῦσιν ὡς ὄντι καὶ τούτῳ ἐνὶ τῶν ἐνοδίων θεῶν.

Τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς.] Τροφὴ and παιδεία are frequently so joined, and indifferently used for each other; but where there is any distinction intended, the former is applied to the soul, the latter to the body, and τροφὴ is then used metaphorically of that knowledge by which, as its proper nu-

καὶ λέγεται μέγιστα ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἑκάστου δαί-

triment, the soul is sustained. To these two is added ἀγωγή, *education* or *discipline*.

Λέγεται δὲ οὕτως.] Having fully established the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, Socrates proceeds in the second part of the dialogue to the consideration of its future state, as an imperishable and incorruptible essence.—This subject is discussed also in the Gorgias, p. 512. sqq. de Repub. x. p. 614. ed. Steph. which may be advantageously compared with the above, as also in Phædr. c. 56. where the condition of the soul is described previous to its descent into the body. Upon this important portion of the heathen mythology it is to be observed, that Socrates is not made to express himself as convinced of the absolute truth and certainty of the things he describes. Plato, as Stallbaum justly remarks, in his frequent references to mythics, does not appear to have introduced them for ornament merely, although the 'poet of philosophers' was by no means unmindful of this, but it would seem that he had some more useful and graver object in view. For in his discussion of such subjects he generally makes it to be understood, that there is more room for doubt and conjecture than valid argument and conclusive reasoning: to accomplish which, he so uses, for the most part, the popular fables and traditions of Greece, as that he not only alters or rejects what is unsuited to his purpose, but at the same time makes an effort to reform and remove the superstitions of his countrymen, which is his evident design throughout. It is equally evident that he was also desirous to emancipate the minds and judgments of his friends from the thraldom of a blind and absurd belief, and lead them, by a requisite preparation, to comprehend and partake of the benefits resulting from a purer and more exalted wisdom. The sum of the arguments advanced by Plato on the subject of a future state is simply this; that the good are happy and the evil miserable; that the happiness of the former consists in virtue and truth, and the misery of the latter, in the contrary of both; but for the probability of his own, or the speculations of others upon what this happiness or misery is to be in quality or degree, he does not by any means contend, nor dilate upon with any other view than that already ascribed. Cf. V. Cousin, Œuvr. de Plat. i. 177.—"Vient ensuite la seconde partie avec le cortége de croyances populaires et mythologiques sur la destineé et l'état ultérieur de ce principe immortel, transporté hors des conditions de son existence actuelle. La première partie était un discussion entre philosophes; la seconde est un hymne, un fragment d'épopeé; c'est, en quelque sorte, un accompagnement doux et gracieux, destiné à relever l'effet des démonstrations précédentes, et à charmer le cœur et l'imagination, après que l'intelligence est satisfaite.

"La philosophie démontre qu'il y a dans l'homme un principe qui ne peut perir. Mais que ce principe reparaisse dans un autre monde avec le même ordre de facultés et les mêmes lois qu'il avait dans celui-ci; qu'il y porte les conséquences des bonnes et des mauvaises actions qu'il a pu commettre: que l'homme vertueux y converse avec l'homme vertueux, qui le méchant y souffre avec le méchant, c'est la une probabilité sublime qui échappe peut-être à la rigueur de la démonstration, mais qu' autorisent et consacrent et le vœu secret du cœur, et l'assentiment universel des peuples. Elles ne sont pas d'hier, elles ne s'éteindront pas demain, ces naïves et nobles croyances qu'un indestructible besoin produit, répand, perpétue parmi les hommes, comme un heritage sacré; et, en vérité, ce serait une philosophie bien hautaine que celle qui défendrait au sage, à l'heure suprême, d'invoquer ces traditions vénérables, et d'essayer de s'enchanter lui-même de la foi de ses semblables et des esperances du genre humain. Ce n'est pas là du moins la philosophie de Socrate. Trop éclairé pour accepter sans reserve les allegories populaires qu'il raconte à ses

μων, ὅς περ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δή τινα τόπον, οἱ δεῖ τοὺς ξυλλεγέντας διαδικασαμέ-

amis, il est trop indulgent aussi pour les repousser avec rigueur ; et l'on voit tout au plus errer sur le lèvres du bon et spirituel vieillard ce demi-sourire qui trahit le scepticisme sans montrer le dédain."

To this part of the dialogue Olympiodorus gives the name Νεκυία, which is likewise applied to the similar passages in the Gorgias and de Repub., and by the ancients to the eleventh Odyssey, which being occupied with a like subject was called by the ancients Νεκυία or Νεκυομαντεία. Socrates now proceeds to say that every soul has its own genius for its guide, which conducts it after death to the lower regions; a wise and well-informed soul pursuant to its own desire, but a vicious and foolish soul, and devoted to the body, against its will. Having been so conducted to a particular place, they are there tried, and those who lived moderately well suffer such punishment for their misdeeds as may tend to their being cleansed, and restored to virtue, at the same time that they receive the reward of their good actions. Those, however, who have committed greater, but yet excusable crimes, such as homicides, or those who ill-treat their parents, are afflicted with severer penalties, from which they are not discharged until they have made the requisite atonement to the objects of their injustice.— But those who have committed unpardonable and irremediable offences, by many and gross acts of oppression and violence, are plunged into Tartarus, to abide there for ever. Finally, those who have led a blameless and an upright life, and especially those who have studied philosophy intently and effectually, are exalted into the upper regions, whence they return no more. This abode of the blessed is on the earth itself, but in a lofty and celestial quarter; for what is water with us is air with them, and our air is their æther: all things are purer, brighter, and more subtle there; endued with more acute perceptions, they enjoy a more vigorous intelligence, and a nearer intimacy with the gods. While we, as fishes in the depths of the sea, so live in the lower air, whence few ascend into the more ætherial space; all things with us are coarse and earthly, our perceptions dull, intelligence slow, nothing really and sincerely good.

Throughout this discussion, though *the mind* and *the soul* appear to have been used as synonyms, yet there is a dictinction to be observed between them. The soul is that whole, whatever it is in us which thinks, feels, acts, desires, is conscious to itself of itself and all things else. It is called by the Greeks ψυχή, and is attributed to all animals (ζώοις). But these are either rational (λογικά), or irrational (ἄλογα, i. e. brutes); of rational beings there are four classes, gods, dæmons, heroes, and men. Platonists divide the soul into three parts or faculties ; two irrational, ἐπιθυμίαν, and θυμόν, the affections and passions, and the third rational, λόγον, reason, which, if it is regarded not as a faculty of the soul, but as a part, and that, too, the most excellent and influential, is called νοῦς, the mind. This part, then, which is mainly concerned in the question of immortality, is generally implied by the term *mind*, the whole is designated as the *soul*. Cf. Tennemann, Man. Philos. s. 134. Plato considered the soul to be a self-acting energy, (αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν, de Leg. x. p. 88. sqq.,) and viewed as combined with the body, he distinguished in it two parts, the rational (λογιστικὸν, νοῦς) ; and the irrational or animal (ἀλογιστικὸν or ἐπιθυμητικόν) : mutually connected by a sort of middle term (θυμὸς or τὸ θυμοειδές, de Rep. iv. 349. ed. Steph.) The animal part has its origin in the imprisonment of the soul in the body; the intellectual still retains a consciousness of the *ideas :* whereby it is capable of returning to the happy condition of spirits.

Ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων.] i. e. The dæmon or genius which was appointed as the guide and associate of every human being during life. Whether every individual had his own peculiar dæmon, or that one dæmon took charge of a greater number of individuals, the learned are not agreed, nor does it appear that Plato himself thought proper to decide.

·νους εἰς Ἅιδου πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ᾧ δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε πορεῦσαι. τυ-

Some supposed the dæmon to be a part of the soul itself, or the *νοῦς*, Plat. Tim. p. 551. A. or an *ἦθος*. Cf. Porphyr. Epist. ad Aneb. p. d. b. *Διαμφισβητῶ δὲ μήπω δαίμων ἴδιος μέρος τι τῆς ψυχῆς εἴη· καὶ οὗτος ἄρα εὐδαίμων εἴη ὅστις νοῦν ἔχει σοφόν.* Olympiodorus, Cod. i. p. 288. is of opinion that one dæmon has the charge of several souls, for it was not allotted to a soul but to a life; *ἀλλὰ βιόν· τί δὲ κωλύει τὸν αὐτὸν βίον πλείους αἱρεῖσθαι ψυχάς*: therefore every species of life had its own presiding dæmon which also took charge of the souls by which that species of life was adopted. With this he aims at reconciling the passage in Rep. x. p. 250. C. where the soul in its choice of a new life selects also a dæmon for itself, the dæmon does not select the soul, whence he concludes that each dæmon presides over a particular kind of life; to which also Plotinus refers, Enn. iii. iv. 3. p. 284. B. *ὀρθῶς οὖν λέγεται ἡμᾶς αἱρήσεσθαι· τὸν γὰρ ὑπερκείμενον κατὰ ζωὴν αἱρούμεθα.* To which opinion Jamblichus also so far accedes as to determine the dæmon to be a part, but the predominant one, of the soul, ix. 6. p. 169. *Εἰ δὲ δεῖ σοὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ περὶ τοῦ οἰκείου δαίμονος λόγον ἀποκαλύψαι, οὐκ ἀφ' ἑνὸς μέρους τῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, οὐδ' ἀπό τινος στοιχείου τῶν ὁρωμένων ἀπονέμεται ἡμῖν οὗτος· ἀφ' ὅλου δὲ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς παντοδαπῆς ἐν αὐτῷ ζωῆς, καὶ τοῦ παντοδαποῦ σώματος, δι' ὧν ἡ ψυχὴ κάτεισιν ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν, ἀπομερίζεταί τις ἐν ἡμῖν μοῖρα ἰδία πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπομεριζομένη κατ' ἰδίαν ἐπιστασίαν· οὗτος δὴ οὖν ὁ δαίμων ἕστηκεν ἐν παραδείγματι πρὸ τοῦ καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς κατιέναι εἰς γένεσιν· ὃν ἐπειδὴ ἔλαται ἡ ψυχὴ ἡγεμόνα, εὐθὺς ἐφίστηκεν ὁ δαίμων ἀποπληρωτὴς τῶν βίων τῆς ψυχῆς, ὃς καὶ εἰς τὸ σῶμα κατιοῦσαν αὐτὴν συνδεῖ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα· καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ζῶον αὐτῆς ἐπιτροπεύει. ζωήν τε τὴν ἰδίαν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτὸς κατευθύνει· καὶ ὅσα λογιζόμεθα, αὐτοῦ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡμῖν ἐνδιδόντος, διανοούμεθα, πράττομέν τε τοιαῦτα, οἷα ἂν αὐτὸς ἡμῖν ἐπὶ νοῦν ἄγῃ· καὶ μέχρι τοσούτου κυβερνᾷ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἕως ἂν διὰ τῆς ἱερατικῆς θεουργίας θεὸν ἵλεων ἐπιστήσωμεν καὶ ἡγεμόνα τῆς ψυχῆς*: For the better understanding of which, the passage in Rep. x. 520. 521. may be adduced, when the souls are addressed, previous to their election of a life; *Ἀνάγκης θυγατρὸς, κόρης Λαχέσεως λόγος. Ψυχαὶ ἐφήμεροι, ἀρχὴ ἄλλης περιόδου θνητῶν γένους θανατηφόρου· οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε—. Ἐπειδὴ δ' οὖν πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς τοὺς βίους ᾔρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ ἔλαχον ἐν taξει προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν· ἐκείνη δὲ ἑκάστῳ ὃν εἵλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα ξυμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἱρεθέντων.* From which it is not more clear that one dæmon presides over several souls, than that every individual soul has its own peculiar dæmon. Cf. Apul. de Deo Socr. p. 50. "Ex hac ergo sublimiori dæmonum copia Plato autumat singulis hominibus in vita agenda testes et custodes singulos additos, qui nemini conspicui semper adsint, arbitri omnium non modo actorum verum etiam cogitatorum. At ubi vita edita remeandum est, eumdem illum, qui nobis præditus fuit, raptare ilico et trahere veluti custodiam suam ad judicium, atque illic in caussa dicenda assistere: si qua commentiatur, redarguere: si qua vera dicat, asseverare: prorsus illius testimonio ferri sententiam." Origen. c. Cels. viii. p. 767. B. *Ἑλλήνων μὲν οὖν οἱ σοφοὶ λεγέτωσαν δαίμονας εἱληχέναι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν ἀπὸ γενέσεως.* WYTT. According to Empedocles, the soul of man consists of two parts; the sensitive, produced from the first principles with the elements: and the rational, a dæmon sprung from the divine soul of the world, and sent down into the body as a punishment for its crimes in a former state, to remain there until it is sufficiently purified to return to God. Xenocrates taught the inferior gods or dæmons to be derived from the soul of the world, and therefore, like that principle, to be compounded of a simple or immutable and a divisible or changeable substance. He assigned them a middle rank be-

χόντας δ' ἐκεῖ ὧν δεῖ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ὃν χρὴ χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμὼν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις. ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος λέγει· ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ

tween the gods and man, partaking of the nature of mind and body, susceptible of passions like human beings, and consequently liable to diversity of character. Nearly similar is the doctrine of Ocellus, from whom, however, as he makes dæmons the inhabitants of the sublunar regions, Aristotle differs essentially, who supposed no such intelligences except in the celestial sphere. Enf. Phil. passim. Cf. Horat. Epist. ii. 2. 187. Theocrit. Id. iv. 40. Αἲ, αἲ, τῶ σκληρῶ μάλα δαίμονος ὅς με λέλογκε. Lys. Epitaph. p. 130. *νῦν δὲ ἥ τε φύσις καὶ νόσων ἧττων καὶ γήρως, ὅ τε δαίμων ὁ τὴν ἡμετέραν μοῖραν εἰληχὼς ἀπαραίτητος.* Menand. apud. Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 727. *Ἅπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρίστατ' εὐθὺς γενομένῳ μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου.* Virg. Georg. i. 302. Tibull. ii. 2. 1, iv. 6. 1. Pers. Sat. ii. 3.

Ὅς περ ζῶντα εἰλήχει.] Kœhler reads ὥσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, after ed. Francof. a. 1602., and explains the passage; *Dæmonem suum quemque ducere, quemadmodum eum viventem deprehenderit, eo, quo defuncti se colligant*, &c., which is obviously incorrect both in sense and arrangement. Ὅς περ (so in vett. editt.) is the true reading, and consistent with the doctrine of Plato. For in Rep. x. l. c. supr. he makes Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity, address the souls; *ψυχαὶ ἐφήμεροι—οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε*: the genius which the soul selected being so allotted by Lachesis to that life upon which the soul chose to enter, and in which, according to its future destiny, it was called *εὐδαίμων*, or *κακοδαίμων*. Whence Gottleber correctly renders the passage, *ὅς περ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, qui genius viventem eum sorte accessera'*. V. Cousin; *le même génie, qui a été chargé de lui pendant sa vie.* Dacier; *le démon (le génie) qu'il a eu en partage.*

Εἰς δή τινα τόπον.] *Into a certain place;* this τόπος is called by Socrates, Æschin. Socr. iii. 19., *πεδίον ἀληθείας.*

Οἱ δεῖ τοὺς ξυλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους.] i. e. *Where having been assembled, they must undergo their trial: διαδικάζεσθαι*, as Reiske correctly observes, in Ind. Demosth., signifying, *to commit one's cause to a legal investigation*, whence *διαδικασαμένους* supr. is equivalent to *διαδικασμὸν ὑπέχοντας* elsewhere. Cf. infr. c. 62. init. *πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο*, κ. τ. λ.

Πορεῦσαι.] Interpr. Hesych. *πέμψαι, ἀγαγεῖν.*

Ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακρ. περ.] Plato does not accurately define the number of years in which the *περίοδοι*, or revolutions of years allotted to transmigrating souls, were completed; but to some he assigns the space of one, to others of three, and again to others, of ten thousand years. He has not either laid down his doctrine of metempsychosis so simply and obviously as the Pythagoreans, but has studied to explain its principles from the nature of the soul itself. For the soul, from the habits of its former life, being tied down to the love of pleasure, naturally seeks for a body of such a description as may be best adapted to the gratification of its desires. Consequently, being deceived through ignorance of what is really good, in the choice of a new existence, it abandons the better for the worse.

Ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος.] Wyttenbach conjectures the verse alluded to, to be; *Ἁπλῆ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οἶμος εἰς ᾅδου φέρει.*—Heindorf; *Ἁπλῆ γὰρ οἶμος πάντας εἰς Ἄιδου φέρει*, or as Wytt. supr. Cf. Clem. Alex. Stromm. iv. p. 492. B. *οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν κατὰ τὸν Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφον νοεῖν ἁπλῆν οἶμον εἰς Ἄιδου φέρειν.* Dionys. Hal. Art. Rhet. vi. 5. p. 73. *εἰ μέν τις ἐτελεύτησε—ἐν ἀποδημίᾳ, ὅτι οὐδὲν διενήνοχε, μία γὰρ καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οἶμος, κατὰ τὸν Αἰσχύλον, εἰς ᾅδου φέρουσα.* Cic. Tusc. i. 43. "Præclare Anaxagoras: qui cum Lampsaci moreretur, quærentibus amicis, velletne Clazomenas in patriam, si quid accidisset, auferri: Nihil necesse est in-

ἁπλῆν οἶμόν φησιν εἰς Ἅιδου φέρειν, ἡ δ' οὔτε ἁπλῆ οὔτε μία φαίνεταί μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει· οὐ γάρ πού τις ἂν διαμάρτοι οὐδαμόσε μιᾶς ὁδοῦ οὔσης. νῦν δὲ ἔοικε σχίσεις τε καὶ περιόδους πολλὰς ἔχειν· ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω. Ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἕπεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα· ἡ δὲ

quit: undique enim ad inferos tantumdem viæ est." Horat Od. i. 28. 16.—"Et calcanda semel via leti." Virg. Æneid vi. 126.—"facilis descensus Averno." For Telephus, see Class. Dic. His story formed the subject of the last tragedy of Æschylus, inscribed with his name.

Νῦν δέ.] Matthiæ Gr. s. 607.

Ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων.] Τὰ ὅσια is used of *the last duties towards the dead*, and so likewise τὰ νόμιμα, and νομιζόμενα, in Latin *justa*, of *the customary and established rites of burial*, &c., whence Wyttenbach understands the phrase by the figure ἓν διὰ δυοῖν, to signify *religio mortuorum, sacra inferis et manibus exhibita*. Upon the different parts of such ceremonies, which Socrates alleges as an argument for the diversity of routes conducting to the lower regions, Cf. Schol. in loc. ex Cod. Olymp. i. p. 235. Ὅτι μία μὲν κατὰ το κοινὸν, ἡ εἰς ᾅδου πορεία· πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ παντοδαπαὶ αἱ μετὰ τὴν μίαν ὁδοὶ, ἅτε τοιούτων καὶ τοσούτων οὐσῶν τῶν λήξεων, ἃς τέλη ποιοῦνται αἱ ὁδοιποροῦσαι (ψυχαὶ)—ἢ διὰ τὰς Δήμητρος πλάνας· ὡς γὰρ διαφόρων οὐσῶν τῶν ὁδῶν ἐπλανήθη· ἢ ὅτι ἐπὶ τριόδου θύουσι τῇ τριόδι ἑκάστῃ (leg. τριοδῖτι Ἑκάτῃ) καὶ παραδεικνύουσι τὰς τριόδους ἐν ἄλλοις νομίμοις. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀποιχομένων τὰς ψυχὰς τριχῇ θεραπεύουσιν· ἄλλως μὲν τὰς τῶν παναγῶν ἱερίων· ἄλλως δὲ τὰς τῶν βιοθανάτων· καὶ ἔτι ἄλλως τὰς τῶν πολλῶν. For ὁσίων, Vulg. Aug. Ald., &c. read θυσιῶν, adopted by Ficinus, and by Olympiodorus, who understands an allusion to the sacrifices offered to Hecate, where three ways met;—Ὁ Σωκράτης διχῇ δείκνυσι, φιλοσόφως μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐεῖσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἡγεμόνων· μιᾶς γὰρ οὔσης ὁδοῦ, μὴ ἂν διηθῆναι τῶν ἀγόντων· ἱερατικῶς δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τριόδοις τιμῶν τῆς Ἑκάτης. Heindorf receives ὁσίων, but considers it to imply a reference to the mysteries, in which the circuitous approaches to Orcus were exhibited to the view of the spectators. Upon the construction supr., τεκμαιρομενος without an accusative of the object, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 396. 2. Cf. in Criton. c. 2. init. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἔκ τινος ἐνυπνίου. Xenoph. Cyrop. vii. 5. 62. Ἐτεκμαίρετο δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, &c.

Οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα.] Heusde, Spec. Crit. p. 23. denies the sense of οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ supr. and proposes οὐκ ἀγανακτεῖ τὰ παρ. as being correctly joined with ἕπεται preced. and so opposed to ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βίᾳ καὶ μόλις, κ. τ. λ. seq. But all the editions sanction the reading in the text, which requires no emendation, and signifies that *the soul is not unacquainted with its present state; its immediate condition has not befallen it suddenly nor unexpectedly, for it had already been familiarized with it, by the study of philosophy, and meditation upon death*. Therefore it must be pleased with a change which it was long since aware was to be for its good, and would gladly accompany the guide, of whose conduct its own felicity was the undoubted object. This sense, it is evident includes the meaning which Heusde desired to make more obvious, but which is thus sufficiently apparent without his correction. Ἀγνοεῖ, besides, may be taken in the full signification here, in which its aorist occurs in that splendid passage Iliad. ν'. 18. sqq.—ἄλλε δὲ κήτε' ὑπ' αὐτῷ Πάντοθεν ἐκ κευθμῶν, οὐδ' ἠγνοίησεν ἄναακτα,—where it evidently implies the joyful recognition, or confession of the

ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν χρόνον ἐπτοημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βίᾳ καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται ἀγομένη. ἀφικομένην δὲ ὅθι περ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καί τι πεποιηκυῖαν τοιοῦτον, ἢ φόνων ἀδίκων ἡμμένην ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα τοιαῦτα εἰργασμένην, ἃ τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ταύτην μὲν ἅπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε ξυνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμὼν ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴ δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένῃ ἀπορίᾳ, ἕως ἂν δή τινες χρόνοι γένωνται, ὧν ἐξελθόντων ὑπ' ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν· ἡ δὲ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα,

presence of their sovereign by the monsters of the deep.

Ἡ δὴ ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώμ. κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Milton, Comus, 463. sqq.,

—— but when Lust
By unchaste looks, loose gestures, and foul talk,
But most by lewd and slavish act of sin,
Lets in defilement to the inward parts,
The soul grows clotted by contagion,
Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose
The divine property of her first being.
Such are those thick and gloomy shadows damp,
Oft seen in charnel vaults and sepulchres
Lingering, and sitting by a new made grave,
As loth to leave the body that it loved,
And linked itself by carnal sensuality
To a degenerate and degraded state.

Ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον.] See supr. c. 30—περὶ ἐκεῖνο, sc. τὸ σῶμα.—ἐπτοημένη—expressive of the soul's reluctance to abandon the body, to which it clung as the instrument of its sensual appetites. Cf. supr. c. 13. μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι, c. 30. sqq.—ὁρατὸν τόπον, *monuments or sepulchres.*—πολλὰ—used here for καταπολὺ,—*making violent resistance.* Πολλὰ παθοῦσα, intell. ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμιῶν.

Ἅ τούτων ἀδελφά.] Suid. Ἀδελφά· οἰκεῖα, ἁρμόζοντα, πρέποντα. Etymol. M. ἀδελφά· ὅμοια. Phavor. ἀδελφά· ὅμοια, οἰκεῖα, ἁρμόζοντα, πρέποντα, συγγενῆ. Whence τούτων ἀδελφά is used of *crimes similar to homicides*, &c., as ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν of *similar* or *congenial souls*; i. e. impure, ἀκαθαρτῶν. So Cic. Acadd. iv. 43. "Germanissimus Stoicis," or as some read "Stoicus." Orat. 9. "Germanos se putant esse Thucydidis," or according to some—"Thucydidas."

Ταύτην—ὑπεκτρέπεται.] Matthiæ Gr. s. 393.—Ἅπας, used as more emphatic, for πᾶς. Politic. p. 259. C. βασιλεὺς ἅπας. Eurip. Bacch. 70. στόμα τ' εὔφημον ἅπας ὀσιούσθω.

Ξυνέμπορος.] Tim. Plat. Lex. συνοδοιπόρος, *fellow-traveller.*

Ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένῃ ἀπορίᾳ.] *Involved in complete perplexity.* de Rep. iii. p. 395. D. ἐν ξυμφοραῖς τε καὶ πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ἐχομένην. Gorg. p. 522. A. ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἔχεσθαι.—Ἕως ἂν—χρόνοι, sc. περίοδοι χρόνου πολλαὶ καὶ μακραί supr.; whence χρόνοι is used in the plural.—Γένωνται, *expire*; used here in a different sense from c. 37. supr. χρόνου ἐγγενομένου.

Ὑπ' ἀνάγκης.] *Perforce, of necessity.* Forster incorrectly reads ὑπ' Ἀνάγκης, from de Repub. x. 344., but had that deity been intended here, the allusion should have been more distinct, besides it would have been written ἄγεσθαι, not φέρεσθαι, ὑπ' Ἀνάγκης.

Καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως.] i. e. Καθαρῶς καὶ κοσμίως, *one that has led a pure and well-regulated life.*

καὶ ξυνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ᾤκησε τὸν αὐτῇ ἑκάστῃ τόπον προσήκοντα.

§. 58. Εἰσὶ δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτὴ οὔτε οἵα οὔτε ὅση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπό τινος πέπεισμαι. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; περὶ γάρ τοι τῆς γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἃ σὲ πείθει. ἡδέως ἂν οὖν ἀκούσαιμι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου γέ μοι τέχνη δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἅ γ' ἐστίν· ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ' ἂν οἷός τε εἴην, ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὦ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν. τὴν μεντοι ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς, οἵαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ

§. 58. Καὶ αὐτὴ οὔτε οἵα.] After αὐτή intell. ἐστίν. Anaximander and Hecatæus may be here alluded to, who had set such inquiries on foot respecting the form and magnitude, &c., of the earth. V. Strabon. i. p. 13. c. Diog. L. ii. 2. Stall. Forster correctly renders ὅση, *tantula*: cf. infr. Ἔτι τοίνυν—πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό.

Ὡς ἐγὼ—πέπεισμαι] Vulg. πέπυσμαι; but the former is preferable, both on account of ἃ σὲ πείθει seq. and. ὑπό τινος preced.

Οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου γέ μοι τέχνη.] This proverb was in use among the ancients in regard to difficulties which required no great power of intellect or ingenuity to solve. It is so applied in the present instance; but how the proverb itself originated is altogether uncertain. Schol. Plat. Γλαύκου τέχνη· ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ῥᾳδίως κατεργαζομένων, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν πάνυ ἐμπείρως καὶ ἐντέχνως εἰργασμένων. Ἵππασος γάρ τις κατεσκεύασε χαλκοῦς τέτταρας δίσκους οὕτως, ὥστε τὰς μὲν διαμέτρους αὐτῶν ἴσας ὑπαρχούσας (l. ὑπάρχειν) τὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου δίσκου πάχος ἐπίτριτον μὲν εἶναι τοῦ δευτέρου, ἡμίολον δὲ τοῦ τρίτου, διπλοῦν δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου· κρουομένου δὲ τούτου ἐπιτελεῖ συμφωνίαν τινά. καὶ λέγεται Γλαῦκον ἰδόντα τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν δίσκων φθόγγον πρῶτον ἐγχειρῆσαι δι' αὐτῶν χειρουργεῖν· καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς πραγματείας ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγεσθαι τὴν καλουμένην Γλαύκου τέχνην. (Conf. Pausan. Phoc. c. 16.) ἕτερος δὲ Γλαῦκου αὐτὸν ἀναθεῖναι εἰς Δελφοὺς τρίποδα χαλκοῦν οὕτω δημιουργήσαντα τοῖς πάχεως τε (f. δημιουργ. θαυμαστῶς ὥστε) κρουομένου τούς τε πόδας, ἐφ' ὧν βέβηκε, καὶ τὸ ἄνω περικείμενον καὶ τὴν στεφάνην τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ λέβητος καὶ τὰς ῥάβδους διὰ μέσου τεταγμένας φθέγγεσθαι λύρας φωνῇ. Καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος ἀπὸ Γλαύκου τινὸς δόξαντός τι πλέον πεποιηκέναι, εἰρῆσθαι τὴν παροιμίαν.

Ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπ. μοι φαίν.] Sc. ἀποδεῖξαι, which, as Wyttenbach observes, is understood from διηγήσασθαι preced. Tr. *But to prove that these things are true seems to me more difficult than is consistent with the art of Glaucus.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 628.—Ἡ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 449. c.

Ἅμα μὲν ἐγώ.] Xenoph. Cyrop. iii. 1. 2. ἅμα μεν διέπεμπεν ἀθροίζων τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν,—ἅμα δὲ ἔπεμπεν εἰς τὰ ὄρη, κ. τ. λ. Ibid. iv. 1. 13. Anab.

τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν. Ἀλλ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ.

Πέπεισμαι τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐγὼ ὡς πρῶτον μέν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερὴς οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης

iii. 4. 11. This form is rarer among the Latin writers. Liv. iii. 50. "Decemviri simul iis, quæ videbant, simul his, quæ acta Romæ audierant, perturbati." Ibid. xxxi. 46. "Simul minarum, simul promissionum in futurum memores."—STALL.

Ἐν μέσῳ τῷ ουρανῷ περιφ. οὖσα.] Cf. in Tim. c. 15. a med. Γῆν δὲ, τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν, εἰλουμένην δὲ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμηχανήσατο, πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην σωμάτων ὅσα ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γέγονε.

Upon the word εἰλουμένην, in this passage, the disputes have arisen concerning Plato's opinion of the earth; whether, according to Aristotle (de Cœlo. 11. 13. p. 659. B.—11. 14. p. 663. E.), who, reading εἰλουμένην, gives it the sense of κινουμένην, and Diogenes Laertius (111. s. 85.), he maintained the earth's *rotation* upon its axis, or whether, according to Proclus, ad h. l. who condemns this interpretation, (and reading ἱλλομένην gives it the sense as in Tim. Plat. Lex. συγκεκλεισμενην καὶ περιειλημμένην. Ἱλλάδες γὰρ οἱ δεσμοί;) he held the earth to be immoveably fixed upon its axis. But in fact, as Ruhnken and Hemsterhuis justly observe, the reading in this case makes no difference, for both εἰλουμένην and ἱλλομένην are precisely the same. The former, in Plat. Lex. as supr., quotes two translations of the passage which do not remove its ambiguity. Cic. Acad. ii. 39. *Jam vero terram, altricem nostram, quæ trajecto axe sustinetur, dieique noctisque effectricem*, &c. Chalcid. p. 41. *Terram vero matrem et altricem omnium terrenorum animantiam constrictam limitibus per omnia vadentis et cuncta continentis poli*, &c. And the latter, ibid., admits the possibility of either interpretation; Terram quæ circum axem se summa celeritate convertit et torquet." Cic. Acad. ii. 39. or "quæ circum axem protensum convoluta et adstricta hæret. Vincula quibus terram natura constrixit." Macrob. ad Somn. Scip. i. The second opinion is ably advocated by Letronne (Journal des Savans. 1819, Juin) in an article upon M. J. V. Le Clerc's Pensées de Platon, sur la Morale, &c. Paris, 1819, in which the author supports the opinion of Aristotle, as supr. Letronne understands εἰλουμένην (περὶ) in a passive sense, and instead of signifying, *the earth revolving*, i. e. *turning itself on its axis*, he takes it to mean rather *being rolled*, i. e. *agglomerated round its axis*; the expression being metaphorical, from wool or flax *twisted* or *coiled in a ball* round the spindle of a distaff. So the term is applied to the earth as being *wound* round its own axis, which, prolonged at either extremity, becomes the axis of the universe.—πόλον διὰ παντὸς τεταμένον. Hence it will appear that εἰλουμένην περὶ πόλον is nearly synonymous with περιφερὴς οὖσα in the text, which Letronne quotes in further confirmation of his opinion. He cites two passages also from the Timæus in favour of the earth being immoveably fixed; in which Plato seems to have sufficiently decided the point himself. In the one he speaks of the double motion of the sun and planets, their diurnal and proper, and in another he describes their diurnal motion as a revolution of the whole firmament, which is evidently incompatible with the rotation of the earth upon its axis, whence it is certain that he, then at least, believed the earth to be immoveable in the centre of the universe. This opinion, however, he is said by Theophrastus, apud Plut. Quæst. Plat. t. x. p. 183., to have repented of late in life. It may be added, that this passage, as supr., ἐστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ, κ. τ. λ., is borrowed from Timæus the Locrian, 111. s. l. to whom, among others, Plato is indebted for his acquaintance with the tenets of Pythagoras, and whose doctrine respecting the

ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντῃ καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορρόπιαν· ἰσόρροπον γὰρ πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεθὲν οὐχ ἕξει μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἧττον οὐδαμόσε κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχον ἀκλινὲς μενεῖ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας· Ἔτι τοίνυν, ἔφη, πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ τινὶ μορίῳ, ὥς περ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους, περὶ

earth was, that being placed in the centre of the universe, it formed the boundary of night and day, *causing sunrise and sunset by the separation of the horizons*, and that it was the most ancient body which the universe contained.—This is also in favour of the argument of Proclus, to which Letronne's is nearly alike. But the question cannot still be considered as divested of an uncertainty which it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to remove. V. Boeckh. de Plat. Syst. Cael. Glob. p. vii.—xi. Wytt. ad Bak. Posid. p. 61.

Ἄλλα ἱκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν—] h. e. *ἀλλὰ τὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ πάντῃ ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτὴν ἰσόρροπον ἱκανὸν εἶναι*, intell. *ad eam sustinendam.* Stall.—the dative *ἑαυτῷ* depending upon *ὁμοιότητα*: so in Theætet. p. 176. B. *ψυχὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.* Stephens correctly explains the passage: *verum ad eam retinendam satis esse, quod cælum sibi quaquaversus simile sit et quod ipsa sit æquilibris.*

Ἰσορρόπιαν.] A spherical body, which is *ἰσόρροπον*, i. e. equally attracted on all sides towards its centre, has no need of any foundation to support it, but remains fixed and still; but besides, the earth is situated in the centre of the universe, *οὐρανὸς*, which is itself *ἰσόρροπος*, and with which the earth has a common centre. Aristotle attributes the origin of this theory to Anaximander; de Cælo, ii. 13. *εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητά φασιν αὐτὴν μένειν, ὥς περ τῶν ἀρχαίων Ἀναξίμανδρος· μᾶλλον γὰρ οὐθὲν ἄνω ἢ κάτω, ἢ εἰς τὰ πλάγια φέρεσθαι προσήκει (f. προσήκειν) τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἱδρυμένον, καὶ ὁμοίως πρὸς τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχον· ἅμα δὲ ἀδύνατον εἰς τἀναντία ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κίνησιν· ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης μένειν.* These are the earliest notices of the phænomena of gravitation and the centripetal forces, which have been since developed in such complete and amazing perfection by the great Interpreter of "nature and nature's laws" to man.

Ἰσόρροπον γὰρ πρᾶγμα.] Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 39. "de principio terra universa cernatur, locata in media sede mundi, solida et globosa, et undique ipsa in sese nutibus suis conglobata." De Orat. iii. 45. "Incolumitatis ac salutis omnium causa videmus hunc statum esse hujus totius mundi atque naturæ, rotundum ut cælum, terraque ut media sit, eaque sua vi nutuque teneatur."—Ὁμοίου τινός, *of something like itself*, like the πρᾶγμ. ἰσορ.

Πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό.] Αὐτό must be referred here to *τὴν γῆν*. Cf. supr. c. 37. sub. fin. *οὕτω γὰρ αὐτό.*

Μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος.] Heindorf arranges the passage with a view to its sense; *καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακ. στηλ. ἀπὸ Φάσ. ἐν σμικρῳ τινὶ μορίῳ περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας, ὥς περ περὶ τέλμα μύρμ. ἢ βατράχους* sc. *οἰκοῦντας*: the words *περὶ τὴν θάλατταν* pertaining to *ἡμᾶς* preced. and not, as some incorrectly explain it, Ficinus among others, to *βατράχους*. Socrates says that the then known portion of the habitable world, between Phasis, a river of Colchis on the east, and the pillars of Hercules

τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖσι τοιούτοις τόποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῇ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἃ ξυνερρύηκέναι τό τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὁμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα· αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ, ἐν ᾧ πέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄστρα, ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα ὀνομάζειν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν

on the west, was but a small portion of the globe itself, compared with whose magnitude, men were but as ants and frogs, and the Mediterranean sea, which is here understood as extending from Pontus to the pillars of Hercules, a mere marsh. India afterwards succeeded the Phasis and Pontus as the eastern boundary of the habitable world, whence Juvenal, 10. 1. "Omnibus in terris quæ sunt a Gadibus usque Auroram et Gangem," &c. Aristot. de Cælo, ii. 14. fin. Meteorolog. ii. 5. Upon the use and sense of *τὴν θάλατταν* simply, as supr., Larcher observes, ad Herodot. i. 185., "We must recollect that Herodotus wrote for the Greeks, and therefore understood by this term, 'this sea,' that part of the Mediterranean near which the Greeks abode. He has used the same expression B. i. c. 1. 'This sea,' therefore, (*cette mer—ci*) in Herodotus, signifies the sea nearest to the Greeks, i. e. that whose coasts they inhabited, the Ἑλλήνικὴ θάλασσα in. B. v. c. 54., the Ἑλληνὶς θάλασσα of B. vii. c. 28., the sea in which was the island of Cyprus, that is so say, the Mediterranean or some part of it. Diodorus Siculus, in like manner, calls the Mediterranean, *our sea*, B. v. c. 18. p. 264. v. c. 25. p. 349. Thus in Horace, 'hoc mare' signifies the sea nearest Rome. Epod. ii. 49. sqq." For *μίχρι* supr. Aug. Tub., and Orig. read *μίχρις*, but the former is sanctioned by the more numerous and better editions, besides its being in accordance with the precept of the old grammarians, that *μίχρι* and *ἄχρι* were to be used in the Attic dialect even before words beginning with a vowel.—Lobeck, ad Phrynic. p. 14.

Τέλμα.] Etymol. M. et Hesych. interp. *τόπος πηλώδης ὕδωρ ἔχων*. Fischer incorrectly explains it, *loca culta, rura, τὰ γεωργήσιμα χωρία*. Cf. Cels. apud. Orig. iv. 517. B. *καταγελῶν τε Ἰουδαίων καὶ Χριστιανῶν γένος, πάντας παραβέβληκε νυκτερίδων ὁρμαθῷ, ἢ μύρμηξιν ἐν καλιᾷς προελθοῦσιν, ἢ βατράχοις περὶ τέλμα συνεδρεύουσιν, ἢ σκώληξιν ἐν βορβόρου γωνίᾳ ἐκκλησιάζουσι*. Senec. Quæst. Nat. i. Præfat. p. 505. "Hoc est illud punctum quod inter tot gentes ferro et igni dividitur. O quam ridiculi sunt mortalium termini! Ultra Istrum Dacus non exeat; Strymo Thracas includat:—Si quis formicis det intellectum hominis, nonne et illas unam aream in multas provincias divident?" &c.

Παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη.] i. e. *Diversified both in their shape and size.*—*Εἰς ἃ ξυνερρύηκέναι*, Compare with this construction of the infin. in the orat. obliq. c. 16. supr. sub. fin. Ὅτι *ἀναγκαῖον τὰς—ψυχὰς, κ. τ. λ.*—Τὴν *ὁμίχλην*, Hesych. *ὁμίχλη· ἀὴρ παχύς, σκοτεινός, ἀχλύς, ὑδατώδης σκοτία*.

Αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν.] Proclus, in Tim. l. i. p. 56., acknowledges that Socrates and Plato were indebted for this idea of the pure Earth to the sacred tradition of the Egyptians; *ὁ δὲ Πλάτων ἡμᾶς μὲν ἐν κοίλῳ φησῖν οἰκεῖν· αὐτὴν δὲ εἶναι ἄρα ὅλην ὑψηλήν· ὃ καὶ ἡ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἱερὰ φήμη παραδίδωκε*.

Κεῖσθαι.] *Rests.*

Ὃν *δὴ αἰθέρα, κ. τ. λ.*] *Which the majority of those who are accustomed to treat of such subjects, call by the name, æther.*—Ὑποστάθμην, *sediment, grounds*, or *lees*. Anaxagoras also held the doctrine of a higher and celestial earth.—Simplic. ad Aristot. Physic. p. 33. B. 34. A. Hesychius explains *ὑποστάθμη* by *τρυγία, τρύξ*. V. Wessel. ad Diod. Sic. t. i. p. 211.

περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωθότων λέγειν· οὗ δὴ ὑποστάθμην· ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ ξυῤῥεῖν ἀεὶ εἰς τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς. Ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτῆς λελῆθέναι· καὶ οἴεσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὥς περ ἂν εἴ τις· ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οἴοιτό τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ὁρῶν τὸν ἥλιον· καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα τὴν θάλατταν ἡγοῖτο οὐρανὸν· εἶναι, διὰ δὲ βραδυτῆτά τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγμένος μηδὲ ἑωρακὼς· εἴη, ἐκδὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὅσῳ καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὢν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀκηκοὼς εἴη τοῦ ἑωρακότος. ταὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι· οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἔν τινι κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἴεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἄστρα χωροῦντα. τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταὐτόν, ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτῆτος οὐχ οἵους τε εἶναι ἡμᾶς διεξελθεῖν ἐπ' ἔσχατον τὸν ἀέρα, ἐπεὶ εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ' ἄκρα ἔλθοι ἢ πτηνὸς γενόμενος ἀνάπ-

Ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας—λελῆθέναι.] Sc. λελῆθέναι ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, i. e. *that we are unconscious to ourselves of our inhabiting the cavities of the earth, and imagine that we are dwelling upon its surface.*

Τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους.] *The bottom of the sea*, as opp. to τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης infr.

Τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι.] Properly, παρ' οἷ, or παρ' ἑαυτῷ, but the plural is frequently so used after εἴ τις in consequence of its indefinite signification.—Cf. Xen. Mem. Socr. 1. 2. 62. ἐάν τις φανερὸς γένηται κλέπτων....τούτοις θάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ζημία. So ὅστις and οὗτοι answer to each other. Matthiæ Gr. s. 475. *a.* s. 487.

Ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος, κ.τ.λ.] h. e. Οἰόμενοι, sc. νομίζοντες διὰ τούτου (τοῦ ἀέρος) οὐρανοῦ ὄντος, τὰ ἄστρα χωρεῖν.—the accusative of the participle being used in this and similar constructions, because in ὡς is implied the sense of the verb νομίζων, ἡγοῦμενος, or οἰόμενος. Seag. Viger, c. viii. s. 10. r. 3.

Τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταὐτόν.] Explained by Wyttenbach; *Hoc autem idem esse, ac nos propter tarditatem atque infirmitatem ad summum aerem pervenire non posse.* Bib. Crit. part x. p. 12. Heindorf will not allow that Plato could have so written after ταυτὸν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμ. πεπον. immediately preced. and as Eusebius reads τοῦτον for ταυτόν, he proposes the further correction τὸ δὲ εἶναι τοιοῦτον· ὑπ' ἀσθ. *quum tamen res ita se habeat, ut propter imbecillitatem—ad extremum aerem emergere nequeamus.*—Ficinus appears to have read τὸ δὲ εἶναι διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀσθ. Ταὐτόν is wanting in Cod. Zittav.

Ἐπεὶ εἴ τις—κατιδεῖν ἂν.] Ἐπεὶ in the orat. obliq. is sometimes followed, as supr., by an infinitive. Seag. Viger, c. vii. s. 6. r. 1. Stephens gives κατιδεῖν ἂν the sense of κατόψεσθαι. The

τοιτο, κατιδεῖν ἂν ἀνακύψαντα, ὥς περ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἰχθύες ἀνακύπτοντες ὁρῶσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἄν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανὴ εἴη ἀνέχεσθαι θεωροῦσα, γνῶναι ἂν ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς φῶς καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς γῆ. Ἥδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἅπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἐστὶ καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὥς περ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἅλμης· καὶ οὔτε φύεται ἄξιον λόγου οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέν ἐστι, σήραγγες δὲ καὶ ἄμμος καὶ πηλὸς ἀμήχανος καὶ βόρβοροί εἰσίν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ ἡ γῆ ᾖ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν κάλλη κρίνεσ-

omission of ἂν in vett. editt., which has been supplied after him, he accounts for from the participle following beginning with ἄν.

Ἀνακυψαντα.] *Having emerged:* ἀνακύπτειν properly signifies *to lift up the head after stooping*, as birds do when they drink. Cf. Lucian, de Sacrific. t. i. 532. ὑπερβάντι δὲ καὶ ἀνακύψαντι μικρὸν εἰς τὸ ἄνω, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ νώτου γενομένῳ, φῶς τε λαμπρότερον φαίνεται, καὶ ἥλιος καθαρώτερος, καὶ ἄστρα διαυγέστερα, καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἡμέρα καὶ χρυσοῦν τὸ δάπεδον. Plato uses the term in a similar sense, in Phædr. p. 346. A., where he speaks of the soul as elevating itself above the darkness of the material world, to the full enjoyment of the pure light of truth; ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναι φαμέν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὄντως ὄν.

Οὕτως ἄν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κ.] Repeated after the parenthesis ὥς περ ἐνθάδε, κ. τ. λ., to make the sense more clear.—Καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανή,—*and if our nature were capable of enduring the sight* (of those things which are in heaven, and on the surface of the earth,) *one would perceive that it was of a truth the heaven, of a truth the light, and of a truth the earth.* Upon ἀνέχεσθαι θεωροῦσα, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 550. *b.*

Ἥδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ.] h. e. Τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς, ἐν οἷς ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦντες λελήθαμεν.—Καὶ οἱ λίθοι, Cf. infr. c. 59. καὶ αὖ τὰ ὄρη ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους, κ. τ. λ.

Οὔτε φύεται ἄξιον λόγου οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ θ.] *Nothing at all worthy of consideration*, or *regard, exists in the sea*, &c. This opinion was held by Plato, Pythagoras and the Egyptians generally, who looked upon all the various productions of the ocean with contempt, and spoke of them in terms of disparagement and abuse. Wyttenbach explains the passage by the figure Hendiadys; *nil existere perfectum* (τέλειον) *cujus aliqua ratio habeatur*, (ἄξιον λόγου). Cf. in Tim. c. 73. sub. fin. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον γένος ἔννυδρον γέγονεν ἐκ τῶν μάλιστα ἀνοητάτων καὶ ἀμαθεστάτων, οὓς οὐδ' ἀναπνοῆς καθαρᾶς ἔτι ἠξίωσαν οἱ μεταπλάττοντες, ὡς τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὸ πλημμελείας πάσης ἀκαθάρτως ἐχόντων, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ λεπτῆς καὶ καθαρᾶς ἀναπνοῆς ἀέρος εἰς ὕδατος θολερὰν καὶ βαθεῖαν ἕωσαν ἀνάπνευσιν· ὅθεν ἰχθύων ἔθνος, καὶ το τῶν ὀστρέων ξυναπάντων τε ὅσα ἔννυδρα γέγονε, δίκην ἀμαθίας ἰσχάτης ἰσχάτας οἰκήσεις εἰληχότων. Hom. Iliad. α'. 316.—παρὰ θῖν ἀλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο. Orph. Ἀποσπ. vi.

Σήραγγες.] Σήραγξ means, according to Hesych. and Suid., *a hollow rock under the sea; ὕφαλος πέτρα ῥήγματα ἔχουσα.* Cf. Virgil, Æneid. i. 108.—"Tres Notus abreptas in saxa latentia torquet," sc. ῥήγματα ὕφαλα.

Ὅπου ἂν καὶ ἡ γῆ ᾖ.] *Ubicumque in mari terra sit.* WYTT.; for some parts of the sea were considered as immense bodies of water only, which were utterly sterile and

θαι οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν ἄξια. ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὖ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν πολὺ ἂν ἔτι πλέον φανείη διαφέρειν. εἰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν καλόν, ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οἷα τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ μύθου ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμεν.

§. 59. *Λέγεται τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὕτη ἰδεῖν, εἴ τις ἄνωθεν θεῷτο αὐτήν, ὥς περ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώ-*

productive.—Καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν κάλλη. i. e. *they are not in any degree worthy of being compared to the specimens of the beautiful with us.*—Ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὖ—διαφέρειν, i. e. *but on the other hand those things* (already spoken of in the celestial portions of the globe) *would appear still further to excel the things with us.*

Μῦθον λέγειν καλόν.] See supr. c. 4. sub. fin. ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους. From the text as supr. it would appear, that what had preceded was to be considered as λόγος, and what followed as μῦθος. However, as Simplicius observes, in Aristot. de Cælo, iii. p. 158. A., this branch of the discussion appears to contain an admixture of both; καὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς γῆς ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι ὁ Πλάτων συνεπαινεῖ, ὡς μέχρι τοῦ αἰθέρος ἐκτεταμένα· πολλῷ τῷ μυθώδει καὶ αἰνιγματικῷ ὡς οἶμαι χρώμενος· καὶ γὰρ μῦθον καλεῖ τον περὶ αὐτῆς λόγον. Cf. Olympiod. in h. l. Ἴσως δὲ ὅτι, καὶ μῦθος, καὶ λόγος, ὁ αὐτὸς εἶναι δύναται· λόγος μέν, ὅτι καὶ τὰ πράγματα τοιαῦτα, μῦθος δέ, ὅτι αἰνίξασθαι δύναται καὶ βελτίονα ὑπερέχοντα. in Gorg. c. 166. Ἄκουε δή, φασὶ, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον.

Τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ.] i. q. Τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ γῆς, *ea quæ sunt in terra subjacenti: in proxima cælo terra: in altissima terra.*—Wytt.

§. 59. Τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὕτη ἰδεῖν.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 535. *b.* For αὕτη, Heindorf and Bekk. αὐτὴ, incorrectly, for there is a distinct reference to τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ ουρανῷ ὄντα supr. But τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κτλ. is correct, because there the earth itself is spoken of as opposed to something preceding.

Εἴ τις ἄνωθεν θεῷτο.] *Should one survey it from above;* being placed on an eminence.

Ὡς περ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι.] *Balls made of twelve pieces of different coloured leather.* Socrates alludes here to the dodecahedron, which is according to Plato, the figure of the world. The elementary parts of the world he held to be of regular geometrical forms, whence the five regular, or Platonic bodies, the cube, tetrahedron, octahedron, icosahedron, and dodecahedron; the particles of earth he held to be cubical, those of fire pyramidical, those of air in the form of an octahedron, and those of water in that of an icosahedron; that these are adjusted in number, measure, and power, in perfect comformity to the geometrical laws of proportion; that so from perfect parts one perfect whole was produced, of a round figure, as in itself most beautiful, and best adapted to contain all other figures. The dodecahedron is a body comprehended under twelve equal sides, each of which is a pentagon, or it may be conceived to consist of twelve quinquangular pyramids, whose vertices meet in the centre of a sphere conceived to circumscribe the solid, with consequently equal altitudes and bases. Cf. Plutarch, de Placit. Phil. ii. 6. Πυθαγόρας, πέντε σχημάτων ὄντων στερεῶν, ἅπερ καλεῖται καὶ μαθηματικὰ, ἐκ μὲν τοῦ κύβου φησὶ γεγονέναι τὴν γῆν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς πυραμίδος τὸ πῦρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὀκταέδρου τὸν ἀέρα, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ εἰκοσαέδρου τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δωδεκαέδρου τὴν τοῦ παντὸς σφαῖραν· Πλάτων δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις Πυθαγορίζει.

μασι διειλημμένη ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὥς περ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφεῖς καταχρῶνται. ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἁλουργῆ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὅση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ξυγκειμένην ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἢ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἑωράκαμεν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοῖλα αὐτῆς, ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἔμπλεα ὄντα, χρώματός τι εἶδος παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ποικιλίᾳ, ὥστε ἓν τι αὐτῆς εἶδος ξυνεχὲς ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὔσῃ τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυόμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρπούς· καὶ αὖ τὰ ὄρη ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν

Quæst. Plat. iv. p. 1003. C.—*πότερον, ὡς ὑπονοοῦσιν ἔνιοι τὸ δωδεκάεδρον τῷ σφαιροειδεῖ προσένειμεν, εἰπὼν ὅτι τούτῳ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ὁ θεὸς κατεχρήσατο φύσιν, ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφῶν; καὶ γὰρ μάλιστα τῷ πλήθει τῶν στοιχείων, ἀμβλύτητι δὲ τῶν γωνιῶν, τὴν εὐθύτητα διαφυγὸν, εὐκαμπές ἐστι, καὶ τῇ περιτάσει καθάπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι κυκλοτερὲς γίνεται καὶ περιληπτικόν· ἔχει γὰρ εἴκοσι γωνίας στερεὰς, ὧν ἑκάστην ἐπίπεδοι περιέχουσι ἀμβλεῖαι τρεῖς· ἑκάστη γὰρ ὀρθῆς ἐστι καὶ πέμπτου μορίου· συνήρμοσται δὲ καὶ συμπέπηγεν ἐκ δώδεκα πενταγώνων ἰσογωνίων καὶ ἰσοπλεύρων.* Senec. Quæst. Nat. iv. 11. "Pilæ proprietas est cum æqualitate quadam rotunditas: æqualitatem autem hanc accipe, quam vides in lusoria pila. Non multum illi commissuræ et rimæ earum nocent, quominus par sibi ab omni parte dicatur. Quomodo in hac pila nihil illa intervalla officiunt ad speciem rotundi: sic nec in universo quidem orbe terrarum editi montes, quorum altitudo totius mundi collatione consumitur."

Ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶν.] *Of which the colours which the painters use are, as it were, samples or patterns: καταχρῶνται* being used here in the sense of *χρῶνται* as frequently, and especially by Plato. HEIND.

Τὴν μὲν γὰρ.] Sc. *γῆν*, i. e. *for this part of the earth, indeed, &c.*

Γύψου.] *Gypsum*, or *chalk*. Herodot. vii. 69.

Στίλβοντα — ποικιλίᾳ.] *Refulgent amid the diversity of the other colours.*—Ξυνεχὲς ποικίλον--ξυνεχές is used here, as frequently elsewhere, for *ξυνεχῶς*; hence the earth is said to be completely and throughout diversified with colours; the necessary property of a variegated surface.

Καὶ αὖ τὰ ὄρη—καὶ τοὺς λίθους, κ. τ. λ.] Cf. Isaiah, 54. 11. 12., "O thou afflicted, tossed with tempest and not comforted! behold, I will lay thy stones with fair colours, and lay thy foundations with sapphires. And I will make thy windows of agates, and thy gates of carbuncles, and all thy borders of pleasant stones." Ezekiel, c. 28. 13., "Thou hast been in Eden, the garden of God; every precious stone was thy covering, the sardius, topaz, and the diamond, the beryl, the onyx, and the jasper, the sapphire, the emerald, and the carbuncle, and gold: the workmanship of thy tabrets and of thy pipes was prepared in thee in the day thou wast created." Cf. St. John, on the New Jerusalem; Apocalypse, 21. 18. sqq.

λόγον τήν τε λειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω· ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδιά τε καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ἔτι τούτων κάλλιον. Τὸ δ' αἴτιον τούτου εἶναι, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι καθαροί εἰσι καὶ οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διαφθαρμένοι, ὥς περ οἱ ἐνθάδε, ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἅλμης, ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο ξυνερρυηκότων, ἃ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἴσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμῆσθαι τούτοις τε ἅπασι καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὖ τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανῆ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὄντα πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν. ζῷα δ' ἐπ' αὐτῆς εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκοῦντας,

Τήν τε λειότητα.] So Stephens correctly, for Vulg. *τήν τελειότητα*, the former being most applicable, not to stones merely, but equally suitable as the *διαφάνεια* and *χρώμ. καλλ.* to mountains also; besides that *τὴν τελειότητα* is evidently by no means compatible with *καλλίω* seq.

Ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε.] i. e. *ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια ταῦτα τὰ ἀπαπώμενα εἶναι μόρια, of which those well known* (*ταῦτα*) *little stones here which are so precious, or so highly prized, are merely fragments.* STALL.

Σάρδιά.] *Cornelian*, or *chalcedony*; so called from Sardis in Lydia, where it was discovered first. Plin. H. N. xxxvii. 7.—*ἰάσπιδας, jasper*; of which the varieties are purple, blue, and green. Id. xxxvii. 8.—*Σμάραγδοι, emerald*, or according to others *beryl*, or *aqua marina*, probably *green crystal*, *spar*, or *malachite*. Id. xxxvii. 5.

Κάλλιον.] Vulg. *καλλίω*. Sc. *ἐκει εἶναι πάντα.*

Κατεδηδεσμένοι.] i. e. *καταβεβρωμένοι*, Hesych. interpr.

Ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἅλμ. ὑπ. τῶν δ. ξ.] Eusebius inserts *καὶ* after *ἅλμης*, approved by Heindorf, from both of whom Wyttenbach dissents, and would remove the second *ὑπὸ*. But as Stallbaum justly observes, it is by no means unusual for prepositions to be repeated in apposition, when one noun is added to another for emphasis' sake, as supr. V. Bremi. ad Æschin. c. Ctes. c. 24.

Καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τε καὶ φ.] *To other things, to animals, and even plants.* When *τε* and *καὶ* are joined in the same member of a sentence, *τε* is copulative and *καὶ* argumentative. Seag. Viger. c. viii. s. 7. r. 1.

Τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτήν.] i. e. *The earth itself*; as opposed to those precious things which were just said to have been found in it.

Θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν.] Cf. Origen, adv. Celsum, iii. p. 499. E. *ὅσον ἐπὶ σοὶ, ὦ οὗτος, κούφαις ὑπάγονται ἐλπίσι καὶ οἱ τὸν Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος παραδεξάμενοι περὶ ψυχῆς λόγον, πεφυκυίας ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀψίδα* (*the arch* or *vault*) *τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑπουρανίῳ τόπῳ θεωρεῖν τὰ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν θεάματα.*

Τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ, κ. τ. λ.] Some of those men and animals inhabited the midlands, others lived in the vicinity of the air, which was to them what the sea

τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ὥς περ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν νήσοις ἃς περιῤῥεῖν τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῇ ἠπείρῳ οὔσας· καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, ὅ περ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρείαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἀέρα, ὅ δὲ ἡμῖν ὁ ἀήρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα. Τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει ᾗ περ ἀήρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκε καὶ αἰθὴρ ἀέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἕδη τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας ξυνουσίας γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τόν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

§. 60. Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυκέναι

was to those who dwelt in the cavities of the earth. And others inhabited the islands near to the mainland, which were encompassed by the air.—Ὡς. περ ἡμεῖς, sc. οἰκοῦμεν. Dorvill. ad Chariton. p. 538. ed Lips. "In comparatione post ὡς περ modo casus præcedenti nomini convenit, modo nominativus ponitur, intellecto verbo ex antecedentibus."

Τὰς δὲ ὥρας.] Cf. Ovid. Met. i. 107. "Ver erat æternum, placidisque tepentibus auris Mulcebant Zephyri."—Κρᾶσιν, *temperature.*

Φρονήσει.] Vulg. *ὀσφρήσει*, approved by Heind. and Stall.

Θεῶν ἕδη καὶ τὰ ἱερά.] Tim. Plat. Lex. Ἕδος. τὸ ἄγαλμα. καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἵδρυται. So the Latins use *sedes* for the temples of the gods. Drakenborch. ad Sil. Ital. xii. 41. Burmann. ad Ovid. Met. x. 229. Ἕδος is also frequently used for the statue or image itself, Appian. Mithridat. p. 717. τὸ δὲ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἕδος, ὃ Παλλάδιον καλοῦσι. Herod. Att. Inscript. ii. 2. Ῥηγίλλης ἕδος ἀμφὶ θυοσκόον ἱρὰ φέρουσαι. Hence ἕδη, h. l. *templa cum statuis*; ἱέρα, *quævis loca diis consecrata.* HEIND. For ἕδη, τ. κ. ἰ. Vulg. ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερα, i. e. *sacred groves, and shrines consecrated in them to the gods*; so in Liv. xxxv. 51. "fanum et lucus."

Ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *In which the gods, in reality, dwell, &c.* that is, their presence is immediately acknowledged, not secondarily and by uncertain revelations. Philostr. Heroic. p. 666. θεούς τε γὰρ, ὧν ὀπαδοί εἰσι, γινώσκουσι τότε, οὐκ ἀγάλματα θεραπεύουσαι καὶ ὑπονοίας, ἀλλὰ ξυνουσίας φανερὰς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ποιούμεναι. —Φήμας, *colloquial intercourse with the gods*; Æneïd. vii. 90. "deorum colloquio."—Μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις, *oracular responses and visions* (lit. sensible perceptions, either in dreams or waking) *of the gods.*—Αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς, and *such like communication takes place between men* (αὐτοῖς) *and gods* (αὐτούς.)

Ἀκόλουθον.] *Conformable, analogous.*

§. 60. Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν.] Such Socrates describes the earth naturally to be, and all that pertains to it. Having divided it into upper, middle, and lower, and fully discussed the nature and character of the first, he passes rapidly

καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν· τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἐγκοιλα αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν ἔλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τόπου, ἔστι δ' οὓς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους. Τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συντετρῆσθαί τε πολλαχῇ, καὶ κατὰ στενώτερα καὶ εὐρύτερα, καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ᾗ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ ῥεῖν ἐξ ἀλλήλων

over the second, which he supposes to be the habitation of the less pure and unenlightened mortals, and proceeds to a deliberate consideration of the third, the nethermost parts of the earth. His portraiture of the infernal regions is drawn forcibly and effectively, but is involved in no ordinary difficulty from his minute and many description of the four rivers by which those regions are traversed, upon which Aristotle remarks, Meteorolog. ii. 2. Τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι γεγραμμένον περί τε τῶν ποταμῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης ἀδύνατόν ἐστι. κ. τ. λ.

Τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι—πλατυτέρους.] Cf. supr. c. 58. a med. καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖσι τοιούτοις τόποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῇ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδίας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, &c. Socrates now proceeds to say, that amongst or throughout those cavities (*κατὰ τὰ ἐγκοιλα*) there were many places, themselves of course cavities, bearing different proportions as to shape and size, to that space which we inhabit, supr. c. 58, from Phasis to the pillars of Hercules, i.e. Europe; (those being called Europeans by Aristides, t. 2. 307. ed. Cant., ὅσοι στηλῶν Ἡρακλέους ἐντὸς καὶ ποταμοῦ Φασίδος.) Some of those places being deeper down and wider (*ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον*) than the region in which we dwell; some deeper and more narrow (*τὸ χάσμα—ἔλαττον ἔχειν*); others more shallow (*βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει*) and broader. Olympiodorus mentions a fourth class, which was both shallow and narrow, Cod. i. p. 157. Ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων εἰς τὰ μέσα αὐτῆς καταβὰς ὁ λόγος, τετραχῇ διεῖλε τὰς κοίλας οἰκήσεις· τὰς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι βαθείας καὶ στένας· τὰς δὲ κατὰ διάμετρον (i. e. *on the contrary*,) εὐρείας τε καὶ ἐπιπολαίους· τὰς δὲ ἐπιπολαίους καὶ στενάς τὰς, δὲ καὶ βαθείας τε καὶ εὐρείας.—Ἀναπεπταμένους, *patentiores*. Gottl. Cf. Iliad. φ'. 531. πεπταμένας δ' ἐν χερσι πύλας ἔχετ'. Mosch. 2. 19. εἰς ἔτι πεπταμένοισιν ἐν ὀμμασιν εἶχε γυναῖκας.

Εστι δ' οὓς.] i. e. *ἐνίους δέ*. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 482.

Τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν.] i. e. But all these places have a subterranean communication, by frequent and mutual perforations, some more narrow and others broader. They have conduits also, by which means great quantities of water flow from one place to another, as into craters. There are also perennial rivers of inconceivable magnitude under the earth, both with warm and cold waters; there are vast rivers of fire too, and many of liquid mud, some thinner and some more miry; like the streams of mud which precede the burning torrent of lava in Sicily, and the torrent of lava itself; with which those places severally are filled, to whichever each time the overflow may chance to come.

Κατὰ στενώτερα.] Vulg. στενότερα. Heindorf suggests the Ionic form στεινότερα. Herod. ii. 8. Cf. Schol. ad Xenoph. Anab. iii. 4. 19. in marg. Cod. Guelf. στενώτερον κοινῶς. στεινότερον κατὰ τὸν κανόνα τὸν καθόλου γραπτέον· ἀναλόγως καὶ τὸ ξεινότερον καὶ ξενώτερον. Etym. M. p. 275. τὰ διά τοῦ—οτερος καὶ—οτατος.—εἰ μὲν ἔχει τὴν πρὸ αὐτοῦ συλλαβὴν μακράν, διὰ τοῦ ο μικροῦ γράφεται—εἰ δὲ βραχεῖαν διὰ τοῦ ω μεγάλου, οἷον νεώτερος, σοφώτερος· πλὴν τοῦ στενότατος καὶ κενότατος, ἅπερ φησὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ στεῖνος καὶ κεῖνος γεγονέναι.

εἰς ἀλλήλους ὥς περ εἰς κρατῆρας, καὶ ἀενάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν, καὶ θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμούς, πολλοὺς δὲ ὑγροῦ πηλοῦ, καὶ καθαρωτέρου καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, ὥς περ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ῥύακος πηλοῦ· ῥέοντες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξ· ὧν δὴ καὶ ἑκάστους τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὧν ἂν ἑκάστοις τύχῃ ἑκάστοτε ἡ περιῤῥοὴ γιγνομένη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὥς περ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ. ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἡ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τινά. ἕν τι τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε μέγιστον τυγχάνει ὂν καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρημένον δι' ὅλης τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο ὅ περ Ὅμηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτὸ

Κρατῆρας.] V. Wesseling, ad Diodor. v. 4. where Ceres is said to have lighted the torches with which she continued to search by night for Proserpine, *ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Αἴτνην κρατήρων*, i. e. from the fires which burst from the summit of Ætna. Cf. Lucret. vi. 701. "Nunc tamen, illa modis quibus inritata repente Flamma foras vastis Ætnæ fornacibus effiet, Expediam .... In summo sunt ventigeni Crateres, ut ipsi Nominitant, nos quos fauceis perhibemus et ora."

Πηλοῦ ῥέοντες ποταμοί.] Strabo, vi. p. 413. B. *τακείσης ἐν τοῖς κρατῆρσι τῆς πέτρας, εἶτ' ἀναβληθείσης τὸ ὑπερχυθὲν τῆς κορυφῆς ὑγρὸν πηλός ἐστι μίλας, ῥέων κατὰ τῆς ὀρεινῆς· εἶτα πῆξιν λαβὼν γίνεται λίθος μυλίας τὴν αὐτὴν φυλάττων χρόαν ἣν ῥέων εἶχεν*, &c.

Ὁ ῥύαξ.] So the stream of burning lava, from the craters of Ætna, was properly called; Diod. S. xiv. 59. *ἐφθαρμένων τῶν παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν τόπων ὑπὸ τοῦ καλουμένου ῥύακος, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τὸ πεζὸν στρατόπεδον περιπορεύεσθαι τὸν τῆς Αἴτνης λόφον.* Thucyd. iii. 116. *Ἐῤῥύη δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔαρ τοῦτο ὁ ῥύαξ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τῆς Αἴτνης.*

Ὡς περ αἰώραν τινά.] Olympiod. Cod. i. p. 162. *Ὅτι τῆς τῶν ὑπογείων ῥευμάτων ἀντιθέσεως αἰτίαν εἶναι φησι τὴν αἰώραν, ἥ ἐστιν ἀντιταλάντωσις· καὶ πρὸ αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ζῶον ποιοῦσα τὴν γῆν, εἰσπνέον καὶ ἐκπνέον· καὶ ὅτι* (f. *ἔτι*) *πρὸ ταύτης ἡ δαιμονία καὶ θεῖα αἰτία*: where *αἰώρα* is correctly explained by *ἀντιταλάντωσις*, a reciprocal preponderance of the bowls of a balance when set in motion, in which there are equal weights. So this *αἰώρα*, or *libratio* which existed in the earth, caused a perpetual efflux and influx of those rivers, according to the elevation and depression of the places themselves. *Αἰώρα*, in gymnastics, is applied to an exercise familiar to early life; two boys, one at either end of a beam whose centre rests on a log, reciprocally rising and falling, are said *ἀντιταλαντεύειν*, i. q. *αἰωρεῖν*. See infr. *αἰωρεῖται καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω*. Ficinus, Scap. Lex., and others, explain *αἰώρα* by *vas pensile*, which is wholly inconsistent with the sense and tenor of the passage. *Ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἡ αἰώρα*,—i. e. that this *αἰώρα* is owing to a certain innate property in the earth. One of the chasms or *ἔγκοιλα* in the earth is far larger than the rest, called by Homer and other poets Tartarus; into this all the rivers already mentioned are emptied, and from this they are again discharged to their respective beds and currents; hence the *αἰώρα*, which some interpreters removing the stop after *τινά*, explain as if it was itself *ἕν τι τῶν χασμάτων*, &c. which is utterly inadmissible as far as regards both meaning and grammar.

Ὅ περ Ὅμηρος.] Iliad. θ'. 13. See notes to Pope's Homer, Iliad. θ'. Odyss. λ'. and ω.

τῆλε μάλ', ᾗχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον· ὅ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συῤῥέουσί τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσι· γίγνονται δὲ ἕκαστοι τοιοῦτοι δι' οἵας ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέωσιν. Ἡ δ' αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰσρεῖν πάντα τὰ ῥεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ὑγρὸν τοῦτο. αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταυτὸν ποιεῖ· ξυνέπεται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τῆς γῆς ὁρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὥς περ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων ἀεὶ ἐκπνεῖ τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ ῥέον τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ ξυναιωρούμενον τῷ ὑγρῷ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινούς τινας ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ εἰσιὸν καὶ ἐξιόν. ὅταν τε οὖν ὁρμῆσαν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τό-

βάθιστον——βέρεθρον.] Cf. Virg. Æneid. vi. 577. "— tum Tartarus ipse Bis patet in præceps tantum, tenditque sub umbras, Quantus ad ætherium cæli suspectus Olympum." Hesiod. Theogon. 720. Τόσσον ἔνερθ' ὑπὸ γῆς, ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ' ἀπὸ γαίης. Paradise Lost, B. 1. "Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace And rest can never dwell; hope never comes That comes to all; but torture without end Still urges, and a fiery deluge fed With ever-burning sulphur unconsum'd: Such place eternal Justice had prepared For those rebellious: here their prison ordained In utter darkness, and their portion set As far removed from God and light of Heaven, As from the centre thrice to the utmost pole."— Βέρεθρον, Hesych. interpr. βαθος, βάραθρον, κατώτατον, ἔσχατον, ἢ πηλώδης τόπος, ἢ κοίλωμα καταχθόνιον.

Ἄλλοι πολλοι των ποιητων.] Hesiod. loc. cit. Æschyl. Prom. 154. Eurip. Hippol. 1290.

Εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο.] These words are to be referred to ἕν τι—τετρημένον δι' ὅλης τῆς γῆς, supr. of which they explain the cause, whence γὰρ. τ. τ. χ.

Τοιοῦτοι δι οἵας ἂν κ.] h. e. οἵα ἐστὶν ἡ γῆ, δι' ἧς ἂν ῥιώσιν.

Πυθμένα οὐχ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν—.] *Hic liquor nec fundum nec fundamentum habet.* Wyττ.—Αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει, *rolls* or *librates, and fluctuates up and down*; ἄνω and κάτω are not to be understood of two places only, but of all the parts of this earth which are diametrically opposed. It is to be observed that the cause of this motion in this liquid body is its being equally attracted on all sides towards its own centre, as in the case of the earth, supr. c. 58.

Τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ.] Olympiod. Ὅτι ὄντος πυρὸς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς γῆς, καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος, εἰκότως γίνεται πολυ πνεῦμα ἐκεῖ. τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς ἐξατμιδοῦντος τὸ ὕδωρ (*turning the water into vapour*), τὸ δὲ ὕδατος εἰς πνεῦμα ἀναλομένου.—Περὶ αὐτὸ, sc. τὸ ὑγρόν.

Ὅταν τε οὖν ὁρμῆσαν—ἐκπαντλοῦντες.] *When, therefore, the water rushing with violence, descends into that place which is called* κάτω, *the region underneath,* (—καλούμενον is added because in reality neither ἄνω nor κάτω can be applied to the earth, except relatively, according to the different situations of its inhabitants), *then* (τότε) *having passed through the earth* (διὰ τῆς γῆς) *it flows*

που τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τότε κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ῥεύματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὥς περ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὖ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἀπολίπῃ, δεῦρο δὲ ὁρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὖθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ῥεῖ διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἕκαστα ἀφικνούμενα εἰς οὓς ἑκάστους ὁδοποιεῖται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ. Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω ἢ ἐπηντλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγον· πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς. καὶ ἔνια

into the beds of the rivers (τὰ ῥεύματα) *there* (κατ' ἐκεῖνα), *and fills them up in the manner of those who pump up the water from the hold of a ship.* This is suggested as a feasible interpretation of a passage involved in some perplexity. It is to be observed, that *τότε κατ' ἐκ.* has been adopted supr. after Zeunius and Wyttenbach, as corresponding to *ὅταν* preced., for *τοῖς κατ' ἐκ.* the reading of Bekker and Heindorf, who arranges the passage in explan. *τὰ ῥεύματα εἰσρεῖ διὰ τῆς γῆς τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ*, in which, however, he admits, "duriusculum esse *ἐκεῖνα* sejungere a seq. *τὰ ῥεύματα*, durum itidem, *εἰσρεῖν* ad dativum *τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα* trahere; sed aliter tamen non constare sensus." The latter and more serious difficulty is obviated by *τότε*; but with regard to the former it is absolutely necessary to the sense that *κατ' ἐκεῖνα* should have the force of *ἐκεῖ*, as being opposed to *ἐνθάδε* infr. Further, as *κάτω* is but a relative term, the water may be said, when it has reached the opposite surface, to have emerged, *ἄνω, διὰ τῆς γῆς*, and to have spread itself not through the rivers, (as Wyttenbach explains *τὰ ῥεύματα, in flumina*, and again, *ὡς περ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες, ut apud nos faciunt hi, qui aquam antlia haurientes eam alteri aquæ affundunt;*) but through the beds of the rivers, which became empty again on the return or ascent of the waters to us here, *ἐνθάδε*, who dwell in some one of the, relatively speaking, superior *ἔγκοιλα τῆς γῆς*. So V. Cousin;—*vers des lits de fleuves.* The sense in which *ἐπαντλοῦντες* is taken supr. *clearing a ship's sink by pumping*, evidently accords both with *κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω* supr. and *ἡ ἐπαντλεῖτο* infr. It agrees also with the interpretation of Schleiermacher and Schneider V. *Ἀντλία*. V. Cousin in loc. "Tous les traducteurs: *Comme quand on verse de l'eau qu'on a puisée*, ou quelque chose d' équivalent, à l'exception de Dacier: *comme quand on puise de l'eau avec deux seaux*, interprétation arbitraire et ridicule. Quant à la première, elle est tout-à-fait insignifiante et indigne de Platon. Il faut qu'il ait voulu indiquer quelque mécanisme particulier dont on se servait de son temps pour vider les vaisseaux, et par lequel on mettait l'eau en movement dans une autre direction que celle de la pesanteur. Nous n'avons que le mot pompe pour exprimer cela."

Τὰ ἐνθάδε.] Intell. *ῥεύματα.*—Διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν, *through the channels.*—Εἰς οὓς ἑκάστους, *into which severally they make their way.*

Πολὺ κατωτέρω ἢ ἐπηντλεῖτο.] *Far deeper down than they were drawn up;* referring to οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες supr., and so obviously as to preclude the emendation of Heindorf, ἐξηντλεῖτο. See upon this construction ἢ ἐπην τ. Matthiæ Gr. s. 450. *Obs.* 2. Wyttenbach explains it more fully *κατωτ. ἢ ᾗ ἐπ. inferius quam ubi, &c.*, but he is certainly wrong in giving *adfundebatur* as the sense of *ἐπηντλεῖτο.*

Πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω—τῆς ἐκροῆς.] *But all below* or *lower than their efflux,*

μὲν καταντικρὺ ᾗ εἰσρεῖ ἐξέπεσεν, ἔνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἃ παντάπασι κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἢ ἅπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα· περὶ τὴν γῆν ὥς περ οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. δυνατὸν δ' ἐστὶν ἑκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ' οὔ· ἄναντες γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ῥεύμασι τὸ ἑκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.

than the place of their discharge: τῆς ἐκροῆς being the same as ἡ ἐπηντλεῖτο preced. Socrates meaning to say that these waters, upon their return to Tartarus, issued out again, some deeper, others less so, but all in some degree below the point at which they were discharged.

Καταντικρὺ ᾗ εἰσρεῖ.] i. e. καταντικρὺ τῆς εἰσροῆς. Matthiæ Gr. p. 749. note *d.* s. 481. Obs. 2. V. Cousin in loc. "Aristotle, en refutant cette théorie de Platon, parait avoir entendu par le mot καταντικρὺ une opposition de lieux par rapport au centre de la terre: πάντα δὲ κύκλῳ περιάγειν εἰς τὴν ἀρχήν.... πολλὰ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, τὰ δὲ καὶ καταντικρὺ τῇ θέσει τῆς ἐκροῆς, οἷον, εἰ ῥεῖν ἤρξατο κάτωθεν, ἄνωθεν εἰσβάλλειν. (Meteor. ii. 2.) Et Olympiodore, son commentateur, interprète ce passage dans le même sens. Cette idée ne peut se concevoir qu'en supposant que la figure de l'abîme du Tartare soit circulaire autour du centre de la terre, ce qui est contraire à ce que dit Platon, que le grand abîme est διαμπερὲς τετρημένον δι' ὅλης τῆς γῆς, paroles qu'on ne peut guères adapter à une figure circulaire, car alors il n'y devrait plus de terre, et tout serait abime. Il faut donc que l'abîme soit plus long que large; mais alors deux points de son contour, pour être à l'opposite l'un de l'autre, ne sont pas pour cela l'un en bas et l'autre en haut, comme le veut Aristotle. L'hypothèse de la figure longitudinale de l'abîme me parait encore confirmée par les expressions δυνατὸν δ' ἐστὶν ἑκατέρωσε .... τὸ ἑκατέρωθεν μέρος .... ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ῥεύμασι, qui indiquent évidemment une opposition des points, sur la direction d'une seule et même ligne, et non sur une infinité des lignes différentes, ce qui devrait résulter de la figure circulaire, qui a une infinité de diamètres."

Περιελιχθ. περὶ τὴν γῆν ὥς, π. οἱ ὄφ.] *Coiled around the earth like serpents.*

Εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω καθέντα.] i. e. *When they have descended* or *sunk as low as possible;* of the intransitive sense, as here, of καθιέναι, Heindorf adduces examples ad Theætet. c. 65. V. Lobeck, ad Soph. Aj. 842. where μεθιέναι, ἰφιέναι, ἀφιέναι, &c. are shown to be capable of a similar construction.

Ἑκατέρωσε.] Socrates had already said, that on the return of these streams to Tartarus they re-entered the earth always at a lower point than that of their discharge into Tartarus, also that some emptied themselves at a place transversely opposite to that at which they had so entered, and others at the same side. While others, having made one or more circuits of the earth, emptied themselves again into Tartarus, as low down as they could. But as all these waters, which so penetrate in different directions through, and girded round the earth, were forced to return to a common centre, they could only as they re-entered at both sides of the chasm, descend so low as its centre, but not beyond this, for on both sides, if they descended lower, they would be ascending a steep, whereas they could evidently not pass at either side beyond the sphere of their attraction. Ἑκατέρωσε,—ἀμφοτεροῖς τοῖς ῥεύμασι, and τὸ ἑκατέρωθεν μέρος, may be explained by ἄνω καὶ κάτω,—εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε—κατ' ἐκεῖνα—τὰ ἐνθάδε supr. Heindorf refers it to ἔνια μὲν καταντ.—ἔνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος. But it is not easy to arrive at any certainty upon the de-

§. 61. Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ῥεύματά ἐστι· τυγχάνει δ' ἄρα ὄντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ' ἄττα ῥεύματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω ῥέον περὶ κύκλῳ ὁ καλούμενος Ὠκεανός ἐστι, τούτου δὲ καταντικρὺ καὶ ἐναντίως ῥέων Ἀχέρων, ὃς δι' ἐρήμων τε τόπων ῥεῖ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ῥέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, οὗ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καί τινας εἱμαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζώων γενέσεις. Τρίτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ καόμενον, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν θαλάττης, ζέουσαν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιττόμενος δὲ τῇ γῇ ἄλλοσέ τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ' ἔσχατα τῆς Ἀχερουσιάδος λίμνης, οὐ ξυμμιγνύμενος τῷ ὕδα-

tails of this theory regarding Tartarus, which is elaborately and most needlessly perplexed.

§. 61. Τέτταρ' ἄττα ῥεύματα.] Cf. Procl. in Plat. Rep. p. 396. ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης—καὶ τῶν ποταμῶν ἐκεῖθεν τὴν ἱστορίαν παρειληφε, καὶ γὰρ ὅτι πάντων ἐστὶν. "Ὠκεανὸς μὲν πρῶτα, τὸν οὔπως ἐστι περῆσαι," (Od. λ'. 157.) καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως· "Ἔνθα μὲν εἰς Ἀχέροντα Πυριφλεγέθων τε ῥέουσι, Κωκυτός θ' ὃς δὴ Στυγὸς ὕδατός ἐστιν ἀποῤῥώξ." (Od. κ'. 514.) Ὅθεν οἶμαι καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης Στύγιον αὐτὸν προσείρηκεν.

Εἰς τὰς τῶν ζώων γενέσεις.] See supr. c. 15. init. c. 31. init. Ἐνδοῦνται. n. V. Cousin; *Sont renvoyées dans ce monde pour y animer de nouveaux êtres.*

Τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει.] h. e. Ἐκρεῖ, as in c. 60. supr. here called ἐκβολή. Musgrave, ad Eurip. Iph. T. 1042.—Πόντου νοτερὸν εἶπας ἐκβολαν, reads ἐκβολήν, and adds,—"ἐκβολὴ hic a poeta dici videtur, tanquam *scaturigo quædam a terra provenlens.*—Ἐκβολὴ enim est *fons, scaturigo.* Auct. de Mundo: πηγῶν ἀναβλύσεις, καὶ ποταμῶν ἐκβολαί, καὶ δένδρων ἐκφύσεις, p. 12. Pausanias; πρὸς δὲ ταῖς Ἐρασινου ταῖς κατὰ τὸ ὄρος ἐκβολαις; p. 67. Ed. Sylb. Non hic loquitur de Erasini in mare exitu, sed de loco ubi e terra ἐκβάλλει."—Κατὰ μέσον, i. e. between Ocean and Acheron.

Καόμενον.] Att. for καιόμενον. V. Pierson on Mœris, p. 231.—Τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν θαλάττης, *the Mediterranean.* c. 58. supr. περὶ τὴν θάλατταν.

Θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης.] *Turbid and muddy.*—Περιελιττόμενος δὲ τῇ γῇ, i. e. *but making the compass of the earth, it arrives, among other places, at the extremity of the Acherusian lake,* &c.—Heindorf proposes to read περιελιττόμενος δὲ τῆς γῆς ἄλλοσί τε (*et in alias terræ partes*) ἀφικνεῖται, &c.; making τῆς γῆς to depend upon ἄλλοσί, because the reading in the text would imply that the river encompassed the earth externally, whereas the sense requires that the passage should be understood of its windings under ground. But proba-

τι· περιελιχθεὶς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωρέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου. οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπονομάζουσι Πυριφλεγέθοντα, οὗ καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἀποσπάσματα ἀναφυσῶσιν, ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς. τούτου δ' αὖ καταντικρὺ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον πρῶτον δεινόν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρῶμα δὲ ἔχοντα ὅλον οἷον ὁ κυανός, ὃν δὴ ἐπονομάζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν λίμνην, ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγα. ὁ δ' ἐμπεσὼν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὰς δυνάμεις λαβὼν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελιττόμενος χωρεῖ ἐναντίως τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ ἐξ ἐναντίας· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τούτου ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ μίγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος κύκλῳ περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίως τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι· ὄνομα δὲ τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι, Κωκυτός.

§. 62. Τούτων δὲ οὕτω πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκωνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἷ ὁ δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἵ τε καλῶς καὶ οσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μή. καὶ οἷ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέ-

bly περιελιτ. τῇ γῇ may be used in reference to the earth externally, and περιελιχθεὶς δὲ—ὑπὸ γῆς of its internal windings after it had reached the extremity of the Acherusian lake, and before it arrived at Tartarus. Τῇ γῇ is wanting in Theodoret. Cur. Aff. xi. p. 154. and Euseb. MS. Oxon. Præp. Evang. xi. 38. p. 567.

Κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου.] i. e. Εἰς τι κατωτέρω μέρος τοῦ Ταρτάρου. Cf. supr. Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς—πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει.

Οὗ καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἀποσπάσ. ἀναφ.] i. e. *Of which* (Pyriphlegethon), *the burning currents emit with violence distinct and forcibly separated portions, in whatever part of the earth they may be.*

Εἰς τόπον πρῶτον δεινόν.] i. q. Ἐκπίπτει πρῶτον εἰς τόπον δεινόν.—Κυανός, not only signifies *a cerulean*, or *blueish colour*, but also *a gem* of a similar colour, but inclined to yellow, which some make a species of jasper, others of sapphire. Plin. H. N. 37. 9. Theophr. de lapidd. p. 218. Bas. Meurs. Cypr. ii. 5. p. 94. Schneider, in Lex. explains κυανὸν, as *copper ochre*, and also *lapis Lazuli*.

Δεινὰς δυνάμεις.] i. e. *A mischievous efficacy.*

Χωρεῖ ἐναντίως.] i. q. Ἐξ ἐναντίας χωρεῖ.

§. 62. Διεδικασαντο.] h. e. *Judicium subeunt.* STALL. See supr. c. 57. init. διαδικασαμένους.

Μέσως βεβιωκέναι.] Those who have not been distinguished for the extremes of good or evil in life, are said μέσως βεβιωκέναι, to have run a middle course between virtue and vice, without being remarkable for an adherence to either. Eutrop. de Claudio, 7. 8. "*medie* im-

ροντα, ἀναβάντες ἃ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσί τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἴ τίς τι ἠδίκηκε, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν τιμὰς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστος· οἳ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὔ ποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν. Οἳ δ' ἂν ἰάσιμα μέν, μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἁμαρτήματα, οἷον πρὸς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπ' ὀργῆς βίαιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιῶσιν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνοι τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένωνται, τούτους δὲ ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ κῦμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν, τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυριφλεγέθοντα· ἐπειδὰν δὲ

peravit." Tacit. Hist. i. 49. de Galba. "ipsi *medium* ingenium magis extra vitia, quam cum virtutibus."—Ἃ δὲ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά,—it is not certain what Plato meant by ὄχημα, the material vehicle of the soul; upon which Wyttenbach;—"Itaque accipiendum ex fabulæ verisimilitudine, in fluvialis itineris usum navigia postulantibus." V. Cousin; *ils s'embarquent sur des nacelles*, &c.

Καθαιρόμενοι.] Cf. Virgil, Æneid. vi. 735. "Quin et supremo quum lumine vita reliquit, Non tamen omne malum miseris, nec funditus omnes Corporeæ excedunt pestes; penitusque necesse est Multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris. Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumque malorum Supplicia expendunt.—." Suid. v. Ἀχέρων· Ὁ δὲ Ἀχέρων καθαρσίῳ ἔοικε καὶ οὐ κολαστηρίῳ, ῥύπτων καὶ σμήχων τὰ ἁμαρτήματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

Εὐεργεσιῶν τιμὰς φέρονται.] *They obtain the reward of their good works.*—Cf. de Rep. x. p. 615. B. εἴ τινας εὐεργεσίας εὐεργετηκότες καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι γεγονότες εἶεν.

Ἀνιάτως ἔχειν.] Cf. Æneas Gaz. in Theophr. p. 52. οἱ δὲ κακοὶ εἰς Τάρταρον ἐμπεσόντες, ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβήσονται, αὐτοὶ μὲν οὔκετι ὀνίνανται, παράδειγμα δὲ τῆς δίκης γενόμενοι, εἰς ἀεὶ κείσονται· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν Φαίδωνι καὶ Γοργίᾳ Σωκράτης διϊσχυρίζετο.

Καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς.] *And when it has repented them.*—Matthiæ Gr. s. 564.

Ἐκβαλλει τὸ κῦμα.] Cf. supr. c. 60. Αἰωρεῖται καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω.

Κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν.] i. e. *Into Cocytus, so as to be borne along the course of its current.* Cf. Xenoph. Cyrop. vii. 5. 16. τὸ ὕδωρ κατὰ τὰς τάφρους ἐχώρει ἐν τῇ νυκτί. But κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα seq., *at the Acherusian lake.* Xen. Anab. v. 2. 16. Ξενοφῶν στὰς κατὰ τὰς πύλας ὁπόσους ἐδύνατο κατεκώλυε τῶν ὁπλιτῶν ἔξω.—Φερόμενοι, sc. ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν ποταμῶν.

φερόμενοι γένωνται κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσί τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὓς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὓς ὕβρισαν, καλέσαντες δ' ἱκετεύουσι καὶ δέονται ἐᾶσαι σφᾶς ἐκβῆναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ δέξασθαι, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσιν, ἐκβαίνουσί τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον κἀκεῖθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται, πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὓς ἠδικήκασιν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη. Οἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὥς περ δεσμωτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκιζόμενοι. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν

Ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσιν.] i. e. *If they should succeed in appeasing them.*

Λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν.] Cf. Eurip. Phœn. 1078. ἔξελθε—λήξας ὀδυρμῶν πενθίμων τε δακρύων.

Εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς.] Sc. The homicides into Cocytus, the matricides and parricides into Pyriphlegethon.

Οἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι, κ. τ. λ.] See upon this construction, Matthiæ Gr. s. 634. 1. where *βιῶναι*, only once expressed, is understood after *προς το.*— Wyttenbach takes *τὸ ὁσιως* in the sense of *τὴν ὁσιότητα*, and explains the passage—*qui autem egregie ad sanctitatem vixisse videatur:* adverbs being frequently used with the article for substantives, as *τὸ ἀδίκως* for *ἡ ἀδικία*, *τὸ δικαίως* for *ἡ δικαιοσύνη*: so in Phileb. p. 92. C. *τοῦ καλῶς ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιτύχοιμεν*, for *τοῦ καλοῦ*. Heindorf proposes, from Theod. Cur. Aff. viii. p. 118. xi. p. 115. to read *οἳ δὲ δὴ δόξωσι διαφ. πρ. το ὁσ. β. προκεκρίσθαι, Quicunque autem videntur, præ cæteris sancte vivendo excelluisse ;* but it is probable that *προκεκρῖσθαι* was inserted in Theod. as supr. in explanation of *διαφερόντως*.— Besides the reading in the text is sanctioned by all the copies, and in the case of either of the interpretations given above, is alike independent of any correction.

Ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν.] Cf. supr. c. 59. Milton, Il Penseroso:

> —— Or let my lamp at midnight hour,
> Be seen in some high lonely tower,
> Where I may oft outwatch the Bear,
> With thrice-great Hermes, or unsphere
> The spirit of Plato, to unfold
> What worlds, or what vast regions hold
> The immortal mind, that hath forsook
> Her mansion in this fleshly nook.

Ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.] h. e. *In supernas illas terræ regiones, ubi omnia sunt illustriora, pulchriora, diviniora.* Stall.

Οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκ. καθηράμενοι.] i. e. Those who have weaned themselves from the body and its appetites, and in the study of the sublime precepts of philosophy, enjoy the only real freedom, that of the unpolluted and unshackled mind.

> —— Wisdom's self
> Oft seeks to sweet retired solitude;
> Where, with her best nurse, Contemplation,
> She plumes her feathers, and lets grow her wings,
> That in the various bustle of resort
> Were all-to ruffled, and sometimes impaired.
> He that has light within his own clear breast,
> May sit i' the centre and enjoy bright day:
> But he, that hides a dark soul and foul thoughts,
> Benighted walks under the mid-day sun;
> Himself is his own dungeon.—*Comus.*

ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, ἃς οὔτε ῥᾴδιον δηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι.

§. 63. Ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρὴ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπεί περ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν· καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥς περ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον. Ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα θαῤῥεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα, ὅς τις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους εἴασε χαίρειν ὡς ἀλλοτρίους τε ὄν-

Ἄνευ τε σωμάτων.] Olympiod. Αἱ καθαρθεῖσαι τελέως εἰς τὸν ὑπερκόσμιον τόπον ἀποκαθίστανται ἄνευ σωμάτων.

§. 63. Πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε.] i. e. Παντι τρόπω μηχανᾶσθαι; *to make every effort, to leave no means untried, so as to,* &c.—Καλὸν γάρ τὸ ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη, *for the prize is glorious, and the hope is great.*

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι.] It is to be observed that Socrates expresses himself strongly here against any one insisting upon the truth of the theory just laid down, of which and all such it is impossible but that the principles should be speculative and vague. The grand point of the whole discussion had been fully established as an immutable and incontrovertible truth; this once disposed of, as if to unbend the minds of his auditors, and to divert them, for the brief remaining period of his life, from dwelling upon its afflicting close, the philosopher entered upon the subject of a future state, and its concomitant punishments and rewards. From the first he disclaimed being himself assured, or any attempt to assure others that these opinions were to be admitted as well founded or true; that the good and evil should be after this life requited according to their works, was not to be denied, but the nature of this retribution, upon which reason can only speculate, as still remaining unrevealed, it would be absurd to endeavour to illustrate or define.

Τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν.] h. e. Τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι (sc. οἰομένῳ οὕτ. ἔχ.) i. e. *this* (ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστιν ἢ τοιαῦτ. ἄτ. κ. τ. λ.), *it appears to me to be both becoming in one who so thinks, and worth one's while who so thinks to run the risk of the belief,* or *to run the risk of having it so thought.*—V. Cousin; *La chose vaut la peine qu'on hasarde d'y croire.*—Ἐπᾴδειν, see supr. c. 24. a med.

Περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ.] *In respect to his soul.*

τας καὶ πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσπούδασέ τε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνῃ τε καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἀνδρίᾳ καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ, καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, οὕτω περιμένει τὴν εἰς Ἅιδου πορείαν, ὡς πορευσόμενος ὅταν ἡ εἱμαρμένη καλῇ. ὑμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰσαῦθις ἔν τινι χρόνῳ ἕκαστοι πορεύσεσθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ηδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἱμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδόν τί μοι ὥρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ βέλτιον εἶναι λουσάμενον πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν νεκρὸν λούειν.

§. 64. Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις ἢ περὶ τῶν παίδων ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὅ τι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῖμεν; Ἅ περ ἀεί, ἔφη, λέγω, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν καινότερον· ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἅττ' ἂν

Πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος.] *Thinking that they make the evil* (θάτερον) *greater*:—θάτερον being an Attic euphemism for τὸ κακόν. V. Valcken. Diatrib. in Eurip. Fragm. p. 112. C. Cf. Plat. in Euthydem. p. 218. F. πλεῖον γάρ που, οἶμαι, θάτερον ἐστιν, ἐάν τις χρῆται μὴ ὀρθῶς ὑτῳοῦν πράγματι, ἢ ἐὰν ἐᾷ, *for the evil, I think, is greater if one mismanages anything than if he leaves it altogether untouched.* Ibid. p. 255. C. ὁ δ' ἐμὸς Ἰόλεως Πατροκλῆς εἰ ἔλθοι, πλέον ἂν θάτερον ποιήσειεν, i. e. *would do more evil than good.* See Wettst. ad Timoth. i. v. 25.

Φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός.] *As a tragic writer would say.* Heindorf justly observes, that if an allusion were intended to any particular poet, Plato would have written κατὰ τὸν τραγικὸν, or φησὶν ὁ τραγικός. But it is rather to be supposed that, in the cheerful and happy spirit which never forsook him, Socrates assumes the mock gravity and pomp of tragedy, and expresses himself in terms analogous to those in which a catastrophe, like his own, might be most movingly described.

βέλτιον εἶναι.] Cf. in Crit. c. 16. ἄμεινον εἶναι.

§. 64. Ἐπιστέλλεις.] The verb ἐπιστέλλειν is peculiarly used in reference to the last injunctions of the dying. Infr. c. 65. καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο.

Ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῖμεν.] i. e. *We may act most agreeably to you.* Sens. Vig. c. iii. s. 12. r. 2.

Ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι.] *Taking care of yourselves*; sc. that you may be improved and increased in wisdom and the practice of virtue.

Ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς.] *To me and mine*;—τοῖς ἐμοῖς referring chiefly to his children. — κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε, *although you should not promise it*

ποιῆτε, κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε· ἐὰν δὲ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἀμελῆτε, καὶ μὴ θέλητε ὥς περ κατ᾽ ἴχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὐδ᾽ ἐὰν πολλὰ ὁμολογήσητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν προθυμηθησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν· θάπτωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον; Ὅπως ἄν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, ἐάν πέρ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς. Γελάσας δὲ ἅμα ἡσυχῇ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν, Οὐ πείθω, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγώ εἰμι οὗτος ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενός καὶ διατάττων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ᾽ οἴεταί με ἐκεῖνον εἶναι ὃν ὄψεται ὀλίγον ὕστερον νεκρόν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ πῶς με θάπτῃ. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι ὡς ἐπειδὰν πίω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ ἀλλ᾽ οἰχήσομαι ἀπιὼν εἰς μακάρων δή τινας εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἅμα δ᾽ ἐμαυτόν. ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν με πρὸς

now.

Οὐδ᾽ ἐὰν πολλὰ ὁμολογήσ. κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *No matter how many promises you may have made, or how earnestly, you will avail nothing the more;* it will be all to no purpose. Scag. Vig. c. iii. s. 10. r. 6.

Οὐ πείθω, ἔφη,—Κρίτωνα, κ. τ. λ.] *I do not convince Crito that I am this Socrates who now confers with you,* &c. i. e. Socrates could not yet, he says, persuade Crito, that he who had hitherto conducted this discussion, and arranged its several arguments, was actually Socrates, the living and immortal mind and soul, whereas Crito spoke as if the dead body, concerning the disposal of which he had asked the question, was still Socrates himself, even after the spirit had fled. Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 43. "(De humatione) Socrates quidem quid senserit, apparet in eo libro, in quo moritur: de quo jam tam multa diximus. Cum enim de immortalitate animorum disputavisset, et jam moriendi tempus urgueret, rogatus a Critone quemadmodum sepeliri vellet: 'Multam vero, inquit, operam, amici, frustra consumsi; Critoni enim nostro non persuasi, me hinc avolaturum, neque mei quidquam relicturum. Verumtamen, Crito, si me assequi poteris, aut sicubi nactus eris, ut tibi videtur, sepelito. Sed, mihi crede, nemo me vestrum, cum hinc excessero, consequetur.' Præclare id quidem, qui et amico permiserit, et se ostenderit de hoc toto genere nihil laborare."

Εἰς μακάρων δή τινας.] Supr. c. 57. Οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δή τινα τόπον.—Ἄλλως, *to no purpose, fruitlessly.*

Ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν με—τὴν ἐναντ. ἐγγ.] *Enter then into security for me to Crito, of an opposite character to that which he gave the judges.* Ἐγγυᾶσθαί τινα signifies, *to become security* or *caution for another.* Demosth. p. 809. ed. Reisk. πρῶτον ὑμῖν μάρτυρας παρασχήσομαι, ὡς οὐκ ἠγγυησάμην ἐγὼ τὸν Παρμένοντα, *that I did not go security for Parmeno.* Μάχην μάχεσθαι, ἔχθος ἐχθαίρειν, &c. are forms familiar to the Greeks, so supr., ἐγγυᾶσθαι ἐγγύην, and since ἐγγυᾶσθαι governs an accu-

Κρίτωνα, ἔφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην, ἢ ἣν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἠγγυᾶτο. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἦ μὴν παραμενεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ ἦ μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν ἐγγυήσασθε, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ οἰχήσεσθαι ἀπιόντα, ἵνα Κρίτων ῥᾷον φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὁρῶν μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καόμενον ἢ κατορυττόμενον ἀγανακτῇ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὡς δεινὰ ἄττα πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορύττει. Εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ ἄριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ θαῤῥεῖν τε χρὴ καὶ φάναι τοὐμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως ὅπως ἄν σοι φίλον ᾖ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῇ νόμιμον εἶναι.

§. 65. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἵπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς διεξιόντες, ὅση ἡμῖν γεγονυῖα εἴη, ἀτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι ὥς περ πατρὸς στερηθέντες διάξειν ὀρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα

sative of the person, hence the form ἐγγύην ἐγγυᾶσθαι τινά τινι or πρὸς τινά.

Οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἦ μὴν παραμ.] Intell. ἠγγυήσατο.

Ἀγανακτῇ.] *Should lament* or *be troubled.* Infr. c. 66. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὕντινα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε.

Ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτη.] Ficinus appears to have read ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτης ἢ ἐκφέρεται ἢ κατορύττεται: but as Heindorf observes, there is no reason for changing the text as supr., as Crito is understood from c. seq. to have undertaken the charge of the funeral rites. Προτίθεσθαι, *to lay out the dead body.* Eurip. Phœn. 1329. ἐγὼ δ' ἦκω μετὰ—γραῖαν Ἰοκάστην, ὅπως Λούσῃ προθῆται τ' οὐκ ἔτ' ὄντα παῖδ' ἐμόν. Hecub. 609—611. ὡς παῖδα—λούσω προθῶμαί θ'. Virg. Æneid. ix.486. "—nec te tua funera mater Produxi, pressive oculos, aut vulnera lavi." Ἐκφέρειν and κατορύττειν are terms also peculiar to the burial ceremonies. See Robinson's Grec. Antiq. B. v. cc. 3. 4.

Οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο.] *Not only as far as regards itself,* sc. τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν. Heind. With Socrates, Epictetus observes, ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως, ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις; in Arrian. i. c. 17. p. 93.—Πλημμελὲς, sc. ἐστίν, *is culpable.* Schæfer Melett. p. 4. conjectures that it should be written πλημμελεῖ, upon which Heindorf.—"de *hominibus* frequens est πλημμελεῖν: num itidem de *rebus?*" — Φάναι, *to direct.*

§. 65. Ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι.] i.e. *He arose and went into a certain chamber.* Eurip. Heracl. 59. ἀνίστασθαί σε χρὴ

βίον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλούσατο καὶ ἠνέχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδία—δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεῖς σμικροὶ ἦσαν, εἷς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο, ἐκείναις ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεχθείς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν· χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἔνδον. Ἐλθὼν δ' ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος, καὶ οὐ πόλλ' ἅττα μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ἕνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς παρ' αὐτόν, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαί γε σοῦ ὅ περ τῶν ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσι καὶ καταρῶνται, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς παραγγέλλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ πραότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπανεῖς, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλ' ἐκείνοις. νῦν οὖν, οἶσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον

Εἰς Ἄργος, οὗ σε λεύσιμος μένει δίκη.—Περιεμένομεν οὖν, κ. τ. λ., more fully, περιεμ. οὖν τοτὲ μὲν—ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ' αὖ διεξιόντες.—Τοτὲ μέν being omitted sometimes before τοτὲ δέ as ὁ μέν before ὁ δέ. Cf. supr. c. 55. init. Ἄμουσον,—τὸ δὲ ἄδικον.

Δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεῖς.] Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 23. Υἱεῖς—τρεῖς. supr. c. 3.—Τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππην.—Αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες, *the female attendants, relations*, or *kinswomen*. Some commentators explain this of the *wives* of Socrates, in which case, as Heindorf correctly observes, it should have been written, not αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες, but αἱ γυναῖκες αὐτοῦ. Cf. Ælian. Var. Hist. xii. 1. 18. ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων γυναικῶν αἱ ἔτυχον αὐταῖς συνελθοῦσαι, διαπεπλεγμέναι τε ἦσαν τὰς κόμας, καὶ διαπεποικιλμέναι τὰ πρόσωπα. In the variety of conflicting testimonies it is not easy to arrive at the truth of this part of Socrates' history, regarding his wives and children. That he had two, Myrto and Xanthippe, most of the ancient writers agree upon, but whether they were both alive at the same time, and whether Myrto or Xanthippe was mother to Lamprocles, or Sophroniscus and Menexenus, seems still a matter of great doubt. The probability is, that Lamprocles, the eldest, was the son of Myrto, and that the two younger were the sons of Xantippe, of whom only mention is made by Plato and Xenophon. Cf. Hemsterhus. ad Lucian. Halcyon. i. p. 184. et Præfat. xxxiii. Panæt. in Plutarch. Aristid. p. 335. C. Athen. xiii. p. 556. A. Bentl. in dissert. Phalarid. de Epist. p. 73. Diog. Laert. ii. 26. Jo. Luzac. in Lect. Att.

Καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν.] *And it was now near sunset.* Cf. infr. Ἀλλ' οἶμαι—ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσι καὶ οὔπω δεδυκέναι.

Οὐ πόλλ' ἅττα.] i. q. Ὀλίγα ἅττα, *pauca quædam*. HEIND.

Οὐ καταγνώσομαί γε σοῦ.] *I will not reproach you at least with what I reproach others.*

Τῶν ἀρχόντων.] Sc. Τῶν ἕνδεκα.

ἀγγελῶν, χαίρέ τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾷστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. Καὶ ἅμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῄει. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, Καὶ σύ, ἔφη χαῖρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. Καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ὡς ἀστεῖος, ἔφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσῄει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λῶστος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίως με ἀποδακρύει. ἀλλ' ἄγε δή, ὦ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται· εἰ δὲ μή, τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, Ἀλλ' οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσι καὶ οὔπω δεδυκέναι. καὶ ἅμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ ὀψὲ πίνοντας, ἐπειδὰν παραγγελθῇ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πιόντας εὖ μάλα, καὶ ξυγγενομένους γ' ἐνίους ὧν ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγου· ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως γ', ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοί τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οὓς σὺ λέγεις, οἴονται γὰρ κερδανεῖν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδαίνειν ὀλίγον ὕστερον πιὼν ἄλλο γε ἢ γέ-

Καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν.] Referring to πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾷστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα supr.

Καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον.] *And during the whole time* (of his imprisonment, sc. thirty days) *he used to visit me, and occasionally* (when his other occupations allowed), *conferred with me, and proved himself the kindest of men.*

Εἰ τέτριπται.] The seed of the hemlock was brayed or ground to extract the juice. Plin. N. H. xxv. 13.—Ὁ ἄνθρωπος, sc. ὁ τῶν ἑνδεκα ὑπηρέτης.

Ἀλλ' οἶμαι—ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι—] *But I think that the sun is still upon the mountains, and has not sunk as yet.*—There is something exquisitely touching in this short and simple sentence; it is the language of heartfelt but despairing tenderness, that would protract to its latest limit the fatal and unavoidable result, and claim for a few brief moments more from death, the object in whose life it lived, and in whose sacrifice its only hope had perished.

Πίνοντας.] *Bibere solitos.* WYTT.—the present for præterite.

Εὖ μάλα.] *Very freely.*

Καὶ ξυγγενομένους.] *Et quidem nonnullos suis amoribus potitos.* STEPH.—"De *Venere* enim h. l. intelligendum ξυγγένεσθαι. HEIND.

Ἐγχωρεῖ.] Phavorin. Ἐγχωρεῖ λαμβάνεται ἀντὶ τοῦ οἷόν τε καὶ δυνατόν ἐστιν· οἷον, ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι τόδε.

Οἶμαι κερδαίνειν.] With this construction of the infinitive, Cf. in Crit. c. 14. a med. Ὁμολόγεις—πολιτεύεσθαι. Ficinus appears to have read κερδανεῖν.—Ἢ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, i. e. *than to bring ridicule upon myself, to make myself ridiculous in my own eyes.*

λωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος. ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πιθοῦ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

§. 66. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον ἑστῶτι. καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον διατρίψας ἦκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ βελτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη, ἢ πιόντα περιιέναι, ἕως ἄν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἔπειτα κατακεῖσθαι καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει. Καὶ ἅμα ὤρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει. καὶ ὃς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἵλεως, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' ὥς περ εἰώθει ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Τί λέγεις, ἔφη, περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πόματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαί τινι; ἔξεστιν ἢ οὔ; Τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν, ὅσον οἰόμεθα μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν. Μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὅς· ἀλλ' εὔχεσθαί γέ που τοῖς θεοῖς ἐξεστί τε καὶ χρὴ, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῆ γενέσθαι· ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὔχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτῃ. Καὶ ἅμα εἰπὼν ταῦ-

Φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ὄντος.] Socrates alludes here, probably, to a distich of Hesiod, Ἔργ. κ. Ἡμ. 365. Ἀρχομένου δὲ πίθου καὶ λήγοντος, κορέσασθαι· Μεσσόθι φείδεσθαι· δεινὴ δ' ἐνὶ πυθμένι φειδώ.

§. 66. Ἕως ἄν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκ. γεν.] Senec. de Provid. c. iii. p. 195. "Male tractatum Socratem judicas, quod illam potionem publice mixtam, non aliter quam medicamentum immortalitates obduxit, et de morte disputavit usque ad ipsam mortem: male cum illo actum est, quod gelatus est sanguis, et paulatim frigore inducto venarum vigor constitit." Plin. Hist. Nat. xxv. 25. "Cicuta quoque venenum est, publica Atheniensium pœna invisa. — Schol. in Aristoph. Ran. 125. ἀπὸ τῶν ποδῶν γὰρ οὗτος ὁ θάνατος ἄρχεται, πρώτους αὐτοὺς ἀποψύχων ὡς τοῦ ζωτικοῦ αἵματος περὶ τὴν καρδίαν συστελλομένου.

Οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει.] *And so* (while walking up and down,) *the poison will work* or *be effectual of itself*; i. e. will require nothing more. V. Cousin; *le poison agira de lui même.* The Latins use *facere* in a similar sense. Ficinus appears to have read ποιήσεις; so Steph. and Bas. 2.

Καὶ μάλα ἵλεως.] *With the utmost cheerfulness*; καὶ μάλα is often so used, with an intensive or augmentative power in καὶ: so infr. καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς, κ. τ. λ.

Ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας.] *Looking stedfastly*, or *intently.*

Ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρή.] *It is both lawful and expedient.*

τα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπιε. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἷοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν, ὡς δὲ εἴδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βίᾳ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπεκλαον ἐμαυτόν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκεῖνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἷου ἀνδρὸς ἑταίρου ἐστερημένος εἴην. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανέστη. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος, κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν, οὐδένα ὃν τινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων, πλήν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκεῖνος δέ, Οἷα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτου ἕνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρὴ τελευτᾶν. ἀλλ' ἡσυ-

Ἐπισχόμενος.] i. e. *Putting the cup to his lips :* Cornar., correctly, according to the sense of the middle voice: ἐπέχειν τινὶ πιεῖν, act. signifying *to give a drink to any one*, as in Aristoph. Nub. 1385. εἰ μέν γε βρῦν εἶποις, ἐγὼ γνοὺς ἂν πιεῖν ἐπέσχον.

Κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν.] i. e. Τὰ δάκρυα. Matthiæ Gr. s. 543. Obs. 2.

Ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βίᾳ καὶ αὐτοῦ—] *But in spite of myself the tears flowed copiously*, &c.: ἀστακτὶ, *non stillatim, fuse.* Heind. Valcken. ad Theocr. Adon. p. 228.—Ἐγκαλυψάμενος, *having covered my face with my garment.* Dorvill. ad Charit., p. 274.—Ἀπέκλαον ἐμαυτὸν, Cf. Cic. Lacl. 3. "Moveor enim tali amico orbatus, qualis, ut arbitror, nemo unquam erit—nihil enim mali accidisse Scipioni puto: mihi accidit, si quid accidit —."

Οἷου ἀνδρὸς.] i. e. Ὅτι τοιούτου ἀνδρὸς, &c. Hom. Iliad. ε'. 757. Ζεῦ πάτερ, οὐ νεμεσίζῃ Ἄρει τάδε καρτερὰ ἔργα, Ὀσσάτιόν τε καὶ οἷον ἀπώλεσε λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν Μάψ —;

Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθ.—] i. e. *But Apollodorus, even before this, never ceased weeping, and then indeed bursting out into lamentation, bewailing and complaining, he pierced the heart of every one present except Socrates himself.*—Οὐδένα ὄντινα,—upon this construction, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 306.—Κατέκλασε, Steph. conj. for κατέκλασε. Thes. Gr. Ling. voc. κατακλαίω.

Οἷα.] *In what manner ! how !* Cf. Hom. Odyss. β'. 239. Aristoph. Pac. 33.—Οὐχ ἥκιστα,—the superlative of negative adjectives or adverbs is often put with οὐ for the positive without οὐ, especially οὐχ ἥκιστα for μάλιστα.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 463.

Ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρὴ τελευτᾶν.] Correctly rendered by Ficinus, *cum faustis acclamationibus :* so Cornar., *cum laudatione et bonorum verborum pronunciatione.* See Robinson's Grec. Antiq. pp. 162. 202. 214. 268. Olympiod. Cod. i. p. 168. 261. Ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ τελευτᾶν ἠξίουν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, ὡς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἱερου τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος· καὶ ὅτι ἐνίοτε περισπᾷ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν ἀνάγωγον ὁρμήν. The precept of Pythagoras generally, as regarding this εὐφημία, is mentioned by Jamblichus, Vit. Pythag. c. 149. and its especial importance at the time of

χίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε. Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἠσχύνθημέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρυειν. ὁ δὲ περιελθών, ἐπειδή οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ σκέλη, κατεκλίθη ὕπτιος· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ ἅμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον, διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκοπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κἄπειτα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτου τὸν πόδα ἤρετο εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰς κνήμας· καὶ ἐπανιὼν οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πήγνυτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἥπτετο, καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται. Ἤδη οὖν σχεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος, ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ, εἶπεν, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο, Ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα. ἀλλ'

death, c. 257. Ὅλως δ' ἄχρι τῆς τελευτῆς εἶναι τι προστεταγμένον· καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὕστατον καιρὸν παρήγγελλε μὴ βλασφημεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀναγωγαῖς οἰωνίζεσθαι μετ' εὐφημίας, ἡνπερ ἐποιοῦντο διωθουμένους τὴν ανδρίαν. (or as Wytt. conj. διορθούμενοι τὴν ἀνδρίαν *confirmantes fortitudinem.*)

Ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 355.

Διαλιπὼν χρόνον.] *After some time.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 557. p. 969.

Ἐπανιὼν.] *Going higher up,* sc. with his hand.—Ψύχοιτο· Ælian. H. A. iv. 23. κωνείου δ' ἄνθρωπος πιὼν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ αἵματος πῆξιν καὶ ψύξιν ἀποθνήσκει.—Πήγνυτο: Plin. H. N. xxv 13. in cicut. "Semini et foliis refrigeratoria vis: quæ si enecat, incipiunt algere ab extremitatibus corporis—. Semine trito expressus (succus) et sole densatus in pastillos, necat sanguine spissando. Hæc altera vis. Et ideo sic necatorum maculæ in corporibus apparent." Upon the opt. πήγνυτο, see Buttmann Gram. Ampl. t. i. p. 539. Cf. supr. c. 23. διασκεδάννυται. Hom. Iliad. ώ. 605. Τῇ δεκάτῃ δέ κε θάπτοιμεν, δαινῦτό τε λαύς. Odyss. σ'. 237. λελῦτο.

Καὶ αὐτὸς ἥπτετο.] *And he himself touched him;* sc. after he had made those who were standing by touch him, to show how far the poison had already operated in removing all sensation.

Περὶ τὸ ἦτρον.] *The lower belly;* from the navel downwards. Timæus, Plat. Lex., explains ἦτρον from Hom. Iliad. ν'. 568. ὁ μεταξὺ ὀμφαλοῦ τε καὶ αἰδοίου τόπος,—"ἔνθα μάλιστα Γίνετ' Ἄρης ἀλεγεινὸς ὀϊζυροῖσι βροτοῖσιν." Lex Rhetor. MS. Ἦτρον· τὸ ὑπογάστριον οὕτως καλεῖται.

Ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ.] According to the usual custom on such occasions. Cf. Eurip. Hyppol. 1458. Κρύψον δέ μου πρόσωπον ὡς τάχος πέπλοις. Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 7. 28. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν (ὁ Κῦρος) καὶ πάντας δεξιωσάμενος συνεκαλύψατο καὶ οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν. Liv. iv. 12. viii. 9. Sueton. Cæsar. c. 82. Robinson, Grec. Antiq. B. v. c. 3.

Τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ—ἀλεκτρυόνα.] Those who during sickness had been in danger of death, used to sacrifice a cock to Æsculapius, in fulfilment of a vow to that effect, when the deity appeared, by their recovery, to have attended to their prayers. So Socrates would have it understood by this injunction to Crito, that he now felt himself on the eve of liberation from the many pains and perils of his mortal career, and of being restored to the enduring and unmixed

ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ' ὅρα εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. Ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὃς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων ξυνέλαβε τὸ στόμα τε καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.

§. 67. Ἥδε ἡ τελευτή, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἑταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε

enjoyment of another and a better life. Many different opinions have been given on this subject as to the actual intention of Socrates: Lactant. iii. 20. Tertullian. Apolog. 46. and Havercamp. in loc. Luperc. Beryt. Gram. περὶ τοῦ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἀλεκτρυόνος. Eudoc. Ion. p. 282. Suid. v. Λούπερκος: to all of which the answer of Fischer is at once the most feasible and satisfactory—"Ego vero assentior iis qui putant, id a Socrate propterea factum esse, quod sperasset, animum suum, ubi vinculis corporis solutus esset, servatum iri et salutem esse consecuturum.—Nam ægroti saluti restituti, Æsculapio gallum immolarunt." So V. Cousin understands the intended sacrifice to be—"en reconnaisance de sa guérison de la maladie de la vie actuelle." That Socrates should just at this moment have recollected, as some say, a vow which he had made in consequence of his recovering from an illness after the battle of Delium; or that he wished to show by this that he did not disown, as he had been accused, the gods of his country; that he was afraid of being charged before Rhadamanthus by Æsculapius for a forgotten vow; or desired of Crito to make such an offering on his behalf, because Apollo had pronounced him the wisest of men:—all these, and similar explanations of the subject, are so far out of keeping with the whole tenor of the dialogue, and this portion of it especially, that it is enough to mention them to prove that they are inappropriate and misplaced; whereas the interpretation which has been preferred as supr. has been not only authorized by the best commentators, but is evidently in complete accordance with the speaker and the scene.

Εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις.] i. e. *But observe, if you have any other charge to give.*

Ὅς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν.] i. e. Ὅς, sc. ὁ Σωκρατης, κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν, *his eyes were fixed: atque illius oculi diriguere.* HEIND. Cf. Chariton. iii. 9. ἐμμανὴς γενομένη στήσασα τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀνέκραγη. Dorvill. in loc.

Ξυνέλαβε τὸ στόμα τε—] *Closed his mouth and eyes.* Kirchman. de. Funerib. i. 6. Potter, Archæol. B. iv. c. 3.

§. 67. Ἥδε ἡ τελευτή.] Aristippus, on being asked how Socrates had died, answered; ὡς ἂν ἐγὼ εὐξαίμην. Diog. L. in Vit. Arist. ii. 8.

Τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν.] i. e. *The very best of those of whom we had experience then, and moreover the most sensible and just.* So the passage must be rendered according to the reading as supr., which is sanctioned by all the copies; but Wyttenbach objects to τότε, as conveying but a limited share of praise, and unsuited to the recency of the event, whence he proposes τῶν πώποτε, *eorum qui unquam fuerunt.* Heindorf would read the passage; ἀνδρὸς, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἂν, πάντων, τότε (i. e. *extremo vitæ Socratis die,*) ὡς ἐπειράθημεν, ἀρίστου, καὶ, ἄλλως (*per totam ejus vitam*) φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου. V. Cousin prefers the emendation of Buttmann and Schleirmacher, ἐκ τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν, &c., which however Plato is more likely to have written so; ἐξ ὧν τότε ἐπειρ.—Stallbaum conj.: ἀνδρός, ὡς φαῖμεν ἄν, τότε θ', ὡς ἐπειράθημεν, ἀριστου, καὶ ἄλλως φρ. *viri et tum, quum moreretur, optimi, id quod in eo experti sumus, et per totam vitam prudentissimi atque* JUSTIS-

ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

simi. Cf. Xenoph. Anabas. i. 9. 1. *Κῦρος μὲν οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀνὴρ ὢν Περσῶν τῶν μετὰ Κῦρον τὸν ἀρχαῖον γενομένων βασιλικώτατος τε καὶ ἄρχειν ἀξιώτατος, ὡς παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογεῖται τῶν Κύρου δοκούντων ἐν πείρᾳ γενέσθαι.*

Upon closing the Phædo, it may probably be asserted with safety, that one only, and that a deeply serious impression, will remain upon the minds of those who have attentively considered the grandeur and importance of its subject,—one not the less interesting because it fully proves how far unaided reason can advance alone, and at what point it fails without the support and guidance of revelation, by which it is finally enabled to arrive at the eminence, from whence, with a vision unimpaired and unobscured, it surveys and comprehends the otherwise inscrutable control of the Supreme "in the heavens above and in the earth beneath."

Again, to turn from the subject to the philosopher himself, what noble or generous emotion of the heart can fail to be awakened in the contemplation of his character, as pourtrayed by the masterhand of his devoted and admiring disciple? With the same calmness, self-possession, and gentle affability which had adorned his life; with the same firmness of soul, integrity of purpose, and singleness of heart which had dignified his pursuits, and with the same zeal which had ever signalized his investigation of unclouded truth, Socrates, on the last day of his earthly existence, appears in the successful support of the soul's immortality, and the uncompromising advocacy of that virtue and purity which alone can render that immortality blessed. The prison, the poison, and the monstrous injustice of the sentence which ordained them, form no theme of complaint with the truly martyr-philosopher; if adverted to at all, it is in language best calculated to deprive death of its worst concomitant, despair, and to console the grief in which he could not participate, by imparting to his mourning friends a share of his own cheering conviction, that to die was really but to begin to live.

The circumstances attending the last moments of Socrates are detailed with the most affecting simplicity, and a fidelity undeviatingly true to the principal and subordinate characters in this unrivalled scene. There is no unnatural straining after false effect; no inappropriate overlay of highly-wrought poetical embellishment. The death of such a man is drawn from the model of his life; unostentatious, meek, and resigned throughout; it may be presumed that there are but few can quit this record of his great yet unobtrusive virtues, and not exclaim with Cotta—"Quid dicam de Socrate? Cujus morti illacrymari soleo, Platonem legens."

Socrates was born at Alopece, a village near Athens, in April or May, B. C. 468, in the eleventh month of the Archon Apsephion; or, according to others, in April or May, B. C. 469, in the fifth month of Apsephion, and died B. C. 400, in the first year of the 95th Olympiad, in the month Thargelion, during which the annual offering was sent to Delos.—Clint. Fast. Hellen. introd. p. xix.

He was the son of Sophroniscus, a poor sculptor, and Phænareta, a midwife, and was trained to his father's art, which he appears to have studied not without success, having executed a group of the habited graces, which, it is said, were allowed admission into the Acropolis. At his father's death he was left but a small inheritance, which he lost by the dishonesty of a relative, and still continued to support himself by the exercise of his art, devoting all his leisure moments to the study of his more favorite pursuit, philosophy.

His disposition, abilities, and strong propensity towards learning, recommended him to the notice of Crito, a wealthy Athenian, who took him under

his protection, and entrusted him with the tuition of his children. He now relinquished his former occupation, and became a diligent attendant upon the public lectures of the eminent philosophers of his time. His first preceptor was Anaxagoras, upon whose departure from Athens, he attached himself to Archelaus. Prodicus, the sophist, was his preceptor in eloquence; Evenus, in poetry; Theodorus, in geometry; and Damo in music; Aspasia had also some share in the philosophical education of Socrates.

He was not long in attaining to the eminence he deserved; he was the first who checked and exposed, by his own character and influence, the mischief and impositions of the sophists, a large body of professional preceptors at Athens, who, by a vicious system of instruction, being themselves possessed merely of a superficial and seeming knowledge, by an idle abuse of language, and a pernicious perversion of reason, were gradually corrupting the minds and misleading the abilities of the Athenian youth. His successful opposition, and overthrow of this class of false philosophers, whom he encountered with the arms of good sense, irony, and powerful argument, though in the highest degree advantageous to his country, proved, among other things, eventually fatal to himself.

He became, says Tennemann, the instructor of his countrymen and of mankind, not for the love of lucre nor of reputation, but in consequence of a sense of duty. He was desirous, above all things, to repress the flight of speculative theories by the force of an imperturbable good sense; to submit the pretensions of science to the control of a higher authority, that of virtue; and to re-unite religion to morality. Without becoming, properly speaking, the founder of a philosophical school, yet by his example, by what he taught, and by his manner of communicating it, he rendered, as a wise man and popular teacher, immense service to the cause of philosophy; calling the attention of inquirers to those subjects which are of everlasting importance to man, and pointing out the source from which our knowledge (to be complete) must be derived; from an investigation of our own minds.

Concerning the genius, or dæmon of Socrates, there have been many and different opinions. The Abbè Fraguier, Mem. Acad. Bell. Lett. t. iv., understands it of the wisdom and prudence of the philosopher, which enabled him to foresee what others never would have thought of; for prudence, according to Cicero, is a kind of divination. Plutarch and Apuleius, who have written separate treatises on this subject, are in favour of a similar explanation. So also Dr. Nares, in his Essay on the Dæmon of Socrates, 8vo. 1782., who remarks, that Socrates believed in the gods of his country, and was not free from the superstition connected with that belief; whence it may be inferred, that in the expressions usually understood to refer to his dæmon, he alludes only to some species of divination perfectly analogous to the omens of his age and country, calling the sign, whatever it was, by means of which the supposed intimations were made to him, a dæmon or divinity. He would otherwise, as Xenophon observes, have incurred the charge of falsehood and arrogance if he had not declined assuming to himself the merit of an unerring judgment, and if he had pretended to any gift superior to that which is obtained from the divine wisdom by the suggestions of reason.—Whatever Socrates may have intended by it, still, as the same writer observes, it afforded abundant scope for that portion of his accusation in which he was charged with the introduction of new deities.

Socrates has left nothing in writing after him, but his illustrious pupils, Plato and Xenophon, have in some measure supplied this defect. Of the disciples who survived him, Xenophon, Æschines, Simo, Crito, and Cebes disseminated the principles of their master, and lived agreeably to them. Among those who especially devoted themselves to the pursuits of philosophy, Antisthenes, the Athenian founder of the Cynic school, subsequently Aristippus, the chief of the Cyrenaic, and afterwards Pyrrho, gave their attention exclusively to questions of morals, and their practical application. Euclid of Megara, Phædo of Elis, Menedemus of Eretria, were occupied with theoretical or metaphysical inquiries. But the superior genius of Plato embraced both these topics at once, and united the two principal branches of Socraticism, either of which was found sufficient to employ the generality of the Socratic philosophers alone. (Cf. Tennemann, Man. Phil. Enf. Hist. Phil.)

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THE END.

VERSIO LATINA.

VERSIO LATINA.

APOLOGIA SOCRATIS.

(1.) QUA vos ratione, o viri Athenienses, affecerint accusatores mei, nescio equidem: me certe sic affecerunt, ut mei ipsius pene oblitus fuerim; tanta persuasione dicere visi sunt: quamvis nihil, ut ita loquar, veri ad vos detulerint. Sed ex multis, quæ falso asseverabant, id sum potissimum admiratus, quod vobis cavendum esse monuerunt, ne a me, quasi eloquente, deciperemini. Quod enim asserere id minime erubuerint, cujus ego mox redargutionem opere ipso facturus eram, quandoquidem in præsentia vobis appareo longe ab eloquentia alienus: hoc, inquam, mihi super omnia visum est impudentissimum: nisi forte eloquentem isti vocant vera dicentem. Si enim ita dicant, profiterer equidem me, quamvis non eorum more, rhetorem esse. Quippe cum hi, ut equidem dico, veri nihil dixerint; a me vero vos vera omnia audituri sitis. Neque vero, per Jovem, o viri Athenienses, fucatam a me orationem, quemadmodum ab istis, verborum nominumque elegantia, neque aliter exornatam, sed ex improviso passim contingentibus verbis coacervatam audietis. Confido enim me justa dicturum, neque quisquam vestrum speret, me aliter esse dicturum: alioquin neque ætatem hanc, o viri, deceret, adolescentulorum more verbis studiose formatis huc ad vos ingredi. Quin immo vehementer, o viri Athenienses, id oro et obsecro, ut, si iisdem me verbis in respondendo utentem audietis, quibus et in foro apud argentariorum mensas, ubi plerique vestrum me nonnunquam audiverunt, et alibi uti soleo; ne admiremini, neve graviter id feratis. Sic enim se res habet. venio equidem nunc primum in judicium, plures quam septuaginta annos natus: ex quo fit, ut in hac judiciali causa revera sim peregrinus. Et profecto, quemadmodum si peregrinus Athenas venissem, ignosceretis utique mihi peregrina voce et forma loquenti, pro educationis meæ consuetudine: ita et in præsentia vos precor, neque id quidem injuria, ut loquendi formam minime attendatis; quæ prout contingit, tum melior, tum deterior esse po-

test: sed idipsum consideretis, huc mentem adhibeatis, justane, an injusta dicam. hoc enim judicis officium est: rhetoris autem officium, vera loqui.

(2.) Justum est autem, o viri Athenienses, me primo quidem ad accusationem primam falso confictam, et ad primos accusatores respondere: deinde ad novissimam, atque novissimos. Me quidem multi jam multis annis falso apud vos accusarunt: quos equidem magis formido, quam Anyti adstipulatores; quanquam et hi sunt in persuadendo potentes. Sed illi potentiores, o viri, qui plerosque vestrum a pueritia occuparunt, accusantes me procul a veritate, atque vobis persuadentes, esse videlicet Socratem quendam sapientem, eorum quæ super aerem, quæque sub terra fiunt, perscrutatorem, qui soleat inferiorem rationem disserendo superiorem ostendere; hi profecto, o viri Athenienses, qui hunc de me rumorem divulgaverunt, mei accusatores potentissimi sunt. Qui enim hæc audiunt, opinantur harum rerum perscrutatores non credere deos esse. Profecto accusatores hujusmodi et permulti sunt; et longo jam tempore me accusant; et in ea ætate vobis suaserunt, in qua plerique vestrum pueri, aut certe adolescentuli, perfacile credidistis, deserta in causa, nemine me defendente. Atque id, quod a defensionis ratione omnium alienissimum est, neque nomina quidem illorum scire licet, atque proferre; præterquam si quis illorum comœdus sit. Quotcunque vero per invidiam et calumniam hæc vobis rursus persuaserunt, quive ipsi persuasi persuaserunt aliis; hi omnes infiniti omnino sunt: nec eorum quemquam in judicium traducere, nec redarguere licet; sed necesse est, adversus istos, tanquam in nocte, pugnare defendendo, atque refellendo, nemine respondente. Existimate ergo et vos, quemadmodum dicebam, accusatores meos duplices extitisse: et qui nuper accusarunt; et qui jamdiu, quales modo describebam: atque judicate, me quidem oportere prius respondere illis, quos et ipsi prius, multoque magis audivistis. Sed jam respondendum mihi est, o viri Athenienses, illis criminibus, conandumque in hoc tam brevi tempore opinionem istam delere, quam vos per calumnias decepti, longo jam tempore contra me concepistis. Opto autem ita demum adversarios refellere, atque obtinere, si modo id vobis et mihi melius sit futurum. Quamquam difficile id fore arbitror: neque admodum, quale id sit, me latet. Verum, ut Deo placet, ita succedat. nos autem legi parere oportet, ac defensionem pro nobis afferre.

(3.) Repetamus igitur ab initio, quæ sit accusatio, ex qua adversus me nata est illa calumnia, qua confisus Melitus mihi diem dixit. Quid ergo aiunt accusatores mei? tanquam enim si in judicio adessem, eorum recitetur accusatio, in qua contra me jurant, quæ et a me exigit juramentum. *Socrates injuste agit, atque curiose perquirit, quæ sub terra et quæ in cœlo sunt, deteriorem rationem reddit superiorem. Præterea alios docet.* Talis utique est accusatio. Nempe talia quædam et in Aristophanis comœdia: Socratis enim illic persona affirmans, se per aerem pervagari: et complures ejus- Quarum ego rerum neque multum, neque parum

quidquam scio. Neque propterea hæc dico, quod harum rerum scientiam parvi faciam, si quis in hujusmodi rebus sit sapiens; absit ut tanti criminis reus a Melito accuser, ut præ timore hæc negem: sed quia revera, o viri Athenienses, horum nihil scio. testes autem hujus plerosque vestrum adduco. Oro vobiscum ipsi repetendo invicem aperite, quotquot me colloquentem aliquando audivistis: audivistis autem plerique vestrum. Recensete igitur invicem, num quis vestrum aliquando iis de rebus quidquam, sive multum, sive parum audiverit disputantem: atque ex hoc denique cognoscetis, ejusmodi esse cetera, quæ multi de me circumferunt.

(4.) At enim horum nihil est verum. Quin etiam a quopiam audiveritis, me homines docere, atque inde pecunias cumulare, neque id quidem verum est. Atqui præclarum id mihi videtur, si quis docere homines possit, quemadmodum Gorgias Leontinus, et Prodicus Chius, et Hippias Eleus. horum namque singuli eam facultatem habent, per quam ad singulas profecti civitates, adolescentibus, quibus liceret in patria suorum se civium disciplinæ gratuito commendare, persuadent, ut ipsos aliorum disciplina relicta sectentur, ac data pecunia, gratiam insuper habeant. Est et alius quidam vir hic sapiens, quem ego huc advenisse sum admodum delectatus. contigit sane, ut aliquem offenderem, qui plus pecuniarum Sophistis perpenderat, quam ceteri omnes, Calliam, Hipponici filium. Hunc ergo interrogavi. (duos enim habet filios.) O Callia, inquam, si filii tui pulli equini aut taurini essent, haberemus aliquem, quem illis mercede adhibita præficeremus, qui eos pulchros, et ad propriam virtutem bonos efficeret: (esset vero talis aut equestrium aliquis, aut agricultorum.) Nunc vero, cum filii tui sint homines, quemnam cogitas illis præficere? et quisnam virtutis hujus humanæ atque civilis scientiam habet? Arbitror, id te, cum filios habeas, cogitavisse. estne, inquam, talis aliquis, an non? Est profecto, inquit ille. Quis, inquam, est? et unde? et quanta mercede docet? Evanus, inquit, est, o Socrates, Parius; merces vero ejus quinque minæ. Atque ego Evanum existimavi beatum, si revera hanc habet artem, atque adeo diligenter docet. Atqui ipse, si talia scirem, admodum gloriarer, et magni me facerem. sed certe, o viri Athenienses, hæc equidem nescio.

(5.) At vero requiret forsan aliquis vestrum, Quidnam, o Socrates, tuum est opus? et unde adversus te exortæ sunt hæ calumniæ? nisi enim aliquid præter aliorum consuetudinem ageres, nunquam tantus de te rumor concitatus esset. nam unde de te sermo tam frequens, nisi egisses aliquid a ceteris alienum? Dic ergo nobis quid tandem id sit, ne nos de te temere aliquid judicemus. Justa sane hæc mihi videtur interrogatio: atque ego vobis conabor ostendere, quidnam id sit, quod mihi nomen hoc, et calumniam peperit. Sed audite jam; etsi vereor, ne forte quibusdam vestrum jocari videar. verumtamen existimate, me vobis vera omnino dicturum. Equidem, o viri Athenienses, non ob aliud certe, quam ob sapientiam quandam, ejusmodi nomen nactus sum. Sed ob quam sapientiam? forte ob eam, quæ humana sapientia est. nam hac revera sapiens esse videor. Illi vero, quos paulo ante commemorabam, majorem

forte quandam humana sapientiam haberent; vel quid dicam, non habeo: neque enim ego ea præditus sum. Quod si quis me hanc possidere dicat, mentitur, et in meam calumniam hæc dicit. Sed ne vobis molestum sit, o viri Athenienses, si quid vobis magnum dicere videar: neque enim ex me duntaxat dicam, sed testem vobis afferam fide dignum. Profecto, si qua mihi est sapientia, qualis ea sit, testem adhibebo vobis Delphicum deum. Chærephontem certe novistis. ille familiaris mihi erat ab juventute, vestræque multitudini amicus, ac pulsus una vobiscum fuit, et simul in urbem reversus. Novistis plane qualis erat Chærephon, quam vehemens ad quodcunque se convertisset. Hic ergo quandoque profectus in Delphos, vaticinium id experiri ausus est. Ne graviter feratis, o viri, quod in præsentia sum dicturus. Interrogavit utique, an esset ullus me sapientior. Respondit Pythia, sapientiorem esse neminem. De his quidem frater iste suus vobis testificabitur: nam ille vita functus est.

(6) Considerate vero, quorum gratia hæc dicam. debeo enim vobis aperire, unde hæc adversum me calumnia sit exorta. Profecto, cum hæc audissem, ita mecum ipse reputavi, Quidnam Deus ait? quidve voluit? Ego enim mihi conscius sum, neque in magnis, neque in parvis esse me sapientem. Quid igitur sibi vult, cum me asserit sapientissimum? Deum quidem mentiri non est credendum: neque enim id fas est Deo. Atque ita in diuturna ambiguitate versatus sum, perscrutans, quid significarit oraculum: post hæc autem vix tandem post longas ambages viam ejusmodi sum ingressus. aggressus enim sum quendam ex his, qui sapientes videntur, quasi in hoc, sicubi unquam, redargutionem vaticinii facturus, oraculoque ostensurus, non me quidem, quem præfecerat, sed illum, esse in sapientia præferendum. Dum ergo illum examinarem: (hujus vero nomen promere non est necessarium; sed erat quidam ex his, qui in republica versantur:) illum, inquam, dum examinarem, unaque dissererem, o viri Athenienses, hunc in modum affectus sum: visus mihi est vir ille videri quidem sapiens tum aliis, tum vel maxime sibi ipsi; esse vero nequaquam. deinde conatus sum illi ostendere, putare quidem eum, esse se sapientem, sed minime esse. Quapropter et ille infensus mihi redditus est; et multi qui aderant, graviter id tulerunt. Itaque ad meipsum reversus, ita mecum ipse reputavi: Ego profecto sum hoc homine sapientior. apparet enim neuter nostrum pulchrum bonumque aliquid nosse: sed hoc interest, quod hic quidem cum sciat nihil, scire se aliquid opinatur; ego vero, quemadmodum nescio, ita nescire me puto. Videor ergo in hac tantula re hoc homine sapientior esse, quod, quæ ignoro, neque scire me arbitror. Post hæc alium adii ex his, qui illo insuper sapientiores habentur; in eoque considerando omnino similiter judicavi, atque illum aliosque multos mihi reddidi inimicos.

(7) Proinde similiter deinceps processi ad alios, non ignorans, quantum adversus me odium concitarem; ideoque non absque dolore quodam timoreque procedebam. Veruntamen necessarium mihi visum est, oraculum divinum omnibus anteferre, passimque

progredi perscrutaturum, quid sibi velit oraculum; hujusque gratia omnes, quotcunque aliquid scire videntur, adire. Et per canem, o viri Athenienses, (oportet enim vobis vera fateri,) tale aliquid mihi contigit hæc ex divino oraculo perquirenti, ut, qui opinione hominum maxime probabantur, eos quasi omnium imprudentissimos invenirem; qui vero inferiores habebantur, eos, quantum ad prudentiam spectat, probabilius se habere. Operæ pretium est, referre vobis errores laboresque meos, quos equidem propterea sustinui, quo a me oraculum adeo probaretur, ut redargui ultra non posset. Post civiles homines ad poetas me contuli, tragœdiarum et dithyramborum aliorumque carminum auctores, quasi hic perspicue admodum deprehensurus, esse me his rudiorem. Acceptis itaque eorum libris, in quibus elaboravisse maxime videbantur, sciscitatus sum eorum sensa, ut nonnihil ab ipsis perdiscerem. Erubesco, o viri, verum hic vobis aperire: dicendum est tamen. Alii pæne omnes præsentes, ut ita dixerim, melius de rebus his loquerentur, de quibus ipsi poemata conscripserunt. Deprehendi igitur brevi id in poetis, eos videlicet non sapientia facere, quæ faciunt, sed natura quadam, ex divina animi concitatione, quemadmodum et hi, qui divino furore afflati vaticinantur. nam et hi multa quidem dicunt, atque præclara; sed eorum quæ dicunt, nihil intelligunt. Tali quodam pacto poetæ affecti fuisse mihi videntur: et simul animadverti, eos in aliis quoque propter poesin omnium se sapientissimos judicare, in quibus non sunt sapientes. Abii ergo et hinc eadem omnino sententia, qua et a civilibus veris abieram.

(8) Tandem vero me ad artifices contuli; mihi ipsi conscius, me, ut ita loquar, in artificiis nihil scire; hoc autem noveram multa et pulchra scire: neque in hoc equidem deceptus sum. sciebant enim, quæ ipse nesciebam, et hac in parte me sapientiores erant. Sed, o viri Athenienses, in eodem errore, quo et poetas, peritos artifices deprehendi. nam ob hoc ipsum, quod sua rite perficiebant, unusquisque eorum se in ceteris quoque vel maximis sapientissimum esse putabat. Atqui hic error illam quoque, quæ ipsis inerat, sapientiam offuscabat. Quamobrem, si meipsum oraculi loco interrogarem, utrum eligam, itane me habere, ut habeo, videlicet neque scientem quæ illi sciunt, neque meam inscitiam ignorantem; an utraque habentem, quæ illi habent: responderem plane mihi ipsi simul atque oraculo, præstare, ita ut habeo me habere.

(9) Ob hanc utique inquisitionem meam, o viri Athenienses, inimicitiæ multæ difficillimæ atque gravissimæ adversus me coortæ sunt; ex quibus multæ sunt calumniæ consecutæ. Nomen vero sapientis mihi propterea exortum est, quod præsentes plurimum illa me putant scire, in quibus alios refello. Videtur autem, o viri Athenienses, revera solus deus sapiens esse; atque in hoc oraculo id sibi velle, humanam videlicet sapientiam parvi, immo nihili pendendam esse. quod vero Socratem nominat sapientem, ob id facere, quo nomine meo, tanquam exemplo quodam utens, quasi sic dicat: Is, o viri, sapientissimus est, qui, quemadmodum Socrates, novit revera sapientiam suam esse nihili pendendam. Hæc igitur ego sic affectus, et nunc perquirere passim, deo parens, et perscrutari non

desino, conveniens si quem aut civium aut peregrinorum esse existimem sapientem. ac si quando mihi ille talis non videatur; tunc ipse deo suffragatus, illum sapientem non esse demonstro. Atque ob occupationes ejusmodi nullum mihi ferme relinquitur otium vel ad publicum aliquid agendum, vel privatum; sed in extrema paupertate ob Dei cultum sum constitutus.

(10) Præterea adolescentes maxime opulenti, quive a negotiis vacant, me ultro sequentes delectantur, cum refelli a nobis homines spectant. quin etiam ipsi nonnunquam me imitati, alios deinde confutare contendunt. Qua quidem in re plurimam reperiunt turbam hominum, aliquid se scire putantium, cum aut nihil sciant, aut perparum. qui vero ab his convincuntur, non tam illis quam mihi redduntur infensi: clamantque esse Socratem quendam scelestissimum juventutisque corruptorem. At si quis sciscitetur ab eis, quidnam vel agendo vel docendo corrumpat, nihil quidem assignare possunt, immo prorsus ignorant. Sed ne deesse illis materia videatur, ad ista confugiunt, quæ communi voce facile philosophantibus objici solent: eos scilicet neque sublimia super terram neque profunda sub terra: neque deos esse putare, rationemque inferiorem quasi superiorem ostendere. vera enim, ut puto, fateri nolunt, se scilicet indignatos, propterea quod convicti fuerint, simulare se illa scire, quæ nesciunt. Utpote igitur ambitiosi et vehementes, et multi, ac velut ex composito, atque obnixæ diligentisque persuasionis studio me criminantes, vestras aures impleverunt, et jamdiu et nuper calumniis in me studiose confictis. Ex his autem Melitus, et Anytus, et Lycon contra me surrexerunt. Melitus quidem ob poetas mihi infestus; Anytus vero ob artifices atque reipublicæ gubernatores; Lycon denique gratia rhetorum. Quamobrem, quemadmodum ab initio dicebam, admirarer equidem, si opinionem istam tantis conceptam calumniis, tam inveteratam, nunc in tam brevi tempore amovere a vobis possem. Hæc equidem, o viri Athenienses, vera vobis loquor: neque celo, neque subtraho aut magnum quidquam, aut parvum; quamvis ferme norim, in his dicendis me eisdem fore molestum. Quod quidem argumentum vobis est, me vera loqui, atque hanc esse calumniam contra me exortam, ejusque causas ejusmodi esse. et sive in præsentia sive in posterum hæc inquiretis, ita esse invenietis.

(11.) Ad illa igitur, quæ primi accusatores detulerunt, hæc mihi sufficiens apud vos sit defensio. Ad Melitum vero bonum et, ut ipse ait, patriæ amatorem, ceterosque sequentes accusatores deinceps respondere pergam. Sed horum rursus, tanquam alii quidam accusatores sint, accusationem juramento assertam vicissimque asserendam in medium adducamus. Habet vero ferme se hunc in modum: Socrates injuste agit, juventutem depravans, ac deos, quos civitas putat, ipse non putans, sed alia quædam nova dæmonia. Accusatio quidem est ejusmodi. hujus autem accusationis quamlibet partem discutiamus. Juvenes depravare me objicit, atque in hoc injuriam facere. Ego vero, o viri Athenienses, contra injuriari Melitum dico; propterea quod serio ludit, tam facile homines in judicium trahens, simulansque seriis se rebus incumbere, earumque

rerum habere curam, quæ ipsi nunquam curæ fuerunt. Hoc autem ita esse, conabor et vobis ostendere.

(12.) Heus Melite, responde mihi, numquid ipse maxime cures, ut quam optimi adolescentes evadant. Curo equidem. Age ergo his nunc dicas, quisnam juvenes meliores efficiat. constat enim scire te, cum tibi id curæ sit. Me certe corruptorem eorum, ut ais, jam deprehendisti, accusasti his, in judicium traxisti. ergo age, et eum qui efficit meliores dic his, et quisnam sit ostende. quidnam, o Melite, taces? Videsne, nihil te habere quod dicas? Atqui nonne turpe id tibi videtur esse, ac sufficiens argumentum ad id quod ipse dico, te hæc nunquam curasse? Verum dic jam, bone vir: Quisnam eos efficit bonos? Leges. At vero non istud interrogo, o vir optime. sed quis homo, qui et primum id ipsum norit, leges scilicet, quibus illi meliores fiant. Hi, o Socrates, judices. Quid, o Melite, ais? istine juvenes erudire possunt, bonosque reddere? Et maxime quidem. Utrum omnes? an alii quidem possunt, alii vero nequaquam? Omnes. Bene per Junonem loqueris, et magnam eorum qui prosint juvenibus copiam. Verum quidnam hi, qui audiunt? faciuntne et ipsi meliores, an non? Ipsi quoque. Quid vero senatores? Et senatores. Sed enim, o Melite, cavendum est, ne concionatores forte adolescentes corrumpant. an vero et hi omnes similiter faciunt meliores? Hi quoque. Omnes igitur, ut videtur, Athenienses honestos bonosque reddunt, præter unum me. ego enim corrumpo solus. Itane ais? Ita certe; et quidem vehementer. Magna tu quidem me damnas infelicitate. Proinde mihi responde, an et de equis idem putes: omnes scilicet homines equos bonos efficere, unum vero duntaxat eos corrumpere. an omnino contra unum esse: vel certe perpaucos equitandi peritos reddere meliores equos: quamplurimos autem esse, qui si inter equos versentur, illisque utantur, depravant? Nonne ita se res habet, o Melite, et de equis, et de ceteris omnibus animantibus? Penitus ita, sive tu et Anytus non confiteamini, sive confiteamini. Etenim permagnam juvenes nacti essent felicitatem, si unus duntaxat eos posset pervertere, ceteri vero omnes ipsis prodessent. Ceterum, o Melite, satis demonstras, te nullam juventutis curam habuisse unquam; ac plane declaras incuriam tuam, teque nunquam meditatum fuisse ea, de quibus me accusas.

(13.) Præterea obsecro te per Jovem, o Melite, responde nobis, utrum melius versari possumus inter bonos cives, an inter malos. Responde amabo. nihil enim difficile te rogo. Nonne mali semper mali aliquid agunt his, quibuscum versantur? boni autem bonum? Procul dubio. Estne ullus, qui detrimentum suscipere potius quam emolumentum velit ab his, quibus familiariter utitur? Responde, o bone vir. lex enim respondere te jubet. Estne quisquam qui damnum pati velit? Nullus. Age ergo, tu me huc in judicium vocas quasi juventutis depravatorem. an dicis, me id volentem facere, vel nolentem? Equidem volentem dico. Numquid tu, o Melite, longe minor natu usque adeo me grandiori sapientior es, ut plane cognoscas tu quidem, malos obesse familiaribus, bonos vero prodesse? ego autem in tantam insaniam prolapsus sim, ut neque

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oravi, ne graviter feratis si pro more meo verba facio. Estne quisquam, o Melite, qui humana quidem esse putet, homines vero nequaquam? Respondeat mihi, o viri, neque modo in his, modo in illis perturbet. estne aliquis, qui equos non putet esse, sed equestria? vel tibicines quidem non esse, sed tibicinum officia? Non est quisquam, o virorum optime. Ego enim pro te et tibi et his aliis respondeo, siquidem ipse non vis respondere. Sed ad hoc saltem, quod magis ad rem pertinet, responde. An est quisquam, qui dæmonia quidem opera opinetur esse, dæmones autem minime? Nullus. Quam tarde et vix respondisti ab his coactus? Nonne igitur dæmonia opera confiteris me et putare et docere, sive nova, sive antiqua sint? omnino enim, ut tu confiteris, dæmonia ego assero, atque hæc quidem in responsione vicissim accusationi rescripta jurabo. Quod si dæmonia puto, necessarium est omnino, putare me dæmones quoque esse. an non ita se res habet? Ita certe. Pono enim te confitentem, quandoquidem respondere non vis. Dæmones autem, nonne aut deos arbitramur esse, aut deorum filios? faterisne hoc, an negas? Prorsus. Nonne si dæmones esse arbitror, ut ipse concedis, dæmonesque dii quidam sunt, id evenit, quod modo dicebam? ænigma proponere te et quasi nugari dicendo, me deos non existimantem, deos tamen rursus existimare, quandoquidem dæmones esse duco? Rursus, si dæmones deorum filii sunt, spurii videlicet quidam, aut ex nymphis, aut ex aliis quibusdam, ut fertur, quisnam hominum filios quidem deorum esse putet, deos vero neget? Perinde enim absurdum foret, ac si quis equorum quidem filios vel asinorum mulos esse putet, equos autem et asinos esse non putet. Sed, o Melite, videris procul dubio accusationem istam idcirco ita posuisse, vel ut ingenii nostri periculum faceres, vel quia, in quo re vera me criminareris, nihil haberes. Tu vero quanam ratione persuaderes alicui, vel minimum quidem mentis habenti, non esse ejusdem viri, dæmonia simul et divina putare; ac rursus ejusdem, neque dæmones, neque deos, neque heroes? Nulla certe ratione fieri posse aliter ostendi potest.

(16.) Ceterum, o viri Athenienses, quod quidem ego non deliquerim, quemadmodum Melitus accusat, haud magna mihi purgatione opus esse videtur: sed ea, quæ dicta sunt, sufficere judico. Quod autem ab initio dixi, malevolentiam plurimam esse contra me apud plurimos concitatam, id profecto verissimum est: et hoc me perimet, si quidem perimar; non Melitus, neque Anytus; sed multorum calumnia et invidia; quæ quidem alios quoque multos viros bonos peremit hactenus, et, ut arbitror, perimet. nihil enim grave, vel mirum, si in me obesse non desinat. Forsitan vero ita me quispiam interrogabit: Nonne te pudet, o Socrates, tale quiddam exercere, ex quo continuo in periculum venias moriendi? Equidem huic objectioni justam hanc responsionem dabo: Haud recte, o vir, loqueris, si putas, magnam aut vitæ aut mortis habendam esse rationem homini, cujus vel parva quædam utilitas sit: ac non illud potius duntaxat considerandum, quoties aliquid agit, utrum justa agat, an injusta, aut boni viri opera, sive mala. Alioquin ex hac ratione tua spernendi fuissent semidei omnes, quotcunque apud

Trojam occubuerunt, et alii, et in primis ipse Thetidis filius: qui usque adeo mortis contempsit periculum, ne turpem subiret infamiam, ut cum sibi dea mater properanti ad Hectorem occidendum prædixisset, his ferme, ut arbitror, verbis: O fili, si pro vindicta Patrocli amici tui ab Hectore interfecti, Hectorem interfeceris, ipse peribis; inquit enim, Subito post Hectorem infelix tibi sors imminet: cum, inquam, ab ea hæc accepisset, usque adeo discrimen mortemque contempsit, ut multo magis timuerit turpem vitam amicorum inultis injuriis, quam mortem: statimque responderit, mori se malle pro justa amici vindicta, quam moras trahentem apud naves ridiculum contemptumque vivere. Hunc ergo periculi mortique curam habuisse quisnam dixerit? et profecto ita res se habet, o viri Athenienses. Quo quisque in loco vel seipsum constituit, arbitratus id optimum esse, vel a superiore jubetur consistere; in eo, ut mihi videtur, permanere oportet, periculumque subire, neque mortem, neque aliud quidquam magis quam turpitudinem formidantem.

(17.) Equidem, o viri Athenienses, graviter aberrarem, si cum illis paruerim præfectis, quos ipsi mihi præposuistis et in Potidæa, et in Amphipoli, et in Delio: (tunc enim, ubi illi me consistere jusserunt, ibi constiti, ut quisquam alter, mortisque discrimen subivi:) ubi deus me posuit, permanereque voluit, ut opinatus sum atque existimavi, videlicet philosophantem me vivere, ac meipsum aliosque scrutari; ibi ob mortis alteriusve rei metum ordinem desererem. Pergrave, inquam, id esset delictum, et tunc revera me juste quis in judicium traheret, quasi deos non putantem, videlicet oraculo non parentem, atque mortem timentem, putantemque me sapientem esse, quum sapiens minime sim. Nam mortem timere, o viri, nihil est aliud, quam sapientem videri eum, qui non sit sapiens. quippe cum id sit scire videri, quæ nesciat. Nemo enim scit, utrum mors summum bonorum omnium contingat homini. metuunt autem, perinde ac si eam scirent maximum esse malorum. Cui vero dubium esse debet, quin hæc ipsa inscitia sit maxime vituperanda, per quam aliquis se putat scire, quæ nescit? Ego autem, o viri, in hoc forsan a multis hominibus differo: ac si qua in re sapientiorem me aliquo esse dicerem, in hac utique dicerem, quod cum haud sufficienter, quæ sunt apud inferos, norim, similiter me non nosse cognosco. Injurias autem inferre, superiorique non obedire vel deo vel homini, malum turpeque esse scio. Hæc igitur, quæ nescio, utrum bona sint, nunquam magis timebo, atque fugiam, quam illa, quæ mala esse cognosco. Quamobrem si me nunc absolvatis, (non credentes Anyto, qui dixit, aut me in judicium ab initio vocandum non esse, aut vocatum necessario esse damnandum: nam si a vobis absolverer, fore ut filii vestri, Socratis secuti vestigia, omnes omnino corrumperentur) si, inquam, ad hæc vos ita dicatis: o Socrates, Anyto non credimus, teque sententiis nostris absolvimus, hac tamen conditione, ut nunquam posthac in hac inquisitione philosophiaque verseris: ac si id facere [deprehendare, mortem obeas.] si igitur, ut dicebam, his conditionibus dimittere me velitis, respondebo utique vobis: o viri Athenienses,

diligo vos equidem atque amo ; Deo tamen parere malo, quam vobis. et quamdiu spirabo viresque suppetent, philosophari non desinam, exhortans et docens quemcunque nactus fuero, sicut soleo, hunc in modum : Quid tu, o vir optime, cum civis sis Atheniensis, civitatis amplissimæ ac sapientia et potentia præstantissimæ, non erubescis in eo omnem operam ponere, quo tibi pecuniarum et gloriæ et honoris quam plurimum sit ? ut autem prudentia et veritas, et optimus animi habitus in te sit, neque cogitas, neque curas ? Ac si quis vestrum mecum contenderit, id se curare asseverans, haud statim dimittam illum, neque recedam, sed sciscitabor, examinabo, redarguam. Quod si mihi non videatur possidere virtutem, attamen profiteri ; objurgabo, quod ea, quæ plurimi pretii sunt, nihili pendat, vilissima vero plurimi faciat. Hoc equidem officium præstabo juniori et seniori, quemcunque nactus fuero, rursusque peregrino et civi ; magis autem civibus, quanto mihi genere propinquiores estis. Hoc enim Deus ipse jubet. Reor autem, quod et vos latere non debet, nullum adhuc bonum vobis in hac urbe majus contigisse, quam hoc meum ministerium, quod Deo parens exhibeo. Nihil enim aliud agens circumeo, quam suadens junioribus senioribusque vestrum, neque corporum, neque pecuniarum, neque aliarum omnino rerum curam prius vehementiusque, quam animi, habendam esse, ut quam optimus sit ; docens, non ex pecuniis virtutem, sed ex virtute pecunias, aliaque bona omnia et privatim et publice hominibus provenire. Si igitur hæc docens perverto juvenes, essent certe perniciosa. at si quis dicat, me alia quam hæc docere, nihil dicit. Horum gratia, o viri Athenienses, profiteor equidem, sive credatis Anyto, sive non credatis, sive dimiseritis me, sive non dimiseritis, profiteor, me nihil aliud esse facturum, nec si mihi sit pluries moriendum.

(18.) Ne conturbemini, o viri Athenienses ; sed quemadmodum ab initio rogavi, me æquo animo audiatis : erit enim vobis, ut arbitror, utile, si, quæ nunc dicturus sum, audietis. equidem vobis nonnulla dicturus sum, quæ audientes forsitan ad clamorem in præsentia provocemini. ego vero silentium a vobis exposco. Scitote, si me occideritis talem, qualem vobis modo dicebam, non me læsuros esse vos magis, quam vos ipsos. Me quidem neque Melitus, neque Anytus unquam lædet. neque enim posset : siquidem nefas est, ut arbitror, meliorem virum a deteriore lædi. Interficere tamen potest, vel pellere, vel contumelia quadam afficere. atque hæc iste quidem et alius aliquis ingentia putet esse mala : ego vero non puto ; sed multo pejus esse, illa facere, quæ nunc iste facit, aggrediens, injuste virum occidere. Quamobrem, o viri Athenienses, non tam mihi nunc opus est, defensionem pro me ipso meditari, ut aliquis existimaret, quam vobis : ne quid me condemnantes contra id munus, quod deus vobis tribuit, delinquatis. Si enim me interfeceritis, haud facile alium talem reperietis, vere quidem, etsi forte id dictum ridiculum est, civitati vestræ a deo adhibitum, velut equo cuidam magno et generoso, sed ipsa mole pigriori, atque calcaribus excitari indigenti : qualem videtur me deus civitati addidisse, qui singulos exsuscitans et monens, et objurgans, non cesso diem totam

ubique vobis assistere. Talem vero alterum non facile nanciscemini, o viri Athenienses. ergo, si mihi credideritis, me vestris sententiis absolvetis. At vero si forte dormitantium more, graviter ferentes vos exsuscitari, me, ut vult Anytus, temere occideritis; reliquum omne tempus dormietis, nisi forsan deus vobis prospiciens alium quendam miserit. Me vero esse talem, ut a deo civitati tributus fuisse videar, hinc potestis animadvertere. Non humanum certe id esse videtur, quod ego mea quidem omnia omnino neglexerim, atque in hac rei familiaris negligentia tot annos jam perseverem, vestro semper intentus bono, dum singulos adeo, tanquam pater, aut frater natu major, suadens, curam virtutis habere. Quod si quam pro officio meo mercedem reciperem, humanam quandam id rationem haberet. nunc vero, quod et vos plane videtis, accusatores isti mei, quanquam impudentissime alia contra me omnia coacervarunt, hoc unum tamen solita illa impudentia nequaquam ausi sunt pertentare, testesque adhibere, qui probent, me unquam pro his mercedem ullam exegisse, aut petisse. Hujus autem rei sufficientem vobis, ut arbitror, testem affero, paupertatem meam.

(19.) Sed forsan absurdum alicui videri potest, me privatim hæc consulere singulis, anxie nimis circumeuntem; publice vero in concionibus ausum non fuisse hoc idem civitati consulere. Hujus autem causa est, de qua sæpe me passim dicentem audivistis, divinum videlicet quiddam atque dæmonicum in voce quadam mihi adesse. quod quidem Melitus in accusatione derisit. sed mihi quidem ab ipsa pueritia hoc adest, vox scilicet quædam, quæ quoties fit, me prohibet agere, quod acturus eram, provocat vero nunquam. hoc, inquam, est, quod mihi repugnet, quo minus me ad publica conferam. Et recte admodum mihi adversari videtur. constat enim, o viri Athenienses, si quondam negotia publica aggressus fuissem, jamdiu mihi fuisse pereundum: itaque nullam vel vobis, vel mihi attulissent utilitatem. Ne mihi succenseatis, oro, vera dicenti. nemo enim diu salvus esse potest, si aut vestro, aut alteri cuiquam populo legitime adversetur, quo multa injusta atque iniqua, quæ fieri solent in civitate, prohibeat. sed necesse est, eum qui revera pro justitia pugnat, si modo brevi salvus futurus sit, privatum degere, neque rempublicam attingere.

(20.) Horum equidem magna vobis afferam argumenta; non verba quidem, sed, quod vos multifacitis, facta. Audite jam, quæ mihi contigerint, ut planius perspiciatis, nulli me quidquam contra justitiam ob mortis metum concessurum fuisse, atque non concedentem, simul fuisse periturum. Referam vobis equidem molesta quædam atque judicialia, vera tamen. Ego enim, o viri Athenienses, nullo adhuc publico functus sum munere, nisi quod ad consilium sum electus. contigit autem, tribum meam Antiocheam eo tempore præsidere, quo vos decem illos exercitus duces, quia navali pugna interemptos non susceperint, damnare simul omnes properastis, injuste quidem, ut cunctis postea vobis notum fuit. Tunc ego solus ex omnibus præfectis me vobis opposui, ne quid ageretis præter leges, meisque suffragiis restiti. Quo in tempore, cum oratores multi parati essent deferre meum nomen, atque in judicium

trahere, vosque ipsi ingenti idem clamore juberetis; existimavi, oportere me magis pro lege atque justitia subire periculum, quam vobiscum sentire, non sentientibus justa, ob metum carceris aut mortis. Et hæc quidem facta sunt, civitate adhuc sub libertate populi constituta. postquam vero ad paucorum potentiam deventum est, rursus triginta illi, qui rempublicam occuparunt, vocantes me una cum aliis quatuor in Tholum, jusserunt Leontem Salaminium ex Salamine adducere, quo ille necaretur; qualia videlicet multa illi, et aliis multis eo tempore mandabant, ut complures criminibus suis insolverent. Tunc ego non verbis quidem, sed re ipsa, rursus ostendi, nihil omnino, quamvis dictu rusticius videatur, curare mortem; illud vero omnino curare, ne quid injustum neve impium facerem. Me vero potestas illa terribilis nequaquam ita conterruit, ut injuste aliquid facerem. Sed ubi Tholo egressi sumus, reliqui quatuor in Salaminam adventantes captum Leontem duxerunt: ego vero domum abivi: ac forsan propterea me illi interfecissent, nisi brevi eorum potestas dissoluta fuisset. Atque horum testes vobis erunt permulti.

(21.) An ergo putatis, tot annos me victurum fuisse, si publica tractavissem, bonique viri officio fungens, justitiæ suffragatus essem, atque, ut oportet, unum id officium omnibus prætulissem? Permultum abest, o viri Athenienses: neque enim alius quisquam hominum ita se gerens, diu salvus esse potuisset. At ego per omnem vitam, sicubi publica tractavi negotia, talem me præstiti, et privatim idem ipse, nemini unquam præter id quod justum est, concedens, vel aliis, vel horum alicui, quos ii, qui me criminantur, meos affirmant esse discipulos. Ego autem nullius unquam præceptor fui. Sed si quis dicentem me ac mea tractantem audire desideravit, sive junior, sive senior, nulli unquam id negavi. Neque vero is ego sum, qui pecuniis acceptis disputem, non acceptis vero taceam: sed pariter diviti atque pauperi interrogandum me præbeo; ac etiam, si quis respondendo audire velit, quæ dico. Et si quis horum probus fiat, vel non, haud juste crimen subirem: quippe cum nulli unquam doctrinam vel tradiderim ullam, vel promiserim. Quod si quis dixerit, privatim a me quidquam vel didicisse, vel audisse, quod nec aliis omnibus commune fecerim, non verum dicit.

(22.) Sed quam ob causam quidam mea consuetudine oblectentur, o viri Athenienses, audite. Omnino verum est, quod vobis supra dicebam, delectari homines, cum redargutioni eorum adsunt, qui se, cum non sint, existimant sapientes. Est enim res non injucunda: mihi vero, ut dixi, a Deo injuncta et per vaticinia, et per somnia, et per omnem modum, per quem aliqua alia sors divina homini quidquam mandarit agendum. Hæc, o viri Athenienses, et vera sunt, et facile arguenda. Enimvero, si ego juvenum alios quidem nunc corrumpo, alios vero jamdiu corrupi, consentaneum esset, ut nunc illorum aliqui seniores facti, quoniam intelligerent, me sibi adolescentibus male consuluisse, contra me insurgerent, ac pœnas deposcerent. at si ipsi nollent, saltem necessarios illorum aliquos, patres et fratres, et alios cognatos, si quid mali a me eorum necessarii passi fuissent, commemorare nunc et pœnas exigere.

Sed adsunt hic, quos cerno, illorum permulti. Primum quidem Crito iste, æqualis meus atque contribulis, Critobuli hujus pater. deinde Lysanias Sphettius, Æschini hujus pater. præterea Antipho Cephisieus, pater Epigenis. Adsunt et alii, quorum fratres familiariter me usi sunt, Nicostratus, Theosdotidi filius, Theodoti frater, (et Theodotus quidem defunctus est, ut fratrem precari non possit,) et Paralus hic, filius Demodoci, cujus Theages frater erat: Adimantus quoque, filius Aristonis, cujus frater est iste Plato: denique Æantodorus, cujus Apollodorus hic est frater. Alios permultos referre possum, quorum unum aliquem, præsertim in ejus oratione, oportuit a Melito testem produci. At vero, si tunc oblitus est, nunc saltem producat: ego permittam, afferat, inquam, si quid tale habet, in medium. Sed contra omnino se res habet, o viri Athenienses. omnes enim, ut videtis, convenerunt libenter ad opem mihi ferendam, qui corrupisse eorum necessarios detrimentumque attulisse, a Melito Anytoque accusor. Quod si ipsi, qui depravati sunt, mihi opitularentur, nihil mirum esset: at propinqui eorum, seniores a me nunquam depravati, qua tandem ratione mihi suffragantur, nisi recta quadam et justa? quippe cum et Melitum mentiri, et me vera loqui, cognoscant.

(23.) Quæ igitur pro defensione mea, o viri Athenienses, habeo, ferme hæc sunt, et alia forte similia. Sed forsan vestrum aliquis, ad se moresque solitos se recipiens, graviter ferat, quod, cum levioribus etiam in causis reus multis cum lacrymis soleat deprecari, atque supplicare, ac filios in judicium producere, ut commiserationem commoveant, et alios domesticorum amicorumque permultos: ego nihil horum faciam, quamvis in extremo, ut videtur, discrimine constitutus. his ergo offensus aliquis contra me pertinacius irritetur, atque ipsa in ira sententiam contra me ferat. Si quis ergo inter vos ejus mentis est, ego tamen non censeo obsecrandum, sed hac ratione potius æque me hunc allocuturum: Sunt et mihi, o vir optime, cognati quidam. Neque enim, ut inquit Homerus, ex quercu vel petra, sed ex hominibus natus sum. Itaque et cognatos habeo, o viri Athenienses, et filios tres; quorum unus jam adolescit, duo autem sunt parvuli. nullum tamen eorum huc adducam, supplicaturus eo pacto a vobis absolvi. Curnam igitur nihil horum faciam? Non pertinacia ulla, neque contemptu, viri Athenienses: utrum vero audacter me habeam ergo mortem, an non, alia ratio est. Ad existimationem tamen, et mei, et civitatis totius, non arbitror pertinere, ut ista faciam in hac ætate, et hoc nomine, quod nactus sum; sive id verum sit, sive falsum. Attamen jam opinione hominum præoccupatum est, Socratem inter multos præcipuo quodam excellere. Si ergo hi, qui inter vos sapientia, vel fortitudine, vel quavis alia virtute præstare existimantur, tales erunt, quales sæpe quosdam, cum de illis judicaretur, vidi, turpe nimium erit. qui cum esse alicujus pretii existimarentur, attamen in judicio mirum in modum commiserationi studebant; quasi grave aliquid passuri, si ex hac vita decesserint: perinde ac immortales essent futuri, si vos illos non occidatis. Atqui hi mihi videntur civitati dedecus afferre: propterea quod existimare peregrinorum aliquis potest, eos, qui in-

ter Athenienses virtute præstant in magistratibusque ceterisque honoribus superiores habentur, nihil a mulieribus differre. Hæc autem, o viri Athenienses, nec vos, qui alicujus auctoritatis esse videmini, facere decet; neque, etiamsi nos facere velimus, permittere: sed hoc ipsum ostendere, vos eum multo magis damnaturos esse, qui commiserationes ejusmodi introducens, ridiculam reddiderit civitatem, quam illum, qui quietus judicium exspectaverit.

(24.) Proinde, o viri Athenienses, accedit ad ea, quæ de civitatis existimatione dicta sunt, quod nec justum mihi videtur esse, judicem precari, neque precando absolvi, sed docere atque suadere. Non enim ad hoc sedet judex, ut per gratiam concedat, sed ut judicet secundum leges. Atque id jurejurando promisit, non per gratiam cuicunque libuerit condonare, sed judicare secundum leges. Non igitur licet, vel nobis assuefacere vos dejerare, vel vobis, assuefieri. neutri enim nostrum religionem servarent. Nolite ergo, o viri Athenienses, exigere, talia me apud vos agere, quæ neque honesta, neque justa, neque sancta esse puto: et id quidem omnino, præsertim vero per Jovem, cum impietatis erga deum a Melito hoc accuser. Profecto, si pergerem persuadere vobis, precandoque flectere, cum juraveritis, docerem utique, vos non putare deos esse; ac revera, dum pro me defensionem paro, me ipsum interim accusarem, quasi deos nequaquam existimantem. Sed multum abest, ut ita se res habeat. existimo namque esse deos, o viri Athenienses, magis quam quisquam meorum accusatorum; ac vobis deoque permitto, de me judicare, ut mihi et vobis sit conducturum.

(25.) Quod vero non graviter feram, o viri Athenienses, me a vobis esse damnatum, et alia multa faciunt, et illud in primis, quod non præter spem id accidit: verum multo magis admiror utrorumque numerum calculorum. Siquidem non putabam, tam pauco calculorum numero ab absolutione abesse. nunc autem, ut videtur, si tres solum calculi aliter cecidissent, evadebam. Melitum certe nunc evasisse videor: neque evasisse solum; sed unicuique constat, nisi surrexissent Anytus et Lycon, me accusantes, mille drachmas illum fuisse pensurum, quoniam partem quintam calculorum non accepisset.

(26.) Licetur ergo judicium morte vir iste. esto. sed ego, o viri Athenienses, quonam me liceamini postulabo? An non videlicet eo, quo dignus sum? Quid ergo? quidnam dignum est, pati me aut pendere, ob id, quod quæ didici, non siluerim, sed neglexerim, quæcunque multi facit vulgus, quæstum, rem familiarem, præfecturas, conciones, ceterosque magistratus; præterea aufugerim conjurationes atque seditiones, quæ in republica contigerunt, arbitratus, meipsum revera ad æquiora officia esse natum, quam ut ab his salutem meam pendere existimarem? Ad hæc, inquam, me non contuli, quibus occupatus, neque vobis, neque mihi ipsi fueram profuturus: sed uni huic officio duntaxat incubui, ut privatim unumquemque vestrum salutans, maximam, ut equidem existimo, afferrem utilitatem, suadens videlicet unicuique, nihil ex rebus suis prius, quam seipsum esse curandum, ut quam optimus prudentissimusque evadat; nec res civitatis curandas esse prius, quam civi-

tatem ipsam; et aliarum item rerum curam eadem ratione esse habendam. Quid igitur, cum sim talis, a vobis reportare dignus sum? Bonum certe, o viri Athenienses; si modo pro dignitate revera existimetis: ac tale quidem bonum, quale mihi conveniat. Quid igitur convenit viro egeno beneficoque, cui vacare a ceteris occupationibus expediat, quo vos ad virtutem cohortari queat? Nullum certe est aliud præmium, o viri Athenienses, quod magis virum talem deceat, quam in Prytaneo publico sumptu nutriri: et multo quidem magis, quam si quis vestrum equo, aut bigis, aut quadrigis Olympia vicerit. Nam ille quidem facit, ut felices videamini; ego vero, ut sitis. præterea ille nutritione non indiget, ego indigeo. Itaque, si pro dignitate ac justitia æstimari oportet, ego me hoc dignum existimo, alimonia scilicet publice in Prytaneo mihi exhibenda.

(27.) Forte vero hæc vobis dicens ita protervus videor, ut in superioribus visus sum, ubi commiserationes supplicationesque detestabar. Id autem haud tale est; sed ejusmodi potius, o viri Athenienses. Persuasum est enim mihi, ut nemini sponte injuriam faciam. quod quidem idcirco vobis non persuadeo, quia breve tempus habuimus colloquendi. Verum, si lex talis apud vos esset, qualis apud ceteros, ut, ubi mors pœna sit, in eo judicio non diem unam, sed plures disceptetur, vobis, ut arbitror, persuasissem. nunc vero haud facile fuit, in tam brevi tempore calumnias magnas diluere. Cum igitur mihi persuasum sit, nemini faciendam esse injuriam, permultum abest, ut mihi ipsi sim facturus. Quid ergo? numquid veritus, ne id subeam, quo Melitus me dignum censet, quod equidem aio nescire me utrum bonum sit, an malum, ut hoc devitem, eligam eorum aliquid, quæ plane mala esse scio, atque hoc me dignum esse censebo? Utrum ergo vincula? Et quid oportet me in carcere vitam agere, semper undecimviris servientem? Utrum pecunias solvere, atque, donec solutæ sint, in vinculis permanere? At vero id tantundem est, atque quod supra dicebam, cum mihi desit, unde pecunias persolvam. An forte exsilium? forte enim hoc dignus esse censebor: nimia tamen, o viri Athenienses, me cupiditas vitæ teneret, si adeo imprudens essem, ut non possem animadvertere, si vos cives mei consuetudinem meam sermonesque perferre non potuistis, sed usque adeo gravis invidiosaque vobis fuit mea consuetudo atque oratio, ut mox liberare vos ab illa jam decreveritis, alios tamen facile me putem toleraturos. Permultum abest, o viri Athenienses. Præclara scilicet mihi vita foret, in hac ætate exsulanti, et aliam ex alia civitatem permutanti, et in continua repulsa viventi. Equidem, ut plane intelligo, quocunque proficiscar, audituri me, sicut et hic, sequentur adolescentes: ac si eos repellam, ipsi vicissim, senioribus id persuadentes, me repellent. si non repellam, eorum patres et cognati ob hos ipsos me expellent.

(28.) Forsitan vero dicet aliquis: Nonne potes, o Socrates, in exsilio silentium et quietem agere? At hoc omnium est difficillimum aliquibus vestrum persuadere. Sive enim respondero, id esse non parere Deo, proptereaque me non posse quiescere, non credetis mihi, quasi per ironiam loquenti: sive dixero, me ab hoc officio

nolle vacare, quia id homini maximum contingit bonum, diebus videlicet singulis de virtute verba facere, atque de aliis, de quibus me quotidie loquentem vos auditis, atque ita me ipsum aliosque scrutari, vitamque inconsideratam respuendam esse censere; hæc etiam multo minus mihi credetis. Hæc vero, o viri Athenienses, ita ut dico, se habent; sed haud facile persuaderi possunt. Et simul nunquam malo dignari me consuevi. Quod si mihi forent pecuniæ, judicium pecuniis licerer, quot pensurus forem; neque obesset mihi illas amittere. Nunc vero non adsunt; nisi forte, quantum valeo solvere, tanti æstimari velitis. possum vero ferme argenti minam. tanti ergo judicium æstimo. Plato autem hic, o viri Athenienses, et Crito, et Critobulus, et Apollodorus jubent me triginta minis liceri. ipsi vero tantum vobis promittere parati sunt. liceor ergo tanti. promissores vero argenti hujus hi vobis erunt sufficientes.

(29.) Non multi temporis gratia, o viri Athenienses, criminandi materiam præbuistis volentibus civitatem vituperare, quia scilicet Socratem occideritis, virum sapientem. dicent enim illi, licet non sim, me sapientem, qui vos vituperare volent. Si ergo breve tempus exspectavissetis, absque vestra opera me contingebat mori. Videte ætatem meam, quam procul jam sit a vita, morti vero propinqua. Neque vero hæc adversus vos omnes dico, sed adversus eos tantum, qui me morte damnarunt. Dico etiam hæc ad hos ipsos. Forsan putatis, me, viri Athenienses, in judicio concidisse talium verborum inopia, quibus utique persuasissem vobis, si omnia facienda dicendaque putavissem, quibus a vobis absolverer. Longe vero se res aliter habet. Certe ob paupertatem damnatus sum, non verborum quidem, sed audaciæ atque impudentiæ, et quia talia apud vos dicere nolui, qualia vobis auditu gratissima contigissent, audientibus videlicet me deflentem atque lamentantem, et alia facientem multa atque dicentem, ut dixi, me indigna; qualia frequenter ab aliis audire consuevistis. Sed neque ab initio censui, decere, ob periculum devitandum, illiberale aliquid facere; neque nunc me pœnitet, hac defensionis ratione usum fuisse. malo equidem, tali quadam defensione fretus, mortem obire, quam contraria supervivere. Neque enim in judicio, neque in bello, vel mihi, vel alteri, omnia, quibus vitemus mortem, sunt facienda. nam in prœliis sæpe constat interitum vitari, si quis, objectis armis, supplex ad insequentes se convertat. Alia quoque in singulis periculis machinamenta sunt, quibus interitum quis effugiat, si quem non pudeat facere quælibet atque dicere. Sed considerate, o viri Athenienses, haud id quidem difficile esse, mortem effugere, sed multo difficilius, pravitatem. velocius enim illa currit, quam mors. Atqui ego nunc, utpote ob senectutem, tardior a tardiori captus sum; accusatores autem mei, utpote vehementes atque veloces, ab ea, quæ velocior est, pravitate. Et nunc quidem ego abeo damnatus a vobis, mortem subiturus; isti vero a veritate ipsa damnati, pravitati injustitiæque obnoxii. atque ego quidem pœnæ acquiesco, et isti. Hæc igitur forte sic oportebat se habere; arbitrorque, ea habere se mediocriter.

(30.) Post hæc autem vobis, qui me condemnastis, cupio divinare. nam illuc mihi jam perventum est, ubi solent homines divi-

nare, quando videlicet sunt prope mortem. Prædico equidem vobis, o viri Athenienses, si me interfeceritis, supplicium vobis statim post mortem meam esse venturum, ac per Jovem multo durius eo, quo me affeceritis. nunc enim id egistis, putantes liberare vos, quo minus rationem vitæ vestræ redarguenti cuiquam reddere compellamini. Id vero contra omnino vobis accidet. Nam plures futuros arbitror, qui vos redarguant, quos ego compescebam, etsi vos id non sentiebatis: tantoque illi infestiores erunt, quanto et juniores; ideoque vos gravius id feretis. Profecto, si putatis per interfectionem hominum a vituperatione vos absolvere, nimium aberratis. Non enim est hæc liberatio vel valida satis, vel honesta. sed illa tam facillima, quam optima est, non disturbare quidem alios, sed se ipsum comparare, ut quam optimus evadat. Hæc ergo vobis, qui me condemnastis, vaticinatus, finem facio.

(31.) Vobis autem, qui me absolvistis, libenter de hujusmodi re, quæ contigit, verba facerem, quamdiu magistratus negotio distinentur, necdum eo vado, ubi me oportet mori. Sed, o viri, assistite mihi id tempus. Nihil enim prohibet, invicem (dum licet) confabulari. Nempe vobis tanquam amicis demonstrare volo, quod mihi modo accidit, quidnam menti significet. Mihi quidem, o judices, (vos enim judices recte appellare possum,) mirabile quiddam contigit. vox enim illa dæmonis vaticinatrix mihi semper in superiori tempore frequenter omnino offerre se consuevit, et in rebus quidem levissimis se opponens, si quid minus recte facturus fuissem. Nunc autem ea mihi, quæ videtis, acciderunt, quæ profecto putaret aliquis atque existimaret, extrema esse malorum. sed mihi neque domo exeunti mane Dei signum adversatum est, neque dum in judicium veniebam, neque in aliqua sermonis parte, dum verba faciebam: quamvis alias frequenter, dum loquerer, in medio sermonis cursu consueverit cohibere. nunc autem in hac re nusquam, vel agenti, vel loquenti est adversatum. Quam vero hujus rei causam esse putem, vobis aperiam. Apparet enim, mihi quod contigit, bonum esse. nec recte ullo modo judicatur a nobis, quicunque mortem opinamur esse malam. Cujus quidem rei magna apud me hæc est conjectura, quod signum mihi, ut consuevit, repugnavisset, nisi bonum quid acturus fuissem.

(32.) Cogitare autem hoc pacto possumus, spem multam esse, id esse bonum. duorum enim alterum mors est. nam aut tanquam nihil omnino sit, sensum nullum ullius rei retinet is qui decessit e vita; aut, quemadmodum dicitur, permutatio quædam et transmigratio animæ ab hoc in alium locum. Sive ergo nullus remanet sensus, sed tanquam somnus quidam est, in quo quis somnium cernit nullum, admirabile lucrum erit in morte. Reor equidem, si quem oporteat ad eam noctem, quam tanta transegit quiete, ut ne insomnium quidem ullum videret, alias noctes diesque vitæ totius conferre, atque dicere, quot ipse noctes atque dies in vita melius dulciusque peregerit: reor, inquam, nedum privatum aliquem, sec nec magnum quidem regem, aliquas numerare posse. Si ergo tale quiddam est mors, lucrum esse equidem dico: (etenim nihil plus hoc pacto totum tempus quam nox una esse videtur:) sin autem mors

est tanquam transmigratio quædam hinc in alium locum, ac vera sunt quæ dicuntur, videlicet in alio seorsum a nobis loco omnes defunctos esse, quidnam melius quam hoc esse potest, o judices? Si quis enim illuc profectus, liber ab his qui profitenter judices esse, veros repererit judices, qui judicare illic perhibentur, Minoem, Rhadamanthum, Æacum, Triptolemum, aliosque, quotcunque semidei juste vixerunt, nunquid ejusmodi transmigratio parvi pendenda censebitur? Rursus Orpheum Musæumqûe convenire et Hesiodum et Homerum, quam multo aliquis nostrum redimeret? Equidem, si hæc vera sunt, sæpius mori velim, quippe cum mihi imprimis mirifice grata sit futura habitatio illa atque consuetudo, quandoquidem una cum Palamede futurus sum, et Ajace, Telamonis filio, et aliis antiquorum, quicunque falso damnati judicio decesserunt e vita, apud quod meos casus cum illorum casibus conferre utrinque, ut arbitror, non injucundum foret. Illud præterea maximum, illic degere scrutantem singulos atque examinantem, quemadmodum hic feci, quisnam illorum sapiens sit, et quis, cum non sit, se tamen existimet sapientem esse. Proinde quanti faciendum est, o judices, perscrutari ducem, qui tantum ad Trojam dixit exercitum? vel Ulixem vel Sisyphum aliosque quam plurimos, quos referre quis potest, viros et mulieres? quibuscum loqui atque examinando versari, inæstimabilis prorsus felicitas esset. siquidem hujus causa, qui illic degunt, haud amplius moriuntur: suntque illi nobis et in rebus aliis beatiores, et in eo insuper, quod reliquum jam tempus permanent immortales; si quidem vera sunt, quæ dicuntur.

(33.) Vos quoque, o judices, bene de morte sperare debetis, idque unum cogitare verum esse, viro videlicet bono nihil mali accidere posse neque viventi, neque defuncto; neque res illius a diis negligi. Neque vero mea nunc casu aliquo acciderunt, sed mihi id constat, mori jam et a laboribus liberari, mihi melius extitisse. atque hanc ob causam divinum illud signum mihi non obstitit. Nec equidem haud admodum his indignor qui accusarunt me vel condemnarunt: quamvis non hac mente accusaverint me atque damnaverint, sed quia detrimentum mihi inferre sperabant. ob hoc utique illis est succensendum. (Sed jam ad eosdem illos reversus, sic eos alloquor:) Tantum tamen vos precor, o viri, ut meos quoque filios, cum adoleverint, si ipsi similiter atque ego vobis molesti sint, pœnis similiter afficiatis; præsertim, si videantur vobis vel pecuniarum, vel alterius cujusquam rei majorem, quam virtutis, curam habere: atque si videri velint, putentve, se alicujus esse pretii, cum nullius sint, illos objurgetis, quemadmodum ego vos; quod non illis incumbant, quibus est incumbendum, ac existiment, cum nullius pretii sint, se aliquid esse. Quod si hæc feceritis, justa a vobis passus fuero, egoque et filii. Sed jam hora est hinc abire, me quidem, ut moriar; vos autem, ut vitam agatis. Utri vero nostrum in melius eant, omnibus præterquam deo est incertum.

CRITO.

SOCRATES, CRITO.

(1) CURNAM hac hora venisti, o Crito? annon valde adhuc est ante lucem? CR. Valde quidem. So. Quando vero maxime? CR. Profunda aurora. So. Admiror, quemadmodum ipse custos carceris tibi obtemperare voluerit. CR. Familiaris jam mihi est, o Socrates, ob crebrum huc adventum meum. Præterea beneficii nonnihil a me accepit. So. Venistine modo? an jam est dudum? CR. Satis dudum. So. Proinde cur non statim me excitasti, sed silentio assedisti? CR. Nunquam per Jovem, o Socrates, excitassem. neque enim ipse vellem in tanto dolore evigilare. Sed te jamdudum admiror, sentiens, quam suaviter dormias; et consulto non excitavi te, ut quam placidissime degeres. Equidem et per omnem vitam ob hujusmodi morem beatum te judicavi; maxime vero in præsenti calamitate, quod eam tam facile ac placide feras. So. Perabsurdum esset, o Crito, si quis tam grandis natu imminentem mortem moleste ferat. CR. Sed et alii, o Socrates, æque senes similibus calamitatibus opprimuntur, quos tamen ætas ab afflictione, quam sors præsens affert secum, non liberat. So. Ita est. Sed curnam adeo mane venisti? CR. Nuntium, o Socrates, ferens acerbum; non tibi quidem, ut mihi apparet, sed mihi potius, et familiaribus tuis omnibus, et acerbum et gravem. quod equidem inter gravissima, ut arbitror, numeraverim. So. Quidnam hoc? nunquid navis ex Delo jam rediit? qua reducta, mihi est moriendum. CR. Nondum rediit quidem; sed reditura videtur hodie, quemadmodum nuntiant nonnulli e Sunio venientes, qui ibi eam reliquerunt. constat ergo ex his nuntiis, hodie esse venturam; ideoque necessarium fore, te cras, o Socrates, e vita decedere.

(2.) So. Bona, o Crito, fortuna: si ita diis placet, ita esto. non tamen existimo, illam hodie redituram. CR. Undenam id conjectas? So. Dicam equidem. siquidem postridie, quam navis redierit, mihi est obeundum. CR. Sic utique aiunt hi, penes quos rei hujus potestas est. So. Itaque non hac die venturam puto, sed altera. conjecturam vero ex somnio quodam accipio, quod paulo

ante hac ipsa nocte mihi visum est: opportuneque videris somnum mihi non perturbasse. Cr. Sed quale id somnium erat? So. Videbatur mihi mulier quædam adveniens, pulchra et aspectu grata, vestes habens candidas, vocare me, atque dicere, o Socrates, tertia hinc die Phthiam pervenies latiglebam. Cr. Quam mirum id insomnium, Socrates? So. Manifestum tamen, ut mihi videtur.

(3.) Cr. Manifestum certe. sed, o beate Socrates, etiam nunc crede mihi, ac salvus esse velis. Mihi enim, si tu obieris, non una tantum calamitas imminet: sed præter id, quod te orbatus fuero tali necessario, qualem alterum nunquam reperiam, videbor utique multis, qui neutrum nostrum satis noverint, cum potuissem te servare, si minus pecuniis pepercissem, te penitus neglexisse. Atqui quænam major potest esse infamia, quam videri, pluris fecisse pecunias quam amicos? non enim poterit persuaderi compluribus, te hinc abire noluisse, nobis, quo id ageres, omni studio contendentibus. So. Quid vero a nobis, o beate Crito, tanti vulgi opinio æstimatur? probatissimi enim viri, quorum magis habenda ratio est, hæc ita gesta esse, ut gesta sunt, arbitrabuntur. Cr. Attamen vides, o Socrates, compelli nos opinionem quoque vulgi curare. præsentia enim hæc declarant, posse vulgus non minima malorum, immo fere maxima, si quis in populo calumniis agitetur, inferre. So. Utinam, o Crito, posset vulgus maxima inferre mala, ut vicissim maxima posset bona. et bene quidem se res haberet. neutrum vero potest; quippe cum neque prudentem, neque imprudentem efficere valeat. faciunt vero quodlibet, utcunque contingit.

(4.) Cr. Hæc quidem ita se habeant. Ad id vero, Socrates, mihi responde, num forte mei ceterorumque necessariorum tuorum respectus te retinet, ne, si hinc evaseris, calumniatores nos postea vexent, quasi te hinc furati fuerimus: cogamurque vel totum patrimonium, vel permultas pecunias amittere, vel præter hæc aliud quippiam pati. Si quid tale times, curam ejusmodi pone. justum namque est, nos tuæ salutis gratia non hoc solum, verum etiam, si oportuerit, majus aliud subire periculum. Verum mihi obtempera, neque aliter facias. So. Et hæc equidem et alia multa, o Crito, considero. Cr. Ne igitur hæc vereare. neque enim multum est argentum, quod postulant hi, qui servare te atque hinc educere pollicentur. Vides præterea, quam tenues sint calumniatores tui, ut non magna ad eos placandos largitione sit opus. Tibi vero pecuniæ adsunt meæ, ad hoc, ut opinor, sufficientes. Proinde si quo mei respectu adductus non putas meas pecunias erogandas, adsunt hospites isti parati persolvere. quorum unus etiam huc attulit sufficientem pecuniam, ad hoc ipsum paratam, Simmias Thebanus. ad hoc ipsum promtus est et Cebes, aliique permulti. Quamobrem, ut modo dicebam, nihil tale metuas, quo minus serves teipsum. Sed neque etiam illud, quod in judicio dixisti, te remoretur, si hac urbe exires, quo teipsum verteres te minime habiturum. aliis enim multis in locis quocunque profectus fueris, te homines colent: ac si velis in Thessaliam te conferre, reperies illic hospites meos, qui te plurimi libenter libentissime complectentur; tutumque præsidio suo adeo reddent, ut nemo in Thessalia tibi injuriam sit facturus.

(5.) Accedit ad hæc, o Socrates, quod rem minime justam aggredi videris, si, cum salvus esse possis, teipsum perdas, taliaque contra te facere studeas, qualia inimici ipsi tui contenderent, contenderuntque, te perdere properantes. Proinde filios quoque tuos perdere mihi videris. quos cum liceat tibi educare atque erudire, deseris omnino, et quantum in te, eorum mores fortunæ committis. Accident vero eis verisimiliter, qualia evenire orphanis consueverunt. Profecto oportebat non genuisse filios; aut in eis educandis erudiendisque laborem non recusare. Tu vero mihi videris, quæ elegisset vir segnis ac piger, nunc elegisse: decebat autem contra viri boni fortisque eligere; præsertim te, per omnem vitam virtutis studium profitentem. Itaque non possum tua nostraque vice, familiarium tuorum, non erubescere, veritus, ne tota hæc res tua ignavia quadam nostra sic tractata fuisse videatur. Et primum quidem ille tunc in judicium ingressus, cum liceret non ingredi; deinde concertatio ipsa judicii similiter acta; et extremus hic finis, tanquam ridiculum quiddam, per ignaviam segnitiemque nostram effugisse nos videbitur, quod nec nos te servaverimus, neque tu ipse te, cum id fieri absque magna difficultate potuerit, si vel parum in nobis usus industriæque fuisset. Hæc igitur, o Socrates, considera, ne præterquum quod mala sunt, etiam dedecori tibi nobisque sint: sed tibi consule. immo vero non jam amplius consulendi tempus, sed consultum jam esse oportuit. unicum vero consilium est; videlicet venienti hac nocte cuncta hæc facta esse oportere. Sin autem ultra tardamus, nihil omnino fieri ulterius poterit. quamobrem omnino mihi adhibe fidem, o Socrates, nec ullo modo aliter facias.

(6.) So. O amice Crito, studium hoc tuum permulti faciendum esset, si qua ratione recta susceptum esset. sin minus, quanto vehementius est, tanto molestius. Considerandum est igitur, agendane hæc nobis sint, an non. nam ego is sum non modo nunc, sed et semper, qui meorum nulli paream, præterquam rationi, quæ ratiocinanti mihi optima videatur. Rationes itaque illas, quibus superioribus temporibus usus sum, nec nunc quidem, postquam in hanc fortunam incidi, rejicere possum: sed similes mihi ferme apparent, easdemque in præsentia, quas et prius, veneror atque profiteor: adeo, ut nisi nunc meliores afferre possimus, plane scire debeas, me tibi non concessurum: non, si etiam plura, quam nunc, multitudinis potentia comminata, nos tanquam pueros larvali terribilique facie perterrere conetur, pecunia et damna, catenas, cædes objiciens. Cr. Quanam igitur ratione mediocriter considerabimus? So. Hac utique, si id, quod tu de opinionibus paulo ante dicebas, resumamus: utrum semper recte se habeat necne, oportere scilicet quarundam opinionum rationem habere, quarundam vero minime. An forte prius quam in periculum mortis inciderem, recte id dicebatur: nunc vero constat, frustra, disputationis gratia, ita dictum fuisse, cum revera joco cuidam nugisque esset adductum. Cupio equidem, o Crito, una tecum considerare, nunquid sermo ille prior alienus appareat mihi, nunc in hac fortuna constituto; an prorsus idem qui et prius: atque utrum dimittendus sit a nobis, vel ipsi obtemperandum. [Dicebatur autem, ut opinor, semper sic ab iis, qui se

aliquid dicere existimabant, ut nunc quidem ego dicebam: nempe, hominum opiniones partim plurimi faciendas ac sequendas, partim vero minime. Hoc, per Deos, o Crito, nonne tibi recte dici videtur? tu enim, ut fert hominum conditio, tantum abes a periculo ut crastino die moriaris; nec te in errorem inducit præsens calamitas.] Considera igitur: an non sufficienter tibi dici videtur, non oportere omnes opiniones hominum sequi; sed alias quidem sequi, alias vero negligere: neque omnium quidem, sed duntaxat quorundam. quid ergo dicis? hæc non recte dicuntur? Cr. Recte. So. An non bonas honorare decet, malas vero contemnere? Cr. Ita decet. So. Bonæ autem nonne prudentum? malæ contra sunt imprudentum? Cr. Quidni?

(7.) So. Age vero, quonam modo rursus talia dicebantur? qui in gymnasiis se exercet, utrum cujuslibet hominis laudi, vel vituperationi mentem adhibebit; an illius tantum, qui medicus sit, aut gymnasii magister? Cr. Hujus solius. So. An non timere decet vituperationes, et optare laudes illius unius potius, quam multorum? Cr. Procul dubio. So. Hac itaque ratione illi agendum est, exercendumque, et edendum atque bibendum, qua illi unico videatur, qui præsideat intelligatque, potius quam, ut videtur vulgo. Cr. Vera hæc sunt. So. Quid vero, si illi uni non pareat, opinionemque ejus et commendationes nihili pendat, honoret vero vulgi ignorantumque commendationes, nunquid a malo tutus erit? Cr. Minime. So. Quid autem est id malum, et quonam tendit, et in quam non obedientis partem? Cr. In corpus videlicet; hoc enim corrumpitur. So. Recte dicis. Nonne et de aliis, o Crito, eadem ratio est? Ne omnia percurramus: de justis inquam injustisque, de turpibus et honestis, bonisque et malis, de quibus in præsentia nobis consultatio est, utrum multorum opinionem sequi vererique debeamus, an unius potius, qui intelligat, quem decet et venerari et timere magis, quam cunctos alios. cui nisi obtemperaverimus, lædemur et corrumpemur in eo, quod justo quidem melius fieri, injusto autem corrumpi soleat. an nihil id est? Cr. Id quidem, o Socrates, arbitror.

(8.) So. Age vero, si id, quod a salubri quidem fit melius, ab insalubri vero corrumpitur, corruperimus, imperitorum potius quam peritorum sequuti judicia, an nobis eo destructo vivendum erit? est autem id corpus. nonne? Cr. Corpus. So. Nunquid ergo vivendum nobis cum depravato corpore atque destructo? Cr. Nullo modo. So. An forte cum illo vivendum est nobis corrupto, quod injusto quidem læditur, justo vero juvatur? nunquid vilius illud, quam corpus existimamus, quidquid illud est e nostris, circa quod justitia, injustitiaque versatur? Cr. Nullo modo. So. Sed pretiosius? Cr. Valde. So. Non igitur, o vir optime, admodum nobis curandum est, quid de nobis multi loquantur; sed quid dicat is unus, qui intelligit justa et injusta, atque ipsa veritas. Quamobrem primo quidem non recte adduxisti, opinionem vulgarem de rebus justis, et honestis, et bonis, harumque contrariis, esse alicujus existimandam. At vero dicet aliquis, posse vulgus nos interficere? Cr. Nimirum dici id potest, o Socrates. So. Vera loque-

ris. Sed, o mirabilis, hæc ratio, quam percurrimus, superiori similis esse videtur: atque hanc rursus considera, utrum nobis maneat, necne: videlicet, non multi faciendum esse vivere, sed bene vivere. Cr. Manet quidem. So. Sed hoc quoque manetne? bene, et honeste, et juste vivere idem esse? Cr. Constat.

(9.) So. Igitur ex his, quæ confessi sumus, hoc considerandum, utrum justum sit conari me hinc exire, Atheniensibus non dimittentibus, vel injustum: ac si appareat, justum esse, tentemus: si minus, dimittamus. Quas vero tu affers considerationes de pecuniarum sumptu, de vulgari opinione, de filiis educandis: cavendum est, o Crito, ne excogitationes revera horum multorum sint, qui facile interficiunt, atque eorum, qui similiter, inquam, si possent, reviviscerent, et id quidem absque mente. Nobis vero, quandoquidem sic exigit ratio, nihil aliud attendendum est, quam quod modo dicebamus, utrum agamus justa, pecunias largiendo, gratiamque habendo his, qui me hinc educant: utrum, inquam, in hoc agamus justa, hos quidem educti, illi vero educentes; an potius utrinque in his omnibus agendis, agamus injuste: atque si appareat, nos iniqua aggredi, ne excogitandum quidem id est; sed mansuete subire decet et mortem, et quodvis aliud supplicium prius, quam quidquam agamus inique. Cr. Recte loqui videris, Socrates. considera tamen, quid agamus. So. Consideremus, o bone vir, una. ac si qua in parte me dicentem redarguere poteris, redargue. ego enim assentiar. sin minus, desine quæso, o vir beate, jam toties eadem verba repetere: oportere scilicet me hinc, Atheniensibus invitis, abire. Equidem multi facio, persuaso te hæc agere; non autem invito. Attende itaque, nunquid considerationis initium tibi sufficienter dictum sit; conareque quod rogatus sis ita respondere, ut maxime censeas respondendum. Cr. Conabor equidem.

(10.) So. Dicimus sane, nullo modo sponte esse injuriandum; an forte quodam pacto injuria facienda est, aliter vero nequaquam? vel potius injuriari nullo modo vel bonum est, vel honestum, quemadmodum in superiori tempore sæpe confessi sumus? Quod quidem et nuper est confirmatum. An forte omnes illæ superiores conventiones nostræ in paucis his diebus prorsus evanuerunt, ac jamdiu nos tam grandes natu homines, o Crito, tamque studiose invicem disserentes, latuit, nihil a pueris nos differre? An potius sic prorsus res se habet, ut jamdiu dicebamus, sive affirmet id multitudo, sive neget; et, sive graviora præsentibus, sive leviora subire cogamur, attamen injuriam facere omnino malum turpeque esse fatemur illi ipsi, qui facit, an non? Cr. Fatemur certe. So. Quamobrem nullo modo injuriandum est. Cr. Nullo quidem. So. Neque, si injuriam passus fueris, eam ulciscendum, ut vulgus putat. siquidem nullo modo injuriandum. Cr. Ita videtur. So. Quid vero? mala alicui facere decet, o Crito, an non? Cr. Non certe, o Socrates. So. Quid autem, qui mala patitur, num mala vicissim referre illi debet, qui intulit, ut vulgo videtur? justumne id esset, an injustum? Cr. Injustum. So. Nempe mala inferre hominibus, non discrepat ab injuria. Cr. Vere loqueris. So. Neque igitur ulcisci decet, neque malefacere cuiquam hominum,

quodcunque ab aliis ipse passus fueris. Et vide, o Crito, ne quid, dum hæc concedis, præter sententiam tuam nobis assentiare. Perpaucis enim, scio quid loquar, sic vel apparet, vel apparebit. At vero quibus sic apparet, et quibus aliter, his non est communis deliberatio; sed necesse est, eos, cum ultro citroque consilia sua respiciunt, invicem se despicere. Animadverte igitur et tu diligenter, utrum tibi mihique communis sit hæc opinio, mecumque sentias: atque utrum ab hoc principio exorsi deliberemus, quasi nunquam rectum sit, vel injuriari, vel ulcisci injuriam, vel malum referre in eum qui intulit. An hic discedis a nobis, in hoc principio non consentiens? Mihi quidem et jamdiu et nunc ita videtur. Quod si tibi apparet aliter, dic, et doce. sin autem in superioribus permanes, jam quid sequatur audi. Cr. Consentio equidem et permaneo. So. Dico ergo deinceps, immo potius interrogo, Utrum quæ quis confiteatur alicui, justa esse, facere debeat, an fallere? Cr. Facere.

(11.) So. Ex his jam ita considera. Si nos hinc abeamus præter civitatis consensum, utrum male aliquibus faciemus, et his quidem, quibus minime decet, vel non: et utrum in his permanebimus, quæ justa esse convenimus, vel contra? Cr. Nequeo equidem, o Socrates, ad hæc respondere. neque enim intelligo. So. Verum ita considera, perinde ac si, volentibus nobis hinc sive aufugere, sive quomodocunque hoc vocandum sit, veniant leges, civitatisque hujus respublica, et instantes nobis sic inquiant: Dic nobis, o Socrates, quidnam cogitas facere? an non intelligis, hac re, quam aggrederis, te nobis legibus, totique patriæ, quantum in te est, interitum machinari? an putas, civitatem ullam amplius stare posse, ac non subverti, in qua judicia publica nullam vim habeant, sed a privatis hominibus contemnantur atque frangantur? Quid ergo dicemus ad hæc, o Crito, aliaque hujusmodi? Permulta enim in hanc sententiam afferre quis potest; præsertim orator, pro lege ita soluta declamans, quæ quidem sententias publico judicio latas jubet ratas esse. an respondebimus illi, civitatem non recte judicando nobis injuriam intulisse? itane, an aliter? Cr. Ita per Jovem, o Socrates.

(12.) So. At enim leges ipsæ sic responderent: O Socrates, nonne nobis tecum id convenit, standum tibi esse judiciis, quæ civitas tulerit? Quod si leges ita loquentes admiraremur, forte dicerent: Noli, Socrates, quæ modo diximus, admirari: immo responde, cum tibi et interrogare et respondere sit consuetum. Dic age, quidnam nobis civitatique succenseas, quo dissolvere nos contendas? principio, nonne nos te genuimus? atque per nos pater tuus matrem accepit tuam, et provocavit? Dic ergo, an has inter nos leges, quæ sunt circa conjugia, improbes, atque his aliqua in parte, quasi minus rectis, succenseas. Nihil succenseo, dicerem. Sed an his legibus, quæ educatione eruditionique natorum provident, in qua ipse quoque eruditus es? an non recte disposuerunt hæ leges ad hoc officium conditæ, cum juberent patrem tuum in musica te et gymnastica erudire? Recte disposuisse concederem. Age ergo, postquam per nos genitus es, educatusque ac eruditus, primo qui-

dem num potes negare, te nostrum esse et natum et servum, ipsumque te et progenitores? deinde, cum id ita se habeat, an putas jus ex æquo tibi atque nobis esse; et quæ nos tibi facere aggrediamur, eadem vicissim in nos abs te referri justum esse judicas? An, cum nec ad patrem, nec ad dominum, si eam habeas, tibi jus ex æquo sit, ut, quæ ab illis patiare, in eos referre possis; neque si jurgio hi te lacessant, contra jurgare, neque si te verberent, vicissim verberare, neque alia ejusmodi in eos tentare liceat: contra patriam vero ac leges tibi licebit? adeo ut, si, nos judicantes id esse justum, interficere te velimus, tu vicissim nos leges et patriam pro viribus coneris occidere, dicasque, te in his agendis justa facere, qui virtutis curam revera habere profiteris. An sic es sapiens, ut te latuerit, et patri et matri et progenitoribus omnibus patriam esse anteponendam; atque esse venerabilius quiddam sanctiusque, et in superiori sorte, tum apud deos, tum apud homines mentis compotes, patriam collocandam? colereque eam oportere magis, eique obedire; ac rigidius se gerenti mitius assentiri, quam patri: et, si quid jubeat, vel dissuadere illi quantum liceat, vel facere; et patientissime sustinere, quidquid jusserit patiendum? ac, sive mandaverit verberari te, sive in vincula conjici, sive in prœlium miserit ad vulnera excipienda, mortemque subeundam, obediendum est omnino. jus enim ita dictat; et neque tergiversandum, neque fugiendum, neque ordinem deserendum, sed et in bello, et in judicio, et prorsus ubique, ea sunt, quæ respublica patriaque jusserit, facienda: aut certe verbis, quatenus justum est, uti licet ad persuadendum illi eamque placandam: vi autem uti nefas est, vel contra matrem, vel contra patrem, maxime vero omnium contra patriam. Quidnam ad hæc dicemus, Crito, verane loqui leges, an contra? Cr. Mihi quidem videntur.

(13.) So. Proinde leges fortasse dicent: Animadverte, o Socrates, utrum vere dicamus, te injusta contra nos aggredi. Nos quidem, quæ te et alios cives genuimus, educavimus, nutrivimus, participes bonorum omnium, quæ in nostra erant potestate, effecimus: tamen permisimus cuilibet Atheniensium, cognitis jam civitatis moribus legibusque, et reipublicæ gubernandæ forma, si cui non placeamus, licere, acceptis suis, quocunque placuerit hinc abire. Nec ulla ex nobis legibus impedit aut denegat, sive quis vestrum, cui nos civitasque minime placeamus, in coloniam aliquam hinc velit discedere, sive habitationem alio transferre cupiat, quo minus id pro arbitrio facere valeat, secumque sua perferre. At vero quicunque ex vobis, postquam cognoverit, quemadmodum nos judicia disponimus, et in ceteris omnibus regimus civitatem, permanserit tamen, hunc jam asseveramus, opere ipso convenisse nobiscum, quæcunque jusserimus, se facturum. Atque eum, qui non paruerit, tripliciter injuriari censemus: et quod genitricibus nobis non obtemperat; et quod nutricibus non obsequitur; et quod pactus nobis obedire, neque obedit, neque persuadere nobis studet, si quid minus recte facere videamur: cumque præcepta nostra libere proponamus, neque mandemus rigide, sed permittamus alterum e duobus, aut ver-

bis persuaderi nobis, aut mandata explere; tu horum neutrum facis.

(14.) His ergo criminibus te, o Socrates, obnoxium judicamus fore, si, quæ cogitas, feceris: nec minime Atheniensium te, sed maxime omnium. Ac si causam requiram, ob quam præ ceteris sim obnoxius, forte juste me remorderent, dicentes, me maxime omnium Atheniensium civitatis legibus consensisse. sic enim inferrent: Magna nobis, o Socrates, horum sunt argumenta, tibi nos civitatemque placuisse. nunquam enim maxime omnium Atheniensium in ea moras traxisses, nisi tibi mirifice placuisset. Itaque nec spectaculi gratia urbe unquam egressus es, nisi semel in Isthmum, nec alio usquam, nisi in militia; neque aliam fecisti peregrinationem unquam, quemadmodum ceteri solent; neque alterius civitatis te cepit cupiditas, aliarumve legum; sed nos tibi nostraque civitas satisfecimus; usque adeo vehementer probasti nos, nostrisque moribus victurum te consensisti: tum in ceteris rebus, tum quia in ea filios procreasti, utpote quæ tibi placuerit. Quin etiam licebat tibi in ipso judicio exsilium postulare, si voluisses; atque quod nunc invita civitate aggrederis, tunc ea volente poteras facere. Tu vero verbis tunc te extulisti, quasi non graviter ferres, si mori te oporteret. quinimmo mortem ipsam, ut dicebas, potius quam exsilium elegisti. Nunc vero nec verba illa tua erubescis, neque nos leges vereris, sed nobis interitum machinaris. Facis autem, quod deterrimus faceret servus, fugam arripere tentans, contra pactiones conventionesque, in quibus convenisti nobiscum, nostris te præbens institutionibus gubernandum. Primum responde nobis, num id ipsum vere dicamus, consensisse non verbis, sed re ipsa, moribus nostris gubernari debere. An non vera hæc sunt? Quid ad hæc dicemus, Crito? an non confitebimur? Cr. Necesse est, o Socrates. So. Nonne igitur (leges inquient) conventa nobiscum et pacta transgrederis? quæ neque coactus es nobiscum inire, neque deceptus, neque ad breve tempus deliberare ad hæc eligenda es compulsus, sed annos septuaginta deliberare licuit: quo in tempore licuit et abire, nisi tibi placuissemus, conventionesque justæ tibi visæ fuissent. Tu vero nec Lacedæmonem, neque Cretam nobis anteposuisti, quas ipse urbes assidue prædicas recte gubernari, neque aliam ullam, vel Græcarum civitatum, vel Barbararum. immo ex hac rarius peregrinatus es, quam claudi et cæci, mancique alii soleant. usque adeo Atheniensibus tibi præ ceteris civitas placuit, atque nos, videlicet leges. cui enim placere potest civitas, cujus non placeant leges? Nunc vero non permanes in his, in quibus jamdiu nobis tibique convenit. Permanebis certe, si nobis credideris, ne egrediens urbe deridendus evadas.

(15.) Considera rursus, si hæc transgressus fueris, et ea quæ inique cogitas perpetraveris, ad quid tandem id vel tibi, vel necessariis tuis conducet. Cuique enim constat, in periculo necessarios tuos fore, ne ipsi quoque in exsilium expellantur, priventurque civitate, et patrimonio suo exspolientur. Tu autem si quam in civitatem finitimam te contuleris, vel Thebas, vel Megaras, (utræque

enim gubernantur recte) hostis primum reipublicæ illius accedes, et omnes, quibus curæ est patria, despicient abominabunturque te, corruptorem legum existimantes. ideoque confirmabis eorum qui te damnarunt opinionem, ut recte contra te tulisse sententiam videantur. quisquis enim corruptor est legum, is potissimum et juvenum imperitorumque hominum videbitur esse corruptor. Quid ergo? civitatesne, quæ recte gubernantur, et modestissimos quosque homines devitabis? Atqui si id feceris, vitane dignus eris? an forte impudenter te his admiscebis, nec erubesces, de eisdem apud eos disserere, de quibus apud nos consuevisti; virtutem videlicet et justitiam, legesque, et instituta legum plurimi esse existimanda? neque putas, absurdum et ab his dissonans apparere Socratis factum? Procul dubio putandum est. Fortasse vero civitates has declinans in Thessaliam ad Critonis hospites abibis. illic enim absque ordine et temperantia vivitur. Ac forsan libenter illi te audient, narrantem quemadmodum e carcere ridicule fugeris, ut fascem quendam tibi super imponens, aut corio tegens, vel aliis quibusdam te involvens, quemadmodum solent qui fugam surripiunt, et in alienam figuram te transmutans illinc aufugeris. quemadmodum vero vir senex parvo admodum tempore, ut verisimile est, victurus, ausus fueris, ob vivendi cupiditatem in tam sordida inopia vivere, maximas transgressus leges, nullusne dixerit? forte: si neminem offenderis. alioquin multa, o Socrates, atque indigna te audies. vives autem obnoxius cunctis hominibus atque deserviens. Quid vero facies in Thessalia? conviviane frequentabis? utpote qui in Thessaliam, quasi ad cœnam aliquam, adventaveris. Disputationes vero illæ de justitia, ceterisque virtutibus ubinam ulterius nobis erunt? Enimvero filiorum gratia vivere cupis, ut nutrias eos atque erudias. An ergo in Thessaliam eos perduces, ut illic nutrias eos, atque erudias, hospites eos efficiens, ut hoc insuper commodi abs te reportent? an id quidem non facies; hic vero relicti melius te vivo alentur, atque erudientur a necessariis tuis, te absente? Utrum vero, si in Thessaliam abibis, tui id curabunt: sin autem in alteram transibis vitam, non curabunt? Profecto si quid opis est in his, qui aiunt se tuos necessarios esse, credendum est, curaturos.

(16.) Ceterum, o Socrates, fidem nobis adhibens nutricibus tuis, neque filios tuos, neque vitam, neque aliud quidquam pluris facias, quam justitiam: ut cum in vitam alteram transmigraveris, valeas illic præsidibus horum omnium reddere rationem. Nempe si leges transgressus hæc feceris, neque melius, neque justius, neque sanctius id vel tibi continget, vel tuis; neque illuc tibi profecto conducet. quin potius injuriam passus abito, si abieris, non a nobis quidem legibus, sed ab hominibus. Verum si adeo turpiter aufugeris, etiam versa vice injurias malaque referens, conventiones nobiscum initas et promissa transgressus, atque lædens eos, quos minime oportebat, te ipsum scilicet et amicos et patriam, nosque leges: nos utique et viventi tibi infensæ hic erimus, et in altera vita leges, quæ illic sunt nostræ sorores, haud quaquam te benigne recipient, scientes, te nos pro viribus disperdere conatum fuisse. Quamobrem, ne Crito aliter tibi quam nos persuadeat, caveto.

(17.) Hæc equidem, o dulcis amice Crito, audire videor, quemadmodum Corybantes tibias audire se putant. atque in me sermonum ejusmodi sonitus adeo reboat, ut alia audire non possim. Vides, quæ in præsentia mihi apparent: quibus si quid contradicere aggrediaris, frustra conabere. verumtamen si quid te profecturum confidis, dicas. Cr. Ergo vero quod dicam, o Socrates, nihil habeo. So. Desine ergo, Crito; et pergamus hac, quandoquidem hac nos Deus ipse ducit.

PHÆDO.

ECHECRATES, PHÆDO, APOLLODORUS, SOCRATES, CEBES, SIMMIAS, CRITO, MINISTER UNDECIM VIRORUM.

(1.) IPSENE, o Phædon, affuisti, qua die Socrates venenum bibit in carcere? an ab alio audivisti? PH. Equidem, o Echecrates, affui. ECH. Quænam sunt ea, quæ vir ille, antequam moreretur, locutus est? et quomodo e vita decessit? libenter enim audirem. Nam neque quisquam Phliasiorum civium frequenter proficiscitur nunc Athenas, neque jamdiu hospes aliquis inde ad nos accessit, qui certum aliquid ea de re nuntiare nobis posset, nisi illum potato veneno e vita migrasse. de ceteris vero nihil, quid referrent, habebant. PH. Nec ergo, quæ ad judicium pertinebant, quo pacto tractata fuerint, audivistis? ECH. Audivimus. hæc enim nobis quidam retulit. et admirati profecto sumus, quod, jam peracto judicio, diu postea obiisse videatur. quidnam in causa fuit, Phædon? PH. Sorte quadam id Socrati, o Echecrates, accidit. nam pridie quam judicaretur, ornari contigit puppim navis ejus, quam mittunt Athenienses in Delum. ECH. Id vero quidnam sibi vult? PH. Hæc est illa navis, ut aiunt Athenienses, in qua Theseus olim bis septem illos secum tulit in Cretam, servavitque illos et ipse servatus est. Voverat autem, ut fertur, Apollini, si servarentur, quotannis in Delum spectaculum quoddam mittere. quod quidem nunc etiam, ac semper ex illo tempore singulis ad Deum mittunt annis. Cum igitur spectaculi principium agitur, ex lege interim lustrant urbem, neminemque eo tempore publice necant, donec Delum perveniat navis rursusque Athenas revertatur ex Delo. id vero nonnunquam longo peragitur tempore, quando eos occupant venti. Initium vero spectaculi est, postquam Apollinis sacerdos navis illius coronaverit puppim. id vero, ut modo dicebam, pridie quam judicaretur, factum erat. Quamobrem longum tempus Socrates fuit in carcere judicium inter atque mortem.

(2.) ECH. Circa vero mortem ipsam, o Phædon, quænam sunt ab eo dicta, quæ facta, quive familiarium aderant? an forte magistratus adesse non permittebant? atque ita orbatus decessit amicis? PH. Permittebant quidem: ideoque aderant aliqui, et quidem multi.

Ech. Hæc igitur omnia para te quam planissime nobis referre, nisi quid negotii te impediat. Ph. Otiosus equidem sum, atque enarrare vobis conabor: quippe cum meminisse Socratis, sive ipse loquar sive loquentes alios audiam, mihi semper omnium sit dulcissimum. Ech. Similiter, o Phædon, hos qui te audituri sunt, affectos habebis. Sed jam pro viribus diligentissime refer omnia. Ph. Atque mira quadam ratione, o Echecrates, illic præsens affectus eram. Neque enim misericordia me habebat, ut familiarissimi viri morti præsentem. Sane beatus vir ille mihi, o Echecrates, videbatur, tum animi illius habitum, tum orationem consideranti: adeo intrepide generoseque migrabat e vita, ut videretur mihi illum in vitam alteram non absque divina sorte migrare, sed illic quoque beatus fore, si quis unquam alter. Quamobrem neque admodum commovebar, (ut consentaneum videretur hominem rei præsentem lugubri commoveri) neque rursus afficiebar lætitia, quemadmodum solebamus alias, cum in philosophia versabamur. Nam sermones quidem ejusmodi erant: sed revera affectus quidam mirus atque insolita voluptatis dolorisque permixtio me invaserat considerantem, illi paulo post moriendum esse. et quicunque aderamus, ferme similiter eramus affecti, alias quidem ridentes, alias vero lacrymantes. unus autem præ ceteris Apollodorus: nosti enim virum ejusque mores. Ech. Quidni? Ph. Ille igitur ita prorsus erat affectus: atque ego ipse aliique omnes distractum similiter perturbatione animum habebamus. Ech. Sed quinam forte aderant, o Phædon? Ph. Cives quidem et indigenæ aderant ipse Apollodorus et Critobulus paterque ejus: rursus Hermogenes, Epigenes, Æschines, Antisthenes. aderat et Ctesippus Pæaneus et Menexenus atque alii quidam indigenæ. Plato autem, ut arbitror, ægrotabat. Ech. Sed num aliqui aderant peregrini? Ph. Aderant et peregrini, Simmias Thebanus et Cebes et Phædondes: Megarenses vero Euclides et Terpsion. Ech. Aristippus autem et Cleombrotus nunquid aderant? Ph. Non. In Ægina enim dicebantur esse. Ech. Aderantne insuper alii? Ph. Hos ferme, quos narravi, interfuisse existimo. Ech. Dic vero, quales fuerunt sermones?

(3.) Ph. Conabor equidem a principio tibi omnia enarrare. Solebamus quotidie diebus superioribus ad Socratem proficisci ego atque alii, convenientes mane in illa curia, in qua et judicium factum fuerat: carceri enim erat proxima. Colloquentes igitur inter nos operiebamur semper illic, quoad carcer aperiretur. aperiebatur enim haud admodum mane. eo autem aperto ingrediebamur ad Socratem, et ad plurimum diem cum ipso confabulabamur. Tunc ergo prius solito convenimus. pridie namque ejus diei, cum e carcere egressi essemus vespere, navem ex Delo audivimus rediisse. itaque ediximus invicem, summo mane nobis fore ad locum solitum redeundum. Cum vero reversi essemus, exiens nobis obvius janitor, qui nos solebat admittere, exspectare jussit nec prius ingredi quam ab ipso accersiremur. Solvunt enim, inquit, undecim viri Socratem, illique denuntiant hodie mortem esse obeundam. Neque deinde admodum commoratus rediit ad nos, jussitque intrare. Itaque introeuntes Socratem quidem invenimus compedibus paulo ante solutum; Xan-

thippen vero (nosti mulierem) juxta sedentem puerumque ejus manibus tenentem. Quæ nos cum vidisset, ejulare cœpit, et qualia mulieres solent, exclamare: O Socrates, inquit, nunquam amplius affabuntur te tui familiares, neque tu illos. At Socrates Critonem intuitus, o Crito, inquit, deducat quis hanc domum. Et illam quidem reduxerunt quidam Critonis domestici, vociferantem atque plangentem. Socrates autem sedens in lectica contraxit ad se crus, manuque perfricuit, atque inter fricandum sic inquit: Quam mira videtur, o viri, hæc res esse, quam nominant homines voluptatem, quamque miro naturaliter se habet modo ad dolorem ipsum, qui ejus contrarius esse videtur: quippe cum simul homini adesse nolint. attamen si quis prosequitur capitque alterum, semper ferme alterum quoque accipere cogitur; quasi ex eodem vertice sint ambo connexa. Arbitror equidem Æsopum, si hæc animadvertisset, fabulam fuisse facturum: videlicet Deum ipsum, cum ipsa inter se pugnantia vellet conciliare neque id facere posset, in unum saltem eorum apices conjunxisse; proptereaque cuicunque adest alterum, eidem mox alterum quoque adesse. Quod quidem mihi accidit in præsentia. siquidem modo crus propter vincula afficiebatur dolore; sed huic succedere voluptas jam videtur.

(4.) Ad hæc Cebes, per Jovem, inquit, o Socrates, opportune mihi id in memoriam revocasti. cum enim poemata composueris, intendens sermones Æsopi procemiumque in Apollinem: tum alii multi me interrogaverunt, tum Evanus præcipue atque prius, quonam consilio, postquam huc devenisti, hæc feceris, quæ prius feceras nunquam. Si igitur tibi curæ est, ut habeam, quod respondeam Evano, quando iterum ex me quæsierit, quod certo scio ipsum esse facturum; dic quæso, quid illi sit respondendum. Vera, inquit, o Cebes, responde, me id effecisse, non ut vel sibi gratificarer vel cum suis carminibus decertarem: sciebam enim facile id non esse: verum ut insomnia quædam experirer, me simul expians, num forte hæc sit ea musica, quam sæpius jam exercere me jubent. Nam frequenter in superiori tempore insomnium idem, licet alia atque alia forma sese mihi offerens, eadem semper ita præcepit, Fac, o Socrates, musicam, atque exerce. Ego igitur, quod in superiori tempore faciebam, hoc mihi præceptum arbitrabar: et quemadmodum currentes adhortari solemus, sic, quod ipse antea faciebam, ad idem me insomnium cohortari putabam; quasi philosophia maxima musica foret. Postquam vero facto jam de me judicio mori me interim Dei festivitas inhiberet: censui oportere, si forte insomnium totiens jubeat popularem hanc musicam exercere, non negligere ejus præceptum. Tutius enim fore arbitratus sum, antequam e vita migrarem, expiare animum atque, ut monet insomnium, poemata facere. Quamobrem primo equidem cecini eum ipsum, cujus tunc sacra celebrabantur: atque post Deum, judicans oportere eum, qui poeta futurus sit, non sermones sed fabulas facere, me vero non esse fabulatorem, nonnullas ex fabulis Æsopi, quas sciebam, promptioresque habebam, ut in quamque prius incidi, modulatus sum.

(5.) Hæc igitur, o Cebes, refer Evano: et valere jube, atque consule, ut si probe sapit, me sequatur. migro enim hinc hodie.

sic enim Athenienses jubent. Tunc Simmias, Quale id est, inquit, o Socrates, quod Evano mandas? sæpe quidem cum illo fui: et quantum de illo sentio, nullo pæne modo libens ille tibi parebit. So. Quid vero? nonne philosophus est Evanus? Sim. Mihi quidem videtur. So. Volet igitur et Evanus et omnis, quicunque hujus rei digne est particeps. Non tamen forte sibi vim inferet. non enim fas esse aiunt. Et simul hæc dicens, crura e lectica demisit in terram; atque ita sedens deinceps reliqua disputavit. Quæsivit igitur ab eo Cebes, Quonam id modo ais, o Socrates? fas quidem non esse seipsum violare; philosophum tamen optare morientem sequi? So. Sed dic, o Cebes, nonne tu Simmiasque talia quædam audivistis a Philolao, quo familiariter utebamini? Ce. Manifesti quidem nihil, o Socrates. So. Atqui ego quoque de his rebus ex auditu loquor. Quæ igitur forte ipse audivi, referre vobis nulla invidia prohibebit. etenim forte maxime decet, illo migraturum considerare, atque effingere, qualis fore putanda sit hæc ipsa migratio. quid enim aliud usque ad solis occasum quis faciat?

(6.) Ce. Quam ob causam, o Socrates, nefas esse aiunt, sibimet manus inferre? jam enim, quod modo quærebas, ego a Philolao audivi, cum apud nos observaretur, et ab aliis insuper nonnullis, non decere id facere: apertum tamen hac de re quicquam nihil ab aliquo unquam audivi. So. Sed attentione jam opus est. nam et si audiveris, mirum tamen forte videri possit, si hoc solum ex aliis omnibus simplex sit; nec accidat unquam homini, quemadmodum cetera, quando et quibusdam melius mori quam vivere. itaque mirum tibi forte videbitur, si his, quibus præstat mori, non liceat sibimet prodesse, sed alium oporteat exspectare, qui prosit. Tunc Cebes subridens Thebanorum more, Proh Jupiter, inquit. So. Atqui videri quidem potest id sic absurdum. fortasse tamen quandam habet rationem. Profecto sermo ille, qui de his in arcanis habetur, in quadam custodia esse homines, neque decere quenquam ex hac seipsum solvere neque aufugere, magnus quidem mihi videtur neque cognitu facilis. Verumtamen id mihi, o Cebes, recte apparet dictum, Deos quidem curam habere nostrum; nos vero homines unam quandam ex possessionibus esse Deorum. an non ita tibi videtur? Ce. Mihi quidem. So. Nonne igitur et tu, si quid ex mancipiis tuis seipsum perimeret, cum tu nullo modo id permisisses, irascereris utique illi, et, si potestatem haberes, pœna quadam afficeres? Ce. Omnino. So. Forte igitur hac ratione haud præter rationem est, non prius decere seipsum interficere, quam Deus necessitatem aliquam imposuerit, qualem nobis imposuit in præsentia.

(7.) Ce. Consentaneum id quidem apparet. Quod vero dicebas modo, philosophos perfacile velle mori, absurdum, o Socrates, videtur esse; siquidem, quod nunc diximus, rationem habet, Deum videlicet nostrum esse curatorem, nos vero in rebus ejus positos esse. Nullam enim id rationem habet, prudentissimos videlicet homines non ægre ferre, ab ea cura se amoveri, quam sibi præstant Dii, optimi omnium rerum gubernatores. Nunquam enim putaret vir prudens, ipsum se melius esse curaturum, si liber evaserit: sed

demens aliquis forsitan id putaret, fugiendum scilicet esse a domino; neque cogitaret non esse id, quod bonum est, fugiendum, sed in eo maxime permanendum. ideoque absque ratione fugeret. Qui vero mentem habet, semper apud eum, qui sit melior, esse cupit. Atque ita, o Socrates, contra omnino conveniens esse videtur quam quod paulo ante dicebatur. Sapientes quidem decere graviter mortem ferre; insipientes vero libenter. Socrates igitur, cum hæc audisset, delectari visus est argutia Cebetis. conversusque ad nos, Semper, inquit, hic Cebes rationes quasdam perscrutatur; neque admodum facile, quod quivis dixerit, vult admittere. Tunc Simmias, Mihi quoque, inquit, nonnihil videtur Cebes dicere. Quo enim consilio sapientes viri meliores revera quam ipsi sint, fugiant illisque carere facile patiantur? Atque mihi videtur Cebes sermonem in te intendere, quod tam facile et nos relinquas et Deos, ut tu ipse fateris, principes bonos. Justa dicitis, inquit Socrates. arbitror enim vos dicere, meipsum tanquam in judicio oportere purgare. Sim. Et maxime quidem.

(8.) So. Age ergo, conabor nunc apud vos accuratius, quam nuper apud Atheniensium judices fecerim, me defendere. Equidem, o Simmia atque Cebes, nisi me migraturum putarem primum quidem ad Deos alios sapientes et bonos, deinde ad homines defunctos his, qui hic sunt, meliores, injuste agerem non moleste ferens mortem. Nunc certe habetote, sperare me ad viros bonos iturum. sed hoc quidem haud omnino asseverarem. Quod vero ad Deos dominos valde bonos iturus sim, certum habetote, si quid aliud ejusmodi, et hoc utique me affirmaturum. Propterea haud similiter mortem moleste fero: sed bono animo sum; speroque superesse aliquid his, qui defuncti sunt; atque, ut jam diu dicitur, multo melius bonis fore quam malis. Sim. Quidnam, o Socrates, cogitas? nunquid ipse cum isthac sententia hinc abire? an nos quoque participes ejus relinquere? nempe commune nobis quoque id bonum arbitror esse debere. præterea ita demum te apud nos purgaveris, si, quæ dicis, nobis etiam persuaseris. So. Dabo equidem operam. sed Critonem prius auscultemus. videtur enim mihi jamdudum nonnihil significare velle. Cri. Quidnam putas aliud, o Socrates, quam quod jamdudum mihi dicit is, qui tibi venenum est daturus? jubet enim te moneri, ut quam parcissime loquaris: dicens eos qui disputant, nimium incalescere: nihil vero tale bibituris venenum convenire. alioquin eos, qui id fecerint, cogi interdum bis, quandoque ter venenum bibere. So. Mitte ipsum. tantum id, quod est officii ejus, paret, tanquam bis et, si oportuerit, ter præbiturus. Cri. Et antea quidem ferme id responsurum sciebam. sed me ille jamdudum stimulat. So. Mitte ipsum. Ego vero, o judices, rationem vobis jam reddere volo, ob quam mihi videatur vir, qui per omnem vitam incubuerit philosophiæ, merito magna cum fiducia imminentem exspectare mortem, atque bona spe esse, se ibi, postquam hinc migraverit, maxima bona reportaturum. quemadmodum igitur id ita se habeat, o Simmia atque Cebes, conabor equidem aperire.

(9.) Quicunque philosophiam recte aliquando attigerunt, nimirum

videntur latuisse ceteros homines, quod nihil aliud ipsi commentarentur quam mori atque esse se mortuos. Quod si id verum est, perabsurdum foret, si, cum nihil præter hoc aliud per omnem vitam studuerint, hoc ipso adveniente, quod jam diu agitabant exercebantque, graviter ferrent. Hinc Simmias arridens, per Jovem, inquit, o Socrates, mihi quidem haud multum ridere cupienti risum expressisti. Nam multos arbitror fore, qui, si id audiverint, aptissime in philosophos dictum putent: nostrosque homines consensuros et valde quidem, philosophos eos revera se ipsos morti præbere; nec tamen se latuisse, quam digni sint morte. So. Forte id recte, o Simmia, dicerent, præter id quod se non latuisse addunt. latuit sane eos, qua ratione veri philosophi et mori studeant et morte sint digni. Sed jam relinquamus illos, nobisque ipsis loquamur. Putamusne aliquid esse mortem? Sim. Aliquid certe. So. Nunquid aliud quam animæ a corpore solutionem? esseque id mortuum esse, scilicet solutum ab anima corpus per se seorsum esse? seorsum quoque a corpore animam solutam, ipsam per seipsam existere? nunquid mors præter hoc aliud est? Sim. Nihil aliud. So. Considera, bone vir, num tibi idem quoque et mihi videatur. ex his enim nos arbitror planius, quæ perquirimus, inventuros. Videturne tibi philosophi officium esse sectari eas, quæ appellantur voluptates, quales sunt epularum atque poculorum? Sim. Minime quidem, o Socrates. So. Sed nunquid venereorum? Sim. Nullo modo. So. Quid? reliquum corporis cultum an multi facere philosophus tibi videtur? ut habere vestes egregias calceosque et alia, quæ circa corpus sunt ornamenta; utrum multi facere tibi videtur, an nihili pendere, nisi quatenus magna cogat necessitas illis uti? Sim. Mihi quidem videtur verus philosophus hæc omnia floccipendere. So. An non tibi videtur ejusmodi studium haud ad corpus quidem declinare, sed, quantum fieri potest, ab illo discedere atque ad animum se convertere? Sim. Mihi quidem. So. Nonne igitur in ejusmodi rebus primum manifeste apparet philosophus præter ceteros homines animum, quam maxime potest, a commercio corporis segregare? Sim. Apparet. So. Putant vero plerique, o Simmia, eum hominem, cui nihil talium dulce sit neque illis fruatur, revera vivere existimandum non esse, sed pæne mortuum, cum voluptates corporis non percipiat. Sim. Verissima narras.

(10.) So. Quid autem circa sapientiæ ipsius acquisitionem? utrum impedimento est corpus, si quis ipsum socium ad investigandum assumpserit: necne? quale utique, tale aliquid dico. Habentne visus et auditus veritatem in hominibus aliquam? an talia quædam ipsi quoque poetæ semper canunt, nihil nos audire, nihil videre sincerum? Atqui si ii corporis sensus sinceri certique non sunt, neque etiam alii: quippe cum ceteri omnes his quodammodo deteriores sint. an non tibi videntur? Sim. Prorsus. So. Quando igitur animo veritatem attingit? quando enim aliquid cum corpore tentat investigare, procul dubio decipitur a corpore. Sim. Vere loqueris. So. An non sicubi proprie in ipsa ratiocinatione fit sibi aliquid eorum, quæ vere sunt, manifestum? Sim. Ita est. So. Ratiocinatur autem tunc optime, quando horum nihil eum per-

turbat, neque auditus neque visus, neque dolor neque voluptas: sed quam maxime seipsum in se recipiens, deserit corpus, neque quicquam, quoad fieri potest, cum illo communicans neque attingens, ipsum, quod vere est, affectat. Sim. Est ita. So. Nonne et in hoc philosophi animus maxime contemnit corpus, ab eoque aufugit, quæritque secundum seipsum vivere? Sim. Apparet. So. Quid vero hæc, o Simmia? Dicimusne justum ipsum esse aliquid an nihil? Sim. Aliquid per Jovem. So. Rursus ipsum pulchrum ipsumque bonum aliquid esse? Sim. Quidni? So. Num aliquando horum aliquid oculis percepisti? Sim. Nunquam. So. An alio quodam sensu corporis attigisti? loquor autem de omnibus, veluti de ipsa magnitudine, de sanitate, de robore ipso, ac summatim de ceterorum omnium essentia, id est, quod unumquodque sit: nunquid per corpus quod in his verissimum est perspicitur? an ita se res habet. quicunque nostrum maxime et sincerissime cogitare mente se comparat ipsum, quod aggreditur cogitandum, hic proxime ad cognitionem ipsius accedit? Sim. Prorsus. So. Nonne igitur ille purissime faceret, quicunque ipsa mentis excogitatione quam maxime se ad unumquodque conferret, neque visum in excogitando adhibens neque sensum prorsus ullum ratiocinationi conjungens: sed ipsa secundum se ipsam mentis excogitatione sincera utens, ipsum per se quodlibet sincerum existens studeret venari, ab oculis, ab auribus et, ut summatim dicam, a toto corpore liber, utpote perturbante animum, neque permittente veritatem sapientiamque assequi, si quando in communionem recipiatur? An non hic erit, o Simmia, si quis unquam alius, ipsius, quod vere est, compos. Sim. Mirifice vera loqueris, Socrates.

(11.) So. Nonne igitur ex his omnibus necessario sequitur, opinionem ejusmodi legitimis philosophis usque adeo constare debere, ut ad se invicem ita loquantur? Necessaria jam ratione concluditur, nos quadam rationis ipsius via ad id considerandum perduci, videlicet donec corpus habemus, animusque noster tanto malo erit admixtus, nunquam nos id, quod desideramus, verum ad votum consecuturos. Impedimenta enim pæne innumerabilia corpus præbet propter necessariam ejus alimoniam. præterea morbi nobis hinc incidentes investigationem veritatis impediunt: amoribus, cupiditatibus, timoribus, multiplicibusque imaginibus, multis denique nugis nos implet, ut verissime dicatur nihil pensi unquam ac veri nobis afferre. Nam ad bella, ad seditiones, ad pugnas nihil aliud quam corpus multiplex, ejusque cupiditates impelli. Omnia enim pecuniarum gratia fiunt. Pecunias autem quærere cogimur corporis gratia, usui ejus inservientes, atque ita fit, ut propter hæc omnia a philosophiæ studiis abstrahamur. Extremum vero omnium est, quod si quid ab ipso otii nobis contingat, nosque ad considerandum aliquid conferamus, investigantibus nobis rursus ubique sese opponens, tumultu quodam perturbat animum, et quasi percutiens reddit attonitum, adeo ut hoc obstaculo impediti verum perspicere nequeamus. Ceterum nobis revera demonstratum est, si quando optamus pure aliquid intelligere, recedere a corpore oportere atque ipso animo res ipsas considerare. atque tunc, ut apparet, com-

potes evademus ejus, quod affectamus, cujusve amatores profitemur nos esse, scilicet sapientiæ, cum videlicet mortui fuerimus, quemadmodum significat ratio: dum autem vivemus, nequaquam. nempe si nihil cum corpore pure discerni potest, e duobus alterum: aut nullo modo possumus scientiam consequi aut post mortem. Tunc enim animus ipse per seipsum erit seorsum a corpore; prius vero nequaquam. Atque dum vivimus, ita; ut videtur, proxime ad scientiam accedemus si quam minimum cum corpore commercium habuerimus, neque quicquam cum illo communicaverimus, nisi quantum summa cogat necessitas; neque hujus natura replebimur, sed ab ejus contagione cavebimus, quoad deus ipse nos solvat. Atque ita puri et a corporis insania liberati, ut consentaneum est, cum talibus erimus, cognoscemusque per nos ipsos sincerum quodlibet, id est, forsitan ipsum verum. nam impuro quidem purum attingere nefas est. Talia equidem, o Simmia, judico necessarium esse omnes discendi cupidos loqui invicem atque opinari. an non ita tibi videtur? Sim. Et maxime quidem omnium, o Socrates.

(12.) So. Si hæc igitur vera sunt, o amice, magna spes est eunti illuc, quo nunc ego proficiscor, sicubi, et ibi sufficienter ejus rei se compotem fieri, cujus gratia tantum nos negotium in superiori vita suscepimus. Hanc ergo migrationem, in præsentia mihi injunctam, bona cum spe suscipio: similiterque quivis alius, qui modo putavit præparatam sibi mentem tanquam purificatam. Sim. Ita prorsus. So. Purificatio vero nonne in hoc consistit, quod jamdudum dicebamus, videlicet ut, quam maxime possumus, sejungamus a corpore animum, eumque assuefaciamus per se undique a corporis contagione sevocari et colligi, itaque (quoad ejus fieri potest) habitare; idque, et in præsenti tempore et in futuro, a corpore tanquam a vinculis resolutum? Sim. Maxime quidem. So. Nonne igitur hæc mors appellatur, solutio animæ et separatio a corpore? Sim. Prorsus. So. Solvere vero ipsum, quemadmodum confitemur, omni tempore maxime ac soli student, qui recte et philosophantur, atque hæc ipsa philosophorum meditatio est, animum a corpore solvere atque separare. nonne ita? Sim. Ita videtur. So. Quamobrem, ut in principio dicebam, ridiculum foret, si vir, qui se in vita sic comparavit, ut quam proxime ad mortem accederet, ea deinde adveniente perturbaretur. nonne ridiculum? Sim. Quidni? So. Revera igitur, o Simmia, recte philosophantes mortem commentantur, atque ab ea minime omnium perterrentur. Ita vero considera. Cum enim corpus quidem ubique aspernentur, animum vero ipsum cupiant secundum seipsum habere; nonne summa esset absurditas, si tunc, quando id evenit, expavescant molesteque ferant; neque libenter illuc proficiscantur, quo cum pervenerint, spes est eo quidem, quod amabant in vita, potiri (amabant autem sapientiam); eo autem, cujus commercium moleste ferebant, liberari? An vero amatis et mulieribus et filiis defunctis, multi jam sponte voluerunt ad inferos proficisci, sperantes eos ibi visere cum eisque versari, quos amaverant: sapientiæ autem verus amator, vehementer in hanc ipsam spem adductus, non aliter eam pro dignitate ulla se comparaturum, quam si moriatur, imminentem mortem

ægre feret, ac non libenter hinc illuc emigrabit? Arbitrari quidem, o amice, oportet, si vere philosophus sit, magnopere apud ipsum hanc opinionem valere, ut non alibi puram sapientiam posse assequi speret quam in futura post mortem vita. Si autem hoc ita se habet, nonne, quemadmodum modo dicebam, præter rationem foret omnino, si mortem vir ejusmodi formidaret?

(13.) Sim. Per Jovem, contra rationem. So. Sufficiens ergo conjectura erit, inquit, si quem videris moleste mortem ferre, eum non esse philosophum, sed philosomatum quendam, id est corporis amatorem, atque eundem ferme philocrimatum et philotimum, id est pecuniarum honorumque cupidum: ac talem, ut alterum horum affectet aut utrumque. Sim. Omnino ita est, ut ais. So. Proinde quæ, o Simmia, fortitudo nominatur, an non viris ejusmodi maxime convenit? Sim. Maxime. So. Nonne et temperantia (cujus plerique aiunt officium esse nequaquam prosternere se libidinibus, sed parvi pendere illas, modestiamque servare) his duntaxat convenit, qui corpus despiciunt maxime atque in philosophia vivunt? Sim. Necesse est. So. Si enim considerare velis fortitudinem temperantiamque aliorum, tibi perabsurda videbitur. Sim. Quanam, o Socrates, ratione? So. Scis utique, ceteros omnes mortem unum ex maximis malis existimare. Sim. Et maxime quidem. So. Nonne igitur majorum metu malorum, quicunque inter eos fortes sunt, sustinent mortem, quando sustinent? Sim. Hoc pacto. So. Metuendo igitur atque metu fortes sunt omnes præter philosophos: etsi absurdum est, metu vel timiditate aliquem esse fortem. Sim. Nimium certe. So. Quid autem? qui inter eos moderati dicuntur, nonne simili quodam pacto affecti sunt, intemperantia videlicet quadam temperati? quamquam impossibile id esse dicimus. Verumtamen illis evenit affectio quædam huic similis, in istac eorum fatua temperantia. timentes enim, ne aliis careant voluptatibus, easque appetentes, a ceteris abstinent, ab aliis superati; etsi vocant intemperantiam a voluptatibus superari. verumtamen accidit eis, ut superati a voluptatibus alias superent voluptates. Jam vero id illi simile est, quod modo dicebatur, scilicet quodam modo per intemperantiam fieri temperatos. Sim. Simile quidem. So. Animadvertendum est, o beate Simmia, ne hæc haudquaquam recte sit ad virtutem via, voluptates videlicet voluptatibus, dolores doloribus, et metum metu, et majus minori, tanquam nummos, commutare: sed ille duntaxat rectus sit nummus, cujus gratia hæc omnia oporteat commutari atque venundari, scilicet sapientia sive prudentia: pro qua et cum qua omnia empta ac vendita revera sit et fortitudo et temperantia et justitia, ac summatim vera virtus cum sapientia sive prudentia: et accedentibus et recedentibus voluptatibus et timoribus ceterisque generis ejusdem. Sin autem a sapientia segregata invicem commutantur, adumbratio quædam sit ejusmodi virtus, ac revera servilis, nihil sani verique possidens: virtutis autem veritas in horum omnium purificatione revera consistat: et temperantia et justitia et fortitudo, et sapientia ipsa sit purificatio quædam. Quamobrem hi, qui mysteria nobis constituerunt, minime contemnendi videntur; sed revera jamdiu occulte nos admonere, quicunque non

expiatus neque iniatus migrabit ad inferos, eum jacere in luto: quicunque vero purgatus atque initiatus illuc accesserit, cum diis habitare. aiunt enim, qui mysteria tractant, ministri Bacchi ferentes ferulas narthecophori quidem feruligeri multi sunt, Bacchi vero pauci. Hi vero, ut equidem opinor, non alii sunt, quam qui recte philosophati sunt. quorum quidem in numero esse me, neque inferiorem quidem omni studio pro viribus conatus sum; an vero recte contenderim aliquidve profecerim, cum illuc pervenerimus, certo sciemus, si deus voluerit, paulo post, ut mihi videtur. Hæc igitur mea excusatio est, o Simmia et o Cebes, quam videlicet ob causam, cum vos eosque, qui hic sunt, dominos relinquam, merito non ægre feram neque perturber, spero enim, me et illic non minus, quam hic, bonos dominos amicosque inventurum. Multi vero id minime credunt. Si igitur defensio mea vobis magis quam Atheniensibus judicibus persuasit, bene se res habet.

(14.) Cum hæc Socrates dixisset, suscipiens sermonem Cebes sic inquit, Ceterea quidem, o Socrates, recte dicta videntur: quantum vero ad ipsam animam spectat, valde ambigunt homines, ne anima a corpore separata nusquam sit ulterius, sed ea ipsa die, qua homo mortem obierit, intereat statimque sejuncta a corpore dissolvatur, atque exhalans, quasi ventus aut fumus, dissipetur atque evanescat, neque usquam ulterius omnino sit aliquid. Profecto si esset alicubi collecta in semetipsam, et ab his malis, quæ tu modo narrabas, liberata, multa nimirum bonaque spes esset, o Socrates, vera, quæ dicebas, fore. Ceterum ad id fortasse persuasione fideque non parva opus est, ut credatur, superesse animam post interitum hominis, atque aliquam vim intelligentiamque habere. So. Vera, o Cebes, loqueris. Verum quid agendum censes? an forte de his ipsis confabulandum, utrum ita fore an aliter probabile sit? Ce. Libenter equidem audirem de his rebus, quid sentias. So. Neminem arbitror hæc audientem, nec si comœdus quidem sit, esse dicturum nugari nunc me, ac de quibus minime oporteat verba facere. Si ergo placet oportetque considerare.

(15.) Id hoc pacto consideremus, utrum videlicet apud inferos sint mortuorum animæ, necne. Vetus quidem hic exstat sermo, cujus memores sumus, abire quidem illuc animas defunctorum, rursusque huc reverti fierique ex mortuis. Atqui si hoo verum est, ut ex mortuis iterum viventes fiant, essent animæ illic nostræ. neque enim rursus fierent, si alicubi non essent. Atque hæc sufficiens conjectura est, ita esse, si revera constet, haud aliunde viventes fieri quam ex mortuis. at vero nisi id sit, alia opus erit ratione. Ce. Omnino. So. Neque vero id in hominibus solum, si planius intelligere vis, consideres, sed in animalibus omnibus et plantis atque, ut summatim dicam, in omnibus quæ gignuntur, in his, inquam, omnibus consideremus, nunquid omnia sic fiant, neque aliunde quam ex contrariis contraria, quibuscunque tale aliquid contingit: quemadmodum pulchrum turpi quodammodo contrarium est et justum injusto, aliaque ejusmodi quamplurima videmus. Ergo utrum necessarium sit, cuicunque aliquid est contrarium, nullo modo aliunde id quam ex suo contrario fieri? Veluti quando quid majus

efficitur, necesse est ex eo, quod ante fuerat minus, postea majus evadere. Ce. Ita est. So. Nonne et si minus aliquid fiat, ex eo, quod ante majus erat, postea fiet minus? Ce. Sic omnino. So. Quin etiam ex robustiori debilius, ex tardiori velocius? Ce. Prorsus. So. Quid vero? si quid evadat deterius, nonne ex meliori? et si justius, ex injustiori? Ce. Quidni? So. In omnibus igitur satis id exploratum habemus, omnia ita fieri, contraria videlicet ex contrariis. Ce. Prorsus. So. Quid rursus? Estne medium aliquid inter contraria duo? duæ videlicet inter illa generationes, sive progressiones ab altero quidem in alterum, atque in alterum vicissim ab altero? Sane inter majus atque minus medium obtinent incrementum et decrementum: dicimusque id quidem crescere, illud vero decrescere. Ce. Ita. So. Nonne similiter discerni vicissim atque confundi, frigescere et incalescere, omniaque eodem pacto? et si nomina nobis desunt alicubi, ubique tamen ita necesse est, fieri videlicet omnia ex contrariis invicem, generationemque esse utriusque vicissim in alterum? Ce. Omnino quidem.

(16.) So. Quid vero? ei quod est vivere, estne aliquid contrarium? quemadmodum ei, quod vigilare est, dormire contrarium? Ce. Sic est omnino. So. Quidnam? Ce. Mori. So. An non ex se invicem hæc fiunt? siquidem contraria sunt: cumque duo sint, duæ quoque inter hæc generationes mutuæ sive progressiones? Ce. Nihil prohibet. So. Alteram quidem conjugationem eorum, quæ modo dicebam, ego tibi dicam, tam ipsam quam generationes eorum? tu vero mihi aperies alteram. Dico autem illud quidem dormire, illud autem evigilare; atque ex somno vigiliam fieri et ex vigilia somnum: horumque generationes hanc quidem connivere, illam vero expergisci. satisfeci tibi, necne? Ce. Satisfecisti certe. So. Dic tu mihi quoque similiter de vita atque morte. an non contrarium vivere dicis esse atque mori? Ce. Equidem. So. Et ex se invicem fieri? Ce. Ita. So. Ergo ex vivente quidnam fiet? Ce. Mortuum. So. Quid autem ex mortuo? Ce. Necesse est confiteri vivens. So. Igitur ex mortuis, o Cebes, viventia fiunt atque viventes. Ce. Apparet. So. Sunt igitur apud inferos animæ nostræ? Ce. Videtur. So. Nonne ergo et generationum, quæ circa hæc sunt, altera quidem manifesta est? Mori enim manifestum est: nonne? Ce. Ita prorsus. So. Quidnam igitur faciemus? non reddemus vicissim generationem huic contrariam, sed hac in re duntaxat mancam dicemus naturam esse? an vero necesse est reddere ei, quod mori est, contrariam quandam generationem? Ce. Omnino. So. Quam vero istam? Ce. Reviviscere. So. Nonne igitur, si reviviscentia est, progressio quædam hæc est ex mortuis ad viventes? Ce. Est utique. So. Convenit ergo nobis hac insuper ratione, viventes ex mortuis fieri nihilo minus quam mortuos ex viventibus. quod cum ita sit, sufficientem conjecturam hinc haberi, animas mortuorum necessario alicubi esse, unde iterum revertantur. Ce. Videtur mihi, o Socrates, hoc ex his, quæ concessa sunt, necessario sequi.

(17.) So. Animadverte ergo, o Cebes, haud ab re nos hæc, ut arbitror, concessisse. Nisi enim continue altera vicissim alteris

redderentur, quasi quodam circulo remeantia, sed directa quædam progressio foret, duntaxat ex altero in ejus oppositum, neque rursus reflecterentur in alterum facerentque regressum; omnia tandem, mihi crede, eandem subirent figuram atque affectionem, fierique cessarent. Ce. Quonam id pacto dicis? So. Haudquaquam intellectu difficile est, quod loquor. Perinde enim ac si in somnum caderetur quidem, ab eo vero in vigiliam nunquam resurgeretur, minime te latet, omnia tandem eo deventura, ut Endymion ridicula quædam fabula videatur, neque appareat usquam; cum cetera quoque universa somno similiter opprimantur. Proinde si confunderentur quidem omnia, nunquam vero discernerentur, Anaxagoræ illud repente contingeret, Universa videlicet esse simul. Eadem ratione, o amice Cebes, si, quæcunque vitam acceperint, moriantur, mortua vero cum fuerint, mortua relinquantur neque iterum reviviscant; an non necessarium est omnino, cuncta demum interiisse nihilque vivere? Nam si ex aliis quidem viventia fierent, postea vero perirent, quid obstaret, quo minus in interitum cuncta consumerentur? Ce. Nihil prorsus, o Socrates; sed mihi omnino vera loqui videris. So. Est certe, o Cebes, maxime omnium ita, ut mihi videtur; neque nos hæc ipsa quasi decepti confessi sumus: sed revera reviviscentia est, atque ex mortuis viventes fiunt, mortuorumque supersunt animæ. atque bonis quidem melius est; malis vero pejus.

(18.) Ce. Atqui et secundum illud, o Socrates, quod frequenter usurpare soles, si modo verum est, Disciplinam videlicet nostram nihil esse aliud quam reminiscentiam: et secundum hoc, inquam, necesse est, nos in superiori quodam tempore ea, quorum nunc reminiscimur, didicisse. Id vero fieri non posset, nisi prius anima nostra fuisset alicubi, quam in hanc humanam speciem deveniret. quamobrem et hac ratione immortale quiddam anima videtur esse. Sim. Quales hujus rei demonstrationes habes, o Cebes? Commemora eas nobis. Non enim satis in præsentia memini. Ce. Una quidem ratio est pulcherrima, quod interrogati homines, si quis eos recte interroget, ipsi omnia quemadmodum sunt, respondent. Atqui nunquam id facere possent, nisi inesset ipsis scientia rectaque ratio. Deinde, si quis eos ad geometricas figuras descriptionesque vel simile aliquid converterit, ibi manifeste comperiet, ita id se habere. So. Si hæc, o Simmia, ratio tibi non satisfacit, attende, an sic tibi consideranti idem quod nobis videatur. Diffidis enim, eam, quam disciplinam vocant, reminiscentiam esse posse. Sim. Haud equidem diffido. Veruntamen id expedit mihi discere, de quo sermo est, scilicet reminisci. Ac ferme ex his, quæ Cebes cœpit dicere, jam recordor, et credo. Nihilo minus tamen et a te, o Socrates, qua ratione id modo probare ipse aggrediebaris, perlibenter audirem. So. Hac equidem ratione. confitemur sane quodammodo, si quis alicujus reminiscatur, oportere ipsum prius aliquando id scivisse. Sim. Prorsus. So. Nunquid ergo et hoc confitemur, quotiens scientia hoc modo provenit, reminiscentiam eam esse? dico autem hoc pacto. si quis aliud quiddam viderit vel audiverit vel alio perceperit sensu, neque solum idipsum cognoscat, verum etiam agnos-

cat aliud quiddam, cujus non una eademque, sed alia scientia sit; nonne merito dicemus, hunc ejus rei reminisci, in cujus pervenerit notionem? Sim. Quonam pacto id dicis? So. Hoc. alia quodammodo hominis scientia est, alia lyræ. Sim. Quidni? So. An ignoras hoc amantibus evenire, cum lyram aut vestem aut quid aliud ex his aspiciant, quibus uti eorum puellæ amatæ consueverunt. nam et agnoscunt lyram, et simul mente formam recolunt puellæ, cujus erat lyra. Hoc vero est reminisci. ceu si quis, cum Simmiam viderit, sæpe Cebetis recordetur; et cetera ejusdem generis infinita. Sim. Infinita, per Jovem. So. An non igitur tale quiddam recordatio quædam est? maxime vero, si id nobis in illis contingat rebus, quas longitudine temporis et negligentia oblivioni jam tradiderimus? Sim. Ita certe. So. Quid vero? contingitne, ut, qui equum pictum viderit pictamque lyram, reminiscatur hominis? atque cum pictum aspexerit Simmiam, veniat illi in mentem et Cebes? Sim. Sic utique. So. Nonne evenit etiam, ut, qui Simmiam inspexerit pictum, ipsius quoque Simmiæ recordetur? Sim. Evenit certe.

(19.) So. An non secundum hæc omnia contingit, tum a similibus, tum a dissimilibus reminiscentiam provenire? Sim. Contingit. So. Verum quotiens a similibus quispiam reminiscitur, an non necesse est id insuper intelligere, utrum deficiat hoc secundum similitudinem, necne, ab illo cujus repetita memoria est? Sim. Necesse est. So. Attende sane, nunquid hæc ita se habeant. dicimus aliquid esse æquale? non dico lignum ligno, neque lapidem lapidi, neque aliud ejusmodi quicquam, sed præter hæc omnia aliud quiddam æquale ipsum dicimusne aliquid esse, an nihil? Sim. Dicimus, per Jovem; et quidem mirifice. So. An scimus et ipsum, quod est æquale? Sim. Omnino quidem. So. Undenam scientiam ejus accepimus? an non ex his, quæ modo diximus, videlicet conspicati vel ligna vel saxa vel alia quædam æqualia, ex his illud excogitavimus, quod aliud est quam hæc? an non aliud quiddam apparet? Considera vero et hoc pacto. nonne saxa vel ligna æqualia, dum eadem sunt, alias æqualia, alias inæqualia nobis apparent? Sim. Penitus. So. Quid autem? ipsa æqualia possunt inæqualia tibi videri? vel æqualitas, inæqualitas? Sim. Nunquam, o Socrates. So. Quamobrem non idem sunt hæc æqualia atque ipsum æquale. Sim. Nullo modo idem mihi apparent, o Socrates. So. Veruntamen ab his æqualibus, quæ alia sunt quam ipsum illud æquale, ipsius simul excogitasti scientiam atque percepisti. Sim. Verissima loqueris. So. An non, sive simile ipsum sit sive dissimile? Sim. Omnino. So. Nihil sane refert. quatenus enim aliud conspicatus, ex hac ipsa perspectione aliud intellexeris, sive simile sive dissimile, necesse est hinc reminiscentiam provenire. Sim. Et maxime quidem. So. Quid vero ad id? an sic nos habemus circa ea, quæ sunt in his, quæ modo dicebamus, æqualia, lignis, saxisque et aliis? videnturne ita æqualia hæc esse, ut ipsum, quod est æquale? an deesse potius aliquid, quo minus talia sint, quale est æquale ipsum, an nihil? Sim. Permultum certe deest. So. Nonne confitemur: quando quis aliquid intuens animadvertat, appetere quidem hoc, quod in præsentia videt, esse tale, quale quiddam aliud ex his quæ

postquam vero ab eo discesserit, tunc illam insuper interire? Ce. Recte loqueris, Simmia. Videtur enim quasi dimidium ejus, quod oportet, probatum, ante videlicet, quam nasceremur, nostram animam exstitisse: oportere autem id quoque ostendere, postquam mortui fuerimus, non minus fore quam esset, antequam nasceremur, si modo finem suum demonstratio sit habitura. So. Demonstratum quidem est istud, o Simmia et o Cebes, etiam nunc, si modo velitis, et id, quod modo probatum est, et illud, quod ante concesseramus, videlicet omne vivens ex mortuo fieri, in unum connectere. Si enim est anima prius, et cum in hanc venit vitam fitque homo, necesse est non aliunde eam quam ex mortuis proficisci: cur non necessarium sit, ut etiam post mortem corporis maneat, cum oporteat ipsam ad hanc vitam reverti? Demonstratum igitur et nunc est, quod dicitur.

(24.) Veruntamen videmini tu atque Simmias cupere idem rursus diligentius pertractari: ac forsitan puerorum more formidatis, ne revera corpore egredientem ventus dissolvat atque dispergat, præsertim si ventis vehementius flantibus exeat. Ad hæc Cebes subridens, tanquam nobis id formidantibus, inquit, o Socrates, contra persuadere conare: immo vero non tanquam formidantibus nobis: sed fortasse est inter nos puer aliquis talia metuens: huic ergo annitamur persuadere, ne mortem ceu larvas pertimescat. So. Oportet certe huic mederi carminibus quotidie, quoad sanus efficiatur. Ce. Sed ubinam medicum ejusmodi nanciscemur, o Socrates, cum tu discesseris? So. Ampla est, o Cebes, Græcia, in qua sunt viri præstantes: quam plurimæ sunt barbaræ nationes; per has omnes ejusmodi medicum debetis perquirere, neque pecuniis parcentes neque laboribus. nihil est enim, pro quo commodius omnia quis expendat. Perscrutandum quoque est etiam inter vos ipsos. forte enim non facile invenietis, qui melius quam vos id queat efficere. Ce. Fiet id quidem. sed redeamus jam, si tibi placet, unde digressi sumus. So. Mihi quidem placet. quid enim prohibet? Ce. Recte respondes.

(25.) So. An non tale aliquid a nobis ipsis sciscitari debemus, cuinam et quali conveniat ea passio, per quam dissolvi possit: et cui qualique sit metuendum, ne id patiatur, et secundum quam qualemque ejus partem: deinde considerare, cujusmodi anima sit: demum ex his animæ nostræ gratia vel confidere vel timere. Ce. Vera loqueris. So. Nonne igitur ei, quod componitur jamque compositum est, natura id pati convenit, ut, quatenus est compositum, dissolvatur? si quid vero non sit compositum, huic soli potissimum nulla accidit dissolutio. Ce. Mihi quidem sic apparet. So. An non, quæ semper secundum eadem eodemque modo se habent, hæc maxime esse convenit simplicia? quæ vero alias aliter, nec unquam secundum eadem, hæc esse composita? Ce. Ita equidem opinor. So. Redeamus jam ad illa, ad quæ in superiori disputatione processimus. Ipsa essentia, cujus interrogando respondendoque rationem hoc ipsum, quod est, assignamus, utrum eodem modo et secundum eadem se semper habet? an alias aliter? videlicet et ipsum æquale, ipsum pulchrum, ipsum unumquodque, quod est ens, utrum mu-

tationem aliquando aliquam ipsa recipiunt? an ipsorum unumquodque semper id, quod est uniforme, existens ipsum per seipsum, eodem modo et secundum eadem se habet, neque unquam neque usquam nec ullo pacto mutationem aliquam suscipit? Ce. Necesse est, o Socrates, hæc eodem modo et secundum eadem se semper habere. So. Quid autem dicemus de multis, quæ similiter pulchra dicuntur, scilicet hominibus, equis, vestibus vel aliis quibuscunque talibus, quæ vel pulchra dicuntur vel æqualia, vel etiam de omnibus, quæ illis synonyma sunt? num hæc secundum eadem se semper habent? an potius omnino contra quam illa, videlicet neque ipsa sibimet neque invicem unquam, ut simpliciter loquar, ullo pacto secundum eadem eodemque modo se habent? Ce. Hæc, o Socrates, nunquam eodem modo sunt. So. Et hæc quidem tangi, videri aliisque sensibus attingi possunt. quæ vero semper secundum eadem permanent, sola intelligentiæ ratione percipiuntur; suntque invisibilia, quæ talia sunt, neque cernuntur.

(26.) Ce. Vera omnino loqueris. So. Vis ergo duas rerum species ponamus, alteram visibilium, invisibilium alteram? Ce. Ponamus. So. Et invisibile quidem modo semper eodem esse, visibile vero nunquam eodem? Ce. Hoc quoque ponamus. So. Age jam, aliudne in nobis est, quam hinc quidem corpus, inde vero anima? Ce. Nihil aliud. So. Utrinam speciei corpus esse similius cognatiusque dicimus? Ce. Nemini dubium, quin visibili. So. Quid vero anima? visibilene aliquid est, an contra? Ce. Non hominibus quidem, o Socrates. So. Atqui nos de his duntaxat, quæ ab hominum natura videri vel non videri possunt, loquebamur. an de his, quæ ad aliam naturam spectant, tractabamus? Ce. De his duntaxat, quæ ad humanam. So. Quid ergo de anima dicebamus? nunquid visibilem esse? Ce. Non visibilem. So. Invisibilem ergo? Ce. Ita. So. Anima igitur invisibili speciei similior est quam corpus: corpus vero visibili. Ce. Necessarium id est omnino.

(27.) So. An non et hoc evenire in superioribus dicebamus, ut cum anima ad aliquid considerandum socium sibi corpus assumit, vel per visum vel per auditum vel per alium sensum (hoc enim est per corpus considerare, quia per sensus id agitur) tunc quidem a corpore trahatur ad ea, quæ nunquam eodem modo sunt, atque ipsa aberret perturbeturque, quasi ebria vacillet, utpote quæ talia quædam attigerit. Ce. Prorsus. So. At vero quotiens ipse animus per seipsum excogitat, illuc se confert ad purum, sempiternum, immortale, semper eodem modo se habens: et tanquam ipsius cognatus semper inhæret illi, quotiens ipse redierit in seipsum, eique liceat, cessetque ab errore: et circa illa semper secundum eadem eodem modo se habet, utpote qui talia jam attigerit. atque hæc ejus affectio sapientia sive prudentia nominatur. Ce. Præclare ac vere omnino loqueris, Socrates. So. Utri igitur speciei rursus tibi videtur, ex his quæ et in superioribus et modo dicta sunt, anima esse similior atque cognatior? Ce. Arbitror equidem, o Socrates, quemlibet vel indocilem prorsus et pertinacem et hac discursione concessurum, animam et per totum et per omne similiorem esse ei, quod semper eodem

modo est, quam opposito. So. Quid autem corpus? Ce. Alteri speciei.

(28.) So. Considera rursus hoc pacto. Quamdiu in eodem sunt anima atque corpus, hoc quidem servire atque subesse natura jubet, hanc vero præesse atque dominari. Secundum hæc rursus utrum tibi videtur simile esse divino, utrum mortali? an non putas divinum quidem tale esse natura, ut præsit et ducat; mortale vero, ut subjiciatur ac serviat? Ce. Puto equidem. So. Utri igitur horum est anima similis? Ce. Constat, o Socrates, animam quidem similem esse divino; corpus vero mortali. So. Animadverte jam, o Cebes, num hæc ex omnibus, quæ dicta sunt, consequantur: videlicet ipsi divino, immortali, intelligibili, uniformi, indissolubili, semper eodem modo et secundum eadem seipsum habenti, animam esse simillimam: humano vero, mortali, nec intelligibili, multiformi, dissolubili, nunquam eodem modo sibimet se habenti, simillimum esse corpus. Possumusne, o amice Cebes, hæc præter aliud quicquam afferre, quo minus ita sit? Ce. Non possumus.

(29.) So. Quid ergo? cum hæc ita se habeant, nonne corpori convenit, ut brevi solvatur: animæ vero, ut omnino indissolubilis sit, vel aliquid rei omnino indissolubili propinquum? Ce. Quidni? So. Cernis igitur, postquam mortuus homo fuerit, quod in eo visibile est corpus, et in loco visibili positum, (quod cadaver appellamus, cui convenit, ut dissolvatur, concidat, diffluat,) nihil horum subito pati, sed multum aliquando tempus superesse, si quis corpore perbelle affecto decesserit. Corpus enim servatum et rebus quibusdam ad durationem curatum, quemadmodum in Ægypto faciunt, incredibile quoddam tempus ferme integrum manet. Quin etiam si putrescat, tamen nonnullæ corporis partes, ossa videlicet nervique atque similia, ut ita dicam, immortalia permanent. an non? Ce. Ita. So. Anima vero, quæ invisibile quiddam est, in similem quendam aliumque locum migrans, excellentem, purum, invisibilem, nobis occultum, revera ad bonum sapientemque Deum: quo, si Deus voluerit, paulo post meo quoque animo est migrandum: anima, inquam, talis, talique natura prædita nunquid, cum primum a corpore liberata fuerit, dissipabitur atque interibit, ut multi putant? Permultum abest, o dilecte Cebes atque Simmia. immo multo magis ita se res habet: si quidem pura discesserit, corporeum nil secum trahens: utpote quæ sua cum illo in vita communicaverit, sed fugerit illud semper seque in se collegerit, tanquam semper id meditata. quod quidem nihil est aliud quam recte philosophari mortemque revera facile commentari. an non hæc est meditatio mortis? Ce. Est omnino. So. Anima, inquam, si sic affecta discesserit, nonne ad aliquid sibi simile divinum abit? divinum et immortale et sapiens? quo cum pervenerit, evadit felix, ab errore, dementia, timoribus durisque amoribus ceterisque humanis liberata malis: et quemadmodum de initiatis dici solet, revera reliquum tempus vitam cum diis agit? Itane dicendum est, o Cebes, an aliter?

(30.) Ce. Ita per Jovem. So. Sin autem polluta impuraque a corpore decedat, utpote quæ corpus semper amplexa ipsum duntaxat

coluerit et amaverit, ejusque voluptatibus et libidinibus quasi veneficiis quibusdam delinita fuerit, ut usque adeo capta, ut nihil aliud putet esse verum, nisi quod corporeum sit, quod tangi, quod videri possit, quodve bibat et quod edat, et quo in venereis utatur: quod vero oculis quidem occultum et invisibile sit, verumtamen intelligibile et philosophia comprehendendum, habere odio consueverit formidareque et fugere: sic, inquam, institutam animam putasne ipsam per se sinceram evadere? Ce. Nullo modo. So. Sed infectam involutamque, ut arbitror, contagione corporea, quam consuetudo congressusque cum corpore, propter continuam familiaritatem plurimumque ejus cultum, inseruit quasi jam naturalem? Ce. Ita putamus. So. Ponderosum vero, o amice, id putandum est et grave terrenumque et visibile, quod anima ejusmodi secum trahit: ideoque ab eo graviter et ad visibilem retrahitur locum, metu invisibilis atque occulti: et quemadmodum fertur, circa monumenta sepulchraque revolvitur, circa quæ jam nonnulla apparuerunt animarum umbrosa phantasmata, qualia præferunt simulacra tales animæ, quæ videlicet non puræ decesserunt a corpore, sed visibile aliquid trahentes: quo fit, ut videri possint. Ce. Consentaneum est, o Socrates. So. Consentaneum tamen, o Cebes, non esse has bonorum animas, sed malorum, quæ circa hæc oberrare coguntur, pœnas dantes vitæ improbe actæ. itaque tam diu circumvagantur, quoad, cupiditate naturæ corporeæ comitante, rursus induant corpus.

(31.) Induunt autem, ut decens est, ejusmodi mores, quales in vita exercuerunt. Ce. Quales dicis mores, o Socrates? So. Ejusmodi eos quidem, qui ventri dediti per inertiam atque lasciviam vitam egerunt, neque quicquam pensi pudorisque habuerunt, decens est, asinos similiaque subire. an non putas? Ce. Consentanea loqueris. So. Qui vero injurias, tyrannides, rapinas præ ceteris secuti sunt, in luporum, accipitrum, milvorum genera par est pertransire. num alio has migrare dicendum est? Ce. Ita potissimum. So. Similiter et in ceteris: abeunt enim in ea genera quælibet, quibus in vita mores similes contraxerunt. Ce. Manifestum id quidem. So. Nonne horum felicissimi sunt et in optimum proficiscuntur locum, quicunque popularem civilemque virtutem, quam temperantiam et justitiam nominant, exercuere, absque philosophia quidem atque mente, sed et consuetudine exercitationeque acquisitam? Ce. Quonam pacto hi felicissimi sunt? So. Quoniam decens est, hos in tale quoddam genus iterum civile miteque demigrare, quodam modo apum aut vesparum vel formicarum; atque deinde in idem rursus genus humanum, modestosque ex illis homines fieri. Ce. Ita decet.

(32.) So. In deorum vero genus nulli fas est pervenire præter eos, qui discendi cupiditate flagrantes et philosophati sunt et puri penitus decesserunt. Horum quidem gratia, o amice Simmia atque Cebes, qui recte philosophantur, ab omnibus corporis cupiditatibus abstinent; atque ita perseverant, nec se illis unquam tradunt: neque familiæ jacturam paupertatemque formidant, quemadmodum multi pecuniarum cupidi: neque rursus contemptum atque ignominiam, quemadmodum qui magistratus ambiunt et honores, deinde ab his

abstinent. Ce. Neque enim deceret, o Socrates. So. Non, per Jovem. Quamobrem hi, qui animum suum colunt neque corpori fingendo vivunt, spretis his omnibus, haudquaquam ea gradiuntur via, qua superiores illi, quos narravimus : quia videlicet, quo proficiscantur, ignorent. Ipsi vero, existimantes philosophiæ ejusque solutioni repugnandum non esse, hanc ea sequuntur via, qua eos ipsa ducit.

(33.) Ce. Quonam pacto, o Socrates? So. Dicam equidem. Cognoscunt profecto viri scientiæ cupidi, quemadmodum eorum animam suscipit revera ligatam in corpore atque implicitam, ac per ipsum quasi per carcerem quendam res considerare coactam; cumque per seipsam id non faciat, omni prorsus inscitia involutam: (cognoscunt præterea,) quemadmodum philosophia perspiciens, quam callide corporeum vinculum adstringat animam; quippe cum per ipsam fiat concupiscentiam, per quam devinctus animus adjutor sit ad seipsum devinciendum : cognoscunt, inquam, viri scientiæ cupidi, quemadmodum philosophia eorum animam ita constitutam suscipiens, paulatim instruit solvereque aggreditur, ostendens quam fallax oculorum, quam fallax aurium ceterorumque sensuum sit judicium, suadens ab his discedere, quatenus hærere illis summa non cogat necessitas, seque in se ipsam revocare atque colligere, nec ulli credere, præterquam sibi, quatenus videlicet ipsa per seipsam intelligat quodlibet eorum, quæ sunt, existens per seipsum : quod vero ipsa per alia consideret, existens in aliis aliud, nihil existimare verum : (esse vero ejusmodi quidem sensibile atque visibile :) quod autem ipsa per se consideret, intelligibile atque invisibile. Huic ergo solutioni veri philosophi animus repugnandum non esse judicans, sic a voluptatibus, cupiditatibus, doloribus, timoribus, pro viribus abstinet : judicans, quando quis vehementer delectetur vel metuat vel doleat aut cupiat, haud tantum ab his duntaxat pati malum, quantum quis forsan existimarit, videlicet si propter concupiscentias vel ægrotet quispiam vel pecunias comsumpserit : sed quod malorum omnium maximum, extremum, turpissimum est, perpeti, neque tamen illud animadvertere. Ce. Quidnam hoc est? So. Quod videlicet omnis anima hominis cogitur delectari vel dolere circa aliquid vehementer, simulque putare illud, circa quod hoc maxime patitur, manifestissimum esse atque verissimum, cum longe sit secus. hæc autem maxime sunt, quæ visibilia sunt. nonne? Ce. Omnino. So. An non in hac passione anima quam maxima ligatur a corpore? Ce. Quonam pacto? So. Quoniam omnis voluptas atque dolor, quasi clavum tenens, animam corpori affigit atque connectit, efficitque corpoream adeo, ut jam opinetur ea esse vere, quæ suadeat corpus. nempe ex eo, quod eadem opinetur cum corpore eisdemque oblectetur, cogitur, ut puto, ejusdem moris ejusdemque alimoniæ fieri : ut nunquam possit pura in vitam alteram proficisci, sed semper plena corporis labe egrediatur; ideoque cito cadat rursus in aliud corpus, et quasi sata iterum innascatur, atque propterea a commercio divinæ, puræ, uniformis essentiæ aliena prorsus evadat. Ce. Verissima narras, o Socrates.

(34.) So. Horum igitur gratia, o Cebes, justi scientiæ studiosi

temperantiam fortitudinemque sequuntur; non autem illorum, quorum gratia censet vulgus. an tu putas? Ce. Minime quidem. So, Non certe. sed ita veri philosophi animus cogitaret: nec ullo modo arbitraretur, cum ipsum philosophia solvisset, oportere iterum voluptatibus doloribusque se dedere iterumque vinciri, atque irritum opus facere, quasi telam Penelopes retexentem. immo vero horum tranquillitati studens, sequensque rationem, ac semper in ea permanens, verum et divinum opinionemque supereminens contemplatur; a quo nutritus ita vivendun censet, quam diu vivat; atque sperat se, ubi decesserit, in cognatum atque tale migrantem ab humanis eximi malis. Ex hujusmodi quidem educatione non est, cur metuat, o Simmia et Cebes, ne cum recedat a corpore, distrahatur et dissipetur, omnisque in ventos viva recedat.

(35.) Cum hæc Socrates dixisset, longum factum est silentium. et ipse quidem Socrates, quæ dicta fuerant, secum, ut videbatur, repetebat, idemque plerique nostrum faciebant. Cebes autem et Simmias parumper insuper invicem collocuti sunt. Hos ergo intuitus Socrates, Quidnam vobis, inquit, de his, quæ dicta sunt, videtur? an forte aliquid insuper in his desideratis? multæ enim adhuc dubitationes objectionesque supersunt, si quis sufficienter ea sit tractaturus. Si igitur aliud quiddam inter vos agitatis, nihil dico. sin autem in his, quæ dicta sunt, hæsitatis, ne vereamini loqui atque percurrere, si qua in parte putatis melius dici posse, quin etiam socium me assumite, si mecum id commodius fieri posse existimatis. Sim. Verum equidem, Socrates, tibi fatebor. Jamdudum ambigens uterque nostrum impellit alterum jubetque interrogare propter audiendi cupiditatem. veremur autem, ne id tibi ob præsentem calamitatem rogitando simus molestiores. Hæc Socrates audiens leniter arrisit, dicens, Papæ, o Simmia, quam difficile aliis persuaderem, hanc me fortunam haudquaquam adversam existimare, quando ne vobis quidem id persuadere possum: quippe cum metuatis, ne difficilior mœstiorque sim in præsentia, quam in superiori fuerim vita. Atque, ut apparet, deterior cygnis ad divinandum vobis esse videor. illi quidem, quando se brevi præsentiunt morituros, tunc magis admodum dulciusque canunt, quam antea consueverint, congratulantes, quod ad Deum sint, cujus erant famuli, jam migraturi. Homines vero, cum ipsi mortem expavescant, cygnos quoque falso criminantur, quod lugentes mortem ob dolorem cantum emittant: profecto haud animadvertunt nullam esse avem, quæ cantet, quando esuriat aut rigeat aut quovis alio afficiatur incommodo: non ipsa philomela nec hirundo, nec epops, quas ferunt per querimoniam cantare lugentes. At mihi neque hæ aves præ dolore videntur canere, neque cygni. sed quia Phœbo sacri sunt, ut, arbitror, divinatione præditi præsagiunt alterius vitæ bona: ideoque cantant alacrius gestiuntque ea die quam superiori tempore. Atque et ego arbitror me cygnorum esse conservum eidemque Deo sacrum; neque deterius vaticinium ab eodem domino habere quam illos; neque ignavius e vita decedere. Quapropter licet vobis hujus gratia dicere et interrogare quicquid libet, quoad Atheniensium undecimviri sinunt. Sim. Præclare loqueris. itaque et ego tibi ape-

pore interjecto deliberandi habeamus facultatem: deinde, his auditis, vel his concedendum, si consentanea vero videantur afferre: sin vero minus, rationem superiorem defendendam esse atque retinendam. Quamobrem dic age, o Cebes, quidnam potissimum te turbet, quo minus assentiaris. Cb. Mihi quidem videtur eodem revolvi eidemque quod in superioribus diximus, crimini obnoxia esse. Quod enim fuerit anima nostra, prius quam in humanam descenderet speciem, haud equidem retracto, quin bellissime dictum fuerit; ac nisi dictu esset invidiosum, sufficienter demonstratum asseverarem. Attamen nobis mortuis superesse, non sic assentior. Neque tamen Simmiæ concedo objicienti, non esse animam validiorem corpore atque diuturniorem. videtur profecto mihi his omnibus anima præstare quam plurimum. Hic ergo ratio superior (ad me conversa) sic inquiet: Quidnam ulterius ambigis? cum videas homine defuncto, quod in eo imbecillius fuerat superesse; cur non concedis oportere etiam, quod validius diuturniusque erat, hoc ipso in tempore superesse? Sed adverte jam, quanti momenti sit, quod ad id respondeo. similitudine mihi quoque opus est, quemadmodum Simmiæ. Profecto mihi perinde hæc dici videntur, ac si quis de homine textore sene defuncto diceret, nondum interisse illum, sed forte alicubi superesse, conjecturamque afferret vestis, qua ipse, cum texuisset, usus fuerit; assereretque eum adhuc esse incolumem neque interiisse: ac si quis id non credat, interrogaret ab eo, utrum diuturnius sit hominis genus an vestis, qua quotidie quis utatur. quod si respondeat genus humanum diuturnius esse, tunc demonstratum id esse putaret, videlicet multo propterea magis sospitem esse hominem, quandoquidem, quod in eo erat fragilius, nondum perierit. Hoc autem, o Simmia, ita se habere non arbitror. sed considera tu quoque, quid dicam. profecto quivis intelligeret, inepte illud adduci. Nam hic textor, qui multas contriverit vestes multasque texuerit, multis quidem posterior obiit, ultima vero prior: neque propterea magis sequitur, hominem esse veste viliorem atque debiliorem. Eandem fieri similitudinem animæ ad corpus posse arbitror: ac si quis de his duobus eadem illa adducat, congrue dicere videretur: videlicet animam quidem esse diuturniorem, corpus vero debilius minusque diuturnum: verum diceret, quemlibet animorum plura consumere corpora, præsertim si multos vivant annos. Si enim fluat corpus homineque etiam vivente dissolvatur, anima vero, quod consumitur, retexat continue; necessarium tamen erit, quando perierit anima, tunc ultimam habere vestem, eaque sola priorem perire. Cum vero perierit anima, tunc demum imbecillitatem naturæ suæ corpus ostendere, cito putrescens atque evanescens: ut hac ratione nondum confidere valeamus, tunc etiam cum decesserimus, animam nostram superfore. Nam si quis dicenti etiam plura, quam quæ tu dicis, concesserit, nec solum ante ortum nostrum animam exstitisse, verum etiam nihil prohibere, etiam post obitum quorundam remanere; sæpiusque accedere ac decedere fateatur: (adeo enim naturam animæ validam esse, ut sæpius corpori indita se corpusque servet:) his tamen concessis, nondum illud tibi daret, non defatigari in multis generationibus animam; sed

tandem aliqua ex pluribus morte diceret omnino deleri. quin etiam adderet, neminem mortem illam dissolutionemque corporis, quæ animæ quoque iteritum infert, posse discernere: esse enim impossibile, ut quisquam nostrum id sentiat. Quod quidem si ita se habeat, nemo non stulte in morte confidit, nisi demonstrare possit animam omnino immortalem atque indissolubilem esse. alioquin consentaneum est necessarium esse, ut, qui moriturus est, animæ metuat suæ, semperque sit sollicitus, ne in ea, quæ proxime imminet, corporis disjunctione prorsus intereat.

(38.) Omnes igitur, cum hæc audivissemus, conturbati sumus, ut postea invicem aperuimus, quod cum superiori disputatione nobis fuisset magnopere persuasum, viderentur nos ab eo statu in præsentia deturbasse, atque eo jam dejecisse, ut nedum rationibus jum adductis, sed et dicendis insuper fidem ullam adhiberemus; verentes, ne vel nos nequaquam boni essemus judices, vel res ipsæ fide essent indignæ. Ech. Veniam equidem per Deos do vobis, o Phædon. nam mihi quidem, modo te audienti, tale quiddam veniebat in mentem: Cuinam ulterius rationi credemus? quippe cum ratio illa Socratis, usque adeo paulo ante probabilis, jam fidem amiserit. mirum est enim, quantum apud me contra possit ratio illa semperque potuerit, quæ animam nostram harmoniam quandam esse probat: et nunc quidem audita me subito in memoriam revocavit, quantum mihi quoque alias persuaserit. Quo efficitur, ut alia quadam ratione iterum, tanquam ab initio, prorsus indigeam, quæ mihi persuadeat animam cum corpore non interire. Dic ergo, per Jovem precor, quo pacto disputationem peregerit Socrates, et utrum ipse quoque, quemadmodum de vobis ipse fateris, graviter id ferre visus fuerit; an contra benigne suam defenderit rationem: præterea utrum satis, necne, eam tutatus fuerit. hæc nobis, quam potes diligentissime, refer omnia. Phæ. Equidem, o Echecrates, sæpe admiratus Socratem, nunquam majori cum voluptate, quam tunc præsens, sum admiratus, meque affuisse ibi mirifice gaudeo. Habuisse quidem illum, quod objectionibus responderet, forte non est mirandum. sed hæc in eo potissimum sum admiratus, primo quidem quam jucunde, benigne, amice adolescentium verba recepit: deinde quam sagaciter sensit nos illorum rationibus fuisse commotos: demum quam opportune nobis adhibuit medicinam, et quasi fugientes atque victos revocavit nos, convertitque ad prosequendum atque considerandum. Ech. Quonam pacto? Phæ. Dicam equidem. Sedebam forte ad dexteram ejus in subsellio quodam humili, juxta lectulum. ipse vero Socrates sedebat longe superior. Attrectans igitur caput meum comprimensque crines super cervicem: (consueverat enim nonnunquam, ubi contigisset, in meos crines ludere) Cras forsitan, inquit, o Phædon, istas pulchras incides comas. Phæ. Sic arbitror, o Socrates. So. Non certe, si mihi assensus fueris. Phæ. Quid ergo? So. Immo hodie et ego meas et tu tuas, si nobis ratio intereat, neque eam ipsi suscitare possimus. Atque si ego tu essem ac me fugeret ratio, more Argivorum jurarem non prius comam nutriturum, quam vicissim Simmiam Cebetemque expugnavissem. Phæ. At vero contra duos ne Hercules quidem

dicitur suffecisse. So. At tu me Iolaum, dum lux est, advoca. Phæ. Advoca equidem, sed non tanquam Hercules Iolaum, immo tanquam Iolaus Herculem. So. Nihil refert.

(39.) In primis vero cavendum, ne id nobis accidat. Phæ. Quidnam? So. Ne rationum evadamus osores, quemadmodum nonnulli hominum osores sunt. nullum enim majus quam hoc malum nobis posset accidere; videlicet si rationes odio habuerimus. Fit autem eodem pacto odium et adversus rationes et adversus homines. Odium quidem contra homines tunc maxime subit, quando alicui nimium credimus absque arte, putamusque ipsum omnino verum et sincerum fidumque virum esse, deinde vero mox pravum infidumque deprehendimus, rursusque alium eodem pacto. Itaque quando quis sæpius offensus ita decipitur, præsertim ab iis, quos præcipue familiarissimos amicissimosque existimabat; odit tandem plurimum universos, putatque nihil omnino apud quenquam esse sincerum. an te latuit, id ita accidere consuevisse? Phæ. Animadverti equidem. So. An non turpiter et absque humanarum rerum arte hic aggreditur hominibus uti? si enim ex arte uti studeret, cogitaret utique rem ipsam ita se, ut habet, habere, videlicet homines vehementer bonos aut malos perpaucos esse, medios vero plurimos. Phæ. Quo id pacto dicis? So. Quemadmodum videlicet in rebus contingit valde aut parvis aut magnis. An tu arbitraris, quicquam esse rarius quam valde magnum aut valde parvum reperire hominem vel canem vel quodvis aliud? atque rursus celerrimum et tardissimum, pulcherrimum, turpissimum, albissimum, nigerrimum? an ignoras in his omnibus extremorum summa rara quidem et pauca esse; media vero frequentia atque multa? Phæ. Sic arbitror. So. Nonne igitur arbitraris, si improbitatis proponeretur certamen, admodum paucos in hoc genere summos inveniri? Phæ. Consentaneum est. So. Consentaneum quidem. verum non hoc pacto similes rationes sunt atque homines: (sed te nunc ducentem prosecutus sum:) immo vero in hoc similitudo consistit, quando videlicet quis absque rationum arte crediderit rationem aliquam esse veram, sed paulo post appareat falsa: quæ quidem aliquando talis est, aliquando minime, et rursus altera similiter atque altera. Præcipue vero illis id evenit, qui plurimum rationes contradictorias agitant. hos enim scis putare, tandem se sapientissimos evasisse, solosque animadvertisse neque in rebus neque in rationibus esse sanum aliquid aut firmum; sed omnia revera tanquam in Euripo sursum deorsumque jactari, nullumque tempus in aliquo permanere. Phæ. Vere nimium loqueris. So. Nonne ægritudo hæc, Phædon, miserabilis esset, si cum ratio aliqua vera firmaque sit comprehendique valeat, postea tamen, auditis hujuscemodi rationibus, quæ modo afferre vera, modo falsa videntur, aliquis hinc in ambiguitatem deductus, non seipsum, neque ejus inertiam ob id accuset, sed tandem velut æger libenter culpam omnem a seipso in ipsas transferat rationes, et in reliqua vita eas odio habeat atque vituperet, rerum jam ipsarum veritate scientiaque privatus. Phæ. Per Jovem miserabilis ægritudo.

(40.) So. In primis igitur diligenter id caveamus, ne persuadeq-

nos nobis nihil in rationibus esse sanum; sed multo magis, nondum esse nos sanos. Itaque totis viribus, ut sani efficiamur, est annitendum: tibi quidem et aliis totius reliquæ vitæ gratia, mihi vero gratia mortis: qui in periculo sum, ne in hoc ipso tempore non ut philosophum me geram, sed ut contentiosum atque pertinacem; quod quidam homines a disciplina alienissimi facere solent. Illi enim, ubi aliqua de re ambigitur, non ut res ipsa, qua de agitur, se habeat curant; sed ut, quæ posuerunt ipsi, præsentibus videantur vera, obnixe contendunt. Atque ego mihi videor in hoc duntaxat in præsentia ab illis differre, quod non, ut præsentibus probem ea, quæ dico, annitar, (nisi quatenus forte contigerit,) sed ut mihi ipsi vera quam maxime videantur. Sic enim cogito, dulcis amice; et vide quanto cum lucro sit ratio mea. Si forte vera sunt, quæ dico, operæ pretium est ita credere: sin autem nihil superest post mortem, attamen hoc ipsum tempus ante obitum præsentibus minus ero molestus minusque deplorabo. Hæc autem ignorantia minime perseverabit mecum, (malum id quidem esset,) sed paulo post delebitur. Sic equidem, o Simmia, paratus, et Cebes, revertor ad disputandum. Vos tamen, si mihi assentiamini, non Socrati cedite, sed veritati; si enim verum vobis loqui videbor, concedite: sin minus, omnino contradicite, diligenter caventes, ne ego dum annitor, meipsum simul vosque decipiam, et velut apes, aculeo in vobis relicto, abeam.

(41.) Sed jam accedendum est. Primum quidem redigite in memoriam mihi, quæ dicebatis, si minus meminisse vobis videbor. Simmias quidem, ut arbitror, diffidit ac metuit, ne anima, quamvis divinior pulchriorque corpore, prius tamen pro harmoniæ natura intereat. Cebes autem mihi visus est concedere diuturniorem esse animam corpore; sed his addidit scire posse neminem, ne cum multa sæpius consumpserit corpora, tandem quandoque postremum relinquens corpus ipsa quoque pereat, atque mors ejusmodi tantum sit interitus animæ; corpus vero dissolvi continue consueverit. An non hæc sunt, o Simmia et Cebes, quæ nos oportet considerare? Sim. et Ce. Confitemur profecto. So. Sed nunquid omnia, quæ dicta in superioribus fuerant, negatis? an quædam negatis, sed conceditis alia? Sim. et Ce. Quædam procul dubio. So. Quid igitur de eo, quod disciplinam diximus reminiscentiam esse; atque si ita se res habeat, necessario consequi, alicubi fuisse animam, priusquam corpore clauderetur? Ce. Mihi quidem istud dum diceres, mirifice placuit: atque nunc, si qua unquam in alia, in hac maxime sententia permaneo. Sim. Similiter ego quoque affectus sum; vehementerque admirarer, si mihi unquam hac de re aliter videretur. So. At vero necesse est, hospes Thebane, aliter tibi videri, si in hac opinione permanseris, harmoniam videlicet esse compositum quiddam; animam vero harmoniam quandam ex his, quæ per corpus intensa sunt, constitutam. Nunquam enim admittes consonantiam compositam prius esse quam illa, ex quibus componi consonantiam oportebat. nunquid admittes? Sim. Nullo, Socrates, modo. So. Animadvertis igitur cogi te id confiteri, quando dicis, animam quidem esse prius quam in humanam spe-

ciem corpusque deveniret, atque esse corporis consonantiam, videlicet ex his, quæ nondum sunt, constitui. Neque enim talis tibi est consonantia, cui tu simile esse dicis. Immo vero prius est ipsa lyra et fides et soni adhuc inconcinni: tandem vero ex omnibus componitur consonantia omnium postrema, primaque disperditur. Hic itaque sermo quonam pacto tuo illi concinet? Sim. Nullo modo. So. At vero sicubi verba concinnitatem servare debent, præcipue decet esse concinna, ubi de concentu tractatur. Sim. Decet nimirum. So. Hic igitur sermo tibi dissonat. sed vide, utrum ex his duobus eligas, disciplinamne reminiscentiam esse, an potius animam esse concentum? Sim. Primum equidem potius eligo. id namque alterum absque demonstratione admisi ex verisimili quadam convenientia; quemadmodum videtur et multis. Ego autem ea verba, quæ per id quod convenit demonstrationes faciunt, semper inania judicavi: ac nisi quis caveat, valde decipiunt, et in geometria et in ceteris omnibus. Ratio vero de reminiscentia atque disciplina fundamento innititur fide digno. Dictum est enim, animam nostram ita esse alicubi, prius etiam quam laberetur in corpus, ut illa ipsius essentia habens ipsius, quod est, cognomentum. Ego vero hanc, ut mihimet persuadeo, sufficienter recteque admisi. propterea neque mihi neque aliis animam appellantibus harmoniam assentiri possum.

(42.) So. Quid vero, Simmia? Videturne tibi vel consonantiæ vel alteri cuiquam compositioni congruere, ut aliter se habeat quam illa ex quibus conflatur? Sim. Nullo modo. So. Neque etiam, ut aliud quicquam, ut arbitror, patiatur aut agat, quam illa vel agant vel patiantur. Sim. Assentior. So. Non igitur convenit, consonantiam ea ducere, ex quibus composita est, sed sequi. Sim. Opinor ita. So. Quare permultum abest, ut harmonia in contrarium moveatur aut sonet, aut quicquam aliud edat partibus suis adversum. Sim. Permultum procul dubio. So. Quid vero consonantia? nonne eatenus pro natura sua consonantia est, quatenus temperatur? Sim. Haud satis intelligo. So. Nonne si magis plusque contemperetur, si modo id admittit, magis plusque consonantia est? sin vero minus atque perpaucum, minus in paucumque similiter? Sim. Omnino. So. Nunquid de anima id dici potest, ut vel in minima quadam re alia anima hoc ipsum, quod est anima, vel magis vel plus aut contra sit quam alia? Sim. Minime. So. Dic, age, per Jovem precor, num animam dicimus aliam quidem habere mentem virtutemque, atque esse bonam; aliam vero dementiam et pravitatem, malamque esse: hæcne, inquam, vere dicuntur? Sim. Vere quidem. So. Eorum ergo, qui animam esse asserunt harmoniam, quis quidnam dicet esse animabus? hæc scilicet, vitium et virtutem? an aliam quandam consonantiam atque dissonantiam? et bonam quidem esse consonantem; et cum ipsa consonantia sit, alteram in se consonantiam possidere: malam vero dissonantem et ipsam esse nec aliam in se habere? Sim. Quid respondeam, non habeo. constat tamen eum, qui animam esse consonantiam posuisset, talia quædam responsurum. So. At vero jam concessum est, nihilo magis aut minus aliam alia animam esse. ejusmodi vero concessio est,

neque magis neque plus neque minus, neque sub paucioribus gradibus aliam alia consonantiam esse. nonne? Sim. Prorsus. So. Eam vero, quæ neque magis neque minus consonantia est, nimirum neque magis neque minus esse contemperatam. Est ita? Sim. Est. So. Quæ vero neque magis neque minus temperata est, potestne pluribus paucioribusve gradibus particeps consonantiæ esse? an potius æque? Sim. Æque potius. So. Quapropter anima, si quidem neque magis neque minus alia quam alia secundum animæ naturam anima est, consequenter neque magis neque minus est temperata. Sim. Est, ut dicis. So. Cum vero sic affecta sit, nihilo magis consonantiæ est vel dissonantiæ particeps. Sim. Nihilo magis. So. Præterea cum ita comparata sit, num plus aliquid pravitatis vel virtutis alia quam alia possidet? si quidem pravitas dissonantia est, virtus vero consonantia. Sim. Certe plus nihil. So. Quinimmo secundum rectam, Simmia, rationem nulla usquam anima pravitate erit affecta, si fuerit consonantia: quando quidem consonantia vera secundum id, quod consonantia est, nunquam fit dissonantiæ particeps. Sim. Nunquam certe. So. Neque igitur anima, quæ omnino sit anima, pravitate inficietur. Sim. Quo enim modo per ea quæ dicta sunt, id fieri posset? So. Hac igitur ratione omnes animalium omnium animæ bonæ similiter erunt, si secundum animæ ipsius naturam similiter animæ sint. Sim. Mihi quidem, Socrates, ita videtur. So. Nunquid recte sic tibi dici videtur, atque hæc sequi, si vera esset illa positio, animam consonantiam esse? Sim. Nullo modo.

(43.) So. Quid vero? ex omnibus, quæ in homine sunt, aliudne præter animum asseris dominari, præcipue prudentem? Sim. Nihil aliud. So. Utrum corporis perturbationibus indulgentem, an potius repugnantem? Dico autem tale quiddam: veluti si sub æstu sitis angat, interea tamen adversatur animus, retrahitque in contrarium, ne bibat: similiterque si premat fames, ne edat: in aliisque quam plurimis animum videmus corporis affectibus repugnantem. nonne? Sim. Et quidem maxime. So. Nonne in superioribus confessi sumus animam, si consonantia fuerit, nunquam dissonaturam his, quibus intenditur vel remittitur vel evibratur, vel quodcunque aliud patiantur illa, ex quibus ipsa conflatur; sed secuturam illam, nunquam vero ducturam? Sim. Confessi sumus. So. Quid vero nunc? nonne contra omnino videtur agere, quatenus ea ducit omnia, ex quibus dixerit aliquis ipsam constitui, atque ferme omnibus per omnem vitam repugnat multisque dominatur modis? interdum rigidius quodam cum supplicio puniens per gymnasticam atque medicinam, interdum vero mitius castigans comminando aut monendo adversus cupiditates et iras atque timores, tanquam altera quædam res contra alteram loquens, quemadmodum Homerus tradit in Odyssea:

> Tum pectus pulsans, cor sic affatur Ulixes,
> Hoc quoque cor perfer, namque et graviora tulisti.

An putas Homerum hæc dixisse, tanquam harmonia quædam sit, ac talis, ut corporis passionibus subjiciatur, non autem ducat atque

dominetur? an potius, quasi quiddam longe divinius quam harmonia sit animus? Sim. Divinius per Jovem mihi videtur significasse. So. Non ergo, vir optime, recte harmoniam esse animam diceremus. sic enim, ut apparet, neque Homero divino poëtæ neque nobis ipsis consentiremus. Sim. Sic est.

(44.) So. Age, harmoniam Thebanam satis, ut videtur, jam placavimus. rationem vero Cadmeam, o Cebes, quonam pacto et qua ratione placabimus? Ce. Tu mihi, Socrates, viam inventurus videris. nempe rationem hanc adversus harmoniam mirifice, præter opinionem nostram, excogitasti. Cum enim audirem Simmiam dubitantem, valde admirabar, si quis rationibus ejus resistere posset. Itaque summæ mihi fuit admirationi, ipsum nec primum quidem potuisse orationis tuæ impetum sustinere. Quapropter non admirarer, si Cadmeus quoque sermo idem pateretur. So. Parcius ista, bone vir; ne qua invidia nobis sequentia interturbet. Sed hæc quidem Deo curæ erunt: nos autem, ut ait Homerus, cominus congressi periculum faciamus, an forte quid dicas. Summa vero eorum, quæ perquiris, est ejusmodi: demonstrandum esse judicas, animam nostram indissolubilem immortalemque esse; ne vir philosophus in morte securus, magnaque cum fiducia sperans, in alia vita longe beatiorem ob philosophiæ studium se futurum, insipiens sit stulteque confidat. Ostendere autem, validum quiddam esse animam atque divinis persimile, priusque etiam quam nos exstitisse, nihil impedimento esse ais, quo minus hæc omnia non immortalitatem quidem significent, sed duntaxat animam corpore diuturniorem esse, multaque ante nos secula fuisse, novisseque et egisse permulta; nihilo tamen magis ob hoc immortalem esse existimandam. immo hunc ipsum in humanum corpus ingressum, quasi morbum quendam, interitus ejus initium esse: adeo, ut et in hac vita sit misera et in corporis morte depereat. Nihil autem differre censes, sive semel tantum sive sæpius labatur in corpus, ut quivis nostrum pertimescat. Merito namque timendum esse, nisi stultus sit, ei, qui neque sciat neque assignare queat immortalitatis animæ rationem. Talia quædam sunt, quæ dicis, o Cebes: egoque ea consulto sæpius repeto, ne quid nos fugiat, sive addere hic quicquam velis sive demere. Ce. Nihil equidem in præsentia habeo, quod aut minuam aut adjungam: atque hæc sunt, quæ dico.

(45.) Tunc Socrates, cum aliquantum se recepisset, ad se conversus, Haud leve quiddam requiris, inquit, o Cebes, sed cujus gratia oporteat generationis corruptionisque causam pertractare. Ego igitur, si vis, ea tibi, quæ mihi evenerunt, enarrabo. deinde si quid eorum, quæ dixero, ad quæstionis tuæ veritatem aperiendam conducere putabis, utere. Ce. Volo equidem. So. Audi igitur jam narrantem. Equidem, o Cebes, cum essem juvenis, mira quadam ejus sapientiæ cupiditate flagrabam, quam naturalem vocant historiam. Præclarissimum enim esse censebam, causas intelligere, per quas singula fiant atque intereant, et qua sint ratione: sæpiusque me sursum deorsumque jactavi, talia quædam primo considerans, nunquid, postquam calidum et frigidum putrefactionem aliquam acceperunt, quemadmodum nonnulli dixerunt, tunc

animalia coalescant. præterea, utrum sanguis sit, quo sapimus, vel aër vel ignis: aut nihil horum sit, sed cerebrum, quod præbeat sensus audiendi, videndi, olfaciendi: ex his autem memoria et opinio fiat: ex memoria vero et opinione quietem accipiente, per hæc scientia oriatur. proinde horum corruptiones considerans, atque eas, quæ circa cœlum terramque passiones contingunt, tandem adeo mihi ad hæc consideranda visus sum hebes, ut nihil magis. Conjecturam vero ad id afferam tibi sufficientem. nempe ob ejusmodi considerationem usque adeo sum occæcatus, ut ea etiam, quæ prius manifeste sciebam, ut mihi aliisque videbatur, dediscerem, et alia videlicet multa, quæ antea me scire putabam, et qua ratione homo crescat. id namque opinabar ante esse cuilibet manifestum, hominem videlicet per cibum potumque augeri. Quando enim per hæc carnes carnibus ossaque ossibus adduntur, eodemque modo in aliis, quando sua cuique adhibentur, tunc sane molem primo parvam, deinde magnam evadere, atque ita parvum hominem effici magnum. Sic ego tunc opinabar. nonne satis belle tibi videor? Cr. Mihi quidem. So. Animadverte hæc insuper. Arbitrabar enim, satis recte mihi videri, quotiens hominem vel equum, magnum parvo propinquum, alterum altero judicarem capite ipso esse majorem. atque multo etiam evidentius decem plura apparebant mihi quam octo propterea, quod denarius duo præter octonarium contineret. præterea bicubitum cubitali majus, quoniam dimidio superaret. Cr. Nunc vero quidnam de his judicas? So. Procul equidem, per Jovem, abesse mihi videor, ut alicujus horum causam intelligere putem, qui nondum mihi ipsi persuadere possum, ut, quando quis uni addat unum, tunc vel illud unum, cui unum adjunctum est, fiat duo: vel et adjunctum et illud, cui adjunctum est, propter alterius ad alterum adjunctionem evadat duo. admiror equidem, si, cum utrumque horum separatum erat, utrumque unum erat, neque erant tunc duo: postquam invicem cohæserunt, hæc ipsa causa fuerit, ut duo fierent, congressio videlicet, per quam propius jam posita sunt. neque etiam, si quis unum dividat, adhuc possum persuaderi, hanc ipsam divisionem causam esse, ut duo evadant. contraria enim tunc atque superius causa fit, qua duo fiant. tunc enim, quia conjungebantur propius invicem, alterumque admovebatur alteri: nunc vero, quoniam removetur alterum ab altero atque separatur. Neque, propter quid unum fiat, adhuc scire me arbitror; neque, ut summatim dicam, aliud quicquam, quare fiat aut pereat aut sit, per hanc ipsam viam me nosse profiteor: sed alium quendam ipse modum frustra misceo; hunc vero nullo modo admitto.

(46.) Verum, cum audissem aliquando ex libro, ut ille aiebat, Anaxagoræ, legentem quendam hanc Anaxagoræ ipsius sententiam, videlicet mentem omnia exornare omniumque causam esse: hoc utique causæ genere magnopere sum delectatus, existimans quodammodo consentaneum, mentem esse omnium causam: putabamque, si id ita esset, ut mens omnia exornaret, singula per hanc ita esse disposita, ut optime disponi potuerant. Propterea, si quis vellet causam invenire, qua singula fiant aut pereant aut sint, hoc

ipsum esse inveniendum, qua videlicet ratione optimum sit unicuique, aut esse aut quodvis aliud pati vel agere. Atque hoc pacto nihil aliud considerandum homini vel de seipso vel de aliis, nisi quod potissimum sit et optimum. Necesse vero est eum, qui id norit, illud quoque, quod est deterius, cognovisse: quippe cum eadem horum scientia sit. Hæc utique mecum ipse reputans, gaudebam, invenisse ratus Anaxagoram magistrum, qui me, id quod tantopere cupiebam, causas rerum doceret; primumque mihi diceret, utrum plana sit terra vel rotunda: et cum hæc dixisset, subjungeret mihi causam atque necessitatem, afferens videlicet idipsum, quod melius est; meliusque fuisse eam esse talem. Proinde si terram diceret in mundo mediam esse, mox exponeret melius exstitisse, ut media esset. Quod si ille hæc ostenderet, ita me comparabam, quasi nullam amplius causarum speciem positurus. Præterea de sole et luna ceterisque stellis, earumque inter se velocitate conversionibusque, et de hujusmodi omnibus me similiter quæsiturum auditurumque comparaveram, quod videlicet et qua ratione hæc melius sit singula vel facere vel pati, quodcunque agant vel patiantur. Neque enim putabam, cum ab initio dixisset mente omnia exornari, ipsum aliam postea causam rebus assignaturum, præterquam quod optimum sit eas ita se, ut habent, habere. Itaque arbitrabar eum in reddendis tum singulorum tum cunctorum communiter causis, singulis quidem assignare, quod unicuique optimum, cunctis vero commune bonum. Neque vero spes ipse meas parvi faciebam, sed summo quodam studio acceptos libros, quam velocissime poteram lectitavi, ut ocissime, quid optimum quidve ejus contrarium esset, cognoscerem.

(47.) Hac igitur mirabili spe ductus, cum legere pergo, video hominem mente quidem nullo modo utentem, nec causam ullam ad ipsum rerum ornatum referentem, sed aëreas naturas et æthereas aqueasque et talia multa incredibilia pro rerum causis assignantem. Qua quidem in re ille mihi perinde visus est agere, ac si quis diceret, Socratem, quæcunque facit, mente facere: deinde volens singulorum, quæ facio, causas explicare, dicat primum quidem nunc me hic propterea sedere, quoniam corpus meum ex ossibus nervisque componitur: et ossa quidem solida sunt et juncturarum intervalla inter se habent: nervi autem sic instituti ut et extendi et contrahi valeant, complectantur ossa cum carnibus atque cute, quæ illa continet. Elatis igitur ossibus in suis conjunctionibus, nervi, qui et intendunt et remittunt commode, faciunt, ut flectendi cujusque membri habeam facultatem, atque hanc ob causam hic inflexus sedeam. Ac rursus disputationis meæ alias quasdam ejusmodi causas assignaret, voces et aërem et auditum aliaque generis ejusdem quam plurima, causas verissimas negligens: videlicet quoniam Atheniensibus melius visum fuerit me condemnare, ideoque mihi etiam melius sit visum hic sedere; justiusque judicarim exspectantem dare pœnas, quas illi jubeant. profecto per Canem, jamdiu, ut arbitror, hi nervi atque hæc ossa apud Megarenses aut Bœotios essent, ipsius, quod optimum est, opinione delata; nisi justius honestiusque censuissem pœnas civitati pendere, quascunque a me exigat, quam

subterfugere atque exsulem vivere. Verum talia quædam causas appellare a ratione est remotissimum. Si quis autem dixerit absque ossibus et nervis atque similibus non posse me, quæ mihi facienda videantur, implere, vere utique dicet. Attamen asserere propter hæc me facere, quæcunque facio, dum ipsa mente ago, non autem ejus quod optimum sit optione, multa magnaque sermonis negligentia esset. Nam qui sic est affectus, nequit discernere, aliam quidem esse veram rei alicujus causam; aliud vero illud, sine quo ipsa causa esse non potest causa. quod quidem multi mihi videntur, quasi in tenebris attrectantes, alieno appellare nomine, dum causam nuncupant. Quapropter nonnulli vertiginem circumponentes terræ, sub cœlo eam stabilem faciunt. alii vero tanquam latum pistoris alveum aëre velut base suffulciunt. Potentiam vero ipsam, qua nunc ita disposita sit, ut optime disponi poterat, neque perquirunt neque dæmonicam quandam habere vim putant: sed Atlantem quendam robustiorem et immortaliorem, magisque omnia continentem invenisse se opinantur. ipsum autem bonum atque decens connectere atque continere revera nihil existimant. Ego igitur libentissime cujusvis essem discipulus, ut quemadmodum se habeat hæc ipsa causa, discerem. Postquam vero hac privatus sum; neque ipse invenire neque ab alio discere potui: secundam navigationem ad causam investigandam molitus sum. Visne, o Cebes, hanc tibi a me demonstrari? Ce. Mirifice cupio.

(48.) So. Censui tandem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cavendum fore, ne mihi idem accideret, quod accidere illis solet, qui in solem deficientem figunt intuitum. orbantur enim nonnunquam visu, nisi in aqua vel in ejusmodi aliquo imaginem ejus aspiciant. Tale quiddam ego reputavi, timuique ne animus mihi prorsus occæcaretur, si oculis res aspicerem sensuque quolibet attingere illas aggrederer. Quapropter operæ pretium esse censui, ut ad rationes confugerem atque in aliis rerum veritatem considerarem. Forte vero nostra hæc similitudo non omni ex parte congruit. non enim prorsus assentior, eum, qui res in rationibus contemplatur, in imaginibus aspicere potius quam qui in operibus intuetur. Verumtamen hac via iter direxi meum, supponensque rationem semper, quam esse judico validissimam, quæcunque huic consonare videantur, pono equidem tanquam vera; idque ago et circa rerum causas et circa reliqua omnia: quæ vero dissonant, vera esse nego. Volo equidem, quæ dico, tibi apertius explanare. puto enim te nondum intelligere. Ce. Per Jovem, haud multum.

(49.) So. Verum novum nihil adduco; sed quæ et sæpe alias et in superiori disputatione dicere nunquam destiti. Pergo jam igitur demonstrare tibi causæ speciem, quam continue pertractavi; ac redeo ad illa jam sæpius decantata, ab eisque exordior, supponens aliquid esse ipsum per se pulchrum et bonum et magnum, et cetera omnia. quæ quidem si tu mihi dederis, eaque esse concesseris, spero tibi ex his ipsam causam demonstrare; itemque invenire, esse animam immortalem. Ce. Quasi vero jam tibi concesserim, nihil tibi opus est præludio, quo minus jam concludas. So. Considera jam, quæ sequuntur deinceps, utrum in his mihi consentias. Arbitror

enim, si quid est aliud pulchrum præter ipsum pulchrum, non ob aliud quippiam esse pulchrum, quam quia pulchri ipsius est particeps. atque omnia dico similiter. nunquid hanc causam recipis? Ce. Recipio equidem. So. Ergo nondum ultra percipio, neque possum ceteras istas præclaras causas cognoscere. Si quis autem mihi dixerit, quare pulchrum sit quodlibet, videlicet quia vel colorem habeat floridum vel figuram vel aliud quodvis talium, cetera equidem valere sino: (in ceteris enim omnibus soleo perturbari:) id vero unum simpliciter atque procul dubio, et forte jam inepte, penes me teneo, nihil aliud esse, quod aliquid faciat pulchrum, quam ipsius pulchri sive præsentiam sive communionem, sive qualicunque ratione et quocunque modo id proveniat. Neque enim id adhuc affirmarem: sed pulchro pulchra omnia esse pulchra, id mihi videtur tutissimum, tam mihi quam aliis respondere: atque huic fundamento innixus, puto nunquam cadere; sed et me et quemvis alium tuto respondere posse, quæcunque pulchra sunt, ipso pulchro fieri pulchra. nonne et ipse consentis? Ce. Consentio equidem. So. Ergo et quæ magna sunt, ipsa magnitudine esse magna: et quæ majora sunt, similiter esse majora: et quæ minora, parvitate esse minora. Ce. Ita est. So. Igitur neque tu quidem assentieris, si quis aliquem dixerit alio quodam capite esse majorem; atque eum, qui minor est, eodem capite esse minorem: sed testificaberis, te quidem nihil aliud esse dicturum, quam omne majus alio non alia re ulla quam magnitudine esse majus; atque ob hoc majus, ob ipsam scilicet magnitudinem: minus autem, nullo similiter alio quam parvitate, et propter hoc esse minus, propter ipsam videlicet parvitatem: metuens, ut puto, ne, si quem dixeris capite majorem esse vel minorem, quispiam tibi sic objiciat: primum quidem eadem re et majus fore majus et minus fore minus: deinde, quod capite, quæ res parva est, majorem affirmes esse majorem. hoc autem dicet monstro esse persimile, ut parvo aliquo magnum quiddam esse dicas. nonne hæc metueres? Tunc Cebes subridens, Equidem, inquit. So. Nonne similiter quoque metueres dicere, decem plura quam octo esse duobus, atque ob hanc causam superare, potius quam multitudine atque propter multitudinem? ac similiter bicubitum cubitali majus esse dimidio, potius quam magnitudine? id enim similiter est metuendum. Ce. Omnino. So. Quid vero, si uni addatur unum, additamentum ipsum esse causam, ut duo fiant, vel si dividatur, divisionem ipsam duorum esse causam, dicere non formidares? altiusque exclamares, nescire te, quonam alio pacto quicquam fiat, nisi participatione quadam essentiæ unicuique propriæ, cujus sit particeps? atque in his nullam aliam habere te causam, cur duo fiant, præter duitatis ipsius participationem: sed oportere hujus participia fore, quæcunque futura sunt duo: et similiter unitatis, quodcunque futurum sit unum? Has vero divisiones adjunctionesque et ceteras ejusmodi argutias valere sineres; relinqueresque sapientioribus te, per eas pro arbitrio responsuris: tu vero tuam, quemadmodum dici solet, metuens umbram et imperitiam, atque innixus tutissimæ illi positioni, sic utique responderes? at vero, si quis eandem positionem complexus instaret, valere si-

neres; neque prius responderes quam, quæ inde manant, considerasses, utrum consonent invicem aut dissonent? Ubi vero illius ipsius rationem oporteret afferre, eodem modo afferres, atque aliam rursus positionem adduceres, quæ superiorum optima videretur, quoad ad aliquid sufficiens pervenires? Nunquam vero simul confunderes contentiosorum more, ubi et de principio et de his, quæ a principio deducuntur, disputas; si modo velles eorum aliquid, quæ vere sunt, invenire? nam illis fortasse nullus hac de re sermo est, nulla cura. Possunt enim præ sapientia et simul omnia commiscere et tamen sibimet placere. Tu vero, si ex philosophorum numero es, quæ dico, ut arbitror, facies. Sim. et Ce. Verissima loqueris. Ech. Per Jovem, o Phædon, merito admodum consenserunt. mirifice enim ille mihi videtur rem ipsam vel hebetissimo cuique explanasse. Phæ. Sic prorsus, o Echecrates, præsentibus omnibus similiter virum fuit. Ech. Quid mirum? cum nobis quoque, qui non interfuimus, nunc similiter audientibus videatur.

(50.) Verum quænam post hæc dicta fuerunt? Phæ. Ut equidem arbitror, postquam hæc illi Socrati concesserunt, concesseruntque, speciem quamlibet aliquid esse, et quæ harum participia sunt, ipsarum denominationem habere; deinceps hunc in modum interrogavit. Si hæc ita se habent, nonne, quando Simmiam dicis Socrate quidem majorem esse, Phædone vero minorem, tunc affirmas in Simmia utrumque esse, et magnitudinem simul et parvitatem? Ce. Equidem. So. Attamen Simmiam confiteris excedere Socratem, non ita revera, ut verba sonant. non enim ita natura institutum esse existimas Simmiam, ut ea ratione superet, qua est Simmias; sed magnitudine, quam habet: neque rursus Socratem, eo quod Socrates est, excedi; sed quia parvitatem præ magnitudine illius habeat. Ce. Vera loqueris. So. Similiter nec a Phædone superari, eo quod Phædon sit Phædon; sed quia Phædon præ Simmiæ parvitate magnitudinem habet. Ce. Ita est. So. Sic itaque Simmias denominationem parvi habet et magni: siquidem in amborum medio positus, alterius quidem parvitatem magnitudine superat, alterius vero magnitudini parvitate cedit. Et simul subridens inquit: Videor equidem affectatius descripsisse. verumtamen est, ut dico. Ce. Sic apparet. So. Dico autem propterea, quia cupio videri vibi, quod et mihi videtur. Opinor enim, non solum magnitudinem ipsam nunquam velle magnam simul parvamque esse; verum etiam neque hanc, quæ in nobis est, magnitudinem unquam recipere parvitatem, neque superari velle: sed e duobus alterum accidere: vel fugere seque subtrahere, quando adventat contraria parvitas; vel cum advenerit, interire: nolle autem exspectare, atque in parvitate recipienda aliud esse quam erat. quemadmodum ego, cum susceperim sustinuerimque parvitatem, quamdiu is ipse sum, qui sum, sic ipsemet sum parvus. Illud autem, magnum quod ipsum est, nunquam sustinuit esse parvum. similiter parvum, quod est in nobis, nunquam vult magnum aut fieri aut esse: neque aliud quicquam contrariorum, quamdiu est id, quod erat, patitur simul contrarium fieri aut esse; sed aut abit aut perit, cum adventat contrarium. Ce. Ita prorsus existimo.

(51.) Phæ. Tunc quidam eorum, qui aderant, hæc audiens, (quis autem ille fuerit, non satis memini,) Dii boni, inquit, nonne in superioribus contrarium eorum, quæ dicuntur, nobis est concessum, videlicet ex minori majus fieri atque ex majori minus; esseque procul dubio generationem contrariorum ex contrariis? nunc autem videmini, fieri id non posse, dicere. Cum vero Socrates, admovens caput, auscultasset, Viriliter, inquit, id recordatus es: non tamen intelligis differentiam inter id, quod modo dictum est, atque illud superius. Tunc enim dicebatur, ex contraria re rem contrariam fieri: nunc vero contrarium ipsum sibimet contrarium fieri nunquam; neque quod in nobis, neque quod in natura contrarium est. tunc quidem, o amice, de his, quæ habent contraria, dicebamus, hæc illorum cognomine appellantes. at nunc de illis ipsis loquimur, quæ his insunt, quorumve præsentia cognomen habent ea, quæ nominantur. Illa vero ipsa dicimus nunquam velle mutuam inter se generationem suscipere. Et simul Cebetem intuitus, inquit: Num te quoque, Cebes, aliquid eorum, quæ nunc objecta sunt, perturbavit? Ce. Haud equidem ita sum affectus: ac tibi affirmo non multum me turbari. So. Id ergo simpliciter confessi sumus, contrarium nunquam sibimet fore contrarium. Ce. Omnino.

(52.) So. Adverte præterea, nunquid et in hoc mecum sentias. vocasne aliquid calorem atque frigus? Ce. Voco equidem. So. Num tanquam nivem atque ignem? Ce. Non, per Jovem. So. An aliud quiddam calorem esse quam ignem, et aliud frigus quam nivem? Ce. Ita. So. Sed hoc quoque tibi videri puto, nivem, quamdiu nix est, nunquam suscepturam esse calorem, quemadmodum in superioribus dicebamus: ac esse nivem, ut erat prius, simulque calidam: sed adventante calore aut subterfugere aut interire. Ce. Penitus. So. Similiter et ignem subintrante frigore aut subterfluere aut extingui; nec unquam posse et suscipere frigus et simul esse ignem, sicut prius erat, et frigidum. Ce. Vera narras. So. Sunt igitur quædam ejusmodi, ut non solum speciem ipsam nomine suo dignentur per omne tempus, sed et aliud quiddam: quod quidem non est primum illud, habet vero, quamdiu est, illius formam. In hoc rursus tibi, quod volo, forte manifestius erit. Impar enim semper oportet nomen id, quod nunc dicimus, possidere. nonne? Ce. Oportet sane. So. Num id solum ex omnibus? hoc enim quæro: an et aliud quiddam, quod quidem est non idipsum impar, attamen hoc oportet una cum suo nomine hoc insuper nomine alio semper appellari; propterea quod ita natura sit institutum, ut nunquam ab impari deseratur? Dico autem, hoc affectum esse ceu ternarium aliaque permulta. Considera vero de ternario. an non tibi videtur, hunc et sui ipsius nomine semper nuncupandum esse et simul nomine imparis? quod quidem impar non idem est, quod est ternarius. Veruntamen ita natura comparatus est et ternarius et quinarius et omnis medietas numeri, ut quamvis non idem sit, quod impar, semper tamen eorum quivis est impar. Præterea duo et quatuor omnisque alter numeri ordo, quamvis idem quod par non sit, simul tamen quilibet illorum par semper existit. concedis, necne? Ce. Quidni? So. Contemplare ergo, quid velim. est au-

Universi, per Jovem, homines, et multo magis ipsi, ut arbitror, dii. So. Cum igitur, quod immortale est, etiam incorruptibile sit, quidnam prohibet animam, si fuerit immortalis, incorruptibilem quoque fore? Ce. Necessario sequitur. So. Imminente igitur homini morte, quod mortale quidem in eo est, interit: quod vero immortale, incorruptum sospesque morti se subtrahit. Ce. Manifestum est. So. Itaque maxime omnium, o Cebes, anima immortalis incorruptibilisque est; eruntque apud manes animæ nostræ. Ce. Nihil equidem, o Socrates, adversus hæc habeo, quo minus rationibus tuis assentiar. Verum si quid aut hic Simmias aut alius quisquam habet, quod dicat, operæ pretium fuerit non siluisse. nescio enim, in quod aliud quis differat tempus, si quid de rebus ejusmodi vel dicere vel audire desideret. Sim. Atqui nec ego habeo quicquam, quo minus superioribus assentiar rationibus. Verumtamen rei ipsius, qua de agitur, magnitudinem et humanam imbecillitatem considerans, cogor intra me dictis nondum acquiescere. So. Quinimmo et hæc bene dicis, o Simmia, et positiones primæ, quamvis fide vobis dignæ videantur, diligentius tamen considerandæ: atque si illas sufficienter, ut arbitror, susceperitis, hanc sequemini rationem, quantum fieri ab homine potest. quod si hoc ipsum fuerit manifestum, nihil ulterius perquiretis. Sim. Vera loqueris.

(57.) So. Hoc autem, o viri, justum est, cogitare, si anima sit immortalis, eam non solum temporis hujus, in quo vivere dicimur, verum etiam universi gratia curatione plurimum indigere. nam grave periculum fore putandum est, si quis neglexerit animam. Si enim mors totius dissolutio esset, nimirum improbi lucrarentur, cum et a corpore et ab eorum pravitate cum anima liberarentur. Nunc autem, cum anima immortalis appareat, nulla superest malorum declinatio, nulla salus, nisi ut optima et prudentissima fiat. Nihil enim aliud, cum migrat ad manes anima, secum transfert præter eruditionem atque educationem. quæ quidem statim in principio transmigrationis illius plurimum vel prodesse vel obesse dicuntur. Ferunt enim, quemlibet hinc illuc emigrantem ab eo dæmone, quod viventem sortitus fuerat, in locum quendam duci, ubi oporteat omnes una collectos judicari, ac deinde ad inferos proficisci eo duce, cui mandatum erat, ut hinc decedentes ad illa loca traducat. sortitos vero illic, quæ oportebat sortiri, tempusque debitum commoratos, ab alio quodam duce rursus huc reduci post multos temporis longosque circuitus. Est autem iter non tale, quale ait Telephus apud Æschylum. ille siquidem simplicem inquit viam ad inferos ferre. Ego vero neque simplicem neque unam esse puto. Alioquin nullis ducibus opus esset: quippe cum unica via aberrare possit nemo. Quinimmo multos tramites multosque anfractus habere. quod quidem ex sacrificiis et ritibus conjectare licet. Animus ergo moderatus et prudens ducem sponte sequitur, neque ignorat præsentia. sed qui cupiditate corporis est infectus, quemadmodum supra dixi, per multum tempus ad ipsum ardenter afficitur: et circa locum visibilem multis reluctatus modis multaque perpessus vix tandem ab eo abducitur dæmone, cui ejus cura erat injuncta. Cum vero ad ea

loca, ubi alii quoque animi sunt, pervenerit, quisquis admodum immundus est et hujusmodi obnoxius crimini, qui vel injustis se contaminaverit cædibus, vel alia his similia similiumque animorum opera perpetraverit; hunc quidem animum omnes fugiunt atque declinant, nec reperitur ullus, qui vel socius vel dux ejus fieri velit. itaque omni auxilio destitutus eo usque pererrat, quoad certa temporum curricula impleantur: quibus tandem impletis in habitationem sibi convenientem ab ipsa necessitate transfertur. Qui vero puram moderatamque transegerit vitam, deos socios ducesque nactus ibi habitat, ubi unicuique convenit.

(58.) Multa vero sunt mirabiliaque terrarum loca: ipsaque terra neque talis neque tanta est, qualem aut quantam hi, qui de terra loquuntur, existimant; quemadmodum mihi a quodam traditum est. Sim. Quanam ratione hæc ais, o Socrates? equidem de terrarum orbe multa audivi: non tamen hæc, quæ tanquam vera accepisse te ais. libenter igitur ex te audirem. So. Atqui, o Simmia, nequaquam mihi videtur ars Glauci, quæ ea sint, narrare: sed, quod vera sint, probare, artis Glauci facultatem mihi videtur excedere. Præterea ego forsan non sufficerem. quin etiam si id scirem, hæc tamen vita mea, o Simmia, longiori huic narrationi nequaquam sufficeret. Formam tamen orbis terræ ejusque loca cujusmodi esse rear, nihil prohibet dicere. Sim. Satis id erit. So. Persuasum quidem mihi est, primo, si est terra in cœli medio rotunda, nihil ei opus esse vel aëre vel alia ulla necessitate ejusmodi, ad hoc, ut nunquam decidat: sed ad eam sustinendam satis id esse, quod et cœlum undique sibi ipsi simillimum est omnino et terra undique æquilibris. Res enim æquilibris in similis alicujus medio posita, nec magis nec minus potest in partem aliquam inclinari: cumque similiter se habeat, ab inclinatione permanet aliena. Primo igitur mihi esse ita est persuasum. Sim. Et recte quidem. So. Præterea ingentem esse terrarum orbem: nosque a Phaside ad Columnas Herculeas habitare in parva quadam ejus particula, ceu formicas atque ranas circa paludes atque mare: esse vero et alios in similibus multisque locis multos habitatores. esse enim passim per terram multas variasque concavitates secundum formas et moles, in quas aqua, nebulæ aërque confluant. Puram vero ipsam terram in puro jacere cœlo, in quo sunt astra, quem plerique eorum, qui hæc tractant, ætherem nominant. Ei quidem subjecta quasi residendo hæc esse, semperque in hiatus terræ confluere. Nos itaque in his concavitatibus habitantes adeo falli, ut in terræ superficie alta nos habitare credamus. perinde ac si quis in medio profundo pelagi habitans putet se altiora maris incolere; atque solem ceteraque astra per mare prospiciens, mare ipsum esse cœlum existimet: quippe cum propter tarditatem imbecillitatemque nunquam ad summum maris evaserit, neque caput undis extulerit, planeque aspexerit, quanto hic locus profundo illo purior pulchriorque sit: quin etiam nec ab alio, qui hunc intuitus sit, acceperit. Hoc igitur idem et nobis accidere, qui in quadam orbis terreni concavitate habitantes altam incolere superficiem arbitremur, atque aërem nominemus cœlum, utpote qui per ipsum, quasi cœlum, astrorum motus intueamur. Idque nobis

accidere propterea, quod propter imbecillitatem tarditatemque ad supremum usque aërem transcendere nequeamus. Quod si quis ad summum evaderet, vel alis fretus eo volaret, hinc prodeuntem inde jam prospecturum; quemadmodum pisces emergentes e mari nostra hæc aspiciunt. Ac si natura ad inspiciendum sufficeret, cogniturum protinus, cœlum illud esse verum veramque lucem, veram quoque terram. siquidem quæ a nobis incolitur terra, hique lapides totusque hic locus adesa sunt atque corrupta; ut ea, quæ in mari sunt, a salsedine. neque nascitur in mari quicquam existimatione dignum; atque ut ita dixerim, nihil est in eo perfectum; sed cavernæ, arena, limus incredibilis atque sordes, ubicunque sit et terra. quæ quidem ad has nostras pulchritudines nullo modo sunt conferenda. Illius vero loci pulchritudo hanc nostram multo magis apparebit excedere. Proinde si fabulam quoque narrare oportet perpulchram, operæ pretium, Simmia, est, audire, quales sint hæ terrarum plagæ, quæ subjacent cœlo. Sim. Immo vero libentissime hanc fabulam audiemus.

(59.) So. Ferunt igitur, o amice, primum quidem talem videri terræ illius faciem, si quis superne despiciat, quales sunt hæ pilæ, quæ ex coriis duodecim contextæ sunt, variis scilicet distinctam coloribus: quorum hi nostri colores, quibus pictores utuntur, similitudinem quandam retinent. Illic vero universam terram ex talibus multoque etiam nitidioribus ac purioribus esse: partim quidem purpuream, mira pulchritudine præditam; partim vero coloris aurei; partim gypso et nive candidiorem: præterea ex coloribus aliis similiter exornatam, ac etiam pluribus pulchrioribusque, quam in nostram notitiam pervenerint. Enimvero has ipsas ipsius concavitates, aqua aëreque repletas, speciem quandam coloris splendidam in primis afferre inter ceterorum colorum varietatem, ut una quædam species ejus varia semper appareat. In hujusmodi vero terra convenienti ratione similes nasci arbores et flores et fructus. præterea montes et lapides ibidem simili ratione habere perfectionem atque perspicuitatem coloresque admodun pulchriores: quorum quidem particulæ quædam sint lapilli, qui apud nos habentur in pretio, Sardia, Jaspides, Smaragdi ceterique ejusmodi. illic vero nihil esse, quod non tale sit aut etiam pulchrius. Cujus quidem rei causa sit, quoniam lapides illi puri sint neque, quemadmodum nostri, a putredine salsugineque attriti atque corrupti; quibus in hunc locum confluentibus lapides et tellus animaliaque et plantæ inficiuntur atque ægrotare coguntur. Terram vero ipsam his omnibus exornari, atque auro etiam et argento ceterisque similibus. præfulgentia quidem hæc ibi nasci et multa et magna, perque omnem terram; ut eam videre spectatorum felicium sit spectaculum. Proinde ibi esse animalia multa et homines, partim regionem mediterraneam incolentes, partim circa aërem, quemadmodum nos circa maris litora, partim etiam insulas quæ haud procul a continenti positæ aëre circumdantur. Sed, ut summatim dicam, quod nobis aqua est et mare ad usum nostrum, idem illic esse aërem: quod vero nobis aër, id illis ætherem esse. Tempora vero apud illos tantam habere temperiem, ut illi et sine morbo continue et longe diutius, quam nostri,

vivant. item visu, auditu, prudentia ceterisque talibus nobis tantum præstare, quantum et aër aquæ et æther aëri puritate præstat. Præterea illic esse deorum templa et lucos, in quibus revera dii familiariter habitent, et responsa et divinationes deorumque sensus familiaritatesque ejusmodi hominibus ad deos esse. Solem quoque et lunam stellasque alias, quales revera sunt, apud eos videri: ceteris in rebus beatitudinem eos his rebus congruam possidere.

(60.) Itaque universam terram sic natura institutam, et quæ circa eam sunt similiter tradunt. Esse præterea in ipsa per ejus concavitates loco in circulum multa, partim quidem profundiora atque ampliora, quam sit regio a nobis culta; partim vero profundiora quidem, sed hiatum angustiorem habentia nostra hac regione. esse et alicubi minus profunda, sed ampliora quam nostra. Hæc autem omnia sub terra sibi invicem obviare, atque irrumpere multis undique modis, tum per angustiora, tum per ampliora; discursusque habere et exitus, quibus magna aquarum copia ex aliis in alia, velut in crateres, confluat. item perpetuorum fluminum sub terra incredibiles magnitudines aquarum, tum calidarum, tum etiam frigidarum: plurimumque ignem et ignis ingentes amnes: multos quoque lutulenti humoris, partim quidem purioris, partim vero sordidioris; ceu torrens luti, qui in Sicilia est, et juxta ipsum amnes lutei inde fluentes. Quibus singula compleri loca, quacunque eos contingit perfluere. Hæc autem omnia sursum deorsumque ferri, veluti suspendiculo quodam sub terram posito, atque ita librato, ut utrinque vicissim inclinet atque attollat. Est autem id suspendiculum ob naturam quandam ejusmodi: unus aliquis ex terræ hiatibus est profecto quam maximus, perque universam terram trajectus et patens. de quo Homerus, *Longe nimis barathrum stat sub tellure profundum.* quod et ipse alibi, et multi poëtarum Tartarum appellarunt. In hoc utique receptaculum omnia confluunt flumina, atque inde rursus effluunt. Talia vero sunt singula, per quales labuntur terras. Quod autem hinc effluant omnia rursusque refluant, hæc est causa, quod hic humor nec fundum habet nec fundamentum. itaque elevatur, et sursum deorsumque redundat. Idemque facit aër et spiritus, qui circa ipsum versatur. Sequitur enim ipsum, et quando ad superiora terræ, et quando ad hæc nostra perlabitur. Et quemadmodum in respirantibus flatus continue exspirat atque respirat, sic et ibi spiritus una cum humore elatus vehementes quosdam ventos et incredibiles commovet, sive influat sive effluat. Quapropter cum aqua in locum inferiorem delabitur, per meatus terræ juxta ejusmodi rivos influit, passimque per eos exundat et implet, velut hi, qui hauriunt. Cum vero illinc huc erumpit, hæc quoque iterum loca complet. Plena vero cum sunt, per rivos terræque meatus exuberat. et cum humores singuli illuc profluxerint, quo quisque profluit opportunius, maria, lacus, flumina, fontes efficiunt. Proinde rursus hinc relabentes per terram, partim quidem per longiores pluresque anfractus, partim vero per pauciores atque breviores rursus in Tartarum confluunt: alii certe multo profundius quam hausti fuerint, alii vero paulo; omnes autem inferius influunt, quam effluxerint: et alii per contrariam partem elabuntur, quam

illapsi fuerint; alii vero per partem eandem. at quidam passim circumfluentes aut semel aut sæpius, spirasque circa orbem terrarum instar anguium replicantes, quantum fieri potest, infra relapsi iterum commiscentur; licet autem utrinque partem ad medium usque defluere, ultra vero nequaquam. ulterior nam prolapsus utrinque foret ascensus.

(61.) Proinde sunt et alia multa, et magna variaque fluenta; sed præcipua quatuor. quorum quidem maximum atque extimum terram circumdans Oceanus appellatur. E contraria vero hujus regione fluit Acheron: qui per deserta alia fluens loca, atque per subterranea in paludem defluit Acherusiam: quo plerique defunctorum deveniunt animi, ibique per fatalia quædam temporum curricula commorati, partim quidem longiora, partim vero breviora, rursus in generationes animalium relabuntur. Tertius vero fluvius horum medius duorum interfluit: nec admodum longe progressus in locum cadit vastum, multo igne flagrantem, efficitque paludem nostro mari majorem, aqua lutoque ferventem. Hinc vero turbidus lutulentusque circumfluit; terraque circumdata, et alibi, et ad extrema paludis Acherusiæ pervenit: nec tamen illius aquæ miscetur; sed sub terra sæpius revolutus absorptusque defluit infra Tartarum. hunc fluvium Pyriphlegethontem nominant: cujus rivi quidam, inde velut evulsi, quacunque terrarum contigerit, manant. E contraria vero hujus regione fluvius quartus primum in locum erumpit ferum et asperum, ut ferunt. colorem vero locus talem habet totus, qualis est cyaneus: quem Stygium nominant. hic autem fluvius prolapsus paludem efficit Stygem. In hunc vero incidens locum, viresque vehementes in aqua assumens, sub terram se condit, circumvolutusque adversus Pyriphlegethontem labitur, et in Acherusia palude e contraria parte illi fit obviam. nec ulli hujus aqua miscetur; sed revolutus in gyrum contra Pyriphlegethontem irrumpit in Tartarum. Poëtæ vero hunc appellant Cocytum.

(62.) Cum vero hæc ita natura disposita sint, quando in eum locum defuncti pervenerint, quo dæmon unumquemque perducit, primo illic judicantur, et qui honeste sancteque, et qui aliter vixerint. Itaque quicunque in vita quodam modo tenuisse medium quoddam comperiuntur, ad Acherontem profecti vehiculis, quæ unicuique adsunt, in paludem perveniunt Acherusiam: ibique habitant, purganturque pœnas dantes injuriarum: et, cum purificati sunt, absolvuntur: rursusque pro merito singuli benefactorum præmia reportant. Qui vero ob scelerum magnitudinem insanabiles esse videntur, qui videlicet sacrilegia multa et magna vel cædes iniquas vel alia horum similia perpetraverint, hos omnes conveniens sors mergit in Tartarum, unde nunquam egrediuntur. Qui autem sanabilia quidem peccata, sed ingentia commiserunt, veluti si qui contra patrem vel matrem irati per vim aliquid fecerint, sed pœnitentia ducti eos in cetera vita coluerint, vel qui simili quodam pacto fuerint homicidæ, eos in Tartarum quidem necesse est cadere: sed ibi per annum commorati a fluctu ejiciuntur, homicidæ quidem per Cocytum, parentum vero violatores per Pyriphlegethontem. Postquam vero ab his delati fluminibus ad paludem Acherusiam perve-

nerunt, clamant illic vocitantque eos, quos vel necaverunt vel injuriis affecerunt; suppliciterque rogant atque deprecantur, ut eos permittant progredi per paludem ibique absolvi: ac si impetraverint, penetrant illuc finemque malorum accipiunt: sin minus queant persuadere, referuntur in Tartarum atque inde rursus in flumina; neque per hæc mala deferri prius cessant, quam ab his, quos affecerunt injuriis, impetraverint. hæc enim pœna illis a judicibus est imposita. Qui autem pie præ ceteris vixisse inveniuntur, hi sunt, qui ex his terrenis locis, tanquam e carcere, soluti atque liberati ad altiora transcendunt, puramque supra terram habitant regionem. Inter hos autem quicunque satis per philosophiam purgati sunt, absque corporibus omnino totum per tempus vivunt, habitationesque his etiam pulchriores nanciscuntur: quarum pulchritudo neque facilis dictu est, neque præsens tempus ad dicendum sufficeret.

(63.) Sed horum, quæ narrata sunt, gratia, o Simmia, omni studio est annitendum, ut in hac vita virtutem et prudentiam sapientiamque consequamur. Præmium namque pulchrum est, et spes est ingens. Hæc igitur eo se pacto prorsus habere, quo ego disposui, non decet virum sanæ mentis asserere: esse tamen vel hæc vel talia quædam circa animos nostros eorumque habitationes, quandoquidem animus ipse immortalis apparet, et decere mihi videtur, et dignum, quasi periclitantes ita existimare. honestum enim periculum est; oportetque hæc quasi carmina quædam magorum ritu mentibus nostris infundere. quamobrem ipse jam diu protraho fabulam. Sed horum gratia bonam spem de animo suo habere debet, quicunque voluptatibus ornamentisque corporis neglectis, tanquam alienis ad diversumque declinantibus voluptates, quæ in discendo percipiuntur, studiose sectatus fuerit, animumque non alieno, sed suo decoraverit ornamento, temperantia, justitia, fortitudine, libertate, veritate; sic ex hac vita migrationem exspectans, tanquam, cum fatum vocaverit, migraturus. Vos quidem, o Simmia et Cebes aliique præsentes, in posterum quodam in tempore singuli transmigrabitis. me vero nunc, ut tragicus aliquis diceret, jam vocat fatum. ac ferme tempus est, ut ad lavandum divertam. præstat enim, ut puto, post lavacrum venenum bibere, ne in lavando cadavere molestiam mulieribus præbeamus.

(64.) Cum hæc dixisset Socrates, Crito sic inquit: Dic age, o Socrates, quidnam hic aut mihi mandas agendum vel erga filios tuos vel circa cetera? quidve agendo maxime tibi gratum fecerimus? Nihil equidem, inquit, novi præcipio, sed quod semper vobis prædico, videlicet si vestri curam habebitis, et mihi et vobis ipsis grata evadent, quæcunque feceritis, etiamsi nunc verbis non concedatis. at vero si vos ipsos neglexeritis, nolentes secundum ea, quæ nunc et superiori tempore dicta sunt, quasi per vestigia vitam dirigere, nihil prorsus perficietis, etsi multa nobis nunc disputantibus concedatis. Ista quidem, ait Crito, curæ nobis erunt. sed quemadmodum sepeliri te jubes? Utcunque, inquit, libet: si tamen me apprehendetis, ac nisi ego vos effugero. Et simul subridens, et ad nos conversus, Non persuadeo, inquit, Critoni, me esse hunc Socratem, qui nunc disputo et singula dicta dispono. sed opinatur me

illud esse, quod paulo post videbit, cadaver. itaque interrogat, quemadmodum me sepeliat. Quod autem jamdiu plurimis verbis contendo, postquam venenum bibero, haud ulterius apud vos me esse futurum, sed ad beatorum profecturum felicitates, hoc quidem mihi videor frustra Critoni dixisse, consolans vos simul atque meipsum. Fidejubete igitur pro me Critoni contraria quadam fidejussione, quam ipse judicibus fidejussit. Ille enim me judicio sistere; vos autem me non sistere, cum obiero, fidejubete, sed abiturum: ut Crito obitum facilius meum ferat; neve meum corpus vel cremari cernens vel sepeliri, me deploret, quasi dira patientem: neque dicat in funere proponi Socratem aut efferri aut sub terram condi. Certum id habeto, optime Crito, maledictum non solum in hoc ipso delinquere, verum etiam animis nonnihil officere, at enim confidere oportet, atque dicere corpus sepeliri meum, atque ita sepeliri, ut tibi placebit maximeque justum esse censebis. His dictis surrexit, intravitque cubiculum quoddam, quasi lavaturus. Crito autem secutus est. Nos vero exspectare jussit. Exspectabamus ergo, de his, quæ dicta erant, inter nos colloquentes rursusque considerantes. Præterea conquerebamur fortunam nostram: qui tanquam parente orbati reliquum vitæ tempus orphani futuri essemus. Cum Socrates lotus esset, delati sunt ad eum pueri sui: duos enim filios habebat parvulos, unum vero jam grandem. venerunt et mulieres domesticæ. Ad eas Socrates cum in præsentia Critonis verba fecisset, et quæ volebat mandavisset; mulieres quidem et pueros abire jussit, ipse vero ad nos rediit, jam circiter solis occasum; permultum enim tempus intus fuerat commoratus. Cum vero ad nos venisset lotus, consedit. Nec multa post hæc locutus erat, cum venit Undecimvirorum lictor. qui illi adstans, O Socrates, inquit, non arbitror eam in te novitatem me deprehensurum, quam deprehendere in ceteris soleo. illi enim indignantur mihi atque exsecrantur, quando illis denuntio venenum esse bibendum, ita magistratibus compellentibus. te vero cognovi præsertim in hoc tempore generosissimum mansuetissimumque et optimum virum omnium, qui unquam hunc in locum devenerunt: et nunc equidem certo scio te mihi haud infestum fore, sed illis, penes quos rei hujus causam esse cognoscis. Nunc ergo scis, quem tibi nuntium afferam. Vale, atque annitere, quæ necessaria sunt, pro viribus facile ferre. et simul his dictis abibat lacrymans. Socrates autem in eum respiciens, Et tu, inquit, vale, et nos id faciemus. Simulque ad nos conversus, Quam urbanus est homo hic? inquit. neque solum in hoc, sed in superiori etiam tempore me salutabat colloquebaturque nonnunquam, fuitque semper virorum optimus. Et nunc quam ingenue me lacrymat? Sed age, o Crito, illi pareamus, ac si jam tritum est venenum, aliquis huc afferat. si nondum est tritum, conterat ille. At reor equidem, inquit Crito, o Socrates, nondum solem reliquisse montes nec occidisse. Et novi alios, postquam id sibi nuntiatum est, valde sero bibere illud consuevisse, largiter cœnatos atque potos, interdum vero etiam illorum potitos, quorum amore afficiebantur. Quamobrem ne adeo festines; adhuc enim superest tempus. Tunc Socrates, Merito, inquit, o Crito, illi ista faciunt. putant enim hæc

facientes lucrari. Atque ego merito ista non faciam. nihil enim me lucraturum spero, si paulo posterius venenum bibero, nisi ut mihi ipsi sim ridiculus, tanquam vitæ cupidus atque parcus ejus rei servator, cujus nihil jam mihi amplius adest. Sed age jam mihi obtempera, nec aliter facias.

(65.) Crito vero his auditis annuit puero, qui longe non aberat. ille vero egressus, et aliquantum commoratus, rediit, eum, qui venenum daturus erat, secum ducens. attulit autem in calice id attritum. Hunc adspiciens Socrates, Cedo, inquit, bone vir, (tu enim harum rerum peritiam habes,) quid me facere oportet? Nihil, inquid, aliud quam post potionem deambulare, quoad gravari tibi sentias crura; postea vero jacere: atque ita tu facies. Hæc dicens porrexit calicem Socrati. Socrates vero hilariter admodum, o Echecrates, accepit, nihil omnino commotus, neque colore neque vultu mutato: sed quemadmodum consueverat, taurine illum aspiciens, Quid ais, inquit? licetne ex hoc poculo nonnihil spargendo sacrificare? Tantum, inquit, o Socrates, contrivimus, quantum satis fore putavimus. Intelligo, inquit. sed et licet et oportet orare deos, ut felix sit transmigratio nostra. quod equidem obsecro, atque utinam ita fiat! Et simul his dictis admonens facile admodum alacriterque ebibit. Plerique nostrum eousque retinere quodammodo lacrymas potueramus. at postquam et bibentem vidimus et bibisse, ulterius non potuimus; sed me quidem dolor adeo superabat, ut lacrymæ largiter jam mihi profluerent. Quapropter me protegens deplorabam, non illum quidem, sed fortunam meam, qui tali amico orbatus essem. Crito autem etiam prius, cum lacrymas nequiret continere, surrexerat. Sed Apollodorus nec in superiori quidem tempore unquam lacrymare cessaverat: tunc vero præcipue vociferans, seque ipsum afflictans, neminem reliquit præsentium, cujus vicem non deploraret, præter unius Socratis vicem. Ille vero hæc animadvertens, Quidnam, inquit, o viri mirabiles, agitis? atqui ego maxime hanc ob causam mulieres abegeram, ne talia facerent. audiveram enim, in benedictione esse ex hac vita migrandum. Quiescite igitur atque tolerate. Nos vero hæc audientes erubuimus, destitimusque a lacrymis. Sed ipse, cum inter deambulandum crura jam gravari sentiret, jacuit resupinus: sic enim, qui venenum præbuit, jusserat. qui paulo post eum tangens, pedes et crura consideravit; deinde gravius comprimens pedem ejus, quæsivit an sentiret. negavit Socrates. Ille rursus pressit tibias, paulatimque manu ascendens ostendit nobis frigere eas atque rigere. et ipse attigit rursus, aitque, cum ad cor pervenerit, tunc esse decessurum. Jam igitur friguerant ei præcordia, cum detegens (erat enim veste coopertus) dixit, quæ vox illi extrema fuit: O Crito, Æsculapio gallum debemus: quem reddite; neque negligatis. Fiet, inquit Crito, quod jubes. sed vide, nunquid aliud velis. Hæc interroganti nihil ultra respondit, sed paulo post commotus est. Et minister detexit eum: atque ipse lumina fixit. Quod quum Crito, cerneret, ora oculosque composuit.

(66.) Hic finis fuit amici nostri, o Echecrates, viri, nostro quidem judicio, omnium, quos experti sumus, optimi et apprime sapientissimi atque justissimi.

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